A self-revealing, Green
NCV of
Technical Specification 6.4, Procedures, was identified in which maintenance and planning personnel did not involve engineering personnel as required by Entergy procedure
EN-MA-1 01, Fundamentals of Maintenance, Revision 9, and
EN-WM-105, Planning, Revision 8, resulting in the incorrect material being used to replace the
gasket on the
flange of
High Pressure Coolant Injection System (
HPCI) steam trap
23T-3. Entergy ultimately replaced the
gasket with the correct material and entered this issue into their corrective action program. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the
Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with
IMC 0609, Appendix A, Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations, using
Significance Determination Process (
SOP) Phases 1, 2 and 3. A Region I Senior Reactor Analyst (
SRA) conducted a Phase 3 analysis because the Phase 2 analysis indicated that the finding had the potential to be greater than very low safety significance (Greater than Green). This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Decision Making component. because
Vermont Yankee personnel did not obtain interdisciplinary input on the decision to use a different, incorrect
gasket material in a steam trap in the
HPCI system. [H.1 (a)