05000298/FIN-2013005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Risk Management Actions for Proposed Maintenance Activities |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness for Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, for the licensees failure to implement required risk management actions during maintenance activities affecting the seismic qualification of the safety-related 4160 Vac Bus F and G when the cabinet doors are opened during under voltage relay testing. The licensee corrected this issue by providing procedural guidance for implementation of the required risk management actions. The licensee entered this deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution as Condition Report CR-CNS-2013-06870. The licensees failure to implement required risk management actions during maintenance activities was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribut
of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the associated objective. Specifically by failing to implement required risk management actions to restore 4160 Vac Bus F and G to their seismically qualified condition, i.e. cabinet doors closed, this thereby affected the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process, dated May 5, 2005, Flowchart 2, Assessment of Risk Management Actions, the inspectors determined the need to calculate a risk deficit to determine the significance of this issue. A senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation, which determined that the incremental core damage probability associated with this finding was less than 1 X 10-6, so the finding has very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and to ensure that personnel follow procedures H.4(b) |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2013005 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Henderson C Steely D Allen D Strickland J Josey J Laughlin S Garchow |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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