05000280/FIN-2012011-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | The following violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy, for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV). 10 CFR Part 50.48(b)(1) requires that all nuclear power plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, must satisfy the applicable requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Appendix R,Section III.G.2, requires that where redundant trains of equipment necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown are located in the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of three means of protecting cables to ensure that one of the redundant trains is maintained free of fire damage shall be provided. The three acceptable methods described in Appendix R,Section III.G.2 for maintaining one of the redundant trains in the same fire area free of fire damage are based on the use of physical barriers, spatial separation, and fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system. Appendix R,Section III.G.2, does not allow the use of operator manual actions in lieu of protection. Contrary to the above requirements, during walk downs on March 22, 2012, the licensee identified that power and control cables for 1-SW-P-10A and 1-SW-P-10B, redundant trains of charging pump service water pumps, were routed through the turbine building (FA-31) in close proximity to each other and they did not meet the fire protection requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance based on the results of the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Phase 2 quantitative screening evaluation performed by a regional fire protection engineer and a senior reactor analyst. The significance determination process screening evaluation resulted in a delta core damage frequency (ACDF) of < 1E-6. Therefore, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This issue was identified in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR 467396. |
| Site: | Surry  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000280/2012011 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M King M Thomas G Wiseman R Fanner J Dymek |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Surry - IR 05000280/2012011 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Surry) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Surry)
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