05000277/FIN-2010004-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
---|---|
Title | Failure to Ensure Adequate Voltage was Available to Safety-Related Equipment |
Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, in that Exelon did not assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis were correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, Exelon did not use the safety-related Function 4 degraded grid relay trip setpoint specified in the Technical Specifications (TS) as a design input in calculations to ensure adequate voltage was available to all safety-related components required to respond to a design basis loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Instead, Exelon used the results from calculation PE 0121, Voltage Regulation Study, to establish the voltage level for system operability. The study credited the use of non-safety related equipment to raise the voltage level. This allowed higher voltages to be used in the design calculations for components than would be allowed by the TS setpoint. The team verified the licensing basis via Task Interface Agreement (TIA) 2009-07 and informed Exelon that the degraded grid relay setpoint must be used for design basis calculations. Exelon entered the issue into the CAP (IR 1119440), performed operability assessments, and established some compensatory measures to restore PBAPS to an operable but nonconforming condition. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was also similar to example 3j in IMC 0612, Appendix E, in that there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of safety-related components and Exelon was required to perform operability determinations to address potentially inadequate voltage to several safety-related components. The inspectors, including the Region I Senior Reactor Analysts (SRAs), performed a Phase 1 SOP screening, in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a design deficiency that impacted operability but not functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. There was no cross-cutting issue associated with the finding because the degraded grid relay setpoints had been most recently evaluated in 2004 and the issue was not reflective of current performance. |
Site: | Peach Bottom |
---|---|
Report | IR 05000277/2010004 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2010 (2010Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | J D'Antonio K Mangan P Krohn R Nimitz A Ziedonis E Burket E Torres F Bower |
INPO aspect | |
' | |
Finding - Peach Bottom - IR 05000277/2010004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Peach Bottom) @ 2010Q3
Self-Identified List (Peach Bottom)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||