05000277/FIN-2011002-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | FH Procedures Were Inadequate to Prevent Fuel from Contacting an Obstruction |
| Description | A Green self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 Procedures was identified, because PBAPS\'s procedures for refueling equipment operation and core alterations were inadequate to prevent a fuel bundle from contacting a core spray inspection (CSl) submarine device while the fuel bundle was being transported from the core to the spent fuel pool (SPF). In particular, system operating (SO) procedure 18.1.A-2, Operation of Refueling Platform, and fuel handling (FH) procedure 6C, Core Component - Core Transfers, did not provide sufficient procedure steps, precautions, or human performance tools to prevent contact while the refueling platform was operated in the automatic mode and when core components were in close proximity to obstructions and interferences. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because the finding was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone\'s objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (i.e., fuel cladding) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Although no fuel damage occurred during this event, the inadequate procedure resulted in a FH event that could have impacted the cladding and affected the cornerstone\'s objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. IMC 0609, SDP, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1-lnitial Screening and Characterization of Findings, was used to evaluate the significance of the finding. Attachment 0609.04, Table 4a, was used to evaluate the impact of the finding on fuel clad integrity. Appendix G was considered for the evaluation, but was not used because it does not directly address fuel clad integrity. Based on the results of fuel sipping done in February 2011, PBAPS concluded that there was no damage to the clad integrity of the impacted fuel bundle that was permanently discharged to the SFP. Since the finding did not affect SFP cooling or inventory and since there was no damage to fuel clad integrity from the impact with the CSI submarine, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in Human Error Prevention Techniques in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area. Specifically, PBAPS FH procedures did not require human error prevention techniques that were commensurate with the risk of moving fuel in close proximity to obstructions and interferences. H.4(a) |
| Site: | Peach Bottom  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000277/2011002 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Schoppy T Fish F Bower A Ziedonis P Krohn C Crisden S Hammann |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |
Finding - Peach Bottom - IR 05000277/2011002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Peach Bottom) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Peach Bottom)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||