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 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeEvent description
ENS 5392411 March 2019 10:00:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1On 03/11/2019 planned maintenance activities will be performed on the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System's (DRMS) Communications System. The work includes upgrades to the DRMS hardware, software and computer peripherals. Components to be upgraded under this planned maintenance include: Redundant Servers, Operator Console, Health Physics Office Console/Workstation, Printers and Portable Mass Storage/Backup and Computer peripherals necessary to interface with the computer system. This planned upgrade on the Unit 2 DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and on the Plant Computer System (PCS). Neither the Emergency Response Facilities nor the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) will receive radiological data. No actual radiation monitors are affected. The scheduled work duration is approximately three weeks. When the DRMS is out of service for the upgrade, compensatory actions will be in place. Radiation monitors will be continuously monitored for any increases in radiation levels. The Unit 2 Shift Manager will be notified of any increase in radiation monitor readings, including exceeding Emergency Action Levels (EAL). This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the upgrade to the DRMS Communications System will result in the loss of the Unit 2 radiological monitoring capability in the Control Room and to the Unit 2 Plant Computer System that affects the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee is currently in a Technical Specification Action Statement, Limiting Condition for Operation for spent fuel pool radiation monitor and leakage rate monitor.
ENS 537111 November 2018 15:38:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1On 11/01/2018, during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 27 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. The other 65 penetrations will be examined during the 2R20 (current) refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in Undefined Mode. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as-found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-4 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5354812 August 2018 02:58:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN - LOSS OF 480 VOLTAGE EMERGENCY BUS On 8-12-18 at 0158 EDT, Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus. This resulted in a Loss of Safety Function due to the 2-2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being Inoperable coincident with the Residual Heat Release Valve (2SVS-HCV104). A Technical Specification shutdown is required per LCO 3.0.3. The Licensee also stated they were in an unanalyzed condition due to the EDG and Residual Heat Release Valve being inoperable at the same time. The Licensee is shutting down to Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown). The Licensee is notifying the Resident Inspector. The Licensee will be making a Press Release about the unplanned shutdown.

  • * * UPDATE ON 08/16/2018 AT 1424 EDT FROM BLASE BARTKO TO KEN MOTT * * *

On 8-12-18 at 0158 (EDT) Beaver Valley Unit 2 experienced a loss of 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus. Per operational guidance, this was determined to be a Loss of Safety Function due to the Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) being INOPERABLE coincident with the Residual Heat Release Valve (2SVS-HCV104) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) and (D). This was also reported as an Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(b). No Press Release was performed for this event. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. At 0410 (EDT) a Technical Specification Shutdown was commenced 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i). At 2011 (EDT) the 480 Volt 2P Emergency Bus was restored and energized. Further evaluation of the event has determined that this event was not an Unanalyzed Condition and did not result in a Loss of Safety Function. The classifications of Unanalyzed Condition and Loss of Safety Function are being retracted. The accuracy of the existing guidance relative to Safety Function has been entered in the Corrective Action Program and interim actions have been taken to provide accurate guidance. Notified R1DO (Young) via email.

ENS 5341922 May 2018 18:38:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1

EN Revision Text: GAS VOIDS DISCOVERED IN BOTH TRAINS OF LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION On 5/22/2018, while operating at approximately 100 percent power, Ultrasonic Testing of the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI) pump suction piping identified gas voids in excess of the acceptable limit for void volume. Both trains of LHSI were declared inoperable. Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.2 for both trains of the LHSI system was entered along with TS 3.0.3 which requires the initiation of a plant shutdown. Time of TS entry was 12:56 (EDT). Plant shutdown was commenced at 15:56 (EDT) in accordance with plant procedures. At 15:59 (EDT) Train 'A' LHSI was restored to operable status, TS 3.0.3 Action was exited and the power reduction was stopped at approximately 99 percent. At 17:43 (EDT) Train 'B' LHSI was restored to operable status, TS 3.5.2 Actions were exited. This is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) Unanalyzed Condition, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented the Fulfillment of a Safety Function and 10 CFR 50. 72(b )(2)(i) TS Required Shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 6/21/18 AT 1535 EDT FROM SHAWN KEENER TO RICHARD SMITH * * *

Further engineering evaluation has determined that the gas voids that existed at the time of discovery would not have rendered the LHSI (Low Head Safety Injection) system inoperable if it were required to actuate. The engineering evaluation concluded that filling of the containment sump during a Design Basis Accident would result in a void volume reduction such that the void in the LHSI suction piping would not be large enough to significantly impact the operability of the system. Therefore, the system remained operable but degraded. No TSs (Technical Specifications) were required to be entered and no shutdown was required. As such, all three reporting criteria do not apply and are being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Burritt).

ENS 5322823 February 2018 20:29:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1750 (EST) on 2/23/2018 credible information was obtained that a non-licensed supervisory person had intentionally misused a controlled substance. Unescorted access has been withdrawn. Per 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(i) this is a 24 hour reportable event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530587 November 2017 14:19:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopIt was determined that a licensed employee was not placed in an additional Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) testing program as directed by the MRO (Medical Review Officer). Upon discovery, the individual was subsequently tested . . . and determined Fit-For-Duty per 10 CFR 26 requirements. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 530567 November 2017 08:29:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn November 7, at 0504 (EST), BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to Main Unit Generator over current. The Auxiliary Feedwater system activated and remains in service. Offsite power supply is available. Normal and Emergency busses are being supplied by Offsite power. One Source Range channel failed to energize due to its corresponding Intermediate Range instrument being under compensated. It was manually energized and is not indicating as expected. The second Source Range instrument energized but is reading erratically. Both Source Range instruments have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification has been complied with by making the Control Rods not capable of withdrawal and isolating all dilution flow paths. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. This event is being reported as an actuation of the Reactor Protection system 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and a Specified System Actuation (Auxiliary Feedwater System) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). BVPS Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100% power in Mode 1. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5287728 July 2017 16:40:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn July 20, 2017, a fire protection supply line at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 experienced a mechanical joint separation. When the mechanical joint separated there was an unplanned flow of water from the fire protection line to the ground, which eventually re-entered the Ohio River via storm drains. The source of the water to the BVPS Unit 1 Fire Protection System is the Ohio River. The fire protection water was not treated with chemical additives. The water flow from this fire protection line was terminated on the same day. Due to the situation described above, FENOC (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company) provided written documentation describing this occurrence to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, (PADEP) on July 28, 2017. This offsite notification to PADEP requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5257123 February 2017 13:02:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopIn order to address the concerns outlined in RIS (Regulatory Information Summary) 2015-06 'TORNADO MISSILE PROTECTION', an evaluation of tornado missile vulnerabilities and their potential impact on Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment was conducted. This evaluation concluded that the following Structures, Systems, and Components (SSCs) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles: The BVPS Unit 1 (BV-1) and BVPS Unit 2 (BV-2) Main Steam Safety Valve (MSSVs) discharge flow paths to atmosphere (reference TS 3.7.1) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping of the MSSVs potentially crimping the piping and resulting in reduced flow capacity. In the worst case, all MSSV's could be rendered inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The BV-1 and BV-2 Atmospheric Steam Dumps (ADVs) discharge flow paths to atmosphere (reference TS 3.7.4) are potentially vulnerable to tornado generated missiles. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the exhaust piping of the ADVs potentially crimping the piping and resulting in reduced flow capacity. In the worst case, all ADVs could be rendered inoperable. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The BV-2 Auxiliary Building tornado missile shield door (A-35-5A), credited for tornado missile protection of the Primary Component Cooling Water (PCCW) system, was found to not be fully closed and latched. A tornado could generate missiles capable of striking the PCCW system with the missile door open rendering both trains of the PCCW system inoperable. This door is now maintained closed and latched except when opened under administrative controls. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The BV-2 Spent Fuel Building tornado missile shield door (F-66-3), credited for tornado missile protection of the irradiated fuel assemblies in the Spent Fuel Pool including the Cask Pit, was found to not be fully closed and latched. This door is now maintained closed and latched except when opened under administrative controls. This condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The potential tornado missile vulnerabilities for the MSSVs and ADVs (discussed above) are being addressed in accordance with EGM-15-002 Rev 1 and DSS-ISG-2016-01 (NRC enforcement discretion and interim guidance documents). Immediate compensatory measures were taken to reduce the likelihood and mitigate the potential consequences of an onsite tornado generated missiles. The NRC Resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5251327 January 2017 07:25:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

An Unusual Event (HU.4) was declared at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 at 0641 EST due to a fire alarm in Containment which was unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current Containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. The Fire Alarm has subsequently been reset (at 0648 EST). The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector." The Licensee has notified State and local government agencies. A containment entry is planned for 1000 EST to verify that there is no fire. Unit 1 continues at 100 percent power. Unit 2 was unaffected. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL SMITH TO STEVEN VITTO ON 1/27/2017 AT 0952 EST * * *

The time of the fire alarm reset was at 0648 EST on 1/27/2017. The Unusual Event has been terminated at 0934 EST on 1/27/2017 after a containment entry and visual inspection determined no fire or indications of a fire exist. The following notifications were made: Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Beaver County in Pennsylvania, The State of Ohio Emergency Management Agency, Columbia County in Ohio, The State of West Virginia Emergency Management Agency and Hancock County in West Virginia. The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Welling), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

ENS 5239022 November 2016 18:44:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopDuring routine floor cleaning activities inside of the BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Main River Water Intake Structure, approximately one and one half cups (approximately 12 oz.) of Simple Green cleaning solution diluted in three gallons of mop cleaning water was inadvertently released into the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of the inadvertent release to the Ohio river, a notification was made to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, (PADEP). This offsite notification to PADEP requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Actions were taken to preclude any further liquid cleaning solution to be released, and no detectable impact to the Ohio River was observed. The amount of cleaning solution does not exceed any Reportable Quantity limit that would be hazardous to the environment or personal health. No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5213229 July 2016 01:51:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

A review of the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Report (FPSSR) found that a postulated fire had the potential to spuriously open all three individual steam generator atmospheric dump valves in addition to a common residual heat release valve. Previous analysis did not consider all of the valves spuriously opening from a fire. The potential impact of these valves spuriously opening is a cooldown that could adversely affect shutdown margin. Hourly fire tours have been put in place for those fire areas that have the potential to initiate this condition. This condition is reportable as an 8 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This condition is not applicable to Unit 1.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAN SCHWER TO VINCE KLCO ON 9/26/16 AT 1428 EDT * * *

Retraction of EN 52132 'Postulated Fire Event That Could Adversely Impact Safe Shutdown Equipment'. On 07/29/2016, an 8-hour notification (EN 52132) was made describing the discovery of a postulated fire event that could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment, specifically the spurious opening of the three Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDVs) and the Residual Heat Release (RHR) Valve, simultaneously. This notification was made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition because of the potential effect on shutdown margin. Further engineering evaluation has determined that the required shutdown margin is not challenged by the event, as bounded by previous analysis of a similar scenario as well as validated operator actions. Therefore, this does not result in a reportable condition. The Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Cook).

ENS 5194820 May 2016 18:40:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1531 (EDT) hours, a tornado signal was inadvertently activated from Hancock County, West Virginia which sounded 118 out of 120 Emergency sirens. The remaining 2 sirens do not receive a tornado signal. The sirens alarmed for approximately 3 minutes. A silent test was subsequently performed for all 120 sirens and validated the emergency siren system remains functional. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency, a 4 hour notification is required. The (NRC) Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. No press releases are planned. The licensee notified state and local agencies.
ENS 517125 February 2016 03:49:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On February 5, 2015 at 0109 EST, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared inoperable due to a higher than allowed identified in-leakage rate for the Control Room Envelope (CRE) when in the Normal Operating Mode. Unit 1 remains at 100 percent power and Unit 2 remains in Mode 3 for an unrelated planned maintenance outage. Unit 1 and Unit 2 share a common CRE. This in-leakage was detected during additional testing following the event documented in EN #51584. At the time of discovery, there is a reasonable expectation this condition could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thus satisfying the reporting criteria for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Actions to implement mitigating actions were immediately initiated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10. CREVS has been placed in Recirculation Ventilation Mode, isolating the control room from outside air. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the condition.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAVID HELD TO VINCENT KLCO AT 1411 EDT ON 4/4/16 * * *

Following the 8-hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 02/05/2016 (EN 51712) regarding the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) inoperability, further engineering evaluation has determined the identified in-leakage does not result in exceeding the design criteria for dose to the control room personnel. Therefore the degraded Control Room Emergency Ventilation System remained operable with the identified air in-leakage as determined by the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. As such, the safety function was never lost and the event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified the R1DO (Jackson).

ENS 516311 January 2016 17:19:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Unusual Event declared at BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) Unit 1 at 1634 EST due to a fire alarm in Containment (which was) unable to be verified extinguished within 15 minutes. Current Containment parameters do not indicate an actual fire. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SAMANTHA BALDWIN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 2057 EST ON 1/1/2015 * * *

At 1655 the fire alarm was reset. The Unusual Event has been terminated at 2035 EST after a containment entry and visual inspection determined no fire or indications of fire exist. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State and local government agencies. Notified R1DO (McKinley), NRR EO (Morris), and IRD MOC (Gott). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and NICC Watch Officer. E-mailed FEMA NWC and Nuclear SSA.

ENS 515844 December 2015 01:33:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On December 3, 2015 at 2107 (EST), the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) was declared inoperable due to a higher than allowed identified in-leakage rate for the Control Room Envelope (CRE) when in the Normal Operating Mode. Both Unit 1 & Unit 2 remain at 100 percent power and they share a common CRE. At the time of discovery, there is a reasonable expectation this condition could prevent the fulfillment of the safety function of a system that is required to mitigate the consequences of an accident, thus satisfying the reporting criteria for 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Actions to implement mitigating actions were immediately initiated in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10. CREVS has been placed in Recirculation Ventilation Mode, isolating the control room from outside air. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of the condition.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 1/7/16 AT 1110 EST FROM SHAWN SNOOK TO DONG PARK * * *

Following the 8-hour 10CFR50.72 notification made on 12/4/2015 (EN 51584) regarding the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) inoperability, an engineering evaluation determined inleakage did not exceed limits described in the Beaver Valley licensing basis. Therefore, the degraded Control Room Emergency Ventilation System remained Operable with the identified air inleakage as determined by the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program. As such, the safety function was never lost and the event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). FENOC is planning to repair the degraded components of the system. The NRC Resident (Inspector) has been notified." Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).

ENS 5147917 October 2015 19:30:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1230 EDT, it was discovered that sodium hypochlorite had leaked into the ground soil at the bottom of a leak sensing pit, which is located near the BVPS-1 Cooling Tower Pump House, at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit Number 1 (BVPS-1). The source of the sodium hypochlorite, is suspected to be from a piping leak, and has been terminated. The cause of the leak has not yet been conclusively determined, and there is no evidence that the sodium hypochlorite reached the surface water of the Ohio River. At 1613 EDT on October 17, 2015, it was determined that there was CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation & Liability Act) reportable leak of a minimum 294 gallons of sodium hypochlorite to ground soil, and the following offsite notifications were made starting at 1625 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report #1131084); Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection; Beaver County Emergency Management; PA Emergency Management Agency. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5147816 October 2015 15:41:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1115 EDT there was a non-oil chemical spill at the main intake structure during delivery of corrosion inhibitor. The spill occurred due to a failed tank-fill connection. Approximately 10 gallons of the inhibitor reached the Ohio River. The spill has been stopped and contained, and recovery is in progress. This is not a CERCLA (Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act), Reportable Quantity for the Environmental Protection Agency. However, at 1245 EDT, it was determined to be reportable to the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (PADEP), in accordance with the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law and NPDS (National Pollutant Discharge Elimination), permit; thus, a notification was made, to the PADEP, at 1250 hours EDT . This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 514535 October 2015 15:01:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 10/5/2015, during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, while performing planned ultrasonic examinations (UT) on the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined, that two penetrations could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME (American Society of Mechanical Engineers) Code Section XI in a Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary. The indications of a degraded condition, on these two penetrations, are not through wall, as no leak path was identified. The examinations are being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D), and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. All 66 reactor vessel head penetrations are scheduled to be examined during the current refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in Mode 6. The reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAN SCHWER TO STEVEN VITTO ON 10/22/2015 AT 1039 EDT * * *

The Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2, FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on 10/05/2015 (EN 51453). This retraction is based on additional examinations and subsequent engineering assessments completed that concluded the penetrations meet the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 as amended by 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and no repairs are required. The two reactor head penetration indications, are therefore not reportable, pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. R1DO(Gray) has been notified.

ENS 5134526 August 2015 09:45:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 05:48 (EDT) BVPS (Beaver Valley Power Station) received notification that siren #6, Potter Township Municipal Building, was sounding intermittently. The fire department activation cable to the siren was severed by a motor vehicle. The ENS activation function remains functional. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'a News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.' The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5132317 August 2015 12:59:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0837 EDT on August 17, 2015, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced a small oil leak of approximately 1 liter from equipment located inside the Alternate Intake structure, some of which progressed to the Ohio River. Subsequent to confirmation of this discovery, notification was made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1030 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report# 1125865), Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management, PA Emergency Management Agency, and downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.) This notification is a required 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The source of the oil leak has been stopped. Absorbent material has been placed to contain the oil that had leaked. No press release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5106411 May 2015 20:38:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1629 EDT on May 11, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 (Mode 6 Refueling) opened circuit breaker PCB-92 to de-energize system service transformer 1A due to an emergent issue with a transformer bushing. This resulted in a loss of power to the ERF (Emergency Response Facility) substation which powers various plant support equipment at both units. The BVPS Unit 2 Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was non-functional for approximately 21 minutes. This was a loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. Following power restoration to the ERF substation, the radiation monitor system was restored at 1650 EDT. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 remain stable. Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5098515 April 2015 07:32:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0411 EDT on April 15, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 manually tripped the reactor from approximately 85% power due to the trip of a condensate pump. The unit was performing an emergent power reduction due to a degraded condensate pump prior to the manual reactor trip. An end of cycle Tave coastdown was in progress at the time of the event. All control rods fully inserted into the core. All three auxiliary feed water pumps started as expected and were subsequently secured in accordance (with) station procedures. The main feedwater system remains available and in service. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. Unit 2 was unaffected and remains at full power. Decay heat removal is via main feedwater system with steam discharge to the main condenser via the steam bypass valves. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. No primary or secondary reliefs or safeties lifted during the transient. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5089514 March 2015 23:32:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1708 EDT on March 14, 2015, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was not operating. This resulted in a loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were initiated. The radiation monitoring computer system is a stand-alone system. No cyber interference is suspected. At 2056 EDT on March 14, 2015, following initial investigation and repairs, BVPS Unit 2 emergency assessment capability was restored in conjunction with DRMS restoration. Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5062719 November 2014 09:57:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

The Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Special Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (SPING 4) monitors were removed from service for a planned equipment upgrade/replacement. During the replacement process certain Emergency Action Level (EAL) required monitors will not be functional, therefore, alternate methods of monitoring have been placed in effect. The replacement activities are expected to take approximately 60 days. A follow-up notification will be made after the required monitors are returned to service and declared functional. This is an 8 hour notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No BVPS Unit 2 systems will be adversely affected by the Unit 1 replacement activity. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PATRICK HARTIG TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1728 EST ON 2/27/15 * * *

The planned equipment upgrade was completed and the Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 1 Particulate, Iodine and Noble Gas (PING) monitors were returned to service and declared functional at 1714 EST on 2/27/2015. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R1DO (Gray).

ENS 504306 September 2014 11:18:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 0951 EDT on September 6, 2014, it was determined that Beaver Valley Unit 2 had experienced an oil spill to the catch basin system that progressed to the Ohio River, requiring notification of: National Response Center (incident report #1094523), Pennsylvania (PA) Department of Environmental Protection, Beaver County Emergency Management Agency, PA Emergency Management Agency and, Downstream water authorities (Midland Water Authority, Allegheny Ludlum, East Liverpool Water Co.) This notification is a required 4-hour report per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). Oil was inadvertently pumped from a transformer spill catch area during routine seasonal water removal efforts. Oil was not expected in the catch area and the spill catch area had tested negative for oil during pre-removal testing. An oil sheen has been detected on the Ohio River immediately surrounding the outfall. The source of the spill has been terminated, however some residual oil is washing out of the catch basin system into the river. It is estimated that less than 5 gallons entered the river. Clean up efforts for the catch basins are currently underway and containment efforts for the oil in the river are being evaluated. A press release is currently being planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM BLASE BARTKO TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1025 EDT ON 9/7/14 * * *

The licensee has decided not to issue a press release concerning this event. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Ferdas).

ENS 5041729 August 2014 16:15:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0932 EDT on August 29, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was operating intermittently. This resulted in an intermittent loss of radiation monitor capability to alarm and indicate in the control room. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were established. At 1556 EDT on August 29, 2014, following initial investigation and repairs, BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared functional. Since the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional, this event resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause was attributed to an automatic reboot of the computer based on lack of disk space.
ENS 5027511 July 2014 18:00:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1415 (EDT) the Control Room received a report that a refrigeration unit had failed and was spilling coolant (Ethylene Glycol) on the floor of an office building inside the protected area. At 1440 (EDT) the leak was isolated. It is estimated that approximately 10 gallons of Ethylene Glycol was introduced to the floor drains which ultimately lead to the environment. This is not a Reportable Quantity for the Environmental Protection Agency but the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection was notified in accordance with the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law at 1500 hours. The spill was contained and cleanup is complete. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5023427 June 2014 16:21:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn June 27, 2014, at approximately 1131 hours EDT, it was determined that an individual who is licensed under Part 10 CFR Part 55 to operate a power reactor was in violation of the FENOC (FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company) Fitness for Duty policy. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii) . The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5012420 May 2014 10:52:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn May 20, 2014, at 0835 hours during plant startup, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 Operations personnel manually tripped the reactor due to meeting the pre-briefed trip criteria of 85% narrow range level on the 'A' Steam Generator. This manual trip criterion was reached after the steam generator water level began to oscillate following the start of the 'A' Condensate pump. A manual main steam line isolation was performed in order to limit reactor coolant system cool down. Plant trip response was as expected without complications, and all control rods fully inserted in the core. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 was not affected by this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. No relief or safety valves lifted during this event. The unit is maintaining primary temperature using the atmospheric steam dumps and main feedwater pumps. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 500791 May 2014 18:12:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 5/01/2014 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on one of the 66 penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. This penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 52 of 66 penetrations have been examined, with 51 satisfactory. All of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in a mode undefined (Defueled) and the reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5007530 April 2014 16:59:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopBased on a review of industry operating experience, it was identified that each unit has two un-fused DC control circuits for non safety-related DC motors which are routed from the turbine building through other separate fire areas including the Control Room. The DC breakers used to protect the motor power conductors are insufficient to protect the control conductors for these circuits. It is postulated that a fire induced short in one fire area could adversely impact safe shutdown equipment by overheating the cable and causing a secondary fire in other fire areas where the cable is routed. At Unit 1, cables for the affected circuits are routed in the Turbine Building, Cable Spreading Area and Control Room. At Unit 2, cables for the affected circuits are routed in the Turbine Building, Normal Switchgear, Service Building Cable Tray Area, Cable Vault, Instrument Relay Room, Control Building West Communication Room, Control Building Cable Spreading Area and Control Room. The postulated secondary fires or cable failures are outside the assumptions of each unit's fire protection analysis. A preliminary investigation of the issue indicates that existing fire protection safe shutdown procedures could be used to safely shut down the plant if needed. This condition is reportable as an 8-hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Interim compensatory measures will be implemented for affected areas of the plant. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 498745 March 2014 13:20:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA planned actuation of the emergency sirens across the state of Ohio was scheduled as part of a Severe Weather Awareness activity. When Columbiana County, Ohio, was activating their county sirens at 0958 EST, they inadvertently depressed the button which activated all 120 sirens within the Beaver Valley Emergency Planning Zone, which included Beaver County, Pennsylvania and Hancock County, West Virginia sirens. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'A News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 498652 March 2014 00:45:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

An Unusual Event (NOUE) was declared at 0013 EST on 3/2/2014 due to a possible fire in the protected area inside containment which could not be verified within 15 minutes (EAL HU4). A containment building smoke alarm was received at 2120 on 3/1/14 after indications that a relief valve lifted during a safety injection accumulator fill evolution. Diverse containment instrumentation was checked and showed that containment dew point was elevated while containment temperature and pressure remained steady. The fire alarm was reset and did not reflash. A containment entry will be made to investigate the alarm. There are no requests for the local fire department to respond and there are no indications of a radiological release to the environment. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Beaver County in Pennsylvania, the State of Ohio, Columbiana County in Ohio, the State of West Virginia and Hancock County in West Virginia. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, NICC and Nuclear SSA (via email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM BRIAN STROBEL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0211 EST ON 3/2/14 * * *

The licensee terminated the NOUE at 0205 EST after a containment entry determined no fire or indications of fire existed. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) IRD (Grant), NRR EO (Nieh), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA (via email).

ENS 4971611 January 2014 22:25:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1605 EST on January 11, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) had a communication loop failure resulting in a loss of control room radiation monitor indication and alarm capability. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared nonfunctional. Repair efforts were initiated and compensatory measures were established. At 2040 EST on January 11, 2014, BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was returned to service and declared functional. The failure of the BVPS Unit 2 DRMS communication loop resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee notified Pennsylvania, West Virginia and Ohio emergency management agencies as well as local authorities of this notification.
ENS 496976 January 2014 19:09:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1659 EST hours on January 6, 2014, Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100% power. The cause of the reactor trip was a main transformer differential trip. All rods fully inserted into the core and the plant is stable in Mode 3. All three auxiliary feedwater pumps automatically started as expected. Normal and Emergency Busses are being powered by Offsite Power. The cause of the main transformer differential trip is being investigated. All other equipment functioned as expected. At 1757 EST hours the Emergency Operating Procedures were exited. Resident inspector has been notified. Decay heat is being removed via the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. No primary or secondary safety valves lifted. Unit 2 was unaffected.

Licensee notified the States of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia and the Counties of Beaver, PA, Hancock, OH, and Columbiana, OH.

ENS 495055 November 2013 19:27:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

On 11/5/13 at 1746 (EST), Beaver Valley Unit 1 Generator tripped on 'C' Transformer differential protection. The Unit was at 47%, so an automatic trip of the reactor was not expected. The reactor was tripped manually. Entered E-0 Reactor Trip Response. The Aux Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump automatically started as required and one motor driven pump was manually started. At 1748, the control room received report of fire in the Turbine building. The deluge system had actuated and extinguished the fire in the Turbine plant mezzanine. Off-site assistance was staged and available. At 1828, an Unusual Event was declared when fire brigade reports indications that an explosion and fire had occurred in a cable tray in the Unit 1 Turbine Mezzanine.

The (NRC) Resident Inspector was notified of the events that occurred. At 1836, NRC (Resident Inspector) was notified of the Unusual Event. Cause of the cable tray explosion and fire is being investigated. The reactor trip was uncomplicated and Unit 1 is stable in mode 3 with decay heat being released to the main condenser. Normal offsite power is available. Unit 2 continues to operate at 100% and there is no impact on the health and safety of the public.

  • * * UPDATE FROM J. A. DAUGHERTY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 2005 EST ON 11/05/13 * * *

At 1959 on 11/5/13, the licensee terminated the Unusual Event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Noggle), NRR EO (Skeen), IRD (Marshall). Notified the DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via e-mail.

ENS 494135 October 2013 01:19:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn October 4, 2013, during the Beaver Valley Unit 1 refueling outage, a planned visual examination of the interior containment liner and coatings was being performed. The containment design consists of an interior steel liner that is surrounded by reinforced concrete. An area approximately 0.4 inches by 0.28 inches was discovered that penetrated through the containment steel liner plate. With the plant currently shut down and in Mode 6 the containment as specified in Technical Specification 3.6.1 is not required to be operable. The cause of this discrepancy is currently being evaluated. This is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). The Site Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4939530 September 2013 15:35:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1422 EDT on 9/30/2013, a craft contractor worker was transported to an off-site medical facility due a work-related injury. The injured individual was in a radiologically controlled area when the injury occurred. The injured was partially surveyed by a Health Physics technician in their anti-contamination clothing prior to leaving the site and no radioactive contamination was detected. The injured individual was then transported by ambulance accompanied by a Health Physics technician to the local hospital for medical treatment. Follow up surveys determined that no contamination was detected on the individual or materials transported. All materials are being recovered and returned to the site. This notification is being made under the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) reporting requirements, since a complete survey of the injured individual was unable to be made and he was considered to be potentially contaminated prior to being transported off-site. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4939230 September 2013 09:26:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0238 (EDT) hours on September 30, 2013, during a planned shutdown of Beaver Valley Unit 1 for a refueling outage, the 'B' Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) pump was manually started in Mode 3 due to lowering levels in the steam generators. The steam generator levels were restored to normal following the start of the AFW pump. The lowering (steam generator) levels were a result of a component failure in a normal non-safety related make up system. The manual start for the AFW pump is being reported as a system actuation per 10 CFR 50 72(b)(3)(iv). The plant is currently in Mode 5. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A condensate pump recirculation valve failing open was the component failure in the normal non-safety related make up system.
ENS 4915829 June 2013 18:30:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1214 EDT on June 29, 2013, Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS) Unit 2 determined that the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) was operating intermittently resulting in an intermittent loss of control room radiation monitor indication and alarm capability. BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was declared non-functional. Repair efforts were initiated and at 1415 EDT DRMS was restored to functional status. Compensatory measures were established during the period of time that the DRMS was operating intermittently. The period that BVPS Unit 2 DRMS was non-functional resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4911614 June 2013 09:20:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

Beaver Valley Unit 2 declared an Unusual Event (EAL HU.5, Toxic Gas Release) at 0835 EDT hours due to a CO2 (Toxic Gas) discharge in the turbine building. No report of fire and no injuries resulted from discharge. At 0851 EDT, the turbine building was clear of any detectible CO2. There was no operational impact from the CO2 discharge. The cause of the CO2 discharge is under investigation. The required states and counties were notified. The Resident NRC inspector was notified. The inadvertent CO2 discharge was from the turbine fire protection system which now isolated while troubleshooting is in progress. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JAMES SCHWER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 6/14/13 AT 1006 EDT * * *

Beaver Valley Unit 2 has terminated the Unusual Event at 0955 EDT * * * Notified R1DO (Dentel), NRR EO (Chernoff), IRD (Grant), DHS SWO, FEMA, DHS NICC, and Nuclear SSA via email.

ENS 486588 January 2013 15:26:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopDuring excavation activities at the site of the former Shippingport Atomic Power Station (SAPS) which is located on company property outside the protected area but adjacent to Beaver Valley Power Station (BVPS), BVPS found soil with evidence of a historical oil leak. The area was underneath a concrete pad for a removed fuel oil storage tank at SAPS. Actions to remove the soil with oil residue have been initiated and are in progress. Decommissioning of SAPS was completed in 1989. BVPS has notified the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection of the condition and the activities being taken on 01-08-13 at 1432 EST. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on a notification to another government agency that has been made. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 483876 October 2012 17:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn 10/6/2012 during the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BVPS-2) refueling outage, it was determined that the results of planned ultrasonic (UT) examinations performed on one of the 66 penetrations of the reactor vessel head would not meet the applicable acceptance criteria. This penetration will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indications are not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10CFR50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-1, to find potential flaws/indications well before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. Currently 60 of 66 penetrations have been examined, with 59 satisfactory; all of the penetrations will be examined during the current refueling outage. The plant is currently shutdown and in Mode 6 and the reactor vessel head is not currently installed. Repairs are currently being planned and will be completed prior to startup. This is reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) since the as-found indications did not meet the applicable acceptance criteria referenced in ASME Code Case N-729-1 to remain in-service without repair. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 482836 September 2012 19:20:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At 1416 EDT, after consultation with the Unit 1 control room, the #1 138 KV bus in the Beaver Valley switchyard was deenergized by the grid system operator in response to a degraded switchyard breaker. The bus loss caused the Unit 1 A train offsite power supply to be inoperable. The Unit 1 B train offsite power supply was previously inoperable due to planned maintenance on its transformer cooling fan control circuit. The Unit 1 B train offsite power supply remained energized and available during this event. Both Emergency Diesel Generators remained operable and both emergency buses remained energized from the onsite source and operable during this event. At 1425 EDT the #1 138 KV bus was re-energized. The planned maintenance was completed on the B train offsite power supply transformer. Following testing, at 1452 EDT both offsite power supplies were declared operable. This notification is provided in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) since both offsite power supplies were inoperable from 1416 EDT to 1452 EDT on 9/6/12. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DAN SCHWER TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1242 EDT ON 10/01/12 * * *

Beaver Valley Unit 1 is retracting EN # 48283 based on completion of an engineering evaluation. The evaluation determined that the Unit 1 'B' train offsite power supply was operable and capable of performing its safety function with its transformer cooling fan control circuit out of service for planned maintenance. Since one train of offsite power was determined to be operable, this condition is not reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." Notified R1DO (Wayne Schmidt).

ENS 4821020 August 2012 17:30:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1432 EDT on 08-20-2012, the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Shift Manager was notified by the Beaver County 911 call center that some sirens in the Beaver County area were activated at 1417 EDT. Investigation revealed that approximately 94 of the 120 sirens in the Beaver County area had been inadvertently activated for approximately 20 seconds in a Fire Alert mode during siren maintenance activities. All States and Counties within the Beaver Valley Emergency Planning Zone have been notified. This event is reportable as a 4-hour Non-Emergency Notification 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as 'Any event resulting in notification to other government agencies that has been or will be made.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 4785219 April 2012 17:47:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt approximately 1156 EDT on 4/19/2012, a craft contractor worker was transported to an off-site medical facility due to a work-related injury. The injured individual was partially surveyed by a Health Physics technician in their anti-contamination clothing prior to leaving the site and no radioactive contamination was detected. The injured individual was then transported by ambulance accompanied by a Health Physics technician to the local hospital for medical treatment. At the hospital, the individual and applicable areas and equipment were surveyed by the Health Physics technician and no radioactive contamination was detected. The individual's anti-contamination clothing was returned to the site. This notification is being made under the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) reporting requirements since a complete survey of the injured individual was unable to be made and he was considered to be potentially contaminated prior to being transported offsite. The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The worker was in containment on a polar crane platform when injured. He was subsequently released from the hospital and cleared to work.
ENS 475135 December 2011 09:35:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop

At approximately 0945 hours on December 5, 2011, the Beaver Valley Power Station Units 1 & 2 (BVPS) Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) electronic data link to the NRC will be taken out of service to implement planned system upgrades which include the improvements requested by Regulatory Information Summary 2009-13. The duration of the upgrade work is expected to be approximately 5 days. During the upgrade, the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) data link to the NRC will not be available ERDS parameters will be available to be monitored by control board indications or plant computer systems. An emergency plan procedure has instructions for providing data to the NRC, if needed, when ERDS is out of service. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. An update will be provided when the ERDS data link to the NRC has been returned to service. (The above report was originally logged by the NRC Headquarters Operations Officer at approximately 0935 on December 5, 2011 and was converted to an event report upon receipt of the updated information below)

  • * * UPDATE FROM SHARBAUGH TO HUFFMAN ON 12/9/11 AT 0948 EST * * *

Testing of the Beaver Valley Power Station Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) upgrade has been completed and the ERDS data link to the NRC has been returned to service. The NRC Resident has been notified. R1DO (Cahill) notified. NRC ERDS Program Manager (Alemu) and ERDS Help Desk informed via e-mail.

ENS 474032 November 2011 20:41:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOngoing field inspections as a result of Industry Operating Experience have identified certain fire barriers that are not in conformance with required tested configurations. Specifically, some of the flexible conduit that penetrates these barriers has a coating that does not exhibit flame retardant characteristics and therefore does not meet the requirements for fire barriers at Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1. In the event of a postulated fire, this non-conformance has the potential to affect fire barriers separating the two independent trains required for post fire Safe Shutdown equipment. This issue is being reported per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions have been established in accordance with the approved Fire Protection Program. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 468174 May 2011 10:35:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn March 15, 2011 with Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2 in Mode 6 during a scheduled refueling outage, the 'A' Standby Service Water (SWE) pump 2SWE-P21A automatically started at 1716 hours when electrical power was removed from the Secondary Process Rack 'A' . The removal of power from the process rack caused pressure transmitter 2SWS-PT113A (Service Water Pump Discharge Pressure Transmitter) to read low resulting in an invalid automatic start of pump 2SWE-P21A. As a result of the automatic start of the SWE pump, the SWE pump discharge isolation valve (2SWE-MOV116A) also opened to provide a flow path from the SWE header to the main service water supply header. The SWE pump is designed to automatically start on a low service water header pressure (i.e. < 34 psig). At the time of the actuation, the service water header pressure was stable at 93 psig. This invalid actuation resulted in a successful start of the Train 'A' SWE system which functioned properly. Plant operators secured the SWE pump after determining that the pump start was invalid and entered the issue into the corrective action program for evaluation. The SWE system is required by the Beaver Valley Unit 2 Licensing Requirements Manual requirement number 3.7.5 to be Functional in plant operating Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. The SWE system is not normally in operation and serves as a backup cooling water supply on a loss of the main intake structure. The non-safety related automatic start of the SWE pump on low service water pressure is provided to prevent an inadvertent plant trip on a loss of a running service water pump and is not required for the design basis event. The plant was in Mode 6 when the invalid actuation occurred. The automatic start of the SWE pump was not initiated in response to any plant event. This event is reportable 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) since it involved an actuation of an emergency service water system as per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), this event is being reported via this telephone notification, in lieu of a written Licensee Event Report, since the automatic actuation of the Train 'A' SWE was invalid. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.