05000305/FIN-2013003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Testing of the Diesel Room Ventilation Damper Actuator Back Up Air System |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors, for the failure to have procedures appropriate to the circumstances for an activity that affects quality. Specifically, Operating Surveillance Procedure OP-KW-OSP-TAV-001A (and B), Diesel Generator A [or B] Back Up Air Supply Leak Rate Test, allowed the performer to open safety related (SR) pressure boundary valves and install non-safety related (NSR) test equipment on both back up air bottle sets without declaring the respective Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) inoperable. The licensee initiated a condition report and revised both procedures to prevent both bottle sets from being tested at the same time while maintaining the respective diesel operable. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding, if left uncorrected, had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the licensee concluded that procedures OP-KW-OSP-TAV-001A (and B) allowed unqualified test equipment to be relied upon as the SR pressure boundary for both back up air bottle sets without declaring the respective EDG inoperable. The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012. The licensee evaluated the installed test equipment and hose connections and concluded their pressure rating exceeded that necessary to function as a pressure boundary; therefore, the inspectors answered Yes to Mitigating Systems Screening question number 1, and screened the finding as having very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, Resources, because the licensee did not assure that procedures were adequate to assure nuclear safety. |
| Site: | Kewaunee  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000305/2013003 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Dahbur K Riemer R Krsek K Barclay C Tilton V Myers J Mancuso |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Kewaunee - IR 05000305/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Kewaunee) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Kewaunee)
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