05000245/LER-1982-004, Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl

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Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
ML20042A102
Person / Time
Site: Millstone 
Issue date: 03/12/1982
From: Mroczka E
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO.
To: Haynes R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML20042A103 List:
References
MP-1-2026, NUDOCS 8203230084
Download: ML20042A102 (2)


LER-1982-004, Forwards LER 82-004/03L-0.Detailed Event Analysis Encl
Event date:
Report date:
2451982004R00 - NRC Website

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rr"lT March 12, 1982 MP-1-2026 Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region 1 9'

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Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21 g

Docket No. 50-245

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Reportable Occurrence R0-82-4/3L

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence R0-82-4/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b.

An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly, NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

& W E. J. Mroczka Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station EJM/TST:mo

Attachment:

LER R0-82-4/3L l

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30) cc:

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, l

Washington, D.C. (3)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, D.C.

20555 8203230084 820312 PDR ADOCK 0500024S S

PDR 4 ' l.

ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-4/3L NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1 PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21 DOCKET NUMBER 50-245 Identification of Occurrence Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation occurred when a primary containment isolation valve failed to open.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence Prior to occurrence the plant was in the refuel mode with reactor pressure at 450 psi.

Description of Occurrence On February 12,1982, at 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br />, while performing Containment Isolation Valve Operability Demonstration, Isolation Condenser Condensate Return valve, 1-IC-3, failed to open when given an open signal from the control room. Tech-nical Specification 3.7.D rc-quires all isolation valves to be operable during reactor power operation.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence After performing a surveillance on the Isolation Condenser February 8,1982, 1-IC-3 was manually tightened in a closed position. This was done while the valve was warm. When the valve cooled, the contraction of the valve caused the wedge in the valve disc to jam in the closed position.

Analysis of Occurrence Failure of 1-IC-3 to open resulted in the loss of the isolation condenser as an alternate heat sink to the main condenser. This, however, did not create a condition which has not been previously analyzed.

In an unlikely emergency condition where a loss of condenser vacuum and feedwater accompany a loss of the isolation condenser, reactor pressure would be controlled by the main steam safety / relief valves.

If reactor depressurization became necessary, emergency core cooling systems would be available to maintain reactor water level.

Corrective Action

The valve operator was tested and functioned correctly.

Subsequently the valve body was heated by an external source. The valve opened freely.

To prevent jamming of the valve in the closed position the isolation condenser operating procedure was revised to include a caution against tightening the valve closed while still warm.