05000255/FIN-2013005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Three Examples of Inadequate Control of Entry into High Radiation Areas |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and two associated NCVs of TS 5.7.1 and one associated NCV of TS 5.7.2 when on three separate occasions, three separate workers unknowingly entered areas with greater than expected dose rates. Specifically, on April 10, 2012, the radiation protection (RP) staff inappropriately authorized plant personnel to enter a locked high radiation area in the Auxiliary Building Pipechase (ABP) 602' elevation that had not been appropriately radiologically characterized prior to the entry; and on April 25, 2012, and again on April 27, 2012, workers inside the containment 607' elevation staging equipment at the B steam generator (S/G) manway inappropriately traversed high radiation areas with elevated dose rates near the A S/G cubicle. On both occasions, workers deviated slightly from the briefed travel paths. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as CR-PLP-2012-03229 and CR-PLP-2012-03313, and as part of their corrective actions, shared lessons learned from this issue with the RP staff to address survey adequacy and for enhanced communications with workers during pre-job briefings. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Program and Process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that, worker entry into areas without knowledge of their radiological conditions placed them at increased risk for unnecessary radiation exposure. Additionally, it was similar to the not minor if statement of Example 6.h in IMC 0612, Appendix E. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the problem was not an as-low-as-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) planning issue, there was no overexposure nor substantial potential for an overexposure, and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to define and clearly communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and ensure that personnel followed procedures. |
| Site: | Palisades  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000255/2013005 Section 2RS1 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Or Safety |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71124.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Scarbeary E Duncan E Sanchez Santiago J Cassidy J Laughlin M Holmberg M Phalen N Feliz Adomo T Taylor |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Palisades - IR 05000255/2013005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Palisades) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Palisades)
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