05000282/LER-2001-006
| Event date: | 01-11-1111 |
|---|---|
| Report date: | 1-1-1111 |
| 2822001006R00 - NRC Website | |
EVENT DESCRIPTION
During the evening of August 3, 2001 an electrical fault in non-safeguards Bus 12 started a fire. An offsite response from the Red Wing Fire Department was required to assist the plant staff in the control of that fire.
The Security Team on duty that evening responded to the fire and an initial report was made to the NRC via the Emergency Notification System to report that a Suspension of Safeguards had been made due to a security responder being outside of his response timeline for a short period of time. After a careful review of the event and following discussions with Region III, it is our opinion that this event did not constitute a Suspension of Safeguards and should not have been reported as such. The event does still require notification of the NRC as responders outside of their timelines is in itself a reportable event.
A more detailed review of the locations of all Security personnel during the event was completed.
During that review it was determined that an additional responder, who was originally thought to be within his timelines, was outside of his timelines for a period of approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes.
The following is a short timeline of activities associated with the response by Security personnel.
August 3, 2001 (Note that times are approximate) 2040 � Fire starts 2053 Security shift Captain reports to Control Room to assume Shift Emergency Communicator duties 2105 � First fire truck and first ambulance arrived — escorted into the Protected Area by Security personnel, including Security responder A 2112 � Notification of Unusual Event declared by the plant 2128 Security responder B sent out of position to assess an alarm on a perimeter zone 2136 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site to assist (Note that Security supervisors are fully qualified to perform all the duties of a Security responder) 2144 Security responder B returns to his response sector (alarm was reset and tested — Responder B was out of position for approximately 16 minutes) 2146 Security Manager arrives on site 2203 Security Consultant arrives on site 2234 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site 2237 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site 2242 Second fire truck, second ambulance and fire department support vehicle arrive on site 2320 Security responder A returns to sector as fire department vehicles depart the site (Out of sector for approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 15 minutes) 2322 Additional Security supervisor arrives on site 0012 (August 4) NUE terminated
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The fire in Bus 12, with the activation of the Emergency Response Organization and the presence of offsite response vehicles, required use of responders in areas outside of their timelines.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT
This event is reportable per 10CFR 73.71 since Security response personnel were outside of their timelines as set forth in the site's protective strategy.
A review of the events showed that the two responders, identified in the timeline above as A and B, were outside of their timelines for periods of approximately 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />s/15 minutes and 16 minutes, respectively. While they were outside of their timelines, they were still within the plant's protected area, able to respond, and were supported by the fact that staffing levels that night were above the Security Plan minimum requirements. Additionally, during the course of the event 3 fully qualified supervisors arrived on site and would have been able to provide some assistance in a contingency event.
It should also be noted that a fire of this nature is a random and unpredictable event that would not have been exploitable by an adversary.
Effect on Safety System Functional Failure and Other Performance Indicators Effect of the fire in Bus 12 will be discussed in LER 1-01-05.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Immediate Actions Taken The responders were all within their timelines when the offsite response vehicles left the Protected Area.
Actions to be Taken The overall Security response to this event is being evaluated through the Prairie Island corrective action process.
FAILED COMPONENT IDENTIFICATION
None.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None.