05000289/FIN-2010004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Deficient Control of Transient Material in Seismic Class I Buildings |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification 6.8.1 for failure to properly control and store transient material within seismic Class I buildings such that the equipment did not pose a hazard to nuclear safety or safe plant operation. Specifically, an extension ladder and a maintenance tool cart were left unattended and unsecured in close proximity to the spent fuel pool cooling piping within the fuel handling building and near intermediate cooling pump IC-P-1A and intermediate cooling supply valve IC-V-4 in the auxiliary building, respectively. Operators promptly initiated actions to remove the sUbject material. During subsequent plant tours the inspectors identified numerous additional examples of improperly controlled transient material. The licensee promptly corrected the identified individual discrepancies and initiated issue reports (IRs) 1095403 and 1122633 to address this performance deficiency. The transient material posed a potential hazard to safe shutdown and safety related equipment operation during a seismic event. Cooling water supplies to the spent fuel pool, the reactor coolant pump (RCP) thermal barriers, and control rod drive mechanisms (CRDM) were potentially affected. The dominant risk associated with this performance deficiency is the increased likelihood of a loss of coolant accident or forced plant shutdown. This finding is more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone. The issue was also similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, example 4.k which stated the issue was more-than-minor because it involved a credible (seismic) scenario in which the transient materials could affect equipment important to safety. This finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve loss or degradation of equipment specifically designed to mitigate a seismic event, and did not involve total loss of a safety function that contributes to external event-initiated core damage accident sequences. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices component because station personnel did not follow procedures for equipment storage and housekeeping within seismic Class I buildings H.4(b). |
Site: | Three Mile Island ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000289/2010004 Section 1R05 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.05 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Richmond J Brand D Kern R Bellamy J Heinly |
CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Three Mile Island - IR 05000289/2010004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Three Mile Island) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Three Mile Island)
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