05000247/LER-2005-001, From Indian Point Unit 2 Re Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Exceeding the Allowed Completion Time for One Inoperable Train of ECCS Caused by an Inoperable Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Check Valve
| ML051030250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/2005 |
| From: | Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-05-0272 LER 05-001-00 | |
| Download: ML051030250 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2472005001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
~~En tergy Entergy Nuclear Northeast Indian Point Energy Center 450 Broadway, GSB P0. Box 249 Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 Tel 914 734 6700 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration April 11, 2005 Indian Point Unit No. 2 Docket Nos. 50-247 NL-05-027 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report # 2005-001-00, "Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Exceeding the Allowed Completion Time for One Inoperable Train of ECCS Caused by an Inoperable Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Check Valve"
Dear Sir:
The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2005-001-00 is the follow-up written report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This event is of the type defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) for an event recorded in the Entergy corrective action process as Condition Report CR-IP2-2005-00252.
There are no commitments made by the Licensee in the attached LER. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager, Licensing, Indian Point Energy Center at (914) 734-6668.
Sincerely, Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center
.0.1g1o1
Docket No. 50-247 NL-05-027 Page 2 of 2 Attachment: LER-2005-001-00 cc:
Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator - Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415 Resident Inspector's Office U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Indian Point Unit 2 P.O. Box 59 Buchanan, NY 10511-0059 Mr. Paul Eddy State of New York Public Service Commission 3 Empire Plaza Albany, NY 12223-1350 INPO Record Center 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, Georga 30339-5957
NRC IFORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 1. FACILITY NAME INDIAN POINT 2
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER
- 3. PAGE 05000-247 1 OF 5
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to Exceeding the Allowed Completion Time for One Inoperable Train of ECCS Caused by an Inoperable Auxiliary Component Cooling Water Check Valve
- 5. EVENT DATE'
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 7
FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV.
MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 NO.MNHDY YA FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 1
19 2005 2005-001 -
00 4
11 2005 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 2. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check allthat apply)
El 20.2201(b)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0l 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
El 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
IEl 20.2201 (d)
El 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
El 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
E0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL E 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
E 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) al 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
El 50.73(a)(2)(x)
.l 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
E 50.36(c)(2)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) a 73.71(a)(4) 100%
E 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
E 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
El 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
E 73.71(a)(5)
El 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
El 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
E OTHER E 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
E 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
E 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
Abstract
On January 19, 2005, during a quarterly surveillance test of the 21 Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) Pump, the 22 ACCW Pump discharge check valve (755A) failed to seat resulting in a short cycle flow through the 22 ACCW Pump.
An Engineering review determined on February 9, 2005, that operability of valve 755A could not be positively demonstrated after the valve's maintenance on November 3, 2004.
The last successful performance of the quarterly surveillance test for the 21 ACCW Pump was on October 14, 2004.
The ACCW Pumps provide cooling water flow to the two containment recirculation pump motor coolers for required cooling during the recirculation phase of a design basis accident.
One inoperable ACCW Pump renders one containment recirculation pump train inoperable.
Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 has a completion time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for one or more trains of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) inoperable.
Inoperability of 21 ACCW Pump since November 3, 2004 exceeds the TS Allowed Outage Time.
The cause of the event was interference in the valve hinge bushing/pin interface.
The apparent cause was inadequate maintenance due to either damage during valve reassembly in November 2004, or the relocation of an undetected pre-existing flaw to a more problematic location during reassembly.
Significant corrective actions included valve disassembly, repair, gasket replacement and verification of freedom of movement of the disc.
A review will be performed of applicable maintenance procedures for adding information on checks for clearance problems.
Personnel will be coached on management's expectation on attention to detail.
The event had no effect on public health and safety.
(if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (Ifmore space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Formn 366A) (17)
PAST SIMILAR EVENTS A review of the past two years of Licensee Event Reports (LERs) for events that involved inoperable components that exceeded the TS allowed completion time identified LER 2003-002 which reported a TS prohibited condition on May 20, 2003, due to the unavailability of Boric Acid Storage for greater than the TS allowed outage time. The event was an inability to verify a boric acid flow path to the core when using the 22 boric acid transfer pump aligned to the blender.
The cause was a diaphragm valve that had failed due to incorrect installation when assembling the valve following maintenance. The event is similar in that improper maintenance resulted in an inoperable TS required component whose inoperability exceeded the TS allowed outage time.
The corrective actions for the event reported in LER 2003-002 would not have prevented this event because the valve types and system were different.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.
There were no actual safety consequences for the event because there were no accidents or transients requiring the ACCW or ECCS.
There were no significant potential safety consequences of this event under reasonable and credible alternative conditions.
Had a LOCA occurred during the time the 22 ACCW pump discharge check valve was inoperable, adequate cooling of the containment recirculation pumps motor coolers may not have been available assuming a failure of the 22 ACCW pump.
However, the ECCS function is provided by three separate ECCS systems: High Head Safety Injection (HHSI), Residual Heat Removal (RHR) injection, and Containment Recirculation.
Either of two RHR pumps can also be used to provide backup for recirculation.
The containment recirculation pumps motor coolers are not required in the injection phase and only needed for long term cooling in the recirculation phase.
For this event, the plant retained adequate ECCS component availability to meet minimum safeguards requirements. A risk assessment of the condition was performed assuming the inoperable 22 ACCW pump discharge check valve would have resulted in an inability of 21 ACCW pump to provide adequate flow assuming a failure of 22 ACCW pump since the PM on November 3, 2004 (77 days). The Incremental Core Damage Probability (ICDP) was determined to be 5.6E-8 using the annual average model with a change in core damage frequency (CCDF) of 6.4E-6 per year.
Therefore, risk for this event is considered low.