02-25-2002 | On December 26, 2001 at 0720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> Indian Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor trip with all control rods fully inserting. The trip was initiated by a main turbine trip on auto stop oil.
The auto stop oil turbine trip was caused by a trip of over frequency relays actuated by a disturbance associated with the 345 Kv Bus W93. This disturbance caused generator output breaker 9 to open. The cause of the over frequency relays actuation was failure of the blocking relay [EIIS:FK:68] on Consolidated Edison's 345 Kv feeder Y94. This failure caused the breakers on Y94 to open causing loss of load to the main generator and an over frequency trip. The over frequency trip caused the turbine trip. The turbine trip resulted in the generator trip. The generator trip caused the Indian Point 2 345 Kv generator output breaker 7 to open.
The resultant trip placed the plant in natural circulation with 480-volt buses 2A and 3A de-energized as per design. All three Emergency Diesel Generators ( EDGs) started and buses 2A and 3A were manually energized by 22 EDG, this was an expected response. 480-volt buses 5A and 6A remained energized from off-site sources during this event. No steam generator or pressurizer safety valves lifted and actuation of the Safety Injection System was not required. No radioactive release to the environment occurred as a result of this transient. |
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FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET
) 6)
SEQUENT R REVISI
IAL R ON
U PAGE (3)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
Westinghouse 4-Loop Pressurized Water Reactor
EVENT IDENTIFICATION
Automatic Reactor trip initiated by a main turbine trip on auto oil.
stop
EVENT DATE
December 26, 2001
REFERENCE
Condition Reporting System Number: 200112878
PAST SIMILAR EVENTS
Licensee Event Report Number: 1997-018-00
EVENT DESCRIPTION
On December 26, 2001 at 0720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> Indian Point Unit 2 experienced an automatic reactor trip with all control rods fully inserting. The trip was initiated by a main turbine trip on auto stop oil.
The auto stop oil turbine trip was caused by a trip of over frequency relays actuated by a disturbance associated with the 345 Kv Bus W93. This disturbance caused generator output breaker 9 to open. The cause of the over frequency relays actuation was failure of the blocking relay [EIIS:FK:68] on Consolidated Edison's 345 Kv feeder Y94. This failure caused the breakers on Y94 to open causing loss of load to the main generator and an over frequency trip. The over frequency trip caused the turbine trip. The turbine trip resulted in the generator trip. The generator trip caused the Indian Point 2 345 Kv generator output breaker 7 to open.
The resultant trip placed the plant in natural circulation with 480-volt buses 2A and 3A de-energized as per design. All three Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) started and buses 2A and 3A were manually energized by 22 EDG, this was an expected response. 480-volt buses 5A and 6A remained energized from off-site sources during this event. No steam generator or pressurizer safety valves lifted and actuation of the Safety Injection System was not required. No radioactive release to the environment occurred as a result of this transient.
DOCKET
SEQUENT
REOSI
ON
EVENT ANALYSIS
This event is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) which requires a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip.
EVENT SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
This event was initiated as a result of a grid disturbance on the North 345 Kv ring bus at the Buchanan switchyard. This is an expected plant response due to the actuation of the over-frequency protection circuit.
These relays were added as part of a plant modification after a similar event in July 1997 resulted in a 100% load reject. Since this event is bounded by section 14.1.12 (Loss of all power to the Station Auxiliaries) of the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) the safety significance was determined to be minimal.
FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET
(1 SEQUENT REVISI IAL � ON LER NUMBER6) PAGE (3 )
CORRECTIVE ACTION
The root cause of this event was the failure of a blocking relay on Consolidated Edison's 345 Kv line Y94. Under normal current carrying conditions the blocking relay operated as designed, however under full transient voltage conditions the circuit internal to the relay developed a ground. This caused the breakers on Y94 to open resulting in the over frequency trip of the turbine. The failed blocking relay was replaced prior to plant restart. Consolidated Edison is continuing its investigation into cause of the blocking relay failure.
PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
A similar event occurred July 26, 1997 and is documented in LER 1997- 018-00. A 100% lost of external load occurred due to a Buchanan switchyard fault in coincidence with a line outage. The root cause of the July 26, 1997 event was a mis-operation of a directional relay device associated with transformer TA5. As a result of that event, over-frequency relays were added to the overall unit protection scheme.
The over-frequency relays actuated as per design for the December 26, 2001 event.
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05000263/LER-2001-010 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000529/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000250/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000251/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000255/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000261/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 05000266/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000272/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000277/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | 05000278/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000286/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | 05000287/LER-2001-001 | Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Leakage Due to Stress Corrosion Cracks Found in Nine Control Rod Drive Nozzle Penetrations | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000289/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000298/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000301/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000302/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000306/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000313/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000315/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000316/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000317/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000318/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | 05000324/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000334/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000338/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000339/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000341/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000352/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000353/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000354/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000361/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 05000362/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(Iv)(A) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(Iv)(B) | 05000364/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000368/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000369/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000370/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000440/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000412/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000400/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000413/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000528/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | 05000483/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000397/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000395/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000443/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000388/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | 05000387/LER-2001-001 | | | 05000458/LER-2001-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation |
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