05000280/FIN-2014406-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | On Duty Security Officer Confirmed Positive Test for Alcohol |
| Description | The purpose of the investigation was to review the facts and circumstances involving a positive for-cause alcohol test result that revealed that a security officer (SO) was not fit-for-duty, approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> into his armed shift at the Surry Power Station (SPS) on December 7, 2012. Specifically, at approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 7, 2012, co-workers at SPS detected the odor of alcohol on the SOs breath, and immediately reported this observation to site security supervision. At the time, the SO was assigned to security duties in the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). In response, the SO was promptly for-cause tested for alcohol, and test results confirmed a Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) level of 0.139 percent. Because the BAC exceeded Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 26.103 limit of 0.04 percent, SPS declared the test result for alcohol as a confirmed positive test result, and the SO was relieved of duty. Based on the confirmed positive test and the fact that the SO had been on duty approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> at the time of testing, the NRC concluded that the SO was unable to effectively perform his assigned OCA security duties. His deliberate actions caused SPS to be in violation of 10 CFR 73.55(i)(5)(ii). This regulation requires the licensee to provide continuous surveillance, observation, and monitoring of the OCA, as described in its physical security plan, to detect and deter intruders and ensure the integrity of physical barriers, or other components and functions of the onsite physical protection program. In this case, the SOs actions did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public because there was no security event necessitating a security response at SPS, and because of the multi-layered security measures that are required at SPS and at all NRC licensed power reactors. Additionally, SPSs continual behavior observation program and followup responses to this issue were prompt and effective. Your followup response included a review of the SOs work history, termination of the SOs access to the facility, and a flagged entry of the SOs name into the nuclear power industrys Personnel Access Data System (PADS). Based on the above and in light of the deliberate aspects of the SOs actions, the NRC has concluded that this violation of 10 CFR 73.55(i)(5)(ii) should be characterized at Severity Level IV. Because this violation was identified by the licensee and meets the non-cited violation criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, it is being dispositioned as a non-cited, Licensee Identified Violation. For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC Inspection Report Numbers 05000280, 05000281/2014406. |
| Site: | Surry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000280/2014406 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | TEV: Severity level IV |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Sanders C Scott D Furst G Mccoy R Croteau R Zimmerman S Coker T Reis |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 26, FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAMS 10 CFR 73, PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF PLANTS AND MATERIALS |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Surry - IR 05000280/2014406 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Surry) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Surry)
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