A self-revealing
NCV of
Technical Specification 6.4.D was identified for the failure to follow procedure 2-MOP-SW-001, Charging Pumps
Service Water Pumps Removal from and/or Return to Service, Revision 3 . Specifically, the licensee incorrectly implemented procedure steps that directed the tagout of the Unit 2 A train charging pump
service water pump, which resulted in the inoperability of the Unit 1 A train charging pump
service water pump. The issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program (
CAP) as CR 501208. The inspectors determined that the failure to follow procedure 2-MOP-SW-001 was a performance deficiency that was within the licensees ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the closure of the Unit 1 A train charging
service water pump discharge isolation valve resulted in the inoperability of that train and entry into the associated TS LCO. The inspectors screened this finding in accordance with
IMC 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and
IMC 0609, Appendix A,
SDP for Findings At-Power, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green), since it did not cause a loss of operability or functionality of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in human performance, work practices,
H.4(a), because inadequacies were identified associated with the pre-job brief, self-check practices, and proceeding in the face of unexpected circumstances.
