05000244/LER-2003-005, Regarding Manual Reactor Trip Resulting from Loss of Off-Site Power Circuit 751
| ML033520202 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/11/2003 |
| From: | Mecredy R Rochester Gas & Electric Corp |
| To: | Clark R NRC/NRR/DLPM/LPD1 |
| References | |
| LER 03-005-00 | |
| Download: ML033520202 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 2442003005R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Robert C. Mecredy ROW Vice President Always at Your Service Nuclear Operations December 11, 2003 Mr. Robert L. Clark Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
LER 2003-005, Manual Reactor Trip Resulting From Loss of Off-Site Power Circuit 751 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Clark:
The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2003-005 is submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(iv)(A).
This event has in no way affected the public's health and safety.
Vety~ruly yours, Robert C. Mecredy
/
xc:
Mr. Robert L. Clark (Mail Stop 0-8-C2)
Project Directorate I Division of Licensing Project Management Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852 Regional Administrator, Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 U.S. NRC Ginna Senior Resident Inspector An equal opportunity employer 89 East Avenue I Rochester, NY 14649 tel (585) 546-2700 www.rge.com l o 0q09oOE An Energy East Company
Abstract
During start-up from the 2003 Refueling Outage (RFO) on October 15, 2003, high wind conditions resulted in the loss of off-site Circuit 751. With the electrical system in the normal start-up alignment, the loss of Circuit 751 resulted in the loss of the bus powering the B Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP). Following the loss of the B RCP, the operators manually tripped the reactor as required by Abnormal Operating Procedure AP-RCS.2, Loss of Reactor Coolant Flow. Safeguards busses 16 and 17 were also lost due to the loss of Circuit 751, but were subsequently re-energized by the B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) as designed. The A and B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as designed. The plant was stabilized in Mode 3 using the appropriate procedures.
Corrective action to prevent recurrence is outlined in Section V.B.
NRC FORM 366 (7-2001)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
B.
PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
An historical search of LERs was conducted with the following results:
The following LERs were the result of the loss of Circuit 751. Although these events resulted in the auto start of an Emergency Diesel Generator, none resulted in a plant trip because of the operating mode and electrical configuration at the time of the event.
S 0
S 0
0 S
1998-005 1997-002 1995-006 1995-007 1994-012 1994-005 1992-007 1991-002 C.
THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (EIIS) COMPONENT FUNCTION IDENTIFIER AND SYSTEM NAME OF EACH COMPONENT OR SYSTEM REFERRED TO IN THIS LER:
COMPONENT IEEE 803 FUNCTION IDENTIFIER IEEE 805 SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Off-Site Power Circuit 751 Main Steam Isolation Valves Reactor Coolant Pump Emergency Diesel Generators Auxiliary Feedwater Pump D.
SPECIAL COMMENTS:
None Jx EB ISV SB P
BA