05000237/LER-2004-001, Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperability Due to Lifted Leads
| ML041730417 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 06/11/2004 |
| From: | Bost D Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| SVPLTR: #04-0035 LER 04-001-00 | |
| Download: ML041730417 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 2372004001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
ExeIon.M Exelon Generation Company, LLC www.exeloncorp.tom Nuclear Dresden Nuclear Power Station 6500 North Dresden Road Morris, IL 60450-9765 10 CFR 50.73 June 11, 2004 SVPLTR: #04-0035 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Facility Operating License No. DRP-19 NRC Docket No. 50-237
Subject:
Licensee Event Report 2004-001-00, 'Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperability Due To Lifted Leads" Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 2004-001-00, 'Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperability Due To Lifted Leads," for Dresden Nuclear Power Station. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), 'Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications," and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."
Should you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Jeff Hansen, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 416-2800.
Respectfully, 9
(V<.6 Danny G. Bost Site Vice President Dresden Nuclear Power Station Enclosure cc:
Regional Administrator - NRC Region IlIl NRC Senior Resident Inspector - Dresden Nuclear Power Station jJ 9 9 S
Abstract
On April 12, 2004, at 1810 hours0.0209 days <br />0.503 hours <br />0.00299 weeks <br />6.88705e-4 months <br /> (CDT), with Unit 2 at 100 percent power in Mode 1, Instrument Maintenance Technicians reported to plant operations personnel that High Pressure Coolant Injection System instrumentation leads were found lifted and taped. The disconnected instrumentation leads would have prevented the automatic realignment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System pump suction from its non-safety related water source, the Condensate Storage Tanks, to its safety related water source, the Suppression Pool. The High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable.
The instrumentation leads were reconnected and the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared operable at 1853 hours0.0214 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00306 weeks <br />7.050665e-4 months <br /> (CDT) on April 12, 2004.
The root cause of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System lifted and taped instrumentation leads was the failure of an Instrument Maintenance Supervisor to verify restoration of the leads when the surveillance was stopped. The corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence of the human performance error is to conduct four consecutive monthly reinforcements of management expectations with regards to procedures MA-AA-1000, 'Conduct of Maintenance," Section 7, 'Documentation of Work," and MA-DR-AD-6-00001, 'Maintenance Shift Turnover Guidelines."
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Automatic Depressurization System) were operable during the time interval that the HPCI instrumentation leads were disconnected.
Therefore, the consequences of this event had minimal impact on the health and safety of the public and reactor safety.
E.
Corrective Actions
The HPCI instrumentation leads were reconnected.
Immediate corrective actions included the verification that this problem did not exist on Unit 3 HPCI.
Four consecutive monthly reinforcements of management expectations with regards to procedures MA-AA-1000, Section 7.0 and MA-DR-AD-6-00001 will be conducted with IM supervisors.
A meeting was held with all IM Supervisors to reinforce the expectation that ownership of turnover logs includes the need to remain cognizant of major plant evolutions, changes in equipment status and trends that may effect safe plant operation in accordance with procedures MA-DR-AD-6-00001, 'Maintenance Shift Turnover Guidelines, and MA-AA-1000."
A Common Cause Analysis will be conducted to evaluate recent IM performance.
An Operations Policy was modified to more clearly delineate actions and accountability for work orders or other activities that affect equipment operability. Actions included logging and tracking to completion of all work requests prior to exiting the associated LCO Action Statement, especially for any activity not completed in its entirety.
F.
Previous Occurrences
A review of Dresden Nuclear Power Station Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and operating experience over the previous five years did not find any similar occurrences.
G.
Component Failure Data
NA