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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARML24352A2072024-12-17017 December 2024 Notification of NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection Request for Information ML24323A0792024-11-15015 November 2024 Transmittal of Dresden, Units 2 and 3, Core Operating Limits Report Cycle 29 ML24317A1432024-11-0404 November 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, 2024 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums ML24303A0712024-11-0404 November 2024 Letter to K. Meshigaud, Chairperson Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station IR 05000237/20254012024-11-0101 November 2024 Information Request for the Cyber Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000237/2025401 05000249/2025401 ML24303A0172024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to B. Peters, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0532024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to J. Greendeer, President Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1462024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to W. Gravelle, Chairperson Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0692024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to J.A. Crawford, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0432024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to E. Elizondo, Sr. Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1342024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to T. Carnes, Chairperson Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1102024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to R. Gasco, Chairperson Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0992024-11-0101 November 2024 Lett to R. Carter, Principal Chief Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0202024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to C. Chavers, Chairwoman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0242024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to D. Kaskaske, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0512024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to J. Barrett, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0552024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to J. Keys, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0132024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to B. Barnes, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station RS-24-104, Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Document Revision2024-11-0101 November 2024 Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Document Revision ML24303A0152024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to C. Harper, Chief Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0272024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to D. Rios, Chairperson Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1422024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to V. Jefferson, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0642024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to J. Rupnick, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0602024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to J. R. Shotton, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24291A0252024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to R. Blanchard Tribal Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0472024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to G. Cheatham, Chairwoman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0302024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to D.G. Lankford, Chief Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0492024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter G. Kakkak, Chairwoman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A0892024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to M. J. Wesaw, Chair Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1352024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to T. Rhodd, Chairperson Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1442024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to V. Kitcheyna, Chairwoman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24303A1172024-11-0101 November 2024 Letter to R. Yob, Chairman Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for SLR of DNP Station ML24291A0202024-10-31031 October 2024 NRC Letter to J. Loichinger Achp Request for Comments Concerning the Environmental Review of DNPS Units 2 and 3 Subsequent License Renewal Application ML24291A0272024-10-31031 October 2024 NRC Letter to C. Mayer Illinois SHPO Request to Initiate Section 106 Consultation for Subsequent License Renewal of Units 2 and 3 RS-24-126, Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(4)2024-10-31031 October 2024 Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(4) IR 05000237/20240032024-10-29029 October 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000237/2024003 and 05000249/2024003 RS-24-103, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2024-10-21021 October 2024 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-24-102, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-5912024-10-21021 October 2024 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-591 RS-24-080, Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in .2024-10-16016 October 2024 Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in . RS-24-093, Response to Request for Additional Information - Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests2024-10-10010 October 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information - Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests ML24275A2442024-10-0303 October 2024 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing ML24225A2132024-09-26026 September 2024 Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval ML24253A0942024-09-23023 September 2024 License Renewal Regulatory Audit Regarding the Environmental Review of the License Renewal Application (EPID L-2024-Sle-0002) (Docket Numbers: 50-237 and 50-249) ML24270A0332024-09-20020 September 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report ML24299A1922024-09-20020 September 2024 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report SVPLTR 24-0030, ISFSI Annual Effluent Release Report2024-09-20020 September 2024 ISFSI Annual Effluent Release Report IR 05000237/20244022024-09-19019 September 2024 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000237/2024402 and 05000249/2024402 - (Public) ML24240A1692024-09-18018 September 2024 Cy 2023 Summary of Decommissioning Trust Fund Status ML24260A2152024-09-16016 September 2024 Confirmation of Initial License Examination ML24255A8642024-09-0606 September 2024 Rscc Wire & Cable LLC Dba Marmon Industrial Energy & Infrastructure - Part 21 Retraction of Final Notification 2024-09-06
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000237/LER-2023-001, HPCI Inoperable Due to Air Void Accumulation2024-01-19019 January 2024 HPCI Inoperable Due to Air Void Accumulation 05000237/LER-2022-002-01, Ultimate Heat Sink Declared Inoperable Due to River Grass Accumulation2022-10-28028 October 2022 Ultimate Heat Sink Declared Inoperable Due to River Grass Accumulation 05000237/LER-2022-001-01, Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip on High Reactor Water Level Caused by Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure2022-10-28028 October 2022 Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip on High Reactor Water Level Caused by Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure 05000237/LER-2022-002, Ultimate Heat Sink Declared Inoperable Due to River Grass Accumulation2022-09-27027 September 2022 Ultimate Heat Sink Declared Inoperable Due to River Grass Accumulation 05000237/LER-2022-001, Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip on High Reactor Water Level Caused by Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure2022-09-0909 September 2022 Reactor Scram Due to Turbine Trip on High Reactor Water Level Caused by Feedwater Regulating Valve Failure 05000249/LER-2021-001-01, Reactor Scram Due to Main Power Transformer Failure2022-06-14014 June 2022 Reactor Scram Due to Main Power Transformer Failure ML20135G7442020-05-14014 May 2020 Final ASP Analysis - Dresden 2 (LER 237-90-006) 05000249/LER-2019-001, Degraded Differential Pressure Indicating Switch in the LPCI Loop Select Logic Caused by Water Damage Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications2019-11-19019 November 2019 Degraded Differential Pressure Indicating Switch in the LPCI Loop Select Logic Caused by Water Damage Results in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications 05000237/LER-2019-002, Scram Due to Main Turbine Low Oil Pressure Trip2019-07-0202 July 2019 Scram Due to Main Turbine Low Oil Pressure Trip 05000237/LER-2019-001, Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Exceeded Technical Specification Due to Excess Ventilation Supply Flow2019-03-29029 March 2019 Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Exceeded Technical Specification Due to Excess Ventilation Supply Flow 05000237/LER-2017-002-01, Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feedwater Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage2018-02-15015 February 2018 Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feedwater Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage 05000237/LER-1917-002, Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feedwater Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage Limits2018-01-0202 January 2018 Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feedwater Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage Limits 05000249/LER-1917-001, Regarding Standby Liquid Control System Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Defect Causing a Piping Leak2017-11-10010 November 2017 Regarding Standby Liquid Control System Inoperable Due to a Manufacturing Defect Causing a Piping Leak 05000237/LER-1977-050, /03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Local Leak Rate Test of Drywell Personnel Air Lock During Refueling2017-11-0303 November 2017 /03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Local Leak Rate Test of Drywell Personnel Air Lock During Refueling 05000249/LER-1977-040, /03L-0 for Dresden 3 Regarding the Circuit Breaker for Service Water Makeup Valve MO-3-4102 to the Isolation Condenser Found in Off Position2017-10-21021 October 2017 /03L-0 for Dresden 3 Regarding the Circuit Breaker for Service Water Makeup Valve MO-3-4102 to the Isolation Condenser Found in Off Position ML17252B4922017-08-28028 August 2017 LER 78-028/01X-1 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re NRC Request for Immediate Actions to Be Taken to Mitigate the Potential for a Spurious Closure of a Recirculation Loop Suction Valve with a LOCA Occurring Between the Loop Discharge and Suction 05000237/LER-1978-028, /01X-1 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re NRC Request for Immediate Actions to Be Taken to Mitigate the Potential for a Spurious Closure of a Recirculation Loop Suction Valve with a LOCA Occurring Between the Loop Discharge and Suct2017-08-28028 August 2017 /01X-1 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re NRC Request for Immediate Actions to Be Taken to Mitigate the Potential for a Spurious Closure of a Recirculation Loop Suction Valve with a LOCA Occurring Between the Loop Discharge and Suction Valves 05000237/LER-1916-003, Cancellation of Licensee Event Report 237/2016-003-00, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to Meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria2017-05-26026 May 2017 Cancellation of Licensee Event Report 237/2016-003-00, Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to Meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria 05000237/LER-2016-004, Regarding Reactor Building Differential Pressure Less than Technical Specification Requirement2017-01-0909 January 2017 Regarding Reactor Building Differential Pressure Less than Technical Specification Requirement 05000237/LER-2016-003, Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to Meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria2016-11-18018 November 2016 Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Charcoal Filter Bank Failure to Meet the Methyl Iodide Penetration Acceptance Criteria 05000249/LER-2016-001, Regarding Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire2016-08-25025 August 2016 Regarding Alert Declared from Unit 3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump Motor Fire 05000237/LER-2016-002, Regarding HPCI Inlet Steam Drain Pot Piping Leak Resulting in HPCI Inoperability2016-07-15015 July 2016 Regarding HPCI Inlet Steam Drain Pot Piping Leak Resulting in HPCI Inoperability 05000237/LER-2016-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Transient2016-04-0808 April 2016 Regarding Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Transient 05000237/LER-2015-005-02, Regarding Unit 2 HPCI Motor Gear Unit Would Not Return to Full Flow During Testing2016-03-31031 March 2016 Regarding Unit 2 HPCI Motor Gear Unit Would Not Return to Full Flow During Testing 05000237/LER-2015-005-01, Regarding HPCI Motor Gear Unit Would Not Return to Full Flow During Testing2016-02-25025 February 2016 Regarding HPCI Motor Gear Unit Would Not Return to Full Flow During Testing 05000237/LER-2015-005, Regarding HPCI Motor Gear Unit Would Not Return to Full Flow During Testing2015-10-30030 October 2015 Regarding HPCI Motor Gear Unit Would Not Return to Full Flow During Testing 05000237/LER-2015-003, Regarding Turbine Building to Reactor Building Interlock Doors Open Simultaneously2015-10-30030 October 2015 Regarding Turbine Building to Reactor Building Interlock Doors Open Simultaneously 05000249/LER-2015-001, Regarding Main Steam Line Flow Switches Found Outside Tech Spec Allowed Value2015-10-29029 October 2015 Regarding Main Steam Line Flow Switches Found Outside Tech Spec Allowed Value 05000237/LER-2015-002, Regarding 2C ERV Failed to Actuate During Extent of Condition Testing2015-04-0303 April 2015 Regarding 2C ERV Failed to Actuate During Extent of Condition Testing 05000237/LER-2015-001, Regarding Unit 2 Scram Due to Feedwater Level Control Issues2015-03-0606 March 2015 Regarding Unit 2 Scram Due to Feedwater Level Control Issues 05000249/LER-2014-001, Regarding Electromatic Relief Valve Failing to Actuate During Surveillance Testing2015-01-0505 January 2015 Regarding Electromatic Relief Valve Failing to Actuate During Surveillance Testing 05000237/LER-2014-002, Regarding Reactor Scram Due to Main Power Transformer Failure2014-06-0606 June 2014 Regarding Reactor Scram Due to Main Power Transformer Failure 05000237/LER-2014-003, Regarding Reactor Scram During Automatic Voltage Regulator Channel Transfer2014-06-0606 June 2014 Regarding Reactor Scram During Automatic Voltage Regulator Channel Transfer 05000237/LER-2014-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously2014-05-27027 May 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously 05000237/LER-2013-009, Regarding HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open2014-01-29029 January 2014 Regarding HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open 05000249/LER-2013-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously2014-01-27027 January 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously 05000237/LER-2013-008, Regarding Leak Identified on a Relief Valve During Pressure Test Resulting in a Degraded Principal Safety Barrier2014-01-24024 January 2014 Regarding Leak Identified on a Relief Valve During Pressure Test Resulting in a Degraded Principal Safety Barrier 05000237/LER-2013-007, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously2014-01-15015 January 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously 05000237/LER-2013-005, Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feed Water Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage Limits2014-01-13013 January 2014 Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feed Water Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage Limits 05000237/LER-2013-006, Dressden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Regarding LPCI Swing Bus Auto Transfer Did Not Transfer as Expected2014-01-13013 January 2014 Dressden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Regarding LPCI Swing Bus Auto Transfer Did Not Transfer as Expected 05000237/LER-2013-004, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously2014-01-0606 January 2014 Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously 05000237/LER-2013-003, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously2013-11-22022 November 2013 Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously 05000237/LER-2013-002, Movement of Control Rods with Control Rod Block Monitor Inoperable2013-09-27027 September 2013 Movement of Control Rods with Control Rod Block Monitor Inoperable 05000237/LER-2013-001, Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously2013-08-23023 August 2013 Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously 05000237/LER-2012-002-01, Regarding Inlet Steam Drain Pot Drain Line Leaks Result in HPCI Inoperabilities2012-12-21021 December 2012 Regarding Inlet Steam Drain Pot Drain Line Leaks Result in HPCI Inoperabilities ML1015505692009-07-24024 July 2009 Letter LS-AA-1 25-1001, Elevated Tritium Values Identified in 2 Storm Drains Due to Through-Wall Leaks in Underground Piping for Dresden Units 2 and 3. ML0602404072004-05-0505 May 2004 Final Precursor Analysis - Dresden Unit 3 - Unit 3 Scram Due to Loss of Offsite Power and Subsequent Inoperability of the Standby Gas Treatment System for Units 2 and 3 ML0234501722002-12-0202 December 2002 LER 89-029-05, Dresden Unit 2, Elevated HPCI Discharge Piping Temperature Due to Reactor Feedwater System Back Leakage 05000237/LER-1981-034, /03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re J-3 CRD Was Tested for Overtravel. the Overtravel Alarm Came Up and Rod Position Indication Was Lost1981-06-10010 June 1981 /03L-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re J-3 CRD Was Tested for Overtravel. the Overtravel Alarm Came Up and Rod Position Indication Was Lost ML17252B5411981-06-0808 June 1981 LER 81-030/01T-0 for Dresden, Unit 2 Re Operator Noticed the HPCI Steam Line Was Cold and Filled with Water. the HPCI System Was Declared Inoperable 2024-01-19
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oDresden Nuclear Power Station 6500 North Dresden Road Exelon Generation,,
Morris, IL 60450 815-942-2920 Telephone www.exeloncorp.com 10 CFR 50.73 SVPLTR # 14-0008 January 29, 2014 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dresden Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-1 9 NRC Docket No 50-237
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 237/2013-009-00, HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 237/2013-009-00, "HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open." This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), "any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident" and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications."
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this submittal.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Mr. Glen Morrow at (815) 416-2800.
Respectfully, Shane M. Marik Site Vice President Dresden Nuclear Power Station Enclosure: Licensee Event Report 237/2013-009-00 cc:
Regional Administrator - NRC Region III NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Nuclear Power Station
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 (01-2014)
Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br />.
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Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry.
Send comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Prtvacy and Information Collections
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Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001. or by Internet e-mail to *tn*oollocts.Resource@nr.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of tntormation and LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (IE.
J Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104). Office of Management and Budget Washington, DC (See Page 2 for required number of 20503., f a means used to Impose an Information collection does not display a currently valid OMB for each block) contol number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, dtgitstcharacters fthe information colection
- 3. PAGE Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 05000237I 1 OF6
- 4. TITLE HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE S
AM
- 9. OTHER FACIUTIES INVOLVED SEU A I RE 1AILT NAM DOKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEUMERNTIA RE MONTH DAY YEAR N/A 0 5000 j~AIIYNAEDCE NUMBERNOI I_
112013 2013 009 -
00 01 29 2014 N/A SELLi
- 9. OPERATING MODE
_11.
THIS REPORT iS hUBM1 5
1uArr TO E REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (C W.kl1 OW aOW,)
o 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
C3 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
[] 20.2201(d) 03 20.2203(a)(3)(0i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vfii)(A)
O3 20.2203(a)(1) 03 20.2203(a)(4) 03 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 03 50.73(a)(2)(vi')(B) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL 03 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2Xiv)(A)
E3 50.73(a)(2)(x)
O 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
C0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71(a)(4) 015 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 03 50.46(a)(3)(1i) 03 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
[3 73.71(a)(5)
[3 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 03 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
[0 OTHER
- ISpecify, in Abstract below or in P 20.2203(a)(2)(vI)
!0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 7 1 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
NReC cannot open unless the control valves are closed because there will not be a buildup of pressure beneath the main valve.
The design of the spare cover plate (Figure 1) is a combination of an interference fit and a seal weld (Figures 2) to hold it into place. The interference fit is the primary mechanism that holds the spare cover plate in place. The seal weld is not a structural weld and its main purpose is to prevent bypass steam flow. When heat is applied to the valve the expansive forces of the spare cover plate and compressive forces of the turbine casing should hold the spare cover plate in place even without the seal weld intact.
The following indications were observed during the failed start:
- The Stop Valve showed closed and the green light (LS-9) remained on. Video from within the room also indicated minimal valve travel.
- The OPEN, red light (LS-1) did not illuminate.
Flow of -3200 gpm from the HPCI Main Pump was achieved (>5000 gpm required; -5600 gpm expected).
The HPCI Turbine reached a speed of -2000 rpm (-3500-3600 rpm expected).
- The Motor Speed Changer (MSC) remained on the low speed stop (verified through video) and the Main Control Room (MCR) indication for the low speed stop remained lit.
HPCI Turbine Exhaust Pressure reached 24 psig (-30-40 psig expected at rated conditions).
HPCI Achieved a discharge pressure of 3671bs (Via Computer Data Point)
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), "any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident" and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications."
C.
Cause of Event
The apparent cause of the Unit 2 HPCI system failing to reach rated flow was a failure of a spare cover plate within the control valve manifold. A failure analysis was provided to Dresden which attributed the failure to a 360 degree circumferential fracture (Figure 3) due to thermal fatigue cracking. The failed control valve spare cover plate was original plant equipment that had been in-service for over 40 years and over 350 system startups.
During each system startup, steam is admitted into the control valve manifold which causes a significant temperature gradient to form across the spare cover plate, and it leads to different rates of thermal expansion between the small spare cover plate and the relatively large turbine casing. These thermal stresses, during system startup, led to fatigue cracking, and allowed for the eventual dislodging of the spare cover plate.
A review of operation and work history shows that there were two potential times the spare cover plate could have been dislodged:
- 1. Following the securing of steam to the turbine during the last quarterly run, or
- 2. During outage related activities of D2R23 The run on September 26, 2013, was observed by the system manager and no related abnormalities were noted prior to, during or after the conclusion of the surveillance. Therefore, the most probable time of failure, based upon the available information, is during D2R23 outage activities (i.e., during control valve stroking without steam).
During D2R23, significant maintenance was performed on the HPC1 system, including a full overhaul of the front standard which included several post maintenance strokes of the control valve in the absence of steam. Based upon information provided by GE after the event, "Tripping the valves from full-open position could cause damage to the Stellite coated valve seating surfaces, thus this type of testing should be performed a minimal number of times to insure the proper function of the system."
Additionally, GE stated "Stroking the HPCI valves through the entire range of motion without steam applied is a typical post-outage/pre-startup test."
D.
Safety Analysis
The safety significance of this condition is low. The Automatic Depressurization and Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems [BO] [BM] were available to provide makeup to the reactor vessel inventory in the event of an accident or transient. Additionally, the respective Isolation Condenser [BL]
systems and other High Pressure Injection Systems (i.e., Feedwater System [SKI and Control Rod Drive System [AA]) were available for reactor vessel pressure control and injection, if required.
Therefore, health and safety of the public were not compromised as a result of this condition.
E.
Correctliy Actions:
As a result of this event, the station has completed or is planning to complete the following:
- 1. The Unit 2 HPCI Failed Control Valve Spare Cover Plate was replaced.
- 2. The station is planning an appropriate inspection of the Unit 3 control valve spare cover durng D3R23.
- 3. The station has created an action to revise the scope of future control valve inspections to include NDE on the seal weld and associated lip for the spare cover plate.
F.
Previous Occurrences
A review of DNPS Licensee Event Reports for the last three years revealed the following reportable conditions related to HPCI inoperabilities:
0 0
0 LER 237/2012-002, "Inlet Steam Drain Pot Drain Une Leaks Result in HPCI Inoperabilities" LER 237/2011-002, "Steam Leak Results in HPCI Inoperability" LER 249/2010-003, *Steam Leak Results in HPCI Inoperability" The corrective actions from the above Licensee Event Reports would not have prevented the current HPCI event.
G.
Comg)onent Failure Data:
Manufacturer Model SIN Type General Electric (GE) 7TDRV231 R1 122610 Turbine Figure 1: H Spare Cover Plate 00% CeNnA~A -A
Figure 2: HPCI Turbine Casing Figure 3: Failed Spare Cover Plate flrns r..tn,,, c.un ~V SCS~*~
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05000249/LER-2013-001, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000237/LER-2013-001, Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | 10 CFR 50.73(s)(2) | 05000237/LER-2013-002, Movement of Control Rods with Control Rod Block Monitor Inoperable | Movement of Control Rods with Control Rod Block Monitor Inoperable | | 05000237/LER-2013-003, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | | 05000237/LER-2013-004, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000237/LER-2013-005, Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feed Water Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage Limits | Regarding Primary Containment Inboard and Outboard Feed Water Isolation Valves Exceed Leakage Limits | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000237/LER-2013-006, Dressden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Regarding LPCI Swing Bus Auto Transfer Did Not Transfer as Expected | Dressden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2, Regarding LPCI Swing Bus Auto Transfer Did Not Transfer as Expected | | 05000237/LER-2013-007, Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | Regarding Secondary Containment Inoperable Due to Two Interlock Doors Being Open Simultaneously | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000237/LER-2013-008, Regarding Leak Identified on a Relief Valve During Pressure Test Resulting in a Degraded Principal Safety Barrier | Regarding Leak Identified on a Relief Valve During Pressure Test Resulting in a Degraded Principal Safety Barrier | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | 05000237/LER-2013-009, Regarding HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open | Regarding HPCI Failed to Achieve Rated Flow Due to Failure of Stop Valve to Open | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A), Prevented Safety Function in Multiple System 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) |
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