Text

We the People, a National Whistleblower Organization
	ML15236A273
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	01/16/2014
From:	; We The People
To:	; NRC Region 1
References
	Download: ML15236A273 (484)
	v • d • e

We The People, Inc.

of the United States------------.

Stup 011!!'/IO/lr! Ila('

1. "Seabrook is in the wrong location."

2. "If the people let Seabrook open, it is their own fault."

But the NRC has not been playing a fair game."

3. I said "What do yu mean?"

"Whenever safety allegations come into the NRC, which may pose a threat to the further operation or licensing of a nuclear plant, those allegations are pencilled away."

4. "Members of the NRC are mostly engineers so they do not rock the boat because the only place to go after working for the NRC is to work in the industry.

5. "Over the years I have looked at how rot ten our agency is in my view. How pro-industry it is. Hey look, if they play it straight and you get stuck with your plant, so be it. Does that make sense? You may not like it but that is the American way, the majority rules. But when I see a system that is designed to thwart the majority or keep the majority ignorant and then one day it happens and you wonder how it happened .. That is not fair .. That is what turned me off, It is a shame to make you think. you are getting a voice ... "

6. When a member of the NRC staff was demoted he went to the present chairman and asked "Why?". He was told 0 What do you expect when you talk about your boss."

7. "The NRC protects the industry more than they protect the people."

8. "We will have a nuclear disaster in the U.S. worse than Chernobyl. It can happen any day because of the way our plants have bet'!n constructed 3nd the way they are run." Confirmed by NRC Bulletin 88-05.

(NRC aulletin BB-05 confirmed existance of counterfeit substandard parts iu U.S. nuclear plants across the country.)

Main Office: Box 277, Rowley, MA 01969, (50:-i1 948-7959 50 Courl SL, Plymouth, MA 02361, 1'0Xl 746-9300 National Press Bldg., 14 & F. Sts., N.W .. Washington D.C. 20045. t.:0:1 628-6611 1

Offices 5 & 6, 3 Pleasant St.. Concord, NH 03301. 228-9484 Bayberry Village, Route 9, Kennebunk. l\'IE 04043, 1:<1- l 967-5111

John A. O'Donnell I Influence Explorer: Campaign Finance and Lobbying Page 3of4

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Xcel Energy $9,035 KPAC 8 Susan B Anthony List AmeriPAC: The Fund for a Greater A .

View all campaign finance data for John A. O'Donnell Sources: OpenSecrets.org Lobbying covers roughly through Q2, 2013 Lobbying by John A. O'Donnell

Lobbied with the Following Firms Xcel Energy, Northern States Power, Nuclear I:nergy Institute

Most Frequently Disclosed Lobbying Issues

° Clean Air & Water, 0

Truces, 0

Energy & Nuclear Power, 0

Utilities, 0

Environment & Superfund,

° Fed Budget & Appropriations, 0

Homeland Security, 0

Transportation,

° Fuel, Gas & Oil, 0

Hazardous & Solid Waste

Clients of Firms John A. O'Donnell Worked For Xcel Energy, N011hern States Power, Nuclear Energy Institute View all lobbying data for John A. O'Donnell Sources: OpcnSecrets.org

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Sununu Would Supporct Smaller Seobrook Zone By RICHARD MAH.CH been considering whether to priate distance to have."

CONCORD <UPn - Gov. ask the NRC to authorize a Sununu said.

John Sununu. breakin~ ranks smaller zone. Management is Providing Seabrook manage*

with New Hampshire.*s con- expected to fi!e an official re- ment requests a change.

i::ressional dclcg3t:on. s~iid yes- quest to the :--.:Re later this Sununu said he expected the terday he would support a month involving evacuation NRC probably would "put it in smaller evacuation zone for the regulations. the context uf a graded re-Sc.abrook nuclear power plant Approval of the cv<>cuation sponse." which would involve if approved by federal regula- plans is required before the es* different degrees of emergency tors. timated S5 billion plant can re- plans in different distances Sununu. who has supported ceive an opernting license. But from the plant.

the existing federally required ~tass:ichusetts Gov :-.tich::iel "If an evacuntion is not nec-10-mile zone for Seabrook. said Duk::ikis. citing safety con- essary for public safet:-.*. then it he would defer to the '.\'uc!c.'.lr C(*rns. has refused to submit is not in the public interest to Hegulatory Cornmis:,1011 ii the plans for the six communities require an cv:.icu;.it1on, **

icdcral agency decides a in his state w1thm :0 miles of Sununu added. "Because C\'l'f\'

smaller zon1~ is upµropnate. Seabrook. time you cv::icuat~. just th~

"I prefer that it uc kept at the Reducing the evacuation transportation and the automo*

JO-mile zone. but I recognize zone from (!)miles :o l mile or 2 bile travel and so on under :111 that the NRC has both the au- miles would reduce the role evacuation condition puts the thority and a rcspons1hility to ~lassachusetts pl::iys in the public at risk.

determine what should take evacuation process and remo\*e "If they would be safer bv not place within that region." said a major stumbling block in being evacuated. I think it ;s lu*

Sununu. a Republican who has Seabrook management's re* dicrous for anybody to ask for a supported Seabrook and was quest for an opcratmg license. public policy to ask for unnec-re-elected last month to a third The project is alre::idy seven essary evacuation," he said.

term. years behind schedule.

New Hampshire's all-Repub- "If the. NRC finds that it is in Sununu acknowledged that lican congressional delegation. the best interest of everyone in- his support of smaller zone however. last week said it sup* volved. and :issures the safety would be a change in his pre-ports keeping the zone at 10 of the public that a smaller vious stand. but said his sup-miles and opposed any move to zone is appropriate. 1 defer to port of a "graded" response compromise emergency plons. the NRC." Sununu said in an m* plan has been consistent.

Asked whether his support of terview with United Press In- He also said there should be a sm;;iller zone would create a terna11onal. ~oR~olitical pressure put on the) pcr('ept1on or 3 rift between Re- "The N RC has both the au-p(Jbllc.ins. Sununu saiJ he did thority and the responsibility to "To suggest that the ~HC not know He said :he :iL.rnd m~ike that dec1s1on. And ought to be pressured political*

taken by delegation members they're going to makt* that o lv one wav or the other to was "their decis1orL" the basis of what is techmc:il! chani:;P its conclusion. rs 1rap-Seabrook m:rn;.i~emcnt has ::rnd praeucally the most appr( propnate ... Sununu said.

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\\'e .,_..he People, Inc of the United States -

Stop Chernobyl Here

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COMMENTS ON DOE MEMO .....

William Young, wh~-was appointed Assistant Secretary of Energy for the Department of Energy in place of Victor Stello, is certainly using Stella's dictatorial tactics. It makes me wonder whether Stello is behind this memo. It has his trademarks of coercing and manipulation.

The memo recommends bringing John Sununu tn to force Selin to come into line with the administration's policy on 11cen..,.~g nuclear power ,;:.c.

plants. Their plan includes powers for the NRG to grant quick and dirty construction and operating licenses, completely eliminating even the hint of democratic process bv cuttinq ~ut the rights cf the publi~

and states to intervene in the p~ocess.

Jchn Sununu is invoked repeated~y by Young as :ne neavy who is ~ore than willing to use whatever threats necessary to get Chairman Selin tc toe the line. The memo makes it clear that there ts no que'stion Sununu would take on this ramrodding job. sununu through President Bush has the ability to threaten Selin with loss of his job if he does not do what he is told.

This latest bit of information demonstrates that the interests of the nuclear industry may be much closer to Bush's heart than is the safety of the Ame~1can people or the preservation of democratic pr1nc1ples.

His reliance on the unpopular Sununu could dama~e his chances 1n the upcoming election.

Does Selin have a mind cf his own? Proponents of nuclear plant safety had their hopes raised on that qu~st1on when Selin closed the dangerous Rowe nuclear power plant. The memo from :he DOE states that agency's fears that Selin will oppose one step 11ce~s1n9. We will see during the hearings on the proposed bill whether Selin has the strenqth to oppose Sununu or whether he will cave in.

Congress will ultimately decide the fate o: the National Energy Strategy bill. Sadly enough, Congress has not been strong in standing up against th~ powerful nuclear !obby. They ~1rher don't hive the p~wer er lack th~ will1naness t~ exercise ~h2t oowe~. Perhaps this

!l'.4"'~i-l-l-*--O-tl-t-~.,e.....-t-.~em--oeno~--i.0--tak.e the . . proper_ -.::t.anc.e and bold_t_o__i.L~-

As vou know. Rooer Fort~na and myself were charced with tryin9 to topple the NRC: a charqe that fActs have proven wrong. After reading this memo. it certainly appears :hat th*?. \-ih:.~.*: 1~<'.'use- and the DOE have

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The followin,& inform~tion C01!Ccn1111g .1 decis1011_QJ.Li<ov~mbcJ.S1 1 l2.59 when_NR£,:~'

judge. Ivan smith of the Atgn1i1,:):i!'!.Llli~ !ilJ.9J..,.icen~i11g Boarg _refjched in a decision ou Ne~J-lwnpshirc '$_£J:rte.q,1.en.rr.nl!m J~ J Ufil-'.!Im.thcr .~.~<~.m1!.k vL!.bf__Ouote~ I - 5 (cm: losed)

We The People receivt:d from Brnve NRC \vhistlehlo\\'ers who stated, "Whenever safety allegations come into the NRC. which may pose a threat to the further operation or licensing of a nuclear plant, those nllcgutions a re penciled away."- See my written testimony I pre.sentcd at the NRC Hearing December 18, 2013 when l referred to large packet Page I of letter to tvtichelle Obama and go to Page 6 C of this packet On November 9, 1989. Judge Ivan smith's Aton11c Safety and Licensing 13oard reached a decision on New Hampshire's emergency plan. !he decision spoke directly to the Appeal Board, established in 1972. order lo n:\.:onsidcr Hadiolog1cal hmergcncy Response Plan ability to evacuate handicapped, schoolchildren. and transients at local beaches. The appeal came t\vo days bef<ne Judge Smith's decision. Judge Smith order implied the appc.al Board's decision did "not preclude the immediate issuance of a license for Seabrook station" because changes in New Hampshire's emergency plan could "be readily and prompll y taken."

Despite the fact attorney general James Shannon promised another appeal, the NRC decided on Novt.mber 20. 1989 they would settle all future licensing disputes over Seabrook station.

Case closed. In the words of Edward l\.1 Kennedy "the rogue agency that lives by its own set of pro-industry rules" would decide the safety of lhe Amcri<.:an people Representative Peter Kostmayer called it an "extrnordinnry action" and a further example of"the steady erosion of safety standards enacted by Congress/"

During this time when Peter Kostmayer was investigating Victor Stello actions and went against President Bush's nomination of Victor Stello to become Assistant Secretary of Energy under \Vutkins. Due tu !\*fr. Kostmayer attempts to expose corruption inside the NRC wias not rc*eJected. Due to these circumstances l'v1r.

Kostmayer top legal aid John A. O'Donnell went on to built a career as a nuclear lobbyist. See NRC quotes # 4 which applies to not only NRC employees but to politicians and their staff who routinely get their political war chests filled by n~clear lobbyists.

lf'you need rurther clarification or comments please contact me.

-11 t ben B. Comic Sr.

7 i1/

/.(AJ>l'l_

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founder of We The People, a National Whistleblol*l'er Non Profit Organil.ation.

scomlexsr@vab.oo.com 904-206-3114

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should 1t car.sider Oile necauary. D~s, 'l'ir:en the qvest1cn lrosa durin; tt.a:-1:.*.:~
of S. lZ20 about in:l udin; tlie )(Ord f~ n:lir.i; in tht t:n 1, a1ternit iYe wc~s tr.1 ~
tha Cor.z:is$10n shali ~satfsfy 1:s,1f ~ha~ t~e ic~eptlnca 'rittrf& o~ the lica.nsa haVG been ~et" befora o~artt~cn ~a:"'1 proposed. At r.y reQu~st, Ch&.1r::a.'l. Ca.rr c;nvcr.1ci a. Cc::-r.:h5~cn ::;:;:,tL*.; to estab1ish the NRC peiftion o~
---*- .. .__thts_pgjn~..L.a.nd by ;. 3-l vo:o s:.;;~;:-t~j ::.e ;.1~a~n&tive w:rcs, 't<i'!1c.~ wei:"'e tnc:1ud1.rtn s-:-rrro. * -* ** ***-** * ,***-- -*--* -------*******-* ....
I also asked Chilrn.a.1 Car:- \f ~!".~ Cc::-::1.s:-i;~n wo:.:l: ser:d 1 lett!r t: thi
Congreu bofcre nis tQt~ ex;:ind 1 sv;por'.!:-:s Ti~le !X of S.12ZO. Such a h!~
wu sent c:i June '2~ :s;i. ~::~.,,*as be.sad i.:~:r. e. i;nt~i:i::aus vo-:;, 4-C. by t.r.a ..
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GUQStt:n tc1d ~e ~h~t :~e r~;cr: 1a~;~~~l l~CC~:a~ying s.1zz~ clair;C ~p l~!*
~n;1~s thi.~ ht ~d -::-. :.in ~=-~.i:.
I I O ChA1rn&n ~Ha:i.,Yer ukad whether C:;c.~:-;;-:;r, S.:Hr. cis11reec *dth !ha Ad.!:11n1stnt1cn's z..nd S.ltZO'!: y:-cy)sfc.~ cf a ~:-:ruhoic fcrho1d~r.~ ' ~re cperlt1ona1 hu.rir.9 inc who~her r.~ r:oi:i::. ~~~;:art re;i:=:va1 ~r. the thruhc1~~
Chair.ac.n Sc.Hr. sa1~ y~s. ht:: c~s.l:ree:, ..!'.':~ ~.e ~uk s:.:p;iort re:.:ovai :of thi t)**
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o th&il"l:l!.n Ko..stmaye~ stated th&t ft s~~~~ to ht~ tn1t l fon:&i pr-t~
apent1on*1**heartn9 (U o~~se~ to th~ 1nfer,:o:1i hea.rir.~ :5~e:1fied 1n S.12%0) it U$&fu1 because i: s~irantceS the pub1~c cartain prcce;ur~& ~~
elicit fnfon11ttion which t~e;t don': have .*.d";!'\::::.:t 1 fo~l1 ~!lr1nq .
I
.Cha.in111.n Selin rtp1ie.d that he 1i*ould Ii k* :c a;r;<a ~:th Ch4 !rr:ui KcHs.tytr, I I but. his c.o11eague5 wau1di.'t ht h~:: o:o it. - *--*;
In t.it.e.xc:bange cf 1etters bot,,.-ce.!': :*:*1.! ar.::: Chz.ir-...z..'i Se11:-: ::-:-. A~;ust l, 1S9l, h&.
agrtt4 to daht; a sentanee ir1 hH dr.tf~ r;:ply tlilt icdre.sse-! tr.a Co:::iissicn'j authorit.,y to ~ake a broad safe!y fi~di~; ?f:e~ e:n!tr~c:i~r. and prtor te
1n1t1&l opertt1on cf a phnt. Wa ob:a.ir.ed tha.: deie;1or. by ir.::iudir.9 ~~ .r::.;r l*tter l lt&tament th~t $.!2ZO eoa~ no! reduc~ tht Cc::-::-dssic~'~ e.xist~r.;
cttscr-t~1on &nd J.uthority tCJ r::3.k6 sz.fe:y ce~en:::~r.1ticr:s. A~ter ne rQcah*..A ~ .*,,r.., ... .. .
---,-* -s1-gRed-1-tttar,.-~ha.!1"'!"'..>tt-SQUrLrJ::in~~rJ.l;_~n ~~s ro1i;r th~ nr.':an_~~ tha~ ht had 1.ifQ~d b do1 tte. -- --;:-- .
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connacticn w\t!'i his rea:.a:-t.s :~ ~hair.:z.": :s.~t~~, H.1ic!'\ :,,..,e !:H."'! du:i-i:ad a!cva.
1 bel1eve th&1; ins. s~ary ! r.c.v~ j!..:s: ~r-c.,.~c!~ c;:.?~s~rc.:e.s that Chtirct.n Se11n 1s undar.:iining the ic-:po:-:12n: ;n*itisicr.s cf S.l2ZO even u he p1"0f9$SIS support for that 1eg1s1Ltior:. i ha*.-e no CC~!Jt th;t ni~ :::r.caUiCliS to Oe.moerat1c h91sl!tol"'S wi11 ~: i..:se: against S.12Z~ en the SQr.ttt f1eor t.'\~
w111 tu.kl ft r:o~ difficult for Ui to ;iir. ?~t s~~;er~ cf Se~ater G~ahL~
(Clu1ma.ri, Sonl't* S\.!bccrr=:Htee c;i l-1;.;cl~ai ~uc~;r Rec;..:1&~1on) fer S.12('.0.
Senator Gr&.h&::'f position 11..:u Ce.en t~... : s.:22~ ~~ r.~t. -:t1~r1~1t a.nrl th!."!
Part 5~ shou1d bt acc.e.pt2oie.. -Cha.ir:..ar. s~H:-.'s c:r.ce..s:ic:'!s '11:111 !.1so har:i .:s if *ni.;c.1etr licenstn;: refom i;91s12.:~c:-, cc::£!~ ~:J
vo~* in Her.ae c:::-:-:i1':~Ur ai~
on thG fleer. r do r.ot k.":0'..( \~:":~ e1 :a :r-;.-: !~.C' C:::;-;HS t'.ia: C.1afr".':!n S..-:1 ;~ I I ml9h~ hlVQ talked to or wh&t ~~ ~igh~ ~~~M sit:.
4
! bilteve that sc~c t:t1c~ s~c~.G ~~ :1~i~ : ; :~:a!r: i~ ~~~;~1vccil wr::t;~
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, J\lYO 0Utl1ned. baiOi< :ii'liHa.l ~;:::C.":S ~c:* ;:~*r::;o -;:;-:,; !:"',c'. 1'.lV~ St:.::r.ar~z:s! .... ;-.l~
sat u the1 r *pr~' uid cons.
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?res: Cln be \.:SQ~ a.s w:-!-=-~~ ev~Ce!'iC! .... ~th Stna.ters l ..i";d ConyN.s:::icn ;~sh::'"' J:L-:t ~uppo:-: Uh'.! *.::i~o crtl s':.a.t1:wtr.t! by Cht.l"'.':-in St1in.
C&l'\ ~i l'l0i¢tt~ted *,..(-:;-:hf::: 1n ::cvi . . ce. t~f~r-e :"i~s ir.~'e:-ac:~c~ l"I*~~~
Admiral w&t:<ins, tc ::'.~711:tt12'.I d~ ff~rene~~ tc r*tsolYe.
Cons: May ~a 11-:posslb1,. t,:, r;2c:1 a;ree::-.e:-i~ **Hh :.h!\r:il~ So11n O:< s;;~h :. st:.:e.":cn~, C:" ::a;' :akt too C:.JC'.'1 tlr:l! a.:id lrf!..l::ltt\t.
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'1 hair::\.tn Se.Hn m1~i'lt .-:era 01..dcX.i ft.11 1n 1ine fer-Pros: Gov!rnor ur.uiu thA~ he ~ou1d for Ac~.r1 att.~s.
Woulc most cu~cki*
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tltho~;h no~ s1;n:c.
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OpttC."I *3: Ha.Ye Sanat:jr .:c0~;;::~ :-::1d z. r>.nr~:-i; :: c:::::;!.~ C'~?~r.::ar. S:iifr,':
AgrN;:;i\t 1.i~t!': t'h~ ?;:::ti~l:r.s :'t' S.:ZZ). She.; Se~u.-:~r Jci'lns~o~ C:.:r ic'niti! h;:a:-- Frc.":I ~::1c~ ~~ Fr~2 Q*.i'!S~1:ns. ~c.v~ ~~>Verr:or S!J:i\.i~U Sptlk to Ch11r~t~ Seli~ ta ~~~a~c;.
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th'" to the. A*:~.~ r. *1 s t r a.-'~ fo n . T,... ar: s: r ! ;:; t cc:.: 1d b ed ! tac! for Se ~ 1.: e noor t.lle.
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Could c1ust Senator Gn.hiU! to ho id .t hur1ns
. ~-
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Qot,of' i:., HlVG Senator Jehrts,on Writa to O.iimzn Sci!:-. !r.O' Seek l Support for thr Provtitons cf S.!2ZJ.

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Pro$: \lt,fujd provide A-wrftten se~ of ~osHiC1'S.
Con*:* ~nswer1**p~~!)1y c~uld r:o~ t2 'r,f!t:e~:e-= ~Y ::: &r.c ~ra unHkaiy to ba ~hit WI want.
Ooth~ !:
linora tna Ptst. ________ .
- --Pro-.r-~eatty-th*~~"!"'JTO-n*-{Ki :.; to :::::: .
Con:: Cots not ?"tp&ir tha d~~l)t l1te?cf cfone.
Chairn:an Stl fn WQuid prvta~1y t"inc a we.y a:-::.:r.e th~i a$ ht h:s in the put.
oou net ~r~vfdQ p:s1t1vfl ri1.~ );.;~;~:-~ i: t. :1A ";.e:-. ..~Hllil.
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ht1pf1Jl. ! i t I t rtc:omand that ir. 11\ttrntl me.etin9, be held t~ c1sc:1as t!'lt above o~tfons., ! *.
1u9gttt th1t Sanato~! John:tor. and Walle? or ~~eir 3t1ff: L~ttnd ~o obt&f n t.heir V1tw*. balance it th1S o1r.t I favor c~r~cn l l~d e ~ i *. i*
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______ ......_._~ ---- ----
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The Secretary of !nergy Wul'llnQton, DC 2069~
October 21, 1991 rhe Honorable Petar H. Kostmayer ChAinnan Su.bcom.m.ittae on Energy and the Environment
om.mittee on Interior and Insular Affairs J.S. House of Repreaentative&
Washington, D.C. 20Sl5-620l
Dear Mr. Cheinnan:
7hia responds to your lottor o~ Oc~ob&:t' lO, !991, req-~asting tha a.ppeare.nce of Deputy S.cretaJ..--y He.r..son Moora aa a replacement :for
~ssistan~ Secretary William Young aw t.~a oe~nt'* witn*aa for '
'l
I your Subcommit~~e'a hearin9 on Nuclear Power Ple:n't t.1censJ.ng Reform. I:
l.
I I'
Although I have agreed to your request to provide Hanson Moora as
~he Oepartmental witne*~ at th9 subject he&:ri.nga, wh1.eh I u.ndarstand have been reacheduled tor ~ovombe..r 1, 1991, I do no~
agraa with 'the other contonts ot your letter wh.ioh-question tha J 1
II a~ili~y of Mr. Young to ropreeen~ this Oepa--t:::Dant ~ith cred.1h111 t"'.i. H4 is the Aaaiatar,t S6c:'atary 1!or Nuc1ear Energy, and I hAve conf idance in him as my designated spokesni.an for I
~atters ~hieh tall within his area o~ raspon*ibility. *I My decision to ask Henson Moore to tastify 1n place ot Mr. Young !1
~
et ~his particular hearing is, as I believe ~"OU will ur..dere~e.nd, based on the speoial sot of circ.umata:ncas. Mr. Young axpraeaed
11.\!ir"l:ain fael1.ngs in an intarne.l conanun.tcat.ion ~ c:a _9q_ .<'.\ . a.ub-jeo&:-, - **-c<--*'--*-*~ --*
quite_..;-~l~~l:. ...l:o-the--topie =~:.e-10ur=ec11eaurea- hearir.gs. \fh.ila 1 : i riefther requested nor du.ired th.&t co;iununicatioo.. o:n wi'Ueh l have i neitner acted nor ever ~ntendad ta aot, I do hove concarns th6 :1 memo might become the tocu& of the ha4%'1ng rather then I consideration of the iin-porta.nt i!i!.t11Ue of nuclear li~-iti1ng refom l_.
.r. :: ~alar..ced menner; therefc:-i:;, Deputy S*C:::'e'tary !<<>era 'ii'014ld be ,
he right wi tn*fie fo::- diStcussinc;; t-hesa broader issu*G
i .
Sincerely, I I i
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October 10, 1991 Hon. Jame$ Watkius. Secr~!arv U.S. Department of Energy '
Washington, D.C 20585 Ooar Mr. Secretary:
On September 27, I invited you to panictpate in the Subcommittee's O~bcr 17 heariJJ8 on nuclear plant liuru~ renewal. Tue Subcotnruittee staff W-a.S :£ubsequcnt1y nOtttied by yoc.tr Office of CongressJonel Affairs that Au.istant Secretary William Young was de!!gnated u the Department11 witness.
I rcerct to inform you that Mt. Young will not be *~ptablc " a witness at our hearing. We h:ivc been v-:ry distressed a..11d dlsappotmed to learn this past week of Mr.
YoWlg'S proposed ca.mpttig:n to compromise the independence of tht: Nuclear Regulatory C.ommisaion and its Cha:in:.nao with re1pett to positions a.".ld sta.temcni.S on proposed cncra policy Ieifslatioo. I rn~t auurc you that I take very scrioll.$ly the divislon of the promotional a.nd regulatory functions cf federal atomic energy policy as ma.niksted in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974. Jt is difficult to view the ideas expressed in Mr.
----:=:::;:::,,,ill,,,,,,.,,*. _
You!!.8'$ Septembc~ 24 :nemonrndum to youas al'!}"lhirl~ less than a serious affront to that pnnclplc of sep.araooii,- an cf possilliyaconspirec);. te"vH::i:t!tt-ure-J1\dependencc-of-an --"'---
independent" regulatory commission.
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Under th~ cl"'Cu.tr.sta.nce;.,~o .:ct feel that ~Ar. Yo~!Ilg bas sufficient crechbiliry
~ make a meaningful contribu.dcn tc our h'1..ar..ng. ~decJ.. wt. fr.at tha.t bis presence would havo a high l.ikeiiho00 of shifting th~ fo~w of our ht"..ari.o.g.. 'Nhile '1'n! s.re considering whether to schedule anuther hearing on ti."ic: indcp~uC...."'ncc of NRC., we do not wish co have att.<!ntiOI! div'.:ned fr:m.l the iinpcrt.'.!nt issue; *::f '...!:.:.cr~e r~newaJ at our October 17 hearing.
fadccd.. if the views an<.1 ~u~e.~t.:d ai::tioos cxpz.:..>sc,,J JJ hf!J', Y~l:ug's September 24, 1991 memorandum to you oo Oiaim1an Selin r~prcs~nt Dep--...rtro!!nt policy, then we
/
do 001 wish to hear from an~ Department witness on the 17th. lf you cs...1 assun: us that /
~uch u not the case. we would be p!ce..~('.d ro :!CCGP'* :-":'Ur1pen01:.':.l :;;.~~nny ~)r thtu of Deputy ~cretary Moore at our hearing. _,
...: =
ri. Je.mes Watkin.!> ...v' ,....-*-.
tobcr 9, 1991 age 2 Please advise us as soon as possible how you wish to proceed in this matter.
Since.rely,
((7 .
V -h- /C .. ~
U..v. .ft Kostmayer Peter 2~
Chairman .
Subcommittee on ergy and the Envi!'onment I I I I
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UNIT&tf$T.4TU NUCt.£AR REG'tJl.ATORY COMMISSION WAS>llHC'TOH. C.C. ~
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Ol'lltC:I QI' TI-II August 19. 198_6
C:.CMMl~OHl1' MEMORANDUM FOR: The Files FROM: James K. A.sse1st1ne
SUBJECT:
DISCUSSION WITH ?HEN S. COMLEY RE NUctfAR SAFETI' AHO EMERG!NCY PLANNING
.On Friday, Augu.st.lS, 1986,.I met*witn*Hr. Stephen B. Com1ey to discuss his concerns regarding nuclear $afety and emer9ency planning. Mr. Carnley is a resident of Rowley. Massachusetts*. Mr. Comley fs fnu~st.!d in the S~abrook._Nuc1ear Power Plant but is not a party in the Seabreo~ licensing proceeding. We did not di seu.ss any c:onte$Ud issues in the Se ab n:>o k 1 icansing proe~ing. The followinq is 1 written sumary of my responses to M~. Camley*s questions *
....J Ouesti on 1: Oo you f~l that the p1M>ple of RO\ltl ey shou 1d have a voi ca in
~ evacuation planning 1.s it pertains to the Seabrook power plant?
Answer: As a general matter, I believe that the 10-ilrlle emer9ency
~1ann1ng zone (En) established by the Cmmri~sion is a reasonable boundary fo-r planri'ing prctKtive actions, including evae\Jation, fn the event of a nuclear power plant accident. ¥rny;yer, rpe Caarni551gn 5 ,..auJatigp' QM!
1 f1 ex i bl! in that they a 11 ow sxoags j PD gt }tJe lQ.mJ 1~ &FL tp take into account nearo rac1lit1es o~ featur for whi .
. n examo e wou 1d
[n orev1ous OT tfle t so
'. 1 the situation for Seabrnok, and I have no opinion *on the issue at the present time-.
Ouestion 2: Evacuation issue - oeo 1~ ':ll'ho c~n'1" 0 l'!""lvo * *
Do you fe 2 1 some means snou a oe prov1 aea ror peop e ~ho cannot be
~ved, other than me~1y being shelte~d7 J am not nrnc +hrt tt1z i
gue;-;1an ha~ be;n fas;a 1 n in an revious cas
As a genera .
ssuyr-\::;
matter, t e oam1ss1on s re9u ations require that emerge planning within tne EPZ provide for a range of pnJtective SJ.lE.LTER.ED actions. ~e can include she1tei-fna. but for at lea ~
some acci ent s1tuat1ons ~vacuat1on mav oe necasSCJl"V rnr
~~~ue:_ or*a1 a e oeoo ~ ~1tn1n tne 1 ~ 1nus, emersency p ann1ng measures.nave be~n requ1rea to include ne~ded transportation, particularly for those who ar! unable t~
evacuate tnemse1ves. I agree with this e1ement of our emergency planning ~i rements. For this ~as on, the Conmission emphasized the ne~ for arrangements for ambulances and buses 1f evacuation is ne!<fed for a ca~
faciUty for elderly nuns near the F~rm1-Z r-eactcr. The Caamission has also considere<f the n~ for sheltering and evaC'Jation of prisoners in deten-t1on facilities 1ocatad near nuclear power plants. How-.ver. I do not be11ev~ ~h~t th; fac~ the 5ituatiott 1n wnicl'? e'la.t:'Ja~
1
ion ha ;
Question 3: Location issue - Seab~ok. Has the sumner beach population been fully taken into consideration?
Answer: I believe "'that this is a contested issue in the Seabrook pr-oceedinq. My opinion on this and other contested issues
.,..i 11 be based upon the forma 1 record in the Se ab rook case.
I have no opinion on the issue at the ~resent time and I
cannot discuss it with you.
\/Question 4; ** As we have yet to receive all of the information on
~ Chernobyl, what ar-e your opinions on reducing the radius
from 10 miles to 2 miles?
Answer:
~ductions in the radioactive source term (the estimates ~f the amounts and ~ypes of *radioactive materials which could be n!leased during a serious nuclear accident). The industry ar-9ues_that these reduced source t~rms would justify relaxations in several NRC ~9ulat1ons. Chief among those is a reduction iri the size of the enter9ency planning
"* zone.,p~rh4ps U) an area as s~ll as two miles. The American Physical Society and others have identified a number of ares when! additional wort. is needed to. previ de a sound si:ientific bas.is for- any sou~ ur.n reassessment.
They have advised that across-the-board reductions in the source tenn are not yet justified, and that specific numerical reductions an! umitarrante-d. The Corrmission has nc.t yet taken action to reduce the souri:e tenns, and our tachnical staff has advised that any across-the-board .
r-e<:1uct1ons in emergency* planning zones a~ prematun?.. The staff has r'!jei:~d at least one site*sp~if1c preposal ta reduc:a the EP! for tne ~lvert Cliffs plant on the greund that the ~est is prematu~. Of eeurse, any licensee is f~ to propose a site-specific: reduction in the size of the EPZ for the plant and the individual pro~osal would be Ct2ns1dered by the Coirmission on its merits.
Question 5: I unde~tand that the low level 1icensin9 requi~ents have be-en ~uced as they per.t.ain to issues of evacuation problems that may arise in a city or town. This change nas enabled question not ta be resolved before a-license is issued. Given the Chernobyl. incident and tile problems and
~estions that sun-ound the Pilgrim Nuclear Plant in Plymouth (which has been brand~ *tne wont-nin plant in the us*), do you think we Should. n!Yl!T9Se again and M~Uir"e that evaluation issues be r--esolved befor-e a 1o...t 1evel license is granted to any new plants?
Answer: The Comnission's regulations require adequate emergency planning measures to be. in place prior to the issuance of a full-power license, but no . t prior to the issuance of a low-power license (these are limited to no more than five percent of full power). This decision was based upon the technical judgment that a plant beginning operation and not going above five percent power fails to generate the quantity of fission products and decay heat which could pose a hazan1 to the public requiring evacuation or other protective* action. I agre~ with this technical judgment that the risk to the public from low-power operation of a new plant is very low. Some have questioned whether the Chernobyl accident affects this judgment since that acciden1 2
iiiiif!i~!!iii:ii;!ia!ii!!~j;i!iJil:i;li~J!:f!!H. .'
to an't tha r o ino icense and no't .,,/
public of ow-oow:r gperatign.
~* Question 6:
AnS4.¥er: th@ HRC ha
,~ ese cases ave inc ud.ea tne ormnss1on s aec1s1on Wllliii*a*trcv-cw operation of the Indian Point plants in the faca of continued significant deficiencies in eme~ency planning; the Corrmis.sion's decision to reject the safety improvements rei:omende~ by the* NRC staff and the hearl ng bean:! in the Indian Point Special Proceeding; the Colmlission's de~isian to allow the ~start of TIU, Unit l; the Cormnissionis decision to end the seareh for further r-e<iuctions in the risk of seve~ nuclear accidents in the Severe Accident Policy Statement; and the Conmission's de-c:ision to n!str~ct the HRC staff's abi 1 i ty ta develop nef!d~ n!'# safety requ1rement3 in the Comnission's bacxfit l"Ule. My views are well doc:t1mentetl in my dissenting views on each of these decisions, and they have been ~idely publicized. For the most part, I am the only member of the current Comnission who has opposed these actions; however, one other Corrmissioner opposed the bacxfit ru1e. Despite my opposition to these key Corrmission decisions,.l be1iev~ t~si t'<.i Ngr ...... 6 f'a; ... s ;:s *w =-b 1o 2 gl"f d=di ,..~ ~~...i "'"""l"I." .t,,~ 0
1 ...
ZlFffiBS)ag fjzx ra5x!a£~g "SM&; ~So o;~s*:= I a:~~;g~f i ~;n;i V" 1 that the agency could pu~ue its regulatory responsibilities in a manner that would r!stol'"! public confidence in the NRC as an objective and fair regulator that puts the interests of the public foremost.
Question 7: Has Chernobyl changed your thinking regarding nuclear .. power?
Answer: The Chernobyl accident has not dramatically altered my views on nu cl ear power or on the key regulatory is sues which are before the NRC. I continue to believe that nuclear
... power p1ants can be operated, built, and designed safely, and that they should be & part of our overall energy mix.
In ~aching this judgment, I r-ecogn1ze the substantial
,' .' ~
"corrmitment* to nuclear power which we alrea*dy have in the U.S. The challenge is to ensu~ that the approximately* 12S plants we have 1n operation or under consti!Jctiol'\. a~ run
safely. Hence, Cherncbyl has unde~cored my belief that a sevl!T-! nuclear- accident in the U.S. is unacc2ptable, and that further r'e9UlatDrt. initiatives a~ ne~ded for the
future if~ a~ to redua the 1ong-tann rlsx of nuclear power to an acc!ptable level. Jn a ryi::7nt 1ett=,.. ""g-t~*
Pre!ident of the Atomic Industrial For-Jm, f outTined mv o.,..~
men"E of db? @Ff!hf UHEJPS 1oahd 1.18 of die risks nuc ear ewer an e s ra neeae
1 a e to note
~~-P.l~.~r.-J~.ipi;.,-,!!!P.11'~~-..~~~oa 1 s Po 1 icy Statement the Corrmi ssion ag~ to a statment that an objective of our
~gulatory process should be to pr~vent tile occurrence *of a sever-e nuclear accident - that is, an accident causing damage tQ the. reac~r Cllre - at any U. S* nu cl ear power plant. This stat.ement~ tt>gether with the Conmission's recent .increased at~ntion on the operating performance of U.S. plants, particularly those with a history of poor performance. is an encouraging step in the right direction.
~ . Ouestion 8: vou f!~l that oetiole are ~a11 1nfomed about and kno""
nP! ,.g; gangs~ oT. nuc ear cower-.
Answer: t ,am nsio ccnxias*f that; f~; QY'* Hs 1; tup x iptarr~a gt tb~
~1;; gt gu5lear power. e issues are often comp ex, and the debate on ffie lssues is ~~uently polarized and somewh.at"distorted. In rtfJ re<:ent letter to the AIF. co~y attache<f, I attem,,ted to describe my view of the risk of a nuclear accident, including the uncartainties in estimating that rislc. As I noted in rrrt letter, r do *not be1i;v7 th¢;
we fu11v understand that risk, and we snou1a not oe arra1
. Question .9: C1:ls t ver"\JS other funds
obso1 ete?
Answer: ~As I under)!and your question, do I believe tnat nuc1ear power is obsolete based upon cost considerations? The Co1T1T1ission 1 s regulations focus on health and safety considerations rather than on the overall cost of nuclear power. It is true tha~ the cost of nuclear p~er has increased substantially in recent year~, particularly for th~ large new plants. The cost of operating and maintaining the older existing plants has also increase-<i significantly over the past several year-s. Although there are many reasons for the cost increases. among the more significant are poor Nnagement of phnt. construction. the lac~. of standardization, 1 design-as-you-build approach to plant construction, and the need to address new and unanticipated s~fety issues, including those 1r1s1n9 fn:im the Three Mile Island accident. Whether nuc1ear power ~ins compet1t1v~
with Question 10 How Many people were hospitalized.* in Russia?
Ansiiter: I do not know the answer to this question. We are-awaiting ful'"'ther details o.n the Che-chyJ accident at the upcoming meeting of the Internationa1 Atomic Energy Agency late t!iis month.
. . . .. ,t:;1 OUEST!ON 11. How old was the ~fant - 3 years? - Lt.3S ~J1~
Answer:. The r-eac:tor which. had the accident at Chernobyl was the newest unit of the four~nit Chernobyl plant. A1 though I do not kna. the date on which the unit began oper~tion, J.
believe that the plant had been in oceration no mo~ tna)'
tJlf @! fQdd, Jhd §#.fHJb! I es' question 12: What are the d1fferencas bet:Aeen the Russian plants.and our nuclear pl ants as you ~ff them?
Answer: There- cl early are a number of design di ffe~nces betw~n U.S. nuclear powerplantl and the Chernobyl plant. Other Russian plant designs are mor! similar to oul""'S. I do not believe that we have enough deta11ed de~ign information about the Chernobyl plant to fu11y undel""Stand their des~g~
or* the significance of the differences between their design phi'losophy and ou~. \.le a.re awaiting more detai1ed design inforr.-~tion at the upcoming IAEA meeting 1ater this month.
However, quite apart from the design differences between the U.S. and Russian plants, there an! some broad lessons with applicability to the U.S. nuclear pr-ogram. One of *pese ;z th; unass;ptabj J1ll~J: Qf I s;ysr; QSd d;pt her; §Qd Sh* p;*d to ensure tnat su111cient te
ar k r
~;ijiijiiii!iii!l!l.jiiiji~!i!ii!~~!ii!lil!+~!iii!~~~~~~~a~d~.~,~t~1~0~n..
, there are specific safety areas, such as hydrogen control. which may require add1t1ona1 attention based upon the information obtafned from Chernobyl.
Ouest1on 13: Regarding future generations, would you recotm'lend that we continue to build nucle&r plants?
f
- 1 ..
Answer: I telieve that we should retain the nuclear power option for the future fn this country. When I examine other energy a rte ma ti ves, it appeaM at tile present time ~at coa 1 and nuclear a~ the principal means available for providing ,
1 arge central station generating facilities. Conservation and other optio.ns a~ navi ng a s i gni fi cant impac:t; he'Wever, it is unclear -whether they can el iminat~ the n~d tor net 1arge generating fac:i 11 ties at some point in the futur-e.
Sut if nuclear p~er is to remain a viable option for the futu~. th~e conditions must be met. Fi~t, the !xisting plants 121Jst operata safely and there must not Se a s~vere
!(
accident at any of the existing plants for the foreseeable future -- at hast the next 20 years. ~econd, we must
~structun! the process for designing, ccns-tMJcting a.nd ,Y operating future nuc1 ear pl ants. This ~stMJctur1 ng must ~
include greater use of standardized designs; the development of essentially C%lmp1eta designs before the start of c:onstruct1on; better, more central i:ed management of the c:onstruct1 on proc:.ess; gre*ater attent1 on to construe ti on quality assuranct; improve<i designs whi<:h emphasize g~atar mar-gins of safety, simplicity, ease of operation and ease of maintenance; better utility management; and imp~ved '\.,?
Opera ti ens and* maintenance performance. !Jli tj, Wf! ITll.tSt make ..,:,
continued prog"5s toward developing a sare and \
environmentally acceptable solution to the nuclear waste disposal problem. Each of these areas, in ray vi~. is in nffd of att.enti on if nuc:l ear power is ~ remain a vi ab 1e option for the futun!.
~Question 14:
Ans"Wer:
UNITED ST"' 1 u NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 70t.!I' OCT ! L986 Mr. Stephen B. Comley, Administrator Sea View Nursing Home Hans ion Drive RO'ffley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Hr. Comley:
Chlirwn Zech has asked me to respond to your letter to hfl1 of August 22,
1986. The questions 1n your letter focused upon sever11 issues including emergency planning 1t the Seabrook nuclear generating statfon, the Russian nuclear accident at Chernobyl and nuclear power in general.
Enclosed are answers to each of the questions cont.lined in your letter. If we can be of_ further assistance, please let me know.
S1nee rely,
Enclosure:
Questions and Responses
NRC RESPONSES Ouestion l Do.you feel that the people of Rowley should have a vofce in evacuation
._planning as ft pertains to the Seabrook power plant?
Response
The C01111iss1on ~gulations provide that, genera11y, the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) for nuclear power plants shall include areas C;.1£/K~c wf thin about 10.. mfles of a nuclear power pllnt. The exa_ct sfze and configura.-
tion of the zone fs to be detennined fn relation to local emergency response /1FF!t:rl needs and capabilities as they a re affected by demography, topography, 1and I/Ille Cit cha racteri st ics. access routes and juri sd i cti ona l boundari.es.
s rate ove~ntal unit which is outsid in YERi these are Question 2 Ev1cv1t1on 1ssue-~ple who c1n't be 11aved *** Do YCN feel s~ *ans should be provided for people who cannot be llOYtd, other for than *rely being sheltered?
Response
3
Response
Yes. The guidelines in the reference document NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 specify that each licensee's plan shall contain time es.tim.ates for evacuation within the pluine £PZ based on population est11n1tes that include consideration of transient as well as penunent res1dents ind spechl facility populations (e.g., schools,
-hospftals, and nursing homes). Consideration is also given for both normal and adverse weather conditions fn the analysis. The Seabrook Station EyacuUjoo - - .
T1ipe EstiMtes and Traffic Mana etnent Plan sutil'Hted 6 Public Servi f N a on ,
As we ~ve yet to receive all of th:e fnfor'91tfon on C~rnobyl, ~hat are your opinions on reducing the r1d1us frOll 10 *f les to 2 *f les?
Relpo!!ff .
n. * ~s 1rtd1c:a~ t.Mt 1t 1nt.M4s to betfft 1 r"Hsses...,.t of -~.1 pl1Miltf, 111 1 ftftt ef uty ...., 1nsf,..ts .arh1"1 ,,._ *r 1xa.tsfv1 resecrch on senf"e ac:cfHrit re leasts or *source term.* We COftS1Mr ft approprflte tMt 1ny wc:h re1ssess.nt should also include pert1Mnt 1nformtion froa C!Mrnobyl,
td:ing into account the s1iniffc:ant differences bet.Mn the Chernobyl desi9"
.... tlNt of U.S .....ctors (SN rnponH to o-su ... lZ). IS they affect *
f.t}a.: J2'r'1t1* '$ptM,.
D.
cchlettt risks.
si. s!u pf
&:::t:t ti-=!: -: !.u !at
~he Q?-::!i~!:! (~:!~"TI ~s~falL ")!"'1 ~it_,.-:=.
Question 5 -;: * ~~
.""'"'.......Ja:......-:~.A.,jL.o.1111~
I undersund that tht 1ow level l1censing requirments hoe bffn reduced as they ~rt11n to issues of evacuation probletitS th1t -.y arise 1n a city or town. This change has enabled questions not to be resolved before a license is issued. Given the Chernobyl incident an.d the probletl'ls and questions surrounding the Pilgri111 Nuclear- Phnt in Pl.r-outh (which has been branded "the worst-run- plant fn the us*), do you think we should reverse again and require that evaluation issues be resolved before 1 lO'd level license is granted to any ne"W plants?
Rt;..sponse The NRC's dec1s1on to grant low power licenses prior to*arr~v1ng at final positions on C!rtain regulatory issu!s, including eMergency planning, is based on the conclusion that the risk to tne health and safety of the public from low
~r o~ration is not c~rOlft1sed. Analyses of .wny plants rec!ntly licensed by tn! HRC show that the risk fra11 1~ power OJHr&tion is several orders of
rna9nitude lower than that at full power operation. Thfs fs primarf ly because (1) the fission product inventory at low power operation fs substantially less than at full power, (2) safety system requf~nts (e.g ** numbers of pumps needed tC) be available) are MUCh less at low power, and (3) operators have substantially more ti11e to respond to events"and take corrective action.
"* With respect to Chernobyl, th~ NRC's'prelfl1fn1ry evaluation of that accident his concluded that, because of unique design differences between Chernobyl and U.S. plants, t~n! are no fmplfcations requiring 1-.dhte regulatory action on phnts licensed fn the U.S. we will be perlor-.f"9 1 Mare detailed evaluation over the next several months to conff,.. this conclusion.
In S~J"')', we do not believe there fs any b&sfs at thfs t1ine to change our cu~nt regu1atory policies and practices regarding low power license requ i remer:ts.
Question- 6 Do :/'04I fMl that the NRC has represented tM people IS *1 J IS ft has
,..,..Mftted the nuclffr fndustry ?
r Yes, the nc*s regul1t1ons are desffHd to prctKt tJte hfflth ind safety of the publfc, and these hive been vfgorously enforced. During this fiscal year the ac ~s uten *"1 enforc. . nt actions ind propos9d ffnes 1pfnst the nuclNr industry for vfolatfons of the NltC's retUl*tfOfts of 1l110st ffve
f111on dollan. ,
/}/£~E lfU"' JJr '~HI$ $ r#,-~ rHA r r~ll. '/J/616&11. eNTL-'f Questfon 7 His Chernobyl changed your thinking r-eg1rdfng nucle1r power?
Response
Revf eiws of the accident and the Chernobyl design done to date by both the HRC staff and others have not identified any 1spec~s Qf the accident wttic~ show a cle1r-C\lt nexus to U.S. cOllRercial nuclear power plants ~iring 1.-ediate
~guhtory action. However, in order to confi,.. this jucf911ent, 1 more vigorous and syste111t1c investigation f s ~fng perfor11ed to ict.ntify those 1re1s and issues associated with the Chernobyl accf dt'nt that werr1nt further investiga-tion. As such, our *thinkfng regarding nuclear power* M.s not changed.
Ouest1on 8 Do you feel t~t people are really infonned about and know of the dangers of nuclear power?
.' s
Response
The statutory responsfbil1ty of the MRC 1s to provfde for the safe operation of coniercfa1 nuclt1r power fn the U.S. In c'1rryfng out this responsibility, we frequently 1.re 1fforded the opportunf ty to txpl&in our regulatory
. pl'lflosophy and bfses for safety ind 11ctnsing decfsfons. However, it is outside the HRC role 1nd resp~nsfbflfty to 1dvfse the pvblfc &bout the rfsks and'beneffts of nuclear power. The responsfbflfty for 1ner;y policy and develoi-ent of energy* sources 1s assfgntd to the O.,.rtmnt of Energy. The Energy Rtorg1nfz1tion Act of 1975 was en1cte-d by Congress to separate rtspons1bfl1ty for retUl*tfon fro. ,..SJ>Oftsfbf11ty for tnef"iY polfcy to avoi*d conn fcts Of fnttrtst. £*rgency plumfng rtfUl&t10ftS do require that 1nfo,...tfon be ude 1v11hble to the public on 1 ~rfocffc b1sfs on how they will be notified fn an emergency and whit their initial actions should be.
Qyestf0n 9 Cost versvs other fuels-obsolete?
The JltC h responsf~l* for tM lfc:ensf"f alHI reht.4 ,....latory functfons for c~,-cfll nuclNr powr pllnts in tM United Stites. Tltt consfderatfon of the economfcs of nuc l11r power versus other 1nergy sowrces does not h 11 ynder the sututor",Y responsf.flity of the lfRC. We s.,,,.st that thfs question could best be answerM by the U.S. Department of Erttr"17. . *
~r IS !tis~ N1r r!le ~tSl'l'r1Si/,Jl1'ry 'F rNE #~G '" Sti,,.~as IWftH.lltAt-tn. so rH.Ar THB p~,,,,.. 'fH1tr ltl.E C*Nrlfl* *, >f OUestfon 10 it.<<.llV~ ,A Lll.ZN$6 AWD rHIN' rJl~y r':JA-1:- ~ C~
{;If*.,. /S ~ '1'611.. rr/N~ 1 N._
How *ny people were hospft1ltzed in 1'ussfa?
Response
At the International Atomfc Energy Agency Conference on the Chernobyl Accfdent held in Vienna, Austria, August 25-29, 1986, the Sovfet delegation infonfted us that as of that date, 31 persons had died and 203 persons were hospitalized with radiation-related injuries, all fire f1gflters or plant personnel.
Question 11 How old was tile plant - 3 years?
Response
It is our understandfng that Unit 4 at the C~rnobyl "uc1ur Power Station wtnt into ccmmercial operation in 1983.
Ques tf on 12 Whit are the difference-s between the Russian pla@t~ ' .
and our nucleer plants as you stt them?
R!sponse
. Ther! are .aany basic differences betwffn the Soviet RMK class of plants and the U.S. comfterci1l light water re1ctors. The JIOSt pro11fnent differences are (l) 1 lack of 1 western-sty1e conta'f,..nt whfch encloses the tntfre primary syst* of the reactor, (2) a core ca.ipos~d of about 1600 fn*dfvfdual pressure tulMs wf thfn 1 gr1phf te .. trfx. 1nd (3)
po sf the cool&nt vofd reactivity
~fffcfent. CHtl(N1Syt. HAl/16KCD ~EC/'IU.S~ o,c- /ill'1.AN EA.R.11. 11,,-a r KlfOW !IS 4rHE/t.$ '!JtJ, rHAr WE Question 13 H~v~ A LJJr ~~ )l~htA/Y'l!"~~'lt I~ f'>'A~J,1~rt>1-,
Sot11£ tJ,r,;,.r~,
Re91rdfng future generations, would you rec~nd that~ continue to build nuc Jul- plants 7
~Spo!!M As a JNJ11ey, the MC does not *Ice rKI an*ttea ,..N1ftl *thoc:ts for fvtllre feMr&t1on of electrfal eMrtY. s.ctt rec1 1R*t1on~ on nat1on.1 pol fey are the respons fbf 11 t.Y of the Dep.aruent of Entf"I)'.
Ot?estf on 14 Do Yf19 fHl thit the public would l>e Just1ffed fn belfeY1ng tMt the JMC fs not 1ct1ng 1n the public's best fnterest?
Response
Mo, see answer to Question 6.
l\'E WILL SEE TO IT THAT MR. STELLO AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE NRC, K.'Wh'S HOW A.'IERICA DOES FEEL BY' WAY OF A NATIONAL REFERENDUM WHICH WI LL ALLOW THE AMERICA.\J PEOPLE TO MAKE THE DECISION l'i'H.ETHER THEY WA.l\'T TO_ CONTINUE ON WITH NUCLEAR PO\\'ER I~ THIS cou:-:TRY. THE CONSTITlJTION WAS WRIITEN TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A SAY WI-IE~
THEY N'iOW SOMETHING IS l'iRONG IN THE GOV~RNMEST, THAT OBVIOUSLY CAN i'OT BE DO~E USTIL THEY GET ALL THE FA_CTS THAT HA\'E BEEN SUPPRESSED BY THE r:--;oUSTRY, THE :\RC, A.'JD YES, SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. WE THE PEOPLE, INC. OF THE UNITED STATES WILL SEE THAT THEY GET THOSE FACTS AS WELL AS PROVIDE VEHICLES THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO MAKE THAT CHOICE. IF WE FAIL TO DO THIS, h'E HAVE FAILED AMERICA FOR WHAT IT WAS FOU~DED FOR.
We The People, Inc. OflrLIHI

.:=--.,~------of the United States - -

. Stop Chernobyl Here f
To Whom It May Concern:
In October, 19.87, w;hi 1 e I was a guest at* a 1 uncheon for President Ronald Reagan hosted by the Republican Inner Circle in Washington, D.C., r handed the President information about seri-0us safety probl~ms at U.S.
nuclear power plants. (See enc. #9) The packet I gave* him t~ld about
~~unterfeit substandard parts built into the plants, 'endangering the public's safety, and said the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was covering up this potential disaster. It alsb s~id there were individuals within the agency who were worried abou~ this and other safety problems the NRC was not addressing and that these peopie would be willing to speak with the President privately.
Nearl.y five yea:r:s later, the incident has been referred to the FBI by the NRC's Inspector General for Investigation (enc. l2lc) because the former president deni~s the exchange ever occurred even though r have a photograph ?f the excbange.
The enclosed chronology details my attempts~lo bring the coun~erfeit substandard materials problem and the NRC's~£overµp to President Reagan's attention. My first contact with the Presid~nt's office was in August of 1986 when I sent him a letter and a petition signed by 80 percent of the town of Rowley (enc. #1) requesting the President order an investigation of the NRC. My concerns about nuclear plant safety were heightened by an August, 1986, conversation I had with then-NRC Commissioner James Asselstine in which he stated in writing that an accident as bad or worse than Chernobyl would happen in the U.S. because our plants are so badly built .and operated (see enc. #3a).
Mary McGrory wrote a nationally syndicated story (enc. #5) for her column on my efforts to see the President in September of that year, mentioning that I had hired a plane to fly a banner over the White House asking the President to see me. In October, Victor Stello, executive director of the NRC wrote me a letter stating that residents of my nursing home, just twelve miles from the Seabrook nuclear power plant, should be left in place and given potassium iodide to drink in case of a major plant accident. (enc. #6) Outraged by such an inhumane attitude, I increased my investigations of the NRC's policies.
Because President Reagan continued to ignore my concerns, I approached Mr. Gorbachev and his staff, asking him to help prevent a Chernobyl here (enc. #11). Although I made several attempts, I was never able to actually meet Mr. Gorbachev; although I did meet with his Washington Press Secretary, Igor Bulay (see enc. #lld & llg). I arranged to have a banner flown over Washington during Mr. Go~bachev's stay while attending the Iceland summit. Unfortunately the Secret Service didn't allow the b;:1nner to be flown (see AP story e*nc. #1'1) Tn M.:tr(*h 1988, I gave U.S.
Attorney for New York Rudolph Guiliani information about the counterfeit materials in nuclear plants. (enc. #12) Due to publicity about his investigation, Victor Stello was forced to adrni~ th~r~ was ~ problem and ordered an investigation.
A non*rrofil. ca., **wmpc 01Huni1.Jci.111 f\lain Offke: lfox ~77, Ro\1k>*, MA 01969, (508) 948*7959 50 C~1ur1 St.. Plym0111h, ~IA 02361, (508) 746-9JOO
.'<atilrn;il Pres5 Hldg., 1-1 & !-. Sis .. ;-.;.\\'., \\'ashi11g1011 D.C. 200-15, (2021 62~*6611
.**:* ~ .. *.* ... : . ...*,.~
I.~. (
'1 Page 2.
When I wrote Mr. Stello asking when he first found out about counterfeit materials lrom Piping Supply, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing, both New Jersey companies, I received a letter from the NRC's Thomas Murley on August 15, 1988 (enc. #15) stating the NRC had first le~rned of the pro,bl em in January 1988. Another 1 et ter f rem Murley that October said tha't President Reagan had referred my conc~rns about the counterfeit bolts at Seabrook Station were not a* problem (enc. #18). *An article in the Boston Herald the next week stated that counterfeit fixtures
p~eviously okayed by the NRC had failed inspection (enc. #19).
In December, 1988, I sent packets about the counterfeit materials to every*u.s. Senator, Congressman, state governor and to the White House
. staff. An expose compiled by We The People (enc. #20), showed that the
NRC had lowered safety standards for nuclear power plants *Under pressure from the industry and had called off further investigation of the counterfeit materials issue. A letter to Senator Dole is enclosed as an example of* the letters sent to all '-of these individuals {enc. #20a).
It is unfortunat*e for the safety of the 1\1'nerican people that**so l;i.ttle action has been taken on this issue by the NRC and by Congress, the only body with authority o~er the agency. We The People continues to call on Con~ress to investigate the counterfeit materials issue and the corruption within the NRC which has allowed this safety problem to persist.
I hope you find the enclosed materials helpful. Even though I have highlighted certain events, I encourage you to read the whole chronology for a smooth flow, along with the enclosure packet. Please contact me if you require further information.
Sincerely, Comley SBC/ca enclosures: Reagan chronology with enclosures
.... -~** ..
11. ' - t r..
CHRONOLOGY - COMLEY' S INVOLVEMENT WI TH REAGAN (AND THEN V. P. BUSJil August~ 1986 In a*brief letter to. President Reagan's Director of Appointments and Scheduling, Frederick Ryan, Stephen Comley requested a meeting with the President. (Enclosure #1) He* had a petition signed by 80 percent of the people in his town, Rowley, Massachusetts, requesting the President order an investigation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. (Enclosure
la) Reagah never acknowledged or r~sponded to the petitions.
£\.11..S!J.!§1 1~..L.. 1 9 8 ~
Mr. Ryan, in response to a telephone call from Mr. Comley regarding the letter sent.requesting a meeting, wrote a letter saying the President was unable to meet with him due to heavy demands on scheduling and that informational packet Comley sent with the letter had been brought to the attention of the NRC. (Enclosure #2)
August '}...L_ Jj!fil Mr. Comley sent Mr. Ryan additional information and requested a meeting with the President and with Mr. Ryan. (Enclosure #3) With his letter, Mr. Comley *sent information. showing then-NRC Commissioner *James Ass,lstine had told him that the NRC was protecting the nuclear industry, not the American people and that a nuclear accident as *bad or war~~ than Chernobyl would occur because U.S. nuclear power plants were so badly built and operated. (Enclosure #3a) Mr. Comley added that other NRC officials had confirmed Mr. Asselstine's statement and were willing to meet confidentially with the President.
September~ 1986 In a letter to Mr. Ryan, Mr. Comley reiterated his request to meet with the President to tell him what was going on within the NRC. (Enclosure
4) Senator Heinz sent a letter to Comley thankin~ him for his out-standing commitment to President Reagan. (Enclosure #4a)
September ~ 1986 The First story told natio~ally regarding Comley's situation was written by Mary McGrory, columnist for the Washington Post, and titled "Fighting For Survival Of The Unfit." The story mentions that Comley hired a plane to fly a banner over the White House saying, "Mr. Reagan, Please See Me - Ccmley!" (Enclosure #5)
October h 1.986 Mr. Comley received a reply from Victor Stello, Executive Director of the NRC, in answer to questions Mr. Comley had sent to NRC Chairman Lando Zech. Mr. Stello stated the plan for evacuating elderly and others who could not be moved during a radioactive accident.at the Seabrook nuclear plant was to leave them behind and give them a
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chemical, potassium iodide, to drink. (Enclosure #6) Mr. Comley found this attitude both inhumane and a denial* of the constitutional right to equal protectioh, so he undertook a campaign t6 investigate the NRC and the nuclear industry.
Mr. Comley received a letter from the Vice President's office, signed by E. T~rry Mattke, Military Ass~stant/Aide to th~ V.P., acknowledging receipt of a letter to Mr. Bush, which expressed Mr. Comley's concern about nuclear power plant safety. He stated that Mr: Comley's letter would be shared with the Department of Energy and they would in turn correspond with Mr. Cornie~. (Enclosure #7)
During a 6on~ersation with Nancy Reagan at a Dover, N.H. school, Mr.
Comley asked her to urge her husband to meet with him. He explained that he had firsthand information about a serious safety problem with U.S. nuclear plants which the NRC was trying to keep secret. Mr.
Comley gave Mr3. Reagan's secretary, Ray Martinez a packet of information.
Mr. Comley wrote Mrs. Reagan a follow up letter urging her to read the information he gave her secretary and wished her a speedy recovery from a recent operation. (Enclosure #8)
October ~ 1987 While he was a guest at a Washington, D.C; luncheon at the Shoreham Hotel hosted by the Republican Inner Circle and attended by President Reagan, Mr. Comley handed the President a letter and a large envelope containing information about substandard counterfeit materials built into many U.S.*nuclear power plants (see enc. 9a). The letter explained that high ranking officials within the NRC had confirmed that this alarming situation was known as a "public secret" inside the NRC and that the counterfeit materials placed millions of Americans in jeopardy. The letter also said high ranking NRC officials were willing to meet in confidenc~ with the President to ekplain this problem with the agency.
Although the event was closed to the public and the press, Mr. Comley sent out a press release on October 25 saying he intended to give the President this information (see enc. 9b}. But when a W.ashington Associat~d Press reporter, Chris Callahan, called to confirm the ~tory, both the Inne~ Circle and the White House denied witnessing the exchange. However, Mr. Callahan opted to write the story anyway.
(See enc. 9c) Mr. Comley had photographs taken during the Inner Circle luncheon proving the exchange took place. (See enc. 9 d&e)
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December L_ 1987 Mr. Comley received a letter from Frank Ingram, an assistant to the NRC'~ Director of Public Affairs, saying Mr. Comley's letter to Mrs.
Re~gan was put in the NRC' s* Public Document Room under Seabrook. No further action was taken. (Enclosure #10)
December h l.9f1I Because President Reagan ignored Comley, Comley appealed to Mr.
Gorbachev by hiring a plane to fly a banner over Lincoln Patk, Washington, D.C., reading "Mr. Gorbachev: Help us Stop Chernobyl here.
Join We The People." The plane was grounded by the Feder-al Aviation Administration. Additional background, letters, and press on Comley's effort to*secure Gorbachev's involvement are enclosed (#11).
Mr. Comley took information about falsification of nuclear plant safety documents and collusion between the NRC and vendors supplying substandard materials for nuclear plants to Rudolph Giuliani, U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, who was undertaking an investigation of the Shoreham nuclear plant. This story was written up in the New York Times on March 18, 1988 (see We The People's press release of 3/17/88 enc.#12). This article said somebody had taken an employee from the NRC to see Giuliani. After reading this, Victor
stello went to various offices within the NRC trying to find out who
that employee was, but*no one would admit having done so. This forced Stello to acknowledge publicly that counterfeit substandard parts were in existence in plants across the country.
The NRC ordered 38 plants to find and replace all counterfeit substandard parts. (Enclosure #13) This is also in NR9 Bulletin 88-05.
J ul.Y.. 1L.. .l 9 8 ~
In a letter to NRC EDO Victor Stello, Mr. Comley asked when exactly the NRC acquired knowledge of these potential safety problems and what actions were tinally taken as a result of this knowledge. This was specifically in reference to parts corning from Piping ~.Y.Qply, Inc. Qi
.FQJ_,:;iom, ~ew Jei;:_~~ 9_nq Hest .Jers~ Manufacturing Qf WiJliarnstO\i.Il...t. N.t;.li Jersey. (Enclosure #14)
Mr. :::0inas ~! 1.irley, Director of the Offic-e of the Nuclear Reactor Regulation, replied in Stella's stead tci Mr. Comley's July 18 letter.
H~. Hurley stated the NRC first learned about substandar~ piping
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materials supplied to nuclear power plants when a material supplier telephoned the agency during the week of' January 1 7, 1988 (enclosure
15) Accordin~ to Mr. Murley, the NRC issued a subpoena for documents from suspect piping.companies (Piping Supplies, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing, both of New Jersey) on February 24, 1988, then on May 6; 19as, issued NRC Bulletin 88-05. That bulletin required licensees to trace and test materials from the two suspect piping companies. On August 3, 1988, the NRC suspended tne trace and test requirements, deferring to the conclusions of tbe industry-owned Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) that even though the piping materials do not meet engineering safety standard~, they are not Unsafe.
By the time the NRC called off the investigation of counterfeit materials, it had learned that they encompassed valves, circuit breakers, fasteners, and pumps, as well as piping materials, and that these parts ~ere built into more than .half of the nuclear power plants in the U.S. Mr. Comley is certain that the NRC knew about and was covering up the counterfeit materials problem long before the January 1988 date stated by Mr. Murley.
Mr. Comley was invited to the Republican National Convention on this date. He wrote to President Reagan reminding ,him of their October 1987 encounter and reiterated that he wanted a private meeting to convey to the President the "public secret" counterfeit materials problem. (In the agency this problem was labeled as the "public secret.") This lette~ said he h~d ~dditional information involving corruption within the NRC and that people in that agency were willing to tell the President privat~ly about that issue. (Enclosure #16)
Comley attended the Republican National Convention in New Orleans and hired an airplane to fly a large banner which would circle the Super Bowl dome reading '~Hey, George, Stop Chernobyl Here. J'oin We The People." He did this to keep his crusade going. Unfortunately the banner was grounded by the Secret Service. (Enclosure #17) Because of the Secret Service intervened, Comley went down on the convention floor and displayed his sign which read, "Stop Chernobyl Here, Join We The People." During Sununu's address to the convention, Comley met members of Reagan's and Bush's staff and informed them he had evidence to be delivered to both that could ultimately change the outcome of the election. Knowing Comley was a member of the Inner Circle, they paid particular attention to him when he insisted that they write down their names and phone numbers and the time they received this information.
Comley didn't want a repetition of his previous encounter with Reagan, where staff said they had never received the information. To ensure this, c6mley 3ent the same materials certified mail, return receipt
equeste~, to Reagan and Bush at the White Hous~.
j*
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Thomas Murley responded to Mr~ Comley's August 15, 1988, letter to President Reagan and said that the 369 suspect fixtures found by the licensee at Seabrook Station were under review by the NRC and that counterfeit bolts were not a problem at the plant. (Enclosure #18)
Def-ceJnber ~ J 988 An Article appeared i~ the Boston Herald stating that fixtures at Seabrook Station, which had been bkayed by the NRC, failed inspection.
(Enclosure #19)
December, 1988 Mr. Comley sent every U.S. Senator, representative, gover,nor, and White House staff member a copy of an expose (Enclosure #20) of the counterfeit -materials fiasco compil*ed by We The People, the anti-nuclear educational organization, which he directs. The report used publicly available NRC documents, as well as We The People source material, to show that there are ten~ of thousands of substandard parts built into more than half the nuclear power plants in the U.S. When the industry objected to the expense of finding and replacing these potentially very dangerous materials, the NRC called off its investigation and lowered plant safety standards to attempt to meet the 1 ow quality of the counterfe*i t materials. Thus, piping materials, valves, circuit breakers, fasteners and pumps are now allow~d to be weaker and less accurate than the original engineering safety designs called for. The lowered standards have not prevented subsequent failures at nuclear power plants; fortunately these failures have not yet caused a major accident. *
We are enclosing the packet of information we compiled, along with the letter sent out to all politicians mentioned (sample enclosed of letter we sent to Senator Robert Dole) (Enclosure #20a). Included in the packet is a sworn affidavit by a U.S. senior investigator having to do with prosecution of individuals involved in the selling of counterfeit substandard parts. (Enclosure #20b)
Replies to the packet were received f~om Senator Kerry, Senator Kennedy, Senator Bradley, Lawrence Lippe, Chief General Litigation and Legal Advice Section Criminal Division (referred by Attorney.General Thornburgh), Mario Cuomo~ Brackinridge Willcox, U.S. Attorney, Massachusetts Attorney General Shannon, and Kenneth Boley, Nuclear Safety Analyst. (Enclosure #20c)
Enclosure #2la to 2ld incltides the following:
2la. A letter from John C. Hoyle, Assistant Secretary of the NRC, to Comley confi~ming receipt of the material on counterfeit
u.bstandard parts.
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Page 6.
2lb" A September 14, 1990 letter to David Williams, Office of Inspector General, *NRC, from Comley stating facts regarding giving Reagan informat'ion Qn hazards at nuclear. plar1ts.
A May 31, 1991 letter to *Comley from ~Rd A~sistant 1nspector 2lc . . General for Investigations saying the alleg~tion sent by Comley regarding Ronald Reagan's failure to act on the counterfeit materials issue had been forwarded to the FBI.
2ld. Various press artic;:les on this subject. .
Note especially Portsmouth Herald article of 5/10/90; New York Times articles of 8/4/89; 10/13/89; and 6/20/90.
September ~ 1989 We The People members displayed a banner depicting a woman in a wheel-chair with a message reading, "MR. 13USH: WHEN CHERNOBYL HAPPENS HERE, THEY WON'T EVACUATE ME. JOIN WE THE PEOPLE. STOP NUCLEAR POWER.", at Pease Air Force Base in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, while waiting for President George Bush to arrive from Washington. The 10 foot by 22 foot red, white, and blue banner was confiscated by Pease Air Force Base police and some members were detained for trespassing. The banner was later returned when police found out the American Civil Liberties Union was pursuing this matter. Press article of incident is enclosed.
(Enc. #22)
At 1 p.m. members of We The People displayed a banner along the road at Walkers Point overlooking President Bush's summer White House in Kennebunkport to call the President's attention to the dangers of nuclear power. This is the same banner that was cori£i*c~ted by ,ease Air Force Base police in September. The banner dramatizes the fact that in the case of a nuclear dis*ster, there are no plans for evacuating the speci~l needs population including senior citizens who are homebound in nursing homes or hospitals. The NRC declared that these Americans be left behind to drink potassium iodide to be administered by volunteers willing to stay behind in the event of a nuclear accident. (Enc. #23 - press release on this event.)
T 0 0 U R R E A D E R S o HBAll SENIOR Wl\lTER ERIC fact checker. Within five years he was a bly the tOughest of all. He not only had to T Pooley talk. just about anyone could have produced this wee.k's investigative report on a shock-ing pattern of safety lapses at a nuclear power plant in Connecticut. "Basically,"
Senior editor, and he went on to report and write two dozen cover stc>ries on top-ics ranging from police corruption to kids who carry guns. In 1993 he became the magazlpe's political columnist.
unearth a carefully buried story, but he had to master the intriCacies of nuclear plant operation as well. Says Pooley: "I had to keep going over the same ground before I was sure fd got it.'"
says Pooley, with clwacteristic Now Pooley has to master in-modesty, "it was just a classic Btricacies of a different s<>rt. He's whistle-blower ta1e.* No big deal. i joining TIM E's Washingto~ bureau Permit us to disagree. It's a rare j to cover the White House and the journalist who has the energy and ::1 Clinton re-election campaign.
persistence to unravel a story as I Although by riatUre a risk taker, tangled as this one. And Pooley, Pooley has some concerns.
saYs chief of corresPondentS JoeDe llME's W!i$hington bureau is an Attinger, "is one of the best fve 8'lel" amazing group of journalists," he seen. He has unlimited curiosity, .says. "I just hope I can make a con-and a remarkable sense of whether tn"bution.'" Somehow, we think a source is credtole or not." * . he11 manage.
He also has an appetite for * *
tough assignments. On graduating Emmy-winning. ABC-TV news ~-
from Brown University in 1981; A NOSE FOR~ NEws:, GJWii1*8 ~ hOl8y Jyst Jeff Greenfield has agreed to Pooley beaded for East Germany Wll-.,. take* the mGSt c8lllCillt ... smMlll write a column for Us on politics and began reporting on anticommunist Last year TIME taPped Pooley to join and popular culture-"c-SPAN meets the dm:ident groups. Although he bad no af- an mvestigative team specializing in Grateful Dead,'" as he puts it. The first filiation with any news organization, pa- long-term, intenSively reported projects.
appears this week.
pers ~home, including the Cleveland Among his stories since then: an *expose Plain Dea1sr- and the Providence ]our- of Senator Al D'Amato's questionable nal. picked up his dispatches. fund-raising activities and !lD exhaiJstive When Pooley returned to the U.S. in report on Colin Powell's wife and key ad-1982, he joined New York magazine as a viser Alma. This week's piece was proba-
-£"TIME MAGIZINE STORY March 4, 1996: We The People's Slldf, aqd our Attorney, Ernest Hadley (I person-11y worked with Joelle Attinger, Chief of C0,rrespondents, see her name aoove) for 10 yean plus on this article wlai~h the editor han.~ed over to Eric Pooley in sumllier of 93 for his first cover $tofy. We wish Eric hi!~ given We the People Inc the credl! it deserved foi sp~D. feeding Pooley a~d doing all the investigating (see pages 5!: and 52 of Time's Cover Story which are
~;~~,~i'f1'~~~ ha_d ':~~~~ ~n _some ~!~th~~ inform.ants ;or over 11 ye~rs) work
, * ** '. r 1:~* "'. * ." .. ~ 40 t'ooley ha"e miSsed wntin~ .. o.~, ~ ;ae in"V~1.1gation*WTP's b~u~t about concerning But I ask *Y self how t()uld 72 u.s Nuclear plants that were then and )lOW operating with counterfeit subs~nd~rd parts? That omission was irresponsible enough but Pooley's cover sto~ m !IDie both~red m~ even mo.-e because we h~d applied for 200 Grants app~f!Btions and dtd not g~t _one to which could have kept the 7 WTP offices open to continue to protect and shield nuclear an~ government ~RC informants. My family h~d srent over $500,000.00 when the cover story came out and were counting on T~me s Cover story to keep things going. Stephen B. Comley, Executive Director and Founder of We The People Inc. of the United States.
u s I N ~ s s Two gutsy engineers in Connecticut have caught the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at a dangerous game
that it has played for years: routinely waiving safety rules to let plants keep costs down and stay online
~, GEORGE BETANCOURT LOOKED UP FROM HIS DESK AS t;:.>
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. -:\ pers under his arm. On that morning in March 1992, the two men-both senior engineers at Northeast Utilities, which operates five nuclear plants in New England-were colleagues but not yet friends. Apart from their jobs and first names, they seemed to have lit-tle in common. Betancourt. 45, was extravagantly rebellious-beard, biker boots, ponytail sneaking out the back of bis baseball cap-while Galatis, 42,was square-jawed and devout: Mr. Smith Goes Nuclear. But Galati.s respected Betancourt's expertise and knew he could count on him for straight answers.
On this day, Galatis wanted to know about a routine refueling oper-ation at the M~tone Unit l nuclear plant in \Vaterford, Connecticut Every 18 months the reactor is shut down so the fuel rods that make up its core can be replaced; the old rods, radioactive and 250°F hot, are moved into a 40-ft.~deep body of water called the spent-fuel pool, where they are plaeed in racks alongside thousands of other, older rods. Because the Federal Government has never created a stoirage site for high-level radioactive waste, fuel pools in nuclear plants across the country have become de facto nuclear dumps-with many filledmearly to eapacity. The pools weren't designed for this purpose, and risk is involved: the rods must be submer-ged at all times. A cooling system must dissipate the in-tense heat they give off. If the system failed, the pool could boil, turning the plant into a lethal sauna filled with clouds of iradioactive steam. And if earthquake, human error or mechanical failure drained the pool, the result could be catastrophic: a meltdown of multiple cores taking place outside the reactor containment, releasing massiw.e amounts of radiation and rendering hundreds of square miles uninhabitable.
To minimize the risk, federal guidelines require that some older plants like Millstone, without state-of-the-art cooling systems, move only one-third of the rods into the pool under nrorrnal conditions. But Galatis realized that Millstone was routinely ped-0rming "full-core off-loads," dumping all the hot fuel into the pool. His question for Betan-court was, "How long has this been going on?"
Photograph for TIME by Karen Kuehn-Matri:;,c 47
BUSINESS ' . . .
Betancourt thought for a minute.
"We've been moving full cores since before 1. The plant is shut down, and the reactor WS'S8I is I got here," he said, .. since the early /Os... flooded with water. After cool-down, technicians open gates between the vessel and the refueling "But it's an emergency procedure." canal, which leads to the spent-fuel pool, the 40-ft.
"I know," Betancourt said. HAnd we do deep, 30-ft. by 25-ft. body of water whrele it all the time." What's more, Millstone 1 was .
spent fuel is stored.
ignoring the mandated 250-hr. cool-down period before a full off-load, sometimes moving the fuel just 65 hrs. after shutdown, a violation that had melted the boots of a worker on the job. By sidestepping the safe-ty requirements, Millstone saved about two weeks of downtime for each refueling-dur-ing which Northeast Utilities has to pa}'
I
$500,000 a day for replacement power.
Galatis then flipped through a safety report in which Northeast was required to demonstrate to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the plant's network of cooling systems would function even if the I
i:nost important one failed. Instead, the company had analyzed the loss of a far less critical system. The report was worthless, the NRC hadn't noticed, and the conse-quences could be dire. If Millstone lost its primary cooling system while the full core 2. Working from the refueling bridge, tech11icians use .a crane to reach into the vessel and grasp a fuel assembly-a was in th e pool
Galatis toId Betancourt, bundle of 62 rods-and pull it through the water iilto the* PQOI.
the backup systems might not handle the It is placed in a rack with otner spent-fuel rods.
heat. "The pool could boil," he said. "We'd better report this to the NRC now." 3. The process is repeated for each of the 580 fuel assemblies. When the plant i~ ready to resume Betancourt saw that Galatis was right. operation, two-thirds of the rods are returned ID the core along with 190 fresh assembffes. The rest are
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Galatis knew what he meant. Once a moving to stop it. The NRC says the practice blind eye, the question arises, How $aie are leading nuclear utility, Northeast had is common, and safe-if a plant's cooling America's nuclear plants?
earned a reputation as a rogue-cutting system is designed to handle the heat Joad.
comers and, according to critics, harass- But Millstone's wasn't. And when Galatis THOUGH THE NRCS MISSION .STATEMENT ing and firing employees who raised safe- learned that plants in Delaware, Neb~ka promises full accountability""-"nuclear reg-ty concerns. But if Galatis wanted to take and New Jersey had similar fuel-pool trou- . ulatjon is the public's. business," it :say5-on the issue, Betancourt told him, "fil bles, he realized the NRC was sitting on a the agencfs ~<?P 9fftci~ at first ~efused ta back you." nationwide problem. he interviewed by',1'1M~. A,fter re~ed re-So began a three-year battle in which Ten years after the disastrous unc:on- quests, Chainvom~n Shirley ,Anh jac~n, a physics professor who was app0fute,d 'by President Clinton la5t summer, &ally
~:,~/~ If Millstone lost its primary cooling agreed to talk. But the veteran official jn charge of the agency's.day-to-day ~pera
~ system, Galatistold Betancourt, "thepool tions, executive direcfor Jam~ fyf. Taylor, would provide Qnly written answers to could boil. We'd better report this to the NRC." Ti?.1E's fa.ted questions; "The responsibility for safety rests with "Do that," Betancourt said, "and you're dogmeat?' . the industry," Jackson told TIM~. "Like any other regulatory body;NRC is E!SSentially an auditing age11cy." Ja~kson argUed that })er Galatis tried to fix what he considered an tained meltdown at Chernobyl, li years af-
agency is tough.:.."When. we eatch ,prob-obvious safety problem at Millstone 1. For ter the partial meltdown at Three Mile Is- lems, it never makes the pap.er5""-but 18 months his supervisors denied the prob- land, most Americans probably give ()nly added that \vith 3,000 employees and j~t lem existed and refused to report it to the passing thought to the issue of nuclear safe- four inspectors fofevery ~ree plants, "we NRC, the federal agency charged with en- ty. But the story of George Galatis and Mill- have to focus Qri the issues \vi th the greatest suring the safety of America's 110 commer- stone suggests that the NRC itself may be safety significance. We can miss things."
cial reactors. Northeast brought in outside giving only passing thought to the issue.,.. In fact, MiHstone is merely the latest in consultants to prove Galatis wrong, but that it may be more concerned with prop- a 1011g string of cases in which the NRC bun-they ended up agreeing \vith him. Finally, ping up an embattled, economically strait- gled its mandate and overloolced serio\1$
he took the case to the NRC himself, only to ened industry than with ensuring ptiplic safety problems until w}iistle blowers catne discover that officials there had known safety. When a nuclear plant violates safety forward (see box). The NRC:'s relationship about the procedure for a decade with0t1t standards and the federal watchdog tuxns a with the industry has been suspect since 48 TIME. MARCH 4, 1996
1974, when the agency rose from the ashes Institute, the industry's p.r. unit "Industry- DE FACTU DUMP: MUlstone Unit l's spent*
of the old Atomic Energy Commission, wide, our safety record is improving. But fuel pool!llOW holds 3,000 used assembOes whose mandate was to. promote nuclear NRC creates so many layers of regulation have been mothballed in the past decade.
power. The industry vetoes commission that every plant is virtually assured of being For:now, however, nuclear power pro-nominees it dee.ms too hostile (two of five in noncompliance with something." vides 200o of the electricity consumed in NRC seats are vacant), and agency officials . The NBC suggested as much in a 1985 the U.S.;New England depends on nuclear enjoy a revolving door to good jobs at nu~ agency directive on "enforcement discre- plants for more than half its supply. Long-clear companies such as Northeast. "The tion," which allowed the agency to set term, ~ Northeast senior vi~ president f9x is guarding the henhouse," says aside hundreds of its own safety regula- Donal~ iMiller, Millstone and her sisters Delaware Senator Joseph Biden, who is tions. Since 1990, Millstone has received 15 will SUIYive only "if we start running them pushing legislation to ~reate an indepen- such waivers-more than any other nu- like a business [and] stop throwing money dent nuclear safety board outside the NRC. clear statiOlll. In November, Jackson scaled at issues." New England's largest power The Democrat, who is also calling for a fed- back the policy, but she says this never en- company, with $6.5 billion in assets and eral investigation of NRC effectiveness, be- dangered public safety. Others disagree. $3.7 billion in revenues last year, North-lieves the agency "has failed the public." "Discretionary enforcement was out of east is slashing its nuclear work force of It all comes back to money. "When a hand," says NRC acting Inspector General 3,000 employees by one-third over the safety issue is too expensive for the indus- Leo Norbon, who investigates agency next five years. Company CEO Bernard Fox try, the NRC pencils it away," says Stephen wrongdoing but has no power to punish. says the move will not undermine safety.
Comley, executive director of a whistle~ "We shouldn't have regulations on the blower support group called We the Peo- books and !then ignore or wink at them." GEORGEfGALATIS WENT TO WORK AT NORTH-ple, which has brought many agency fail- Yet thte tensions between cost and east Utilities in June 1982 with a degree ures to light. "If the NRC enforced all its safety can 'only increase as deregulation from Remsseiaer Polytechnic Institute and rules, some of the plants we've studied of the nation's utilities ushers in a new era experience with a top manufacturer of nu-couldn't compete economically." of rate-slashing competition. In some clear components. At Northeast, he started In a rare point of agreement with ac- states, comsumers will soon choose their in the division that oversees the utility's 15 tivists, the nuclear industry also says regu- electric cmmpany the way they now fossil-fuel plants, then moved to the nu-lations threaten to drive some plants out of choose a lang-distance telephone carrier. clear group, specializing in performance business, but it argues that many NRC rules Companies with nuclear plants are at a and reliability. Eric DeBarba, Northeast's boost costs without enhancing safety. "The disadvantage because nuclear-generated vice president of technical services, de-regulatory system hasn't kept pace with ad- electricity <can cost twice as much as fos- scribes him as a solid engineer. "Nobody vances in technology," says Steve Ungles- sil-generatred power. No new plants have here ever questioned his honesty or mo-bee, a spokesman for the Nuclear Energy been ordered in 18 years, and a dozen tives," DeBarba says.
BUSJN_ESS Galatis tells it differently. In i drain in just 20 min. from a water March 1992 he began working on c channel next to the fuel pool If the Millstone l, one of three .nuclear ~ gate between the channel and the plants perched on a neck of land that ~ pool had been open. the pool could juts into Long Island Sound from the ; have drained. expDSing the rods and shore of southeastern Connecticut. 1 causing a meltdc>wn. Says Loch-He was checltjng specifications for a baum: "It was a near miss ...
replacement part for a heat exchang- The NRC insists that the chance of er in _the spent-fuel cooling system. such an accident is infinitesimal. But To order the proper part. he needed the agency's risk-iassesSment meth-to know the heat load. So he pulled a ods have been called overly opti-
. safety report that should contain the mistic by activists, engineers and at relevant data. least one NRC commissioner. The But they weren't there. agency's analysis . for a fuel-pool "The report didn't contain the P,.. drainage accided assumes that at safety analysis for what we were do- most one-third of a core is in the pool.
ing," says Galatis. "No heat-load cal- even though plants across the.cotintry culations... It was then he iealized the routinely move fuil1 cores into pools plant had been routinely operating crowded with older cores. If the NRC "beyond design ha.sis." putting 23 based its calculalions on that sce-million ~rtJs into a pool analyzed for nario~ says Lochbcaum, "it would ex-8 million~- which is, he says, "a bit like ceed the radiation-dose limits set by running your car at 5,000 r.p.m." \ Con~ and scare people to 'death.
Galatis raised the issue with But the NRC won't do it" The Nae's member5 of Northeast's division of Taylor told TIME lhat the agency an-nuclear licensing. "They tried to con- alyzes dose rat~ at the time a plant vinCe rne they had jt. analyzed,* he . . *.6 Opens-\vhen its pool is empty. The saYs. He asked them: to produ_ce the ~ ~~ EVIL: Northeast's DeBarm s*j; fl8 ~ rk>thing law, he said, "does not contain a pro-documents, and they could not. laU , ed f _.sing .. sate*. . vision for rereview...
Galatis sensed trouble when, in later about Ga 5 being harass or.--...
ty lssUes . Lochbaum and Prevatte reported talks: "they began denyin'! that the first dis- gy Department announced that a pe~- Sµsque,hanna to the NBC and suggested im-spelled out the' problem in a memo, calling N~vada, wouldn't be ready until 2010; En-' Lochbaum says, didn't :read the full report the fuel pool a license Violation and an "un- ergy Secretary Hazel O'Leary now puts its He and Prevatte called Congress mem-reviewed safety question"-NRC lingo for a chances of opening at no better than fifty- bers, pushed for a public hearing and pre-major regulatory headache-and adding fifty. Bills to create temporary sites are sented their concerns to NRC staff. Con-other concerns he had found, such as the stalled in both houses of Congress. ceding that Lochbaum. and Prevatte "had fact that some of the pool's cooling pipes "Slowly, we woke up to this problem," some valid points," the agency launched a weren't de5igned to withstand an earth- says Betancourt. Th,e NRC relaxed standards task force and in 1993 issued an informa-quake, as they were required to do. North- and granted license amendments that al- tional notice to the 35 U.S. reactors that east sat on the memo for three months, un- lowed plants to "rerack" their rods in ever share Susquehanna's design, alerting them til Galatis filed an internal notice-of- more tightly packed pools. Sandwiched be- to the problem but requiring no action.
- violation form, and Betancourt, a leader in tween the rods is a neutron-absorbing ma- One of the plants was Millstone 1.
the spent-fuel field fi:?r years, wrote a terial called Boraflex that helps keep them memo backing him up. from "going critical." After fuel pools across IN 1992, GALA.TIS DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT "When I started in the industry, 20 the c:Ountry were filled in this way, the in- Lochbaum's struggle to get fuel-pool prob-years ago," Betancourt says, "spent fuel dustry discovered that radiation causes lems taken seriously. He did know he was considered the ass end of the fuel cy- Boraflex to shrink and crack. The NRC is would face resistance from Northeast, cle. No one wanted to touch it. Everyone studying the problem, but at times its offi- where the bonus S}'Stem is set up to reward wanted to be on the sexy side, inside the re- cials haven't bothered to- analyze a pool's employees who don't raise safety issues actor vessel, where the action and danger cooling capacity before granting a reracking that incur costs and those who compromise were. No one noticed fuel pools until we amendment. "It didn't receive the attention productivity see their \bonuses reduced.
started running out of room in them." that more obvious safety concerns got," says (Northeast says it has a second set of In 1982 Congress mandated that the Inspector General Norton- bonuses to reward those who raise safety is-Department of Energy begin to accept nu- Then, in late 1992, David Lochbaum sues. Galatis never got ane.)
clear waste from commercial reactors in and Don Prevatte, consultants working at "Management tells you to come for-1998. Consumers started paying into a fed- Pennsylvania Power & Light's Susquehan- ward with problems," says Millstone engi-eral fund meant to finance a storage site. na plant, began to analyz-e deficiencies in neer Al Cizek, "but actions speak louder Though the Energy Department has col- spent-fuel cooling systems. They realized than words." A Northeast official bas been lected $8.3 billion, no facility has been that a problem had been sneaking up on quoted in an NRG report :saying the compa-completed; in a case of NIMBY writ large, no the industry: half a dozen serious accidents ny didn't have to resol,.-.e a safety problem state wants such a site in its backyard. As at different plants had cl!iUSed some water because he could "blow it by" the regula-the nation's stod.11ile of spent fuel reached to drain from the pools_ In the worst of tors. An NRC study says the number of safe-30,000 tons, activists seized the issue as a them, at Northeast's Haddam Neck plant in ty and harassment allegations filed by
\~ay to hobble the industry, and the Ener- 1984,-a seal failure caused 200,000 gal. to workers at Northeast is !three times the in-50 TIME. MARCH-4, 1996
' dust?y average. A disturbing internal Mill- told TIME. "Legitimate professional differ~ questioning Kacich about the :apparent vi-stone report, presented to CEO Fox in 1991 ences of opinion." In 1977, he says, the NRC olations. In two March 1994 memos to and obtained by TIME, warns of a "'cultural stated, "We could make the choice [of a Kacich, Partlow backed Calatis, scolded problem" typified by chronic failure to fol- full-core off-load] if it's 'necessary or desir- the utility for taking so long Clo respond to low procedures, hardware problems that able for operational _consideratioris.' But him and suggested that they should reward were not resolved or were forgotten, and a that does not mean that what George Galatis "for his willingness to work within management tolerant of "willful [regulato- raised was nofan issue. We have rules on the NU system ... Let him know that his ry] noncompliance without justification." this, and we want to get it right... concern for safety ... is appreciated."
The report, written by director of engineer- By October !993, Galatis was writing to DeBarba and Kacich created another
' ing Mario Bonaca, changed nothing. the chief of Northeast's nuclear g_roup, task force but did not modify the cooling "We've been working at th.is, .. says Fox, "but making fundamental change in a com-plex, technical environment is really hard."
A 1996 Northeast internal document reports that 38% of employees"do not trust 6.* "We haven't always been on top .of a* things," says the NRC's Jackson. "The their management enough to willingly raise concerns (because of] a 'shoot the messenger' *attitude" at the company. In ball got dropped. Here's what I'm saying now:
recent years, two d.ozen Millstone employ-ees have claimed they were fired or de- The ball will not get dropped again."
moted for raising safety concerns; in two cases, the NRC fined NortheaSt. In one, John Opeka, and to Fox, who was then system. Kacich began ha~g conversa-Paul Blanch, who had only recently been company president Galatis mentioned the tions with Jim Andersen, the 1NRC's project named engineer of the year byaleadingin- criminal penalties for "intentional miscon- manager for Millstone 1, about Galatis' dustry journal, was subjected to company- duct" in dealings with the NRC.. Opeka ob- concerns and how to get through the wide harassment after he disCovered that jected to Galatis' abrasive tone but hired spring 1994 off-load. Andersen. who works some of Millstone Unit 3's safety instru- another consulting firm, which also agreed at NRC headquarters in Was'hington, has mentation didn't work properly. with Galatis. Northeast moved on to yet an- told the inspector general that he knew all Galatis bad watched that case unfold other consultant, a retired r.rac official along Millstone was off-loading its full core "George knew what he was getting into," named Jim Partlow. but didn't know until June 19193 that it was says Bla:rich: "He knew Northeast wo~d In D~mber, during a four-:-hour in- a pro~lem. Even then he did n?t inf~nn his protect him. And he did it anyway." because the prosecutor;he sa~ put the vic- modified its off-load procedure, moving all tim on trial-Partlow grilled Galatis about the rods but doing so in stages. Before the IN JANUARY 1993. GALATIS PUSHED FOR A his "agenda" and "motives." After Galatis off-ioad, Northeast fonnally reported to meeting with Richard Kacich, Northeast's showed him the technical reports, Partlow Andersen what he'd known for months:
director of nuclear .licensing. Galatis out- changed his mind about Galatis and began that Millstone might have been operating lined the pool's problems and asked " outside its design ~ a condition for a consultant, Holtec International, ~ that must be reported within 30 days.
to be brought in. Holtec agreed with ! During the spring outage, a valve GalatiS that the pool was an unana- ~ was accidentally left <>open, spilling lyzed safety question; later the con- . i 12,000 gal. of reactor-coolant water-sultant warned that a loss of primary . ** .. :: a blunder that further shook Galatis' cooling could result in the pool's heat- a faith. He began to see problems al-ing up to 216°F-a nice slow boil. x~ most everywhere he looked and.
Galatis sent a memo to DeBarba, '" proposed tile creation of a global-then vice president of nuclear engi- issues task force to find out whether neering, in May 1993. Galatis was Millstone wa5 safe eno~ to go back threatening to go to the NRC, so De- online. His bosses agreed. But when Barba created a task force to address the head of the task force left for a golf "George's issues/' as they were be- vacation a few weeks before the plant coming known. The aim seems to was scheduled to start up, Galatis have been to appease Galatis and says, he knew it wasn't a serious ef-keep him from going public. DeBar- fort. So he made a call to Ernest ba says the calculations that HOO.tee
Hadley, the lawyer who h. ad defend-~
and Galatis used were overly conser- eel whistle blower Blanch against .
vative and that experience told him Northeast two years bef.ore.
there was no problem. The pool hadn't boiled, so it wouldn't boil. .If a AN EMPWYMENT AND WRONGFUL-problem ever developed, there tennination lawyer, Hadley has would be plenty of time to correct it made a career of representing whis-before it reached the crisis stage. "'VIe tle blowers, many of them from Mill-live and work here. Why would we stone .. For 10 years Jie has also want an unsafe plant? We had inter-nal debate on this topic," DeBarba to ENFORCER: NRC Chairwoman Jack~n isir)i~g prove her worked with Stephen Comley* and commitment to safety-and refonn an inert bureaucracy We the People. Comley., a Massachu-TIME, MARCH 4, 1996 51
BUSINESS setts nursing-home operator, is a i since at least 1987 but had never classic New England character, " done anything about them. Now, solid and brusque. He founded l! to clear the way for the fall 1995 We the People in 1986 when he § off-load. NRC officials were appar-realized the evacuation plans for 1 ently offering Northeast what Seabrook Station, a plant 12 ~ Galatis calls "quiet coaching... One miles from his nursing home, in- ~ signof~wasadraftversionofan eluded doses of iodine for those NRC inspection report about the too old and frail to evacuate. spent-fuel pool that had been E-
"Some of us were expend- mailed from the NRC to Kacich's li-able," says Comley. "That got me censing department. "What was going." For years he was known that doing in Northeast's files?"
for publicity stunts-hiring planes asks Inspector General Norton.
to trail banners above the U.S. On June 10, 1995, Jim Ande.r-Capitol-and emotional outbursts sen visited the site to discUss at the press conferences of Galatis' concerns with Kacich's politicians. The NRC barred him staff. Andersen wouldn't meet from its public meetings until a with Galatis but huddled with judge ordered the ban lifted. But Kacich's team, hying to decide Comley's game evolved: instead COACHING STAllFF: Comley, htft, and Hadley, right, with Galdis ~a how to bring Millstone's habits of demanding that plants be shut pubDc meetlngllast October, lent the engineer cruclal suppmt into compliance with NRC regu-down, he began insisting they be lations, either by requesting a li-run safely. He teamed up with the sharp- charges-a breach of confidentiality that eense amendment-a cumbersome pro-witted Hadley to aid and abet whistle the lNRC calls "inadvertent." When Hadley cess that reqtiires NRC review and public blowers and sank his life savings into We complained to him about. Northeast's al- comment-or by filing an internal form up-the People before talcing a dime in dpna- leged harassment of Galatis, Driskill sug- dating the plant's safety reports. This was tions. Comley, says the NRc's Norton, "has gestted he talk to Northeast's lawyer: "He's the easier path, but it could be used only if been useful in bringing important issues to a really nice guy." fibe issue didn't constitute an unreviewed I
- our attention. Steve can be a very intense 'While playing detective-sniffing safety question. Andersen told DeBarba guy. I don't think it's good for his health. through file drawers and computer directo- ;and Kacich that the license amendment "is But people who seem-not fanatical, but ries--Galatis found items that he felt sug- ihe cleaner way to go," but they weren't overlyintense-help-deemmcioc~raiaccy:~w~o~l'.JC.~"~-+-~ate~owilSU)ll-oeJ:we~...trua.urun:Jl-8.na..lIS.-i-:swre__m.e~~~~LeJrunu1gn._JltimnM;eLJ!toL.1~e~t~an~~
reg}Ulator. Safety reports made it clear that amendment approved before the next off-IN APRIL 1994, TWO YEARS AFTER HE DIS- bofll on-site inspectors and officials from load, scheduled for October 1995.
covered the problems with Millstone's the Nae's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regula- On July 10, Betancourt met with Ken cooling system, Galatis reported the matter tiomhadknownaboutthefull-coreoff-loads ]Jenison, an inspector from the NRc's Re-to the NRC. He spoke to a "senior allega-tions coordinator," waited months, then refiled hiS charges in a letter describing 16 problems, including the cooling system, IUEAft.
111 MISSES.. .* ..
The Nudear.Regulatory Commission's Office of the Inspector Genes:al-a watchdog that can investigate but the pipes that couldn't withstand seismic mot puni~s lcioked Into an array of cases:tn which safety problems were Ignored shock, the corporate culture. "At North- lbyNRCSbrff*SomehighDghts: AJ.L 11J"-tr.. C,J!tJ V'fP /VoJc.p OJ/
- east, people are the biggest safety prob-lem," Galatis says. "Not the guys in the en-
$0,_.f r',jn. n. l/e.AIV 31 After a 1975 fire ~ocked out eqwpmem1iiithe bro..WS Ferry plant in Alabama, the NRC gine room. The guys who drive the boat." approved a material calhtd Thermo-Lag as a "lire barrier" to protect elecbical systems.
Galatis told DeBarba and Kacich that Between 19S2 and 199~, however, the NRCiignored seven complaints about Thermo-he was going to the NRC. He continued to Lag; when an eriglneer testified that fire cau511ed it to melt and give off lethal gases, the experience what he calls "subtle forms of INRC closed the ease without action. After mon complaints and an Inspector generars harassment, retaliation and intimidation.'; . iinvestigation, the NRC "reassessed.,; Now, it says, "corrective action is ongoing."
His performance evaluation was down-graded, his personnel file forwarded to In 1980 workers at Watts Bar 1, a plant then under construction by the Tennessee Northeast's lawyers. DeBarba "offered" to '\Valley Authority, floc>ded the NRC with some &,000 allegations of shoddy workmanship move him out of the nuclear group. He and safeity lapses-enough to halt construCtrain for five years. The NRC breached would walk into a meeting, and the room conficlentiality and Identified whistle blowerssuch as electrical supervisor Ann Harris to would go suddenly silent. De Barba says he flhe TVA; ~evefal were fired. After 23 years amd $ 7 billion, Watts Bar 1 was completed last is unaware of any such harassment. tall. Though workers say the TVA has abandoned thorough safety inspections In favor of a With missionary zeal, Galatis contin- '"'random sampling" program, the NRC in Febnlary granted an operating license to Watts ued to forward allegations to the NRC. Yet !Bar, the last U.S. n:.:clear plant scheduled for,start-up.
four months passed before Galatis finally heard from Donald Driskill, an agent with 1 In the early 1 ~80s, when Northeast Utilities' Seabrook Station In New Hampshire was the NRC's Office of Investigations (the sec- 1under construction, Joseph Wampler warned the NRC that many welds were faulty. His ond watchdog unit inside the NRC, this one !Complaints went unanswered, and he was ewmtually fired. Blacklisted, he says, Wampler tracks wrongdoing by utilities). Galatis felt :moved to California and revived his career. But In 1991 the NRC sent a letter summarizing that Driskill was too relaxed about the case. *wampler's allegations-and providing his tu*:name and new address-to several dozen Driskill talked to Northeast about Galatis' 52 TIME, MARCH 4, 1996
gion 1 office, and gave testimony in support We the People, charged that Northeast had AFTER GALA.TIS FILED HIS PETITION, ON AUC.
of Galatis' safety allegations. Less than a "knowingly, willingly, and flagrantly- vio- 21, he found himself in many of New En-week later, Betancourt was called to the of- lated Millstone l's license for 20 years, that gland's newspapers. As citizens' groups fice of a good-natured human-resources it had made "material false statements" to called meetings, Northeast and the NRC as-officer named Janice Roncaioli. She com- the NRC and that it would, if not punished, sured everyone that the full-core off-load plained that he wasn't a "team player,n Be- continue to o~rate unsafely. was a common practice that enhanced safe-tancourt says, and ran through the compa- On Aug. l, Betancourt was called into ty for maintenance wmk~rs inside the emp-ny's termination policies. Roncaioli called DeBarba's office; Roneaioli was present, ty reactor vessel. "We*ve been aware of how Betancourt's account of the meeting and DeBarba told Betancourt he was being they off-loaded the full core," NRC spokes-
"slanted" but would not comment further, reassigned. "We waat to help *you, woman Diane Screnci told one paper. "We citing employee-confidentiality rules. George," Betancourt recalls DeBarba say- could have stopped them earlier."
In a July 14 meeting, Jenison, one official ing, "but you've got to start thinking 'com- At a citizens' group meeting, Galatis who wasn't going to stand fur any regulatory pany.'" It was all very vague and, Betan- met a mechanic named Pete Reynolds, who sleight-of-hand, told DeBarba and Kacich court thought, very intimidating. On had left Millstone in a labor dispute two that if Northeast tried to resolve its licensing Aug. 3-the day Beta.ncaurt was scheduled years before. Reynolds shared some hair-problems through internal paperwork
~.~ Galatis charged that his bosses had alone, he would oppose it. Northeast had to get a license amendment approved before it could off-load another full core, and time was mnn4ig out DeBarbaand Kacich called on Galatis and Betancourt to help them
& "knowingly, willingly, a'1d flagrantly" write the amendment request The plan in-cluded, for the first time, the cooling-system violated ,Millstones license for 20 years. What*
improvements Galatis had been demanding for three years. It was a kind of victory, but scared him most: the NRC had never noticed.
he felt disgusted. "The organizational ethics were appalling," he says. "There's no reason
to meet with the Office.of Investigations- raising stories about his days off-loading I should have had to hire aJawyerand spend Roncaioli called him to her office again. Ac-
fuel He told Galatis-and has since repeat-years taking care of something this simple." cording to Betancourt. she said she wanted ed the account to TIME-that he saw work So Galatis helped Kacich *with the to "reaffirm the meaning" of the DeBarba crews racing to see who could move fuel
amendment request. which was filed July meeting. Betancourt's "Wife and children rods the fastest The co *
--2 . n e an a ey ew up ano . er to worried that he would be fired. tripped radiation alanns and overheated document: a petition that asked the NRC to "Why don't you just do what they want you
the fuel pool. Reynolds' job was to remove deny Northeast's amendment request and. to?" his eldest girl asked Betancourt didn't the big bolts that hold the reactor head in suspend Millstone's license for 60 days. know quite how to answer. "Your own place. Sometimes, he said, he was told to re-The petition, filed on behalf of Galatis and daughter telling you to roll over," he says. move them so soon after shutdown that the heat melted his protective plastic booties.
Galatis knew that if such thin~ had nuclear companies. His career was destroyed a second time; he now worl<S as a happened, they would be reflected in oper-carpenter. The NRC fined North~ $100,000 for problems with the weld~. ator's logs filed in Northeast's document room. So, on Oct 6,, he appeared in the It In 1990 Northeast engineer Paul Blanch discovered that the instrumelds that measure room and asked for the appropriate rolls of tl1e coolant level inside the reactor at Millstone 3 were faifing. Blanch was forced out, and microfiche. The logs backed up what the problem went uncorrected. In 1993 the NRC's Wilriam Russell tol~ the Inspector Reynolds had said: Millstone had moved
'-&eneral that the agency had exercised "enforcement discretion," a polic,Y;that allows it to fuel as soon as 65 hrs. after shutdown-a Waive regulations. Later Russell said the remark had been taken out of context. quarter of the required time. The lo~ noted the sounding of alarms. Galatis wondered S:last December a worker at the Maine Yankee plant In Bath charged that management where the resident inspector had been.
had deliberately falsified computer calculations to avoid disclosing that tlte plant's coormg The deadline came for Millstone's off-systems were inadequate. The NRC didn't discover this, the Union of Concerned Scientists load, but the amendment-still had not been told reporters, because it didn't notice that Maine Yankee had failed to s*bmlt the granted. Connecticurs Senator Chris Dodd, calculations for review-though they were due in January 1990. Representative Sam Gejdenson and a host of
. local officials were asking about the plant's
In l 988 a technician at the Nine Mile Point plant near Oswego, New Ymk, called the safety; and Millstone scheduled a public NRC With allegations of drug use and safety violations at the plant. The NRC executive meeting for late October. Senior vice presi-
~rector at the time, Victor Stello Jr., took a per5onal Interest i_n the matter, but his chief dent Don Miller sent a memo to his em-
~ *ooinod to be building a case against Roger Fortuna, the deputy director of tJ'ie NRC's ployees warning them that "experienced d ce Of Investigation, for-leaking secrets to the watchdog group We the!People. The NRC antinuclear activists"' bad "the intention of
m*nctod that We the People head Steve Comley tum over tapes he had .allegedly made shutting the station down and eliminating 3
$ ~~\l:raAUons with Fortuna. When Comley refused, he was ruled in coRitempt and fined merit 1 OO (he still has not paid). The charges against Fortuna were f<!und to be without 2,500 jobs." The memo stirred up some of Galatis' colleagues. 'You're taking food out
~llll~d When the case came to light--during hearings to confinn Stelm as Assistant of my girl's mouth," one of them told him.
~.ti~ l\I l::nergy-Stello withdrew his name. "The tension between emforcement and DeBarba assembled a task force to as-
~* <'5\';~ @tn..111," a ranking PIRC official says, "tugs at this agency every day_" sess what had to be done to get the pool
'::/f*~t'""'4:.:._ ready for the overdue off-load, but he kept TJl\,ft'" A.{:\Dr-U A lf\nc
~~--
BUSINESS
'* t
. *. t Galatis and B.etancourt off the team. The the NRC was considering penalties. In an FOR GALATIS, THE ENDGAME SHOULE HAVE task force came up with six serious prob- extraordinary move, Russell demanded a complete review of every system at Mill-been sweel On Dec. 20, a Millstone tech-nical manager fired off a frank piece of lems, most already raised by Galatis. Scram-bling to fix the pool in a few weeks, DeBar- stone 1, with the results "submitted 1.mder E-mail warning his colleagues that "the ba hired extra people. The plant shut down. oath," to prove that every part of the plant acceptance criteria are changing.. Being
cipating permission to move fuel is safe-the global examination Galatis outside the proper regulatory framework, Galatis and Hadley had been waiting two asked for two years ago. The results, Rus- even if technically justifiable, will l>e met nths for a reply to their petition to deny sell wrote, "will be used to decide whether with resistance by the NRC. Exped no reg-Northeast's amendment. Finally, on Oct. or not the license of Millstone Unit 1should ulatory relief." DeBarba put 100 engineers 26, a letter from William Russell, directnr be suspended, modified or revoked.,. on a global evaluation of the pJaat, and of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Reg- Now the pressure is on NRC. Chair- they turned up more than 5,000 "items'° to ulation, informed them that their petition woman Jackson to prove her commitment be addressed before the plant could go was "outside of the scope" of the applicable to nuclear safety-and her ability to reform back online. The company annomnced a regulatory subchapter. Two weeks later, the an inert bureaucracy. "I will not malce a reorganization of its nuclear dMsion in NRC granted Northeast's amendment. Mill- sweeping indictment of NRC staff,,. Jack- which DeBarba and Miller were bal:h pro-stone started moving fuel the next morning. son, a straight-talking physicist who in July moted. Miller, who told TIME that: ..com'-
Because of Galatis, the plant is still shut 1995 beCame both the first female and the placency" was to blame for the *tilit:Ys down. "What's especially galling,,. says first African American to run the NB~ told troubles, was put in charge of safety at Northeast's five nuclear plants. On.Jan. 29, the NRC, citing chronic safety concerns, At.\\ Northea-st Utilities assured everyone employee harassment "and historic em-phasis on cost savings vs. performance,,.
a that Millstone was safe. Now the plant is enshrined all three Millstone planfs in the agency's hall of shame: .the high-scrutiny on the NRC's "watch list" and will remain shut "watch list" of troublesome reactors.
Northeast announced that Millstone would 'stay down at least through Jene, at down through June-at acost of $75 million. a cost of $75 million. And Standard &
Poor's downgraded Northeast's de!bt rat-Hadley, "is that the NRC ignored my client TIME. ..Does that mean everybody does ing from stable to negative.
and denied his motion, then validated his things perfectly? Obviously not We "A hell of an impact," says Betancourt.
concerns after " a-ven't al\'Ja)'S been o
m o osemyJo .
Inspector General Norton released his pre- ball got dropped. Here's what I'm saying "If I had it to do over again.... says liminary report. He found that Northeast now: The ball will not get dropped again." Galatis, "I wouldn't." He believes his nu-had conducted improper full-core off- In response to the problems Galatis ex- clear career is over. (Though still em-loads for 20 years. Both the NRc's on-site in- posed, Jackson launched a series of policies ployed by Northeast, he knows thal: whis-spectors and headquarters staff, the report designed to improve training, accounrabil- tle blowers are routinely shut out l>y the said, "were aware" of the practice but ity. and vigilance among inspectors and industry.) He's thinking about entering somehow "did not realize" that this was a NRC staff. She ordered the agency's second divinity school.
violation. In other words, the Nae's dou- whistle-blower study_in two years and ;i na- In January, Northeast laid off 100 em-ble-barreled oversight system shot blanks tiomvide review of a1I 110 nuclear plants, to ployees. To qualify for their ~ranee from both barrels. Norton blamed bad find out how many have been moving fuel money, the workers had to sign elaborate
_training and found no evidence of a con- in violation of NRC standards. The results release forms pledging not to sue the utili-spiracy between Northeast and the NRC to will be in by Aprll, along with a menu of ty for harassment. Four engineers sajr they violate the license. He is still investigating fuel-pool safety recommendations. (By us- were fired in retaliation for their testimony possible collusion by the NRC after Galatis ing a technique called dry-cask storage, to the NRC four years ago on behalf of whis-came forward. What troubled him most, utilities could empty their pools and vi.-are- tle blower Blanch. The company denies Norton told TIME, is that agency officials all house rods in airtight concrete con~ers, any connection between the lay0ffs and the way up to Russell knew about the off- reducing risk. In the past, the NRC has Blanch's case. That makes Blanch chuckle.
loads and saw nothing wrong with them. ruled that the process isn't cost effective.) "The two Georges had better watch their "The agency completely failed," says Nor- Jackson still refuses to meet with backs," he says. "Up at Northeast, they've ton. "We did shoddy work. And we're con- Galatis or even take his phone call. ""Mr. got long memories."
cerned that similar lapses might be occur- Galatis is part of an adjudicatory process," In the end, Galatis believes, the Nae's ring at other plants aroµnd the country."' she explains. But in a letter turning down recent flurry of activity is little more than In a second investigation, the Office of Stephen Comley's request that she meet window dressing. "If they wanted to .en-Investigations is looking into Northeast's with him and Galatis, Jackson wrote, ""The force the law," he says, "they could have license violations and the alleged harass- avenues you have been using to raise issues acted when it counted-before granting ment of Galatis and Betancourt. The in- are the most effective and efficient wa;ys. I the license amendment. Whatever wrist tense public scrutiny their case has re- ee no additional benefit to the mee~." slap they serve up now is beside the point."
ceived \.vill, Galatis says, "make it harder Asked by TIME if she considered three "I believe in nuclear power," rue says, for them to sweep this one under the rug."' years and two wrecked careers "the most "but after seeing the NRC in actiom, I'm On Dec. 12, Russell sent a letter efficient" way to raise the fuel-pQOI issue, convinced a serious accident is not just informing Northeast that because "certain Jackson offered a thin smile. "I'm changing likely but inevitable. This is a dangerous of your acthities may have been conduct- the process," she said. "When all is said and road. They're asleep at the wheel. And l'm ed in violation of license requirements," done, then Mr. Galatis and I can sit and talk." road-kill."
54 TIME, MARCH 4, 1996
eling the Fallout .
Courte~ by GOP, activ.istfaces.NRC prob~
Hy Kimsty Wilson ti on io the .ev.M of eever.e radioactive fallout.
TAJTCORJU:SP'ONoi;:-:T Though~* agency'* advice was r\ot unu,wi.J, Com."
Rowley, Mil...~. - The in"it.atioo a.rrhed jwt 13llt ley Ml i~ reflected a callouene1;4 he was determined 1!1<mth in the (otTII of a' vidt.'Ot.aped In~ rrom the not t.o tal*rat.e. He.began writing letters, Grat to the preside.at of the United St.ate.s inviting St.ephim Com* NRC and la~t to Pra.ldent Rnna:ld Reagan. And whu1
!l!y to become :s W'eLime ll'le1nber of .the itep\lbliClln he failtd tQ ge~ &he ~wer9 he thought Jw deserved,
~wnatorial I.nner Ci.re.le, a kind or lnsi~~" .club for big. C'..-0ntley graduall,y embarked on a one-man eampajgn tlmP GOP contributors w~o share t'he party' a "'*ah&.eti ~.Un.rt tbt Seabrook plant alid then* th** nuclur 1Ul4 cure beUefa."
po~. ~!J.lb,ment in general - digging up evi*
For $9,000, Co ml Py could' hiv~ hh "! .* * * '*:* . . * * .
dfince ot PQtet\tlaJ aafety probJems that picturt taktn with the president, m~ *
1m. a~ lr.ast. tWo caaes hell*I tpur rwr-prlvately 1'ith e3blnet officials, get :. -.l mVtetipUon.s .. : . " .. . . .
rinli$id~ se.at.s at the presidential lnau* .. :,: ~11ebeca.tneaprote$$lonAipeit;hJrlng guration. :* . . * ~anos at hJJi own~~ f'l.7 p~teft DuL while !Up\lblican fund ra.istrs : * ~er11 .over* government buUd.inci;.
1:ourt Comley, Md others r.o a inaster .. buttonholing the go\*e.rnor ~f New miUling list, for hi' money, fed~Nll offi* .'*,...H~~ire at public foruDU, ~ ra*
dwseem determined to lock him up*on ..~~.o,. com~ercials. !l~d er:edinc* bill*
r.harge. st~matingfrom a Nuclear Reg* *. ;!~ along tht tnt4ntat. lUghwa)t
i. liAt.ory C.immi."6it>n hwestigation. It . l&!ld!Qt to Seabr00k. He even mailed
'!IP.>" follow through on thell' elTorts to * *~.i~:is c.:irch to. some 8,000. NRC r..:iv~ h.itn htld in r.ont.empt or court for
etnplWf" wic.b a picture oC one oC his
ululg IA\ coo~rate in the in .... et:tiga* nsld~b propl)td up ln her ~.holding l*""* he co*lld gu lo Jail as ~.:irly as I.his abottl" ofpot.aasiwn iodide. He ia)ia he week. . * 'Phciio\rJ'ulit piGple. rn.* ~apent$;500,0QOoChisown moo')'on
eomJey mtght hue been dJsm..iued * . *
Comley* **;* * " the entir9 e(J'ort.. . . .
!a.~ nl)tb.lng inore t.h~ a erank if he had ** * * " - ., .., . In r1987 C1>.111ley ~nanaged to get out become ft ms.gneL for whistleblowera within the Rea_oan'li attentlo~ at a cloc.ed GOP fund raiser, and ri*;clear indlelt.ry and succeeded in forcing public a.is* handed h1m evidenc.ehe l.'3)'S he obt.ainqd l'rom'a fed.
d~urt l)f potent13J aaf'et;r probl~ro=S.
eral whi,stleblow~, ,dO<;limenlinr tho u~ of eubstan-A welH<Kio. con5ervatin busiues!!man tumfd ar* &rd J)N't.s ln nuclear power plants. . .*
~t!nl antl*nuc:lear ausader. Comley, 47, spent m0$l of "He bas IM:en a sup~r~r of the.GOP for most. or h~ adult lire tending to the ::imaJl, stately cuning ~s lift and* believe:r µi the sys~m," said 13ll.1Y Dori0:. ~
hi)me that w ram ily tst.ablished oa the grounds or an van, ll membtr of the Jllti*nuclear Clam&hell alliance ~
~).room f,..Jera:l Wa.mJOD near the New H:u:npshire in Conf:Qnf, N.H. l\'ben be rouiad out the system. ~
0
: t.au lme. He contributed regularly to Republican didn't :Work *** he b9\lllme incensed." '. * ....
tuses. but h.ad httle direct iovulvement in politics.
SevPnrl mont.h.s a.Cler Con,11ey'1 e~coWlter'witb. Rea- ~
That. started to change in 1.986, whe~ an e:rploslon pri, tht NRC ordered \he inspealon and t.estlng of l:!i
.;I. \hf Chernobyl nucleM reactor in the Soviet Un.ion subsbadard parts In a' le.oat 38 nudear plants. Com* .~
i'rompt.ed Comley to biquiJ e how resldeiit.. or bi& loy takes credit .for tbe NRC soing publi~, while the i nui'$1ng home w.>uld be treated in the event of an o.pncy ~ it. WN l'.'apondiDg to a tJp from
materi* !I t-3. ~* ,
ucc!dent at Seabrook. Nud\!ar Pow.er Stat.ion, 12 miles a.la tupplier. A subttqueot coo.greseional lnvtttlga- c: c *
i1'*ay Tht NRC so.id resident& who otiuld not be t.ion (owid evidence oC subetandard eqillpment befug i t.-z

:t mO\'ed sbouJd b4I kept indoors and in .Wtno C.3!e3 R)vtn pot.asatum iodide, whir.h ht.Ip& blOt"k tho nboorp-Used iJI 72 oC the *nation's 111 operatiDI re8etofl ~a
:.fi
- t:::;,
taon oC ttdiaU.in but does not_P..rr>~ from cunt.:imiaa* ..;~Please see ACTIVIST on Pap 87 jj J~
courted byGOP, 8T ~
~
.t.ct1*v1*st F;,aces* Pro. be. m(orrna.ut *i\s or tho i:a.se, ihemade were part sa~ CClrnle)'
lnj')(!Z lh:tt f\ gtwenunent subpoenll~
~
nod be declined kl tutn them ov~r. Now, the NR\.l ACTIVIST Crom Paflft .
ts t1aVS it cannot. compl~ l\$ i:n~tiptlou tii1til the
~tUr Is rt1<>l~. Activist~ coot.end th NRC i&
raW~ the NRC f~r :itA iiaod)hig of the 1~~: . tryinf to ,put ' lid or. whistlebl<111*~"'*
Fortuna's a~torcey. Jubnn Gn~m;pun. cays bis Comley .i.o bM taken credi~ for 1'1'.?D\Ptinf the NRC to investlaau th* adequacy, 9f ~*~1;1 o key cU11nt ~ notblng to f(."Jr 01}rn th~ t.o.J"~. But r.i<>lrt*
welclut SW>rook, a prooo that lllC.. Jast rear rl!eu lt- h.7 while not cu.r\linuing &heir Grirten\-:e, Ila)'! PY* .
ed ln &ho plluJt'* oj>"raton be!Nl lloocl $100,000. 1ni up I.be toPf'S 'tfouJJ f\l.\n h.i$ Cn"d.l1Jilit1 wit~ *-
Theim.mediate eourco orCorWuy's leg:\l troubles, whiatJcblowen. '"'
bcnnver aims CNm bis refu.;.al to turn O\o'tr 40 r.o. M.'t feew11 ba.s alw~ ~u lh.\t the o~bcy and GO ~rted to~ rwa>rdll,ip or telepbi:JJJe conver* 1.he i.ndu.sti:y w:mt w lr.r.-Jp I.be fl'\llh About nuclear llltiOll.I tw bad Wlt.b Roger tortuna, ~ut1 dlrtctor power frotn the pubUc," ComJey MY** Let'* M~* l ot&beNRO'a Of:Dceoflnveirtlsationa, who ls rHJ>On* pV11 them the tn;>e:s. '1'110 \Tould nvcr talk to. ~e tibl~ tar
a* ... lnvesUpl.i.ag
. . wrongdoiug . . . bf the.,ouclear
. l .
a.pi.u?"
~~ Fo- Yl'M ~~by .tdp NRC ciaJa* o( ~nspizing 'frith Coinlt"] to YtoppJe" ,.t.f\t ont ..
agtnq. Coal{l'eQ a.ad thu NRC'1 iQs~or gentral ev*~tually cleared fort.una. su~ ht was th~
The Chairm.an and Executive Committee of the NaUonal Repubjjcan SenatorjaJ CommUtee do on t/Jis second day of August, in the year of our Lord, one thousand-nine hundred and (linety-one, hereby canter with all due circumstance and respect -.
THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF MERIT upon
>Mr. Stepfie.n 'B. Comfeg * .
from tlie City of!l{owfey in tlie COTTtmQf1.weaft/i ofMassacnusett.s Tlw said. in worll1y and JJonest. p[1rsuit. has unequiyocal~v earned t/Jis good and /1ig/1 tribute in recognition oflheir I undying commitment, patriotic Joya/Ly. and dedication of service to the President.
l-lw RcpulJ/ican PartJ~ mut the United States of ,'\merica.
/'/Iii< :r.-1111111 ( ;1'111'{.!I' /lt1S/I
<.'llilil'IJl.lll I l.1s/11111-*t1111. /I.I; / 1/'t'.'ii1/t '///
. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. 0.C. 2056 May 31 , 1~-91
e OF .THE ECTOR GENER.AL Mr. Stephen* s. Comley Mans ion Drive Rowley, ~...A 01960 iJea:r ~..r. Comley:
This corres;:onC.ence of .Special Agent Kent E~ the **status ,.- ... _
.allegaticin
. -:; -* - - you for-.;;a:ded t*:> the former ?resident Ronald Reagan .. "-~~
'!~e.,,-::.r
-:::-- ..r~h:t
~ - -.. --
cc-:.ol:e ..... .:..~=;
of counte=f eit a.~d substanda=d pa~ts t!:.=oughou~ t..~e nuclea=
rovicied to t.

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~ere~~i
\
-*-==u o_r MD, on Decsmbe= 13, 1.\990.
-.-o-=__i '

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Pti'olD br Sf.ptien ~
ean, a resident of the Sea View Nursing Home In Rowley, NRC and Seabrook officials by anti-Seabrook activist lass. peers out from the front of a Christmas card sent to Stephen Comley. *
~ri_~t')las card sends evacuation message home* miles from lhc nuclear plar.t. indi- friend In a nursing home," said Mr.
By Steve Haberman I ga:e 'upon Seabrook Sra:ion c:ited th:it giving his bed-bound re- Comley ...We ~ve sent out these Hampton Bureau Chief A11d wonder ijrlrc day t\'ill comt side:us Ibis medic:ition was 1he c:irds 10 NRC employees 10 urge For emergcncl' t\*c:::.1a1io11. only insU'Uction he received when them 10 start protecting the Ameri-HAMPTON - Nuele:ir R!t:u*
he quesuoned wh;it to do in 1he c:in public from the dangers of nu*
ory Commission 3nd White -but, J have mv pills. NRC's event of a rele.'l.Se of radiation from cle:lr power. We have asked them Use officials surely get mar:y ord *
lhe pl:int. This response wt!$ wh:u to cont:ic:t' We The People or.
ds wishins them happy h'Jii* T11ar ail arow11.J is prttf\* ji11c: cot him in\'olvcd in hill nve.11car :inother organization they trust, if ys*. bur few will m~e the im* So Happ,v! Merry! c\*cry*onr! b:mle :ipinst 1he p141nt
they have infonnation tibouuafe1y ss1on of the ~n~ senl by :in11- A flood Yulmdc 10 ,\*011 "'"' . Mr. Comley. 1hrough bis orgl* problems which :ire being covered abrook ac11v1st Steph::r. rhinc!" n11:itiuu We The Peopl:, h::is up within the :i9cnc:y," he said.
mlev. r.1;1ilcJ 1hous:inu~ \lf lhc:-.1* Chri~l* We: The Peopl1: h;is been insrru*
Featuring the above phnt(I 111 ** In Ille photo k::n is lmlJ1n~ :i :a:~~ -:;irdi; lo i.:aiploy..:..:~ 111 1h~ mc.:ntal in rcvc::ilin11 lhe C"-istcnc:e identof Mt. Comlev*) Kowi.:,. oottlc l:ibc:ll~u puloi~~iuin i11uidl.'. NIK, Sc.1brun~ S1::11on. 111 *1cr nu- of c:ouni,:rfoi1. subs1:indlll'd p:iru in
~s. nursin~ 'home: iJi:n1it"1~.: the \Jru~ pn::;crihcu ll\ 1hi.: SHC' tn .;h:::r f'UW~'I rta11b ;11.:r11~' lh..: Ol::irly IWU*lhmJS Of the nuc:le:it Iv :i.~ Jeon on 1he C(lvcr. r.:~*:* offi1c1 lhe l.'ffc:ct~, 1f I.' :1.rx*,urL' 11* lhl.' .-nuntry, 1h1: \\'h11..: H1*1N' Mal p11w1.:r f'll;1nl.'i in thi5 country :inJ nu will open rill' ;;;ml {(I ri:::.! radia1111n wl111.:h \'11111.1 r1*~ul! l111in t."11n1*1\'!-.ll. h;1~ 1\~fl1.?Jlc1lly ~'!~ht :i full con*
rf\*~~11111:11in,-..:i-11r:111on111IC'I lhesc 1
.Ill Jl.:l:IJ1°1ll ;ti .'><<:1!111i.1I. :O-i.111*111 "l 111hi1hh "'" "' 1111' ;***"!'"'
Ml <:111111\'\'. "" lll'I ,,, "' .; ""n "' *rl. 1111 11!1* "'11(( * *""' ""* 1.-.;r .11111 111hcr ~oikl~ r~*latctl pruhlcmi.
",'\r Clir1~*f1*1.1.,111*11'. *1.,111 '"'
\' 11"\\ ""'"~.' 11. *1111* 1..... 1!:*.I : .' I"'",., pl:1111, t..1' 1 .: "';,111 *.. .., al 11111*1~*:1r puw1*1 plants.
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CONGR.ESSION-**-.-.* . . . . . .
TEm_: .
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i. y We~y Report .
~ :i./' '// '10 i .
~ NRC Soap Opera...._
Could Block Stello's Nomination

A Time To Sow Subsidies Prove Hard Habit To Break

-- * ;, ' TJ!rest EffofC I *.* -: * **.*'~**.-!°-~**congress"ll~adies *Fann Bill . . ,,;: '.:
To Limit Tenure l Faces *Great Odds
'Mes$ng Arotmd'
. *'*'**~' _~~h.Social Security I On Hill Agenda 11
-:~------
I Changes Abroaj Complicate Policies 1*
On Irrunigration I!
- I l
'l Bush Ups Ante In Ongoing 'Fight Over Prerogatives
.**"*;~ ..\
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GOVlRNIHHT & COMMERCE E~ERGY Stello and the Fortm1a Affa.ir:
Backbiting at the NRC Ta.le of intrigue ~d alleged revenge could doom nomination of Bush choice to fix crippled nuclear weapons co~pl~
ometime in 1988, the Nuclear Stello to the list that includes Robert S Regulatory Commission's chief of internal affairs listed in her notebook three objectives for an inves*
H. Bork, John Tower and Wllliam Lu*
cU: (Backrround, pp. 322, 231)
-. This. is the story or what hu be*
tigation she had begun. Sharon come widely known in NRC circles as Connelly circled the item she put at the Fortuna Affair, a real-lite soap op*
the top:. "Dispose ()f RF." era-one me;snber o! Conrress calls "Nu-The target was Roger Fortuna, the clear Hospital." It is a tale of bureau-second-ranking NRC oCficial in charge cratic and political backbiting in which of investigating wrongdoing at nuclear virtually everyone has at least the .ap*
power plants. Suspected of "building . /
pearance of an ax to grind. It involves
.,,._.. -..~.,,. - .t .J.n .C!!C@!z.atio~ to .topple" the N~G. **.<<' l envelopes filled with government
'""'~ -~.,, ** ~- . he wu'tlin~sfure:i."But. after the"in-quiry became public, Connelly and the NRC's e:icecutive director, Viet'OT Stello Jr., were acc:use!i of pursuing a I
- . ~{¥~~'<\1:*~'7';~~n~Y. allegations abou.t pot.-sr11a~g
-~:*
nuclear-plant operators. a* top-s6~e£ ***
contract. fake vacations, an assumed name. child molestation and a judge's veµdetta aga.inst Fortuna for being tM *~* . decision to fine a ZJl3Jl $200,000 for Call-ajgressive. against industri officialS*. ing to produce ~ nobody ii sure
,Ei1hteen months after th~ probe *exist.
began - and a year after f ortuna was Everybody involved denies doing detailed to* "bureaucratic Siberia" - *anything wronr.
no. one has concluded that he vicilated any laws or iµle5. On Feb, 20, he was Enter EJllaon sivea his. job back. ** ** *.* lllllOll& . . . . The *ltor)i begjm with a mm ln the ~eant;ime, Fortuna'* od~ey ~oter FOrtusia spent AO,OOO defending named Douglas Ellison, a Conner nu-has taken oa enormo.us ramifications. hirl'.tseH during a lengttly fnftdgatton. clear-plant technkian and selr-styled
... *. Demoerat.s' .on* sever&l.' co1;1gr.es- years* as -a nudear rerulator, it now wbi9tleblower who apP941'.S .b? hav~ ..
sio~al committees ~ the H~e*s-~te* appe-.rs ~at if bis nomination !ails, taped virtUally every significant con*
rior .and Energy p~ets *-~d
Seaate Fortuna Will have been bit undoinc. versatioa* he had for eeveral years.
Gover?ltnental Affain -- have seiZed Poised to deliver the fatal blow is a: Desperate for money, he tried to sell on the we. as proof of their oft*siate_d newly enacied creation of Stello's crit- hia tapes to the hicheat bidder - a chartt that the NRC is iii bed, with ics - the 'NRC's inspector reneral, a contest the NRC won by default ln tboie:. it oversees. * *. q~asi-independent check Concresa im*
1988, when it paid him $8,492 in fees
. The mvolvement ot Stello, who posed on the arency lut year.
_ and espemes for tepee of Fortuna.
helped supervise the Fortuna *probe,
Two months on the- job, Inspector Ellison wu working for the Nine bu *made_ the case that muc~ juicier General David C. Williams is reViewinr; Mlle Point Unit J nuclear power plant, for the NRC~s naysayers in Cc>n1reu the }"ortuna ~ - the latest or many operated by Njqara Mohawk Power and tb.e *W.. tha~ much hicher for inquiries intQ the mattar that have in- Corp. in upat.ate New Yol'k, when he the Bush adminiatrition. Stello
1* volveci all three bnnches of govern- first became known to the NRC in Presidejit '.al.alb'* nom'ia*e w ~ easis* ment; thousa,l'.lds of pages of document!! 1986. HLI allesa&ions that Nla1ara Mo-tan~ aectl~ of enem, ~ls J9l:hy,ould _. and counllesi hours of testimony. hawk violated a number of federal be to "'Uic:itate the ~~eni oi Lut month. the Armed Services &a!ety. resulations prompted the Jriiqy'I <DOE) cripplecffnwtib.lllion* Committee was on the verse of recom .. agency t.o ftne the company sao.ooo.
doU.lr' n~ear-bomb. p~uction com- mendi_ni: Stollu'l$ conCirmntion but tn April 1987, tht firm cave Elllsoa plei, and DOE officials say he iS the b'ilbd upun learninJ that he ia a focu.'I $25,000 to ttttle a haruament com*
only qualified person who would take of Williams' investirn1ion. Stello is ac* plaint. In return. be quit.
the job. cu.~ed 111' coq*rini: up sii:niricant safely Before be left. Elllton besan taplnc Althourh Stello's critics in Con* \'iolotion.-1 in hi~ te!.!l Lo i:et Fortuna conversations with variou1 NRC and greu have accused him of much firC'd and 11f 1:-rin:: 111 l:oni:re~s tu jus* Niagara Muhawk officials. At the sreaLer pro-industry sin1 durinc his 23 tify hi:- nrt i1111 ... III I hi~ :ljll: or in,*rellll* time, he was working with Stephen B.
ini.:ly 111kr1111<'11pir SC'natc conlirmu* Comley, an anti-nuclear actlviat who Bu Ptall Kuntz t i11n:i, l hut m;1v lw 1*1111ui:h l11 utld is 11uspected or makinr scores nr t.apea I
GUYUlllMtNI 6 l:UlllllltlllOt The Cast in Brief R~r Fonuna: Deputy director of NRC's Office of lnvesti* PQlitical events and lnstitulions. A tape of him talking to.Fort\lna gations {01). wtUch investigates industry wrongdoing. Sus* was key to the ~atlon.
pended tor a month In 1988, reassigned to the Freedom of Information office for 11 Ben Hayes: onctor of the Office of lnVes-tigalions. FOllght IO 9't Fonuna his job t:>QC:k.
motiths and reMned to 01 Feb. 20.
W'dUain C. P1rier: NRC's general caurisel.
Victor Stello Jr.: Career federal nuclear power regulator. Executive Director for Op- James Blahr. Official in Stello's office erations of lh* NRC until mld-1989. Nomi- who aided Connelly during ttle Forwna In-nated by President Bush to be assistant vestigation.
secritary of energy for detense programs /Jan S. RaMnthal: Former admlnlstratlVe last July and assigned to a IOwer*level En* law jUdge hlr'ed by the "4RC. under pressure ergy Oepartrnent job pending confirmation
Stel~, trom Congr85$, to take over the Fortuna in- Hayes by the Senate.
vestigalion. .
Sharon Connelly: Former dire"e10r of the NRC's Office of J. a..,~ Hytand: Career federal investigator hired by the Inspector and Auditor (OIA). Conducted the Fottuna investiga- NRC .to n;vjew the Comley-Fortuna tape.
tion. Reassigned in March 1989 to a job created for her In the comptroller's o!fica. .David c. Wlbiarns: NRC'I Inspector General. Replaced Connelly and' the OIA.
Douglas ElDson: Former technician cit the Niagara Monawk. His investigation of the Fortuna affair has Power Corp.'s Nine Mlle Point Unit 1 nu* sidetracked Stel10'$ confirmation.
clear power plant In upstate New York. Paid informant*. and..* ...Fortuna's chief accuser. Martt R""9~ One of Connelly's top
.... *-.*:-*! .... '~ ~--** ~ . :'~.*,* *-
deputies.,'*"**~* , . ......... c ...... *
Steptlen a. Ccmley: Founder of We the* James M. T8ySor. Former dep\rty to
'. ~, **r.*
People lnC. of the United States." 'an anti-nuclear infonnation-gathering organization Stello who later replaeed him as the NRC's termed to fight the Seabrook. N.H., reactor, top statler. Rejected prop0sal to ftre For*. wnnams
'jVhieh Is 12 miles from th* nursing h~me he tuna. deciding. to reprimand him instead.
owns in ROWiey, Mass. Has hired airplanes Chria11ne N. Kohl: Administrative judge who presided over to .Ry anti-nuclear banners over Important Comley Fonuna's case on appeal. Overtumed Taylor's reprimand.
himsel! as part o.Ca campaign to the industry and the NRC corrupt.
pr~ve a time and. Ui his words, "desperate" for money, the Governmental A!fain fully without beinc paid and threat-ened to "go public-." Connelly decided
(
Ellison's taping habit is one of sev- report said. to pursue the ease. and Stello obli(ed eral aspects 0£ his life tba,t. have led He began trying t.o . sell what he by setting up a aecret $10,000 fund to
many to question his cr:edi"bility. described as "suitcases" run o! tapes pay~on.
.:
In October 1986, he Was charged that proved* wrongdoing on the part of That decision would later lead many ** **
with molesting his family's 13-year-old the NRC and Niagara Mohawk. He in Congress to eharte that the investi*
baby sitter, and two other minors told peddled them without succeaa to gac,ion wu vindictive. Reps. George authorities 0£ similar i?11tances of sex* Comley and various news organiu* ¥iller, . D-calit.. and Sam Gejdenson.
ud inisconduet. accordin( tO a Govern-. tiona. In what one congressional re- D..COn~.. calltd it "part of a continuing..:
mental Affairs Committee . report on port called "an apparent attempt at effort bY the NRC to undermine OI and the Fortuna affair. Ellison said be was estortion." he also tried to persuade its iiives.tiptions.oC possible wrongdo-framed. but he ple~ed guilty to a leaser Niaga:a Mohawk to buy them. . inl bY .NRC licensees."
charge in a plea barcain. In Aurust 1988. Ellison cobi- Connelly and Stello insist that per*
Ni.1ara ,Mohawk *s* investigation ot4 plained to Sharon Connelly's Office of sonal and profeuional animosity his harassment complaint concluded InspeelOt* and Auditor (OIA) that his played no role in their decision.
that he **w~ ~ubjecied to occasional 1986 alleaations* had been mishanc:UP.d Nevirth,len. both had . previous teasing a.nd 'ridicule by hil peen u a by the OCfice oC lnvestications (01), o! run-ins w\t.h Fortuna and his boss, 01 result of his personal habits and un* which Fortuna wu deputy directar. Director Ben Hayei. some well*
usual conduct," not an intimidation ('l'he OIA, aind replaced by the in* documented bf the NRC's oversicht campaipi. A federal prosecutor would spector renera~ used to investicate committees in Coacnss and all appu*
\ater tell the NR.C that Ellison had "a wroncdoing within the NRC. 01 still ently Will* known in the agency's subur*
work hi&~pry involvinc extensive ab* investicates wronidoinc within the in* ban Maiy~d headquarters.
aence Cor'mental health reasons." du.try.) _StAllo's connlct with the 01 orri*
'l'he prosecutor callee!' him "a very Ellison also alle1ed WTongdoina 9Y cials st,mmed rrom a loncstandinc slendH reed on which to rest a crimi* a commission member and several philoiophlcal dlCterence over how lie*.
nal caSt"' a1ain1t Fortuna. NRC empl<,yee,, including Fortun11. rressively to in\*esti¥Dle industry Specifico.lly, he Anid th:iL Fortuno h11d wtnntcdnin1. while Lhe conOict with
Act Two di11cus.o;ed 11en11ilivo NRC inform;atiLin Connelly appears to have been mure By I9RR, ~:llhmn hud moved to wi1h 11 third porty. pet11nnal. In some ways, the cnnOicts Ptomlu, whtrt he was un<!mpl11yt:d for But F.llis1111 refu11ed In con1uirnle mirror,.ll dltaareemenl1' 11mun)( eon*'
laUYLoo/\llltlll * \;U#IMtlll.t gressional factions, which start was not imminent.
over the years have ~;;;;_~ In fact, it still has not pulled the agency in two I? ~ been restarted.
different directions. *. ~* . ~ 'Jf QC Even more troubling (Bo.i:, p. 590) ~ _ _ ~~/ t.c Kostmayer was what happened to the dnJg Stello Appeara charge.
Findin1 a way to pay , ~ iJ (J . .q.. .=--L.- . /'--1' . Stello sat on that alJe.
Ellison Cor hl.t inform.a- 1-.JJ- ~ ..... ~ T" cation. a normally hi1h*
tion wu no eaay matter. priority matter that Connelly . did not have would have been referred 4uthority to. do it herselt. ..~ / to th* Otfict of Investfga.
She. talked to NRC Gen* tj) ..~'4 I . .,,. ,:.~:.: ~ ~,,,,_.. tion1 - where Fortuna eral Counsel William C. ' ,- ~' worked. Stello did not Parler on Aug. 25, 1988, ~ ~ 11~~_-. I " b ,,l.,-r,.,.'>"i ~ initiate an. iav._tigation to see whether *a small \.J ... { ~ o! t.he drug cha:res until fund could be set up to March 29, 1989, wee.ks af.
pay informants. She of- *ter the whole matter had .
fered no details of the become public and two
- pending investigation. Sharon Connetty Dated thr.e obj*ctive1 for the lnvuttgadon In her months - after Fortuna In a memo to Con- - -* persoMt notUOc>k. Circled at the top was "Dlapoae of RF." learned that he was the nelly, Parler wrote: "I am not aware of There had been a fire at the Nine Mile target oC in internal inquiry.
any budge~justification data in our ex- Point reactor in 1986 that the com* "I didn't want to compromise the isting authority which would authonze pany bad not reported to the NRC, investigation." SLello told Kost.may.
the establishment ofsuch a- fund." But and employHs at. the reactor were us- er's subcommittee, conce.ding that his
. . .:.. .r, h~ ~4:!f.sheJ:eally needed the pioQey ing ~~..:}9o~1JYJ~*ijua,na..when El* decision to delay was "stuJ)id."
to carry out the NRC's "public health lison wor.:ea* there. * * * * * * -*, .. , ~ <: ... *. **
Stello said *.he:* d~lded . the .* drug. , . , _... ,
and s&!ety 111ission" she.should let him Since the Fortu:na alfaii' became clw(e could wait because the ~wt~up .... * * '
know the details and seek his advice. public, Stello ho re~atedly empha- date for the reactor had "slipped" Conn.Uy went to Stello, told him of sized these "safety" iuues to justify shortly after the Ellison contract was EllJson'a charges and ~ked !or help - b.is decision to pay EllisOn. But back aigned. Intetnal NRC documents, even though she was aupposed to be in 1988, when Connelly and the othen however, show that the date bad not independent of bis intluence and offi-cially answered only to the ('Ommi*ion briefed Stello, he and Connelly seemed moet interest.cl 1n aometbinf slipped because ~t waa* always c:omid-ered to be far otr in the futun, Kost*
t for that reason. Stello would later tell else - a Jan. 1-4, 1981, tape o! Fortuna mayer countered. Besides, be added.
Concreu that he learned of new allega- and CQmley ta.lkiJ2( OD the phont,
t.be company's other reactor wu Nn*
tiom dize,ctly _ related to salety at this Blaha told the Governmemal Affairs nine, and some employees worked at meedq with Connelly, but aneral in.
Committee. Based on that tape, wbicb both plants.
Congress questioned the testimony. was to become the centerpiece of the ..Mr. Stello ignored pubUi: health "Stello'* recollection *** does not investigation, Stello decided to enter and aa!ety while Pursuiac a vendetta,"
appear to be supported by the "'eon- into a t<>p-secret "coaaulting" contract Keistm&Yer told the Saiate Armed temporaneous reeord," the GoVern- with Ellilon, Blaha said. Setvites Cqmmittee. "l believe that he mental Affairs Committee later con- b.u willfully mialed my subcommittee eluded. His 1'-..{1ty rationale" may '?be safety lubpfot as well as other committees."
have "merely provided .a convenient Stello has indicated to Congress cover to do aomethmg the NRC gen- that the safety allecations. rather tlwa Elii$0n Paid em counsel bad oth~e indicated the tape, were foremost in hit mind. The tint payment to Ellison was could not. be done." Mid the panel, He said t.he plant to Which the chaqes $500 Wired to him on Aue. 31. Heim*
which concluded tbat Stello was related was about to bt rnta:ted after
mediately drove tram Florida to sub*
deeply involved from this point on. beinj down Cor about a year. "For tliat W'ban Virginia and checked into the Alter meetin1 with Connelly, Stello ~euon, I Celt it important to pursue Embas)r Suites botel.
want to General Counael Parler and said these allep~ons p?omptly,.. he told Secrecy beclme para.mount. When the informatio~ Con11elly W.S attAtt m* the House Interior Subcommittff on the NRC's diviaion director or con*
deed had aalety impli~~ Parler ad* Investlptiona. tract& sicn~ the necessary document, vised Stello that ht c0uld enter into a To,aubcommittee Chainnan Peter he was not allowed to Me Ellison'*
contra~ with the informant - u lone H. Kostmay~r. D-Pa., Stello'* es- name on it. At the hotel, Ellison u-u there wa a sound. fWly doc:umented planation did not. rins true. ln a Jetter awned the name '1'hompt0n." Pay.
health-and*ta!ety rationale. to the Senate Armed. Servica Com* .mentl to Ellison were to bt made In An official from Stello's office, mi\tee, Kostmayer said that there ia cash - delivered In enveloptt by James Blaha, wu alaigned to the cue "1ipiificant. reason to doubt." c.hat. Blaha in four installment. - lo avoid and he. Connelly ind one or her top Stello knew whether *Elli.on had any b.avinc Ellfaon's name on rovemment usiatanl.I, Mark Reiner, new to FJor* new alletations. No NRC esperts With checJca.
ida to 11ee whether Ellison had any finthand knowledge ur Ellison's 1986 IMestigatA)rs in OIA were told that 1.Cely aUe11tions that the NRC had char1ff reviewed his 1988 charsn. there was nothin& Lo EUiton '1 allqa.
not previously addreued. Moreover, KoaLmayer a.id, ini.emal \ion1 and i.hat the C8lt me would be Elli1on provided them with two; document.s 1hnw that lhe planl'I re- cloted. Connelly and Resner took two 3
GOYEllNlllENT Ii COlllllHllCE weeks of vacation so they could work that regard, Rosenthal said.
t in a suite next to Ellison's without their staffers finding ouL For two weeks, Connelly, Blaha and Although Ellison first told OIA in the summer of 1988 that Comley had more tapes, the NRC made no at*
Resner listened to Ellison's tapes, had
tempt to 1et them until the affair be*
transcript.a made and talked to Elliaon. came public *and Rosenthal wu as-
Ellison. wu interviewed in the aigiled to the case. He iuued Comley a presence of a court. nP<>rter only once, subpoena, but Comley has te!used to on Sept. 12; the interview focused al* comply, despite some $200,000 in fines most exclusively on. Ellison's allega- and jail threats from a federal judge in tions about Fortuna. He told them
Bo.ton. Comley said in an interview:
that Comley, the activist, and Fortuna "I have not confirmed nor denied tliat "are gathering as much as they can to I have* any tapes;*
put* together the. biggest package to Fottuna's position is that he was prove that the [NRC] isn't regulating j~t cultivating Comley as a potential but promotinr the industry." EllisAn source~ "Sometimes you rive a little to also saidCoi:nley had scores of tapes of *get a little," he testified. He denied
his conversations with Fortuna.
Twice fu September, Connelly in*
.ever giving confidential information to Comley, and Comley backs him up.
vited criminal investigators to get in- But to Connelly and the others, volved in the Fortuna probe. Ellison'& tapes indicated something An FBI agent eame to the hotel to much more nefarious. **Ellison's belief listen to some of the tapes because "Mr. Stello ignored public that Comley, with the assistance of, or Connelly and Resner thought briberj' under the direction of Fortuna, is
~~ ..._,, ~~.* >0 .,..._, ** :fkt~~~~jn~)~~~to=~*!()::. health~and safety- while:***""**,._,bqilding,an Qiianization to topple. the.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission was venation <irith. Comley but did express pUl'SUing a vendetta." supported by the tapes," !8)11 a docu*
interest bi ass~inf w.~ther so~e ment from their riles.
body had violated Wiretap statutes. (It -Rep. Peter H. K<;>Stmayer bas never been clear who taped the Safety S.Cond crucial Jan. 14, 1987, couversation. They did not appear to be as wor-A Comley or Elliao11; each 'blames the ried about Ellison's other allerations
other. Everyone agrees that the tape - thoie involviac other officiala and riven to the NRC has been altered in investigations 0£ OI officials alter the * ..safety" problems at Niagara Mohawk some form.) * . Fortuna affair became public. fowtd - a.nd congressional investiptors have Connelly also contacted the U.S. Fortuna's actions during the phone concluded that*they were secondary to Attorney's o!fiC:e iD Baltimore. Pros- call. to be "entirely*incollsistent with their main locus.
ecutor Joyce McKee told her ID a let* the dictates of his official position.** Of Said a stall report by the Energy ter: "The tape recordings do not dis* most concern to Rose;ithal was the ap- and Commerce Subcommittee on En*
close tlut Mr. Fortuna participated in *parent "conspiratorial flavor" of the ergy and Powei: "Coanelly lated three tbe commiuion of any criminal of* conversation. He gave examples: objectives tor her investigation in her fense." It waa. McKee who called Elli- Fortuna promised Comley that he personal notebook. Tw.o related to son "a very slender reed on which to would not tell. anyone of Comley's safety mattaft, but at the top o( the rest a criminal cue." plans to have an airplane fly an anti* list, circled. wu 'Dispose ol RF.'
Many othen would later come* to nuclear banner .over the Just.;ce o.. - Connelly appean to have orchestrated the same conclusion about the Fortuna- partment the* following day; Fort.una the investicatioll to fire Fortuna."
Comley tape. "We £~\IDd very little rea* advised Coml~Y.._how to act when he
In an Interview, Coanelly con*
son £or ..* this invesdption," said the went to the Justice Department' the firmed the quote. but denied the st.11!*
Governmental Atf'airs Committa. next day to press for an L'lvestigation ers' conclusion and added: "We're not
~.Brian Hyland, a career investi* of a case Comley wanted reopened and talkinc about Roser FoJtun& the per-cator who reviewed the case for the told him which NRC staffers would soo, we're ta.lkin11bout Roter Fortuna NRC, found tha~ charitl a1ainst For* attend; and Fortuna did nothing t.o the issue, t.hat port.ion *ot tht case."
tuna were blon out ot proportion dissuade Comley from thinkin& that Blaha determined that almost all because ot peno.n~and or1anizational Fortuna had damning in1ide inlorm11- ot Ellison's safety allegatfons had been animosity" betw9'n 01 and o~ 1Jon about the NRC, but was waiting adequately addressed two years ear*
Nl\C General Counsel Parler, who to release it. lier. A few* were .investiraud much is also the arency'1 chief ethics o£Cic:er, "1'ime and time a1ain in the Ja11. later, lncludinc the dr.ic charce that conr.luded that the tape shows po vi* 14 conversations, Fortuna crossed Lhe Stello had put on bold.
olationi o( key employee-conduct line separatint' proper and improper rules.
conduct," Rosenthal concluded. fOCU9 on Fortun*
But he alsu c:oncluded thot thf're Work on the ease slowed after Elli*
Fortun.'* Judgm.,.t was "insufficie?nt t\'id~*nc-<'" lu l'hmv san checked ouc. o( the Em busy Suiles Only one oCficial. another lnvttti* that Fortuna l(a\*e C\11nlt*\' an~* ~*ur1- hoiel on Sept. 18, 1988. But it picked gator hired by the NRC, found the tidenLiul infurm:uion ur !lid iln~*thi11i.: up a11in in November 1988. when Comley* Fortuna t.ape troublin1. Ala.n else to vinlule? SHC rulr1'. ,\n~ 1,qw!I Connelly'A 11.trr rim talked to For*
S. Ro1>enthal, who took over all OIA Comh*\' mu~* haq* w111iltl lrl* lwlp1ul i11 tuna.
\Q FEIUtl' *It.\' ~.1. 1'l'll1 - SRIJ
.. .., * ~ *I ** IU ~ ' ' 1 - * * ~ ott ... 0 * *
ln an informal interview, staff lhe whole case over to Rosenthal on pents testified, and the lnlerior Com*
r.
members asked Fort.una only about. Feb. 28. A week later, Connelly asked rnittee is about to release yet another how his office handled Ellison's 1986 to ~ Je~igned, arid a job was created critical report. Democrat.a from all allegations and told him nothing Coriier in the. comptroller's office. She three *panels attempted to persuade about the t.apea. When Fortuna asked
said s~!'- is h,appy the,re. the Senate Armed Services Committee whether he was the tariet o! an in* A(~er f111ing to set job protection to reject Su!llo's nomination.
quiry, they were "deliberately vague from the federal courts, Fortuna went Throughout 1989 and into early and inaccurate," violating an OIA o(* through an elaborate administrative 1990, they did not appear to be having fice policy to inform targetl or their app~ process that he said cost him much impact. A majority oC the com.
status, the Governmental Affairs $60,000 iD legal tees. mittee appeared ready to approve Committee said.
Normally, that ptocesa would have Stello, and his opponents on that Almost three months later, For* put Fonuna'a fate in hii boss's hands, panel, 4'icluding Glenn, were drafting tuna found out he wa.s the only target. but. Stello did not allow Hayes to par* dissenting opinions and hopinr th~
He was ordered to answer questions tieipate. could muster a rare, succeu!ul noor from OIA o!ficiaJa. - under oath and .. On appeal, James M. Taylor, an* fight against a sub.Cabinet appoin~e.
in the presence oC a court rep~tter.. o~er Stello deputy, decided that For* . A law passed by Congress in 1988 On advice from his lawyer, Fortuna. tuna would not be fired after all be* CPL 100*504) at the behest or the refused. He demanded to know what cause he lat.er agr~ed to be interviewed NRC's critics and sponsored by Glenn authority the agency bad*to force him by Rosenthal. But Fortuna wu issued changed everything. It abolished. the to answer questions under oath a.nd a formal reprimand for refµ.sing to be OIA as of last year and replaced it offered to submit to another informal interviewed the rust time and was de* with the -Office of tbe Inspector Gen-note*taking in~erview. He ei:plained t.ailed to the Freedom of Information eral, whose chief was to be appointed later that he feared being tricked into o!lice - "bureaucratic Siberi&," .. he by the president and coruumed by the a perjury chute. called it - after* a montblong leave. Senate - not the NRC.
A list of OIA's planned questions Fortuna appealed the reprimand For the critics, the law paid off.
":'~_ .............. . .--,..latu-oGwned by congressional in- and p.enuade.d. Stello .to.step. ~id-...ans:! ... The lllan appointed .to. be. ..1.u;~ing jn~ -* .,. '*
vestiga*tors*.:.:... shows that the officials hand *the eue over i0**christine. N. spector general was Martin G;M&Isch; - ** * '
wanted to ask him deWled questions Kohl, an administrative judge. She one of General CoW11el- P..-ler's depu*
about his convenat.ions with Comley ties. He immediately besan his own and Ellison. They planned to make it investigation and bas issued an in*
appear as if they were relyinr only on . terim report that aourea described as statements from Ellison. They wanted "Is that your voice, quite critical of bow Fortuna wu to wait until the end of the interview treated.
10 play him a tape. Roger?" NRC officials Nominated to the inspector ren*
* "Is that your voice, Roger?" they had planned to ask. eral post permanently was Willia.ms, had planned to ask. who has a long career in federal mves.
On Feb. 22, 1989, Fortuna was tigatiom and pouibly te11inr connec*
placed on administzoative leave and in- tiom to main chancters in this sap.
formed by one of Stello'& deputies that dismissed the miscoDduct charge He used to work for Hyland - the he-~~ prqposi~ to fire him for refus- acainit Fortuna anci espunged the . Jormer federal investiptor who said lnc 10 be interviewed. After that, the reprii:nand, saying NRC officials vio- the Fortuna charges were "blown out whole thine blew up. lated their own policies when they of proportion" - when Hyland wu Within days, Democrats from tried to force Fortuna to testify under the Department 0£ Labor's inspector three congressional -committees, well oath. She also (luestioned their mo. general. While* on the President's aware of the historical conflict be* tives. Commission' on Orrtniztd Crime, he tween OI and OJA. and 01 and Stello, Under pressure* lrou:a Hayes, Tay* worked with key consruaiilD&l st.alters were demand.inc all documents relat* lor - who replaced SteUo a.s executive who investigated the Fortuna affair.
lnr to the Fortuna .~ NRC employ* director - qreed to give Fortuna his And u he.lld 'Oi the GAO't special in*
ees later admitted destroying some o( (ormer job back, effective Feb. 20, vestigation di.,isfon. be ttviewed the them. 1990, provided he documented all fu* OIA '5 bandlln1 o( several cases under ture distussiom with informant.a. CoMelly, Including ont that involved The Story Br*ak1 charges of wron1doin1 against Stello, Thincs really heated up when In* Steflo'i Problems and issued his own critical report.
$ide NR.C, a scrappy semimonthly In Congress, SteUo's nomination to Williams, who btcitl work Oec. 3, newsletter, broke the. nut o( the story the DOE U.istant secretary post, ru* is invatfptinr every aspect o( the
- that Ellison had been paid more mored in the sprint tad announced in Fort.WI* iftair, fneludfnr whether For-than $6,000 ror his into'1!1atlon. In a July, haa increutd the resolve o! t.he tuh& did lbythlnl wrons and whether letter, Reps. Gejdenaon and Miller NRC'a critica. St.eUo. litd to Concreu. That was no\
called the pa)o*ment "dur,:racetul" and Critical report.a were issued by the what the Armed S.rvices Commlttee said it "makts a mockery o! NRC'a Governmental Affain Committee, e.xpected to hear when it wu prepar*
lnvesti1ative procest and discredits chaired by John Glenn, D*Ohio, and ini to vote on Stello lat month. so the commission." (The General Ac* the sta(( ot the House Eneri)' and action. on the nomination was post*
countinc Office tOAO) later eon* Power Subcommittee. chaired by poned indefinitely.
cludtd that payment to Ellison wu a Philip R. Sharp, D-lnd. The Kost* 11 We did. not know how serious the legal expenditure.) maver subcommittff held a heated allesaUons were regardlnc Stello,"
Under heavy fire. the NRC turned heorin1 at which 1111 the key partici* said Chairman Sam Nunn. D*Gn.
CQ Fll,l\IH:,\K\' ~-1. l'Nll - S91
GOVERNMENT l COllMERC£
~C Pulled Every Which Way n 1982, Conl:?ffS 'presswed the Nuclear Regulatory COIA), who was auspected of doi.n( Stello's bidding.
Irattin
~mmission to cJ'8c8,te an Uzdependent cadre oC.investi*
to pursue crimifial mn1doers Withhi iheJ~dustry.
Differences bet\veen Stello and Fortuna dau back r
decade or ao, when FortWl.l puabed for an investigation of In 1987"; thi N~C w45 told to rein in t,be guJJ>.ShOes. In i~ss. Stello 11 baz:dling ot t.he inquiry into the 1979 Thrff Mlle Congress* 1icnaled: that it wanted t.P~ let l~e ara.iri. Island accident. The FBI investigat.d ~alleged coV!r-up, Fot'much o.f i~ 16-year exisuQ~; dle.NRC has been
but Stello was never clwpd and denies wrongdoing*
. pulle:d in' dpp&~ite directions by opposing forces in Con-
Stello and Fort\1.na have had* words and disagree*
gresi ~ ttiose *strongly supporti,ng the nuclear industry ments for years," Hayes bu testified. Fortuna said, "I and these 'ti:iore. ~keptiw or ,9pposed. *. . .. ***
find myself a victim of ven11ea.11ce, lying .and deceit, all in In ,~me way$;* the disp~"in Congress is refl~ed in retaliation for having trifd tO do a job that *certain bitter *conflicts ~ong top NRC staifera. ':I'<> many,. .~. people Dever.wanted done at all."
Roger F'.~rtuna affair was SU~ *a conflict. (Story, p. 586) Stello flatly denied that,. ~tifying: "My overriding The NRC created Fortuna,'* Office of Investigations Ii, '*
once.rn was to ASSl.U'P. public ):lealth and safety." He added, (Ol) .in 1982, when the 11eneywls der fin for {ailil'ig to ** "l do not have any ill Ceelings toward Mr. Fortuna."
aggre~ively mv!$µgate sevet-1 cases. It was set up 15,an There were cont'licts divi~ F'ortuna and Hayes and mdep!!~dent arm,\t,hat. reported cm,~~Y to the commis* ConneUj. NRC officials testif'~ that. in the words of one sion, bYJ>ISSing sµcli ~P staffers as Victor Stello Jr., who investigator, Connelly's "diSdain" !or OI was "le&endary."
was considered-m~y o! the pro-industry forces and.who General Counsel William Parler said, "There was a mutual later.~e Ute ~C's uecutive director.for operatio~s. lack of respect." ~itting Stello.and Conn.Uy against For*
**' tr~(te?'"Foi'£\l'.ii4: *ana 'Director' Ben Hayes, t.J:ie* OI was*;.
tuna. he said;-was-~tinr-wom Possicle combination" and * ... *.:::.:("' - .
very aggressiv~ in the eyes ot many "the low common denominator of com.moo ie~e." .
I they were unmanageable free agents.
Tom Bevill, D*Ala., chairman of the House Appropriations Sub-Critics said Connelly often punuea trivial alle1~tions of wrongdoing. She mice had a high*rankb:li NRC*omcial followed to see if he was leaving work early*.Her office l committee on Energy and Water Develapment, pushed the NRC to meJ'fe the OI with inspection clivi-aions under Stello'& control Bevill considered OI "duplicative and re-also investigated a prank in which two water-filled con*
doms were bung outside the NRC's headquarters.
Said Hayes., "I've been investifated a lot. by Ms.
Comielly." Accordhq to Hayes and an official familiar with the cues, onl>' one charge wu ever subatantiated d~d~t." The NRC contemplated - that be misused a 1ovemmet car by havinJ it di*
such a move m*the mid*l98& but levll verted to pick him up at home and biinc him to a dumped the idea.* i!tu complaint.I meeting. Connelly was in the divmed car. Hayes wu from others in Congress, in~.ludi.ng House .Interior censured and forced to pay about $8. . _
Chairman* Morris K. Udall, D-Ariz. It was- power run amok," Wd fonner OIA investica*
Bevill prevailed after ordering ~ NRC to put OI tor Maureen Gowlei. She swore that JDaDY GIA probes under Stello's c:on~ol late in 1987. In 1981!,. ~e othe: weJ:'e vindiC,tive: ..Rorer Fortuna'* atory i& n~ unusual"
!action weighed in qain. At the behest o! the H.ouse ln fllct. Inspector GeDeral David C. Williams, who is Interior and EnercY panels and the Senate Enviromit~nt revieWinf the Fortuna affair, has j'l.lat besun loc>kin1 Into and Pubiic Wor~ Committee, both clla.mbers passed bills another allecation I)( retribution ..again~ OIA.
(HR .CUO, S 2443) th.!l.t wou¥ have nquiHd the NRC to With Stella's knowled1e, Connelly* mvestigated <=&*
make the OI independent ~ l'ielther was m11cted; OI reer stalfer James Kelly ~r he told Conrnu [n 1987 remaim under tbe control of the NRC's euC:utive dir~or. that tht"tra.c wu not *rci'essively punuinc drur allera*
At the NRC, there was a* siznilat: conflict over how tions at nuclear planta. Accused or in1properly soliciting l q,ressively industry wrongdoing should be investigated.
Unclerlyina the conflict wu a basic philosophical dis*
pute: Stello arruea that Criminal inquiries must some*
times come second to aaaurinr public health and safety; a job from a utility, Kelly was sus~nded, but he rousht back. and the NRC espunred hia reco~d. Williams want.a "to find out it Kelly wu tramed," a IOW'c8 u.id.
CoMellywouJd.n't.dilcusaherworkindte.ilbut,denied Fortuna and Hayes say. crimin&l wronrcfoing by industry having vindictive motivations: "I* wu doins my job."
is It.sell a top-priority health-a-Wet)' Issue. Othen Mid slte had reuons to dislike the 01. Hayes Hayes has complained to Cont?eu eeyeral tirnes that wu quite eriticfl ol Connelly's w~k. and openl1 tn*
Stello refused to support his lnveistirations. He cmce ac* dorsed Col)fres.' daion to rrplaee OIA with an ln.pec.
cused Stello of a .. thinly veiled attempt **. to control 01." tor 1eneral. M. tor Fortuna. ha and hit 'fife, Shirley, OftCI
~ NRC*a oversicht committees have issued reports on several instances In which they concluded that Stello had testified ln a aex discrimination ~ q&inat Coanelly'1 top deputy. That. cue became a bic emblrrutmeat tor I Impeded 01 inquiries or otherwise battled with Hayes' Connelly. She wu accused of tryinc to Intimidate the
~ office. Th1t's why Democrat.a reacted ao quickly a year complainant and suapended for a time with_ pay. The ago upon learning that Fortuna, 01'1 deputy direetor, wes Justice Oep1rtmenL inveatipttd and harahly i;rlticized I about l.O be fired. He Wal beinr invnligated at the time by Sharon Connelly of the OCtlce of liupector and Audit her, and key eon&rtumen demand'id thal *ht bt nrtd.
--1'1111 Kant.r S90 - n*:111n*,\K\' ~-. 1111111 CQ i \
C ltU Tbc ~... Yan Times NEW YORK, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1989 I
'LANT NOMINEE t t lo' s, Sharon Connelly. Seve~al years earlier, Mr. Fortuna had exposed an Improper attempt by Mrs. CoMelly to shield one op'i~r S\lbordinates Crom a ADMITS MISTAKES 1i cna.rge o! ~exua.l narassme:u.
Tbe heanmr: todav ts not formallv re*
,Jer=a tp me cgnnrmauon pr~seg '11-'*
Mr. Stello; but members ot t.-ie suocorn*
Jfficial on Nuclear Panel .llJISl!!!
011~
stan a ro1e.
sa10 tnev l'IO~J It wou1a.
v Testimoay About a Tape-
)ays He Delayed Inquiry Ainong the other highlights today Into Safety Allegations . was eXtended discussion of a tape.
which che commissiOri received from ithe wormer in e.'Cc

hang~ for the $6,000 l and which did Dot appear to impllca
By MATTHEW L. WALD 'Mr* .Forwna after alL A judge hired b '
soocoa1 ... n..1t... vo111 nm.. *the commission to investigate Mr. For-
' ASHINGTON, Oct. 12 - ,;!bst. for,; : tuna said in tesdmony that the tape ap-:
chie' of sea ff or the Nuclear RH * : pea red t0 have ~n edited. ~*-.&~~!!:'~.- .*
1 . . mm1s.s1on acimow1ec2ea ur ; Oeipite a spirited exc:,':ang! be~ween: " -,. ,
~"ne nacueot secTef; 1or 9en "--:* M(.o<(~~~p.qd.Mf~<;,o_iµu;tlx, ~hcn.."j.. * ~ _
nms aueuc1ons 01, <ltu! use anli .also ap~'i'"et! "u a, *~t.,,ek.'* 1l:" ~'ii . -- : : -
etv oro 1ems ac a nuc1ear 01ant a '
never made clear e.uc1y wnat Mr; .r or- * ...
ta:te ('je n n *
l* !. d"'-' * * ~ * :
ve-3 cnev were orobab v true. ~ .._e.~,-:~
the tormer omcial, V1ctor ~cello Jr.. Vie:o: ~ 1*- "~"'-!*=er -=c oi Nil a De .lee, pnlllolalio aN.w Yo:tcS:::=:;"'~
Prestde."lc Bush's oomlnee ta .we N~ ~ eo,....,,;~0 ..... aid be 11.ac1 kc;K
Hc......,*lelnilY*llarillcvi.a i>c."-"" o..!;*
arge of the .Energy *Oepartmenl' s. MCC *' - ....,.,,,.. ~ """ << d:vf ._ ~11 CCllfti _..,... fll UMrcOllU'lliaien.
~~=~=r.=::o:~~~
1y cttat a technician at the plant who
. NVI - N;.11v~~t- PA.,~ A 17
.ade the aile1atioas also provtded in-1rmation that =ulo h:npllcace another i
nda~ at ~e Mucteac.-RecuJaiory_.,~;
ommwion, Roger :=:irama. . -. *'
Mr. Stello said he del~rred the in* :
iry..inro.~e-s8fetx.<<mesd'112'~
.at would have alerted ~r. Forama nd he wanted the lnvestlgacion of Mr.
orwna to procff4 j.n secret.
3ut ecause theinveitiiat10n wia.snC?t secret.
inv~uaatorJ tipped chei.r nds when they sought &o question. Mr.
orncna on UIJ *ll*1*tions*onty weeks ter the tedlnidi.rt made them. ac*
rarn~s;iinony*"'toda," ~y other ommission omcials.
r, .
QuestloM on Stello's Judcmeat I Mr. Stello *treed with a comment by e c:halrman ot a Bouse Interior suO.
ommiciee. ltepresencauve Peser R*
ostmayer 91 P~lvanla, who said was a "JWpld oversl&ltt not to a..sk r a prompt*. mvesti1at1on oc tbe alle* .
ons. which concerried the Nlne Mile mc l nuclur plane ln os..-ego. N. Y.
Witnesses repeuedly cast doubt on
r. Slello's Judamenc in approvtnc the ve.stlllLIOn of Mr. Forwna. which u an unorec.U~nted procedure. lor e Nuc:leor RoJitulatory Commiuton at Involved G Sl,000 cash payment to e cecbn1c11n. secret metcmgs In hcMel .
om* anca opparenl v1ol1i1ons of the :
mmission's handbook on respecting ;
e rights of cara*ta of invesu1aton1.
Mr. KoSlmoyer :incl 1uhers said the ;
son for lftt investi1&onon of Mr. For-a wns a lon~siancJintc ltud be1ween
. Forrun4 :inl.I ll pru,cvc uf Mr. Slcl~ :I
) ~!J _____ J________ k*11n N~~w ¥omr r1M~s NAl"ioN~L**~~~~~~;~'U~r1~r*4*.;~~'-*'.~(
lni,Uirji~n NU~i~~itjj"f{J~
1<- Panel Sees AnimoJity I Behf .
nd I. .
y\: *
. 1'
¥ asserjed that he receives confldenllal lly l\lATlllEW L. WALD
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A ~cna\c Tunnuillec said yesterday 1hoa1 ;111 inlc1*n..1 im.. rslig0tti1111 al lhr. Nu-Tl~e c~1nmittee ~ lnformaUon from nuclear plant work*
on and cannot do anything that would ..
damage their confidence In him.
t h*;1r k~11l:11or y Commission uf 1 lt*ir1:r~ of mi511111d11ct by a high-rank-said t11e W. Recently Mr. Comley was fined $200 a dny by a Federal judge In Bosco/i: and
\,
in1~ ufhl'ial af*fK!an.:d 1m1livaled as
""" h hy **i.cnmnnl nud 1m>fesslomd in ve~~~gation. .t; the lines could Increase to $1,000 H he does not comply. We the. Pc;_g~e I
11111\U~il y .. a5 hy 1111y l1~1~i1hm1tc1.c1.'ll. If I hr invcsUnati11n hwulvtd " pny* waste~ money. ~ al In brln I
Ull"lll ul SG.RllU 111 l'llSh Ill 1111 lnrormc:r, Mu "~I'"' inosly h*t*urded ~npes of lclc* I .
u11vcrs;i\i11ns nnd commlssiu11 snlely problems, hod not ~dcqualtdy
. . + According ID i.lie senate report, the
'""'"'" t lnrormallon chat Mr. Fortuna mlghl*
ffkmli. lrinc 10 each other. said a re- handled s11rc1y com11lalnts Mr. lilllson ha~ disclosed lfnproperly to Mr. Com*
l"" 1 issnt-J by Ille Senate Govcmment hnd cx1>ressed. ** lcy was lhal Jhc former lechnldan had Uprrali1111s Commillre. ,o\mong lhe ~anel's llntlings Is thpJ In pfonded gullly lo ollempted sexual l ltl* im*cs1ir,.:11iu11 lms :irouscd illtl'r* s~eklnft h1forp1~tl014 derogntory lo ~r. pbuse of n 13-yea.r-old girl. U Is no&
1*:-1 ht*r*1t1se it was a1*provt:tl by Ille l*111*0111a, Mrs! Connelly asked Ifie ngcn* clcur whnt lnformallon Mr. Comley t'umn1l'isiun"s top i;laH ullkiitl. Vlc:lnr cy's 101> lawyer ti she coultl ltlre nn hi* mlglU hove given Mr. F11rt\1na. ""C a
!>lt*llu Jr .* whom t*residl~nl !hash re- fornmnt as i'\.-OOSUltn11t" 1111d J>:ty him
' **nil)* nominated 10 bf? head ol 11md1tc* tor lnlonnnllOn nnd lnpes nf tl.!lef~Olle In the dlspi1lcd lnvesllgntlon, Mr.'EI*
llso11, Che l11forn1ftnl, was paid $6,000 li*m **I &he nn&iun's I r11tll11L'd 11ude1u ccmvcrs:11i1ttllf. llic lawyer lold hur thnt aud put up In a hotel near Woshlnglon
.......,,.,""' t*11m1*lr11. Mr. Stl!llu la.,s 11ut she 11rulmhtj cmlld 1111t 11111es5 l"~bllc for two weeks while Mrs. Connelly and lw*,*n n111finm:d hy the Srualr, hul he he;tllh 1111d sn cty wus l11v,1lved. :;
two ocher st11H members met with him,
!>l;u h:*I th\~ joh cm ;m ncli111: basis lnsl
,.* Mrs. Co1111clly gave him a code 1111111e
'llrl"l"k.
h1lurn11111ll s Allegatlt111s l.lmltect* ..,r uml nrrun1~ed her vacoOon for the lime Senate l11vcslli;utort1 luler qm:stl~\lctl
ll**tl*w Y*1k 11oncs he was there, the re1iorl said.
'lack o* GllOCI J udgmcnl' lh~ l11wyer, Wiiiiam Parler, the (f?m* Victor Stello Jr. as the top-rank- 'J11c commission hos asserted .that
!'r.n:uur Juhn Glenn, an Ohlu l>cmu- nussfun s ft(.>t_lcrnt cO\mscl, ond he *~Id ing staff orticial at the Nudcar Mrs Connelly w1mted to pay* him rral whu is chainmm of llie commtllee, lhul In ht11ds1i;ht he should have uq:ed . *
b I be-said 1hr l11vt?stigaUon showed "an un- Che commlss~on (0 s11h1mcnn the tiipcs ncgulatory Co1111111se1011 ap* rother tho~ Sii pot:llB
ie tapes
'il'Cmly la<"k nf r.uod j11d~1111ml hy rather 1hnn jmY,* for them, the t*epurl pro~cd a $6,CJ?O casl.1 payment for ~~;~i;,e :::* 1~!~!!~,~~~~~~r;!~~=d:v:!~;
hi&h-lcvcl s1nU members 111 lhcl 00111- said.
I ' :.. an informer m an mtcrnal com- said chat there was no evidence (or that missiun, which UVCCS\."CS civilian nu* 11.e rep~.1rtdoe.s
. not center on,.~Mr. missioll investigation. and 1hot "lo Che contrary, he was clear pl<Jms. Stello, but 1l ys lhal he nllcd lh~ the lhreatenhlg to *go public.' "
1 he invcsli~nl ion under scrnhny was lnforma11t m gbl luwc lulormatlq~ 01~ . .
1iu1 su'-od by Sharon I{. C01mclty, Oien reaclor sofe,t*.]"he safety allegafluns d b The Senote committee coucluded l11*;ad of 1hc cummisston*s omce of In* 11.e lnformaah* 11rnvlded were so{:11m- vesllgallon or the nllegnllo!*s rna e Y that lhe lnvesllgaUon was unfaJr lo Mt-.
spcclor and Auditor, agninsl Roger lied, the Senlate report said. thatt'll1e the technician, Mr. Foucluu d snhl. In Fortuna. vlolaled eslobllshed *. prlncl*
Fol1lma. U1e11 de11ul y dlrccCur of lite Of* case co11fJ ~ally be made.claaFtl1ls
Out the Judge Is still havcstl&al 8 p*es of Internal lnvesUgaUons and Iler uf Jnvcs1igntion. safety 1*atlo1~ale 111err. 11rovldcd a{ con* whether Mr. Fortuna 1'?properly: should not have ISO heavily Involved lop Twu years ago, Mr. 1:u11m1a tcsUlied vcnicnl covet 10 do somclhlng UHll Che closedr* dl.!rogatory Inf~: naa~loa~ :dv~ manngenieut. 111e lnvesUgaUon. Che l\j\ains1 Mr::. Connelly wllen 5'te was N.lt.C. gene,al ~muasel had otbei:Wlse the 111 ormcr to an. an *l1\IC en the coinmlltec said, "represented a waste an-used of I rying lo shtckt lier deputy indkaled ~Id not be done - p1itlh'1 Cale or received lnformatlclll from of go..,emmenl funds; lhe lnvesllga*
from chat'"es ul sexualharassmcnl. someone on tlae.payroU to rovlile Ill* ncUvlst that he should buve pnssedo~ &Ion was "lncompelenlly conducted, I atr. last year Mrs. Connelly, whose formatima 11 rtabriiag co nn f.1tenial af* lo others Rl the Nuclear Regulal Y punctuated by management lnlerven*
olhce h:mdles the cummlsslon's ln1er- lairs lm1esll nllon." * :i;* Com mission. 11011 and other problems.
11al inv**s&igalions, rt:l.-clvcd a com- A sJJCakcsn,an forthe commlssl~, Jo- l1e.nellvlsl, Stef>hen n. Comley, has "In sum, we found very flute reasoo 11laim abont Mr. For1u11a from a fur* sepl1 Fuud..rd, s11id lli:tl his as.ency been sub1.ioenaed and ordered to turn lor lbe course ut conduct or this lnvesU*
n1c:r technician al the Nine Mlle Pol11l 2 haJ received tbe st1idy ycsterdo)' ond over tapes he might have of conversa* gatlon," the committee said.
rrnctor. near Oswego, N. Y. was studying It. . '.. tt1111s between hlmsclf 1md Mr. Fortuna. Mr. Fouduud said tl1al &be commts.
The fnrmt>.f' 1cchnlcian, Dou1lns EHi* A Judge dfUSCit by she commission 10 Mr. Comley of Rowley, Moss., who slon could nut comment further be*
stlft, said Mr. Fortuna. whose o((ke Is lnve!itlgnle has cuncluded tltnt Mi~ For* heads n group, We lhe rcu11lc, hu.1 cause the matter ls sUH under Internal rc5\M1t1i;ible for ltMlll.lng l11lo reactor tuna had 111:~c;d n11pru11rlntcly In IUs ht- * .J 1*1 *cm; "or provide 1111>cs ~ud lnvcsrtgaUon.
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Portsmout*h Herc PORTSMOUTH, N.H., THURSDAY EVENING, OCT. 22, 1987 44 PAGES 301 s
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~-p.)'8 -,o; awlbti *acttvtty with hbi *c>wn '(::' *:~
money. Sea View ts a.small nurstnghome (..thara '* .
. .~*r;.*------------------
'"* **MARY McGRORY
.. ~.* why It's so good. he says) where the residents do a lot at flower-growing and bird-watching. He baa spent between $12.000 and $45,000 and ta ready to spend m0rc because he's "eo ashamed I didn't get.
involved bcfore:* * ; *.
Relentless foe "A lot of people call me a nut," he volunteers.
L ",
If he ls, he could scarcely be more ofT--the-wall than the evacuatlon proposals he Is protesting. In of Seabrook the wake of Chernobyl. Sununu engaged a dlstln*
gutshed sclcnttflc panel, Including two Nobel laur-eates. to advise hlm about the sa1cty of Seabrook.
WASHINGTON - Steven Comley, a stocky. un- They have assured Sununu that In terms of con-bllnking man from Rowley. Mass.. ts hardly of the struction. operation and whllt they prefer lo call Clark Clifford achool of lobbying. Suave he ta not. "the emergency response plan." things could not He barges Into government offices and says. "Why be better. .
the helf ... .r Re does not see establlshtng friendly "What's he temn* us?" snorts Comley. "They reJatlone as a measure of success. "I made him have human error at Three Mlle Island and In Rus-mad u hell, .. he reports about a congressional aide sia, but they don't have It In. New Hampshire?"
whom he wu trytng to persuade to Investigate the The 17 towns In New Hampshire and the stx In Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Massachusetts within the 10-mtle radius all have He deals just as brusquely with the press. When thetr own draft plans. and the same bright thread he faJla to persuade a reporter to cover one of his of lunacy runa through them. Parents arc. for In-Initiatives. he says. "Oh. sure. you'll watt until stance. Instructed not lo try to retrieve their chil-there are 500,000 dead, then you'll go for It." dren from schools when the sirens go off. Their Ever since Chernobyl launched him - like an younR wllJ be transported to other towns by bus.
unguided mlaslle." a friend says - he has been where parents can go and find them later.
charg1ng about In a solo effort to stop the opening Comley's two sons attend a regional high school of Seabrook. the New Hampshire nuclear power In Newbury that ts within the JO-mile radius and plant that ltea 12 mncs away from Sea View, the so would be under the orders of the Emergency Op-nursing home he owns and operates In Rowley. erallons Center. which presently has no jurisdic-First he ranged the town of 4.000. lining up 1.400 tion In Rowley.
residents to sign a petlllon to Massachusetts Gov. Tom Moughan. coordinator of Clltzcns Within Michael Dukaltts demanding that Rowley be In- the l'tn*Mllc Radius. points out that some drafts cluded In evacuation plans betng drawn up In lhe call for the dispatch of city buses from Boston.
event of a Seabrook aecidcnt. Then he went to the some 40 miles away. lo pick up stragglers and peo-State House tn Boston to badger Dukakla In person 1le without cars. There la talk of hav1n.g carlcss not to OK the plans - a move that would d'fectlvely ~le put ribbons on their doorknobs. But since keep Seabrook lnoperauve. the buses - provided enough drivers can be found
' Whlle hla wife runa Sea View. Comley darts In to head Into the fallout - wlll ply only certain and out of Washington ..He haunts the offices of routes, res.ldcnts of side streets will have to run to the Nuclear Regulatory Commtsston and peppers the comer and, as Moughan says, "hope that the the commlasJoncra with letlcr5. He had an Inter- bus wtll get them before the radtauon does."
view wtth the newest appointee. James AsseJUne. What keeps Comley going at his headlong pace during which Aaselllne conceded that the commis- are the plans for nursing home and hospital pa-sion "acted more as the protector of the Industry tients that. as the Newburyport drart says. "can-
than the protector of the public." not be moved."
L.lkeevery other Washington petlUoner. Comley The Darwinian Instructions advise shutting wants to sec the president. A registered Indepen- doors. windows and outside air vents and "moving dent, he has voted for and contHbuted to Ronald patients/residents to Inner rooms/hallways If pos-Reagan and thinks that If he could sit down with sible."
him. the president would have to stop Seabrook. "What the hell kind of way ts that lo treat your
. *He's had no luck, 90 he's taking his plea aloft. mother or your grandfather'?" aaka Comley. None aa he hu done before. ComJcy. a sky diver. believes In overfljghta. He ha.I him! planes to 0y over Boe-or the smart people he Is pestering have answered him yet. ,-_
ton to goad DukakJs. and over Concord. N.H.* to
'disparage Gov. John Sununu, who la fending off a
Mary McGrory Is a syndicated columnist. , ..
vtgorous reetectlon challenge rrom anU-5eabrook . '\ ~ '* """" *i -p* ""i..:;... '
.elements. The praldeot wtfl soon see a streamer up ID the cJouda tbat says. **Mr. President. Sec Mr. ' . I
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, Bec~i"use we care about Rowley and YOU ...
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. the citi.z.ens of Rowley, Massachusetts appeal to you, Ronald Reagan, the Presi nt of the United States.
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~ss the following concerns and recommendations that we, the undersigned, have regarding the ~uclea.r gulatory Commission, a Federal Agency that has the ability to license the Seabrook Nuclear Plant lhat is
.a.ted in Seabrook, New Hampshire but involves various towns in Mass..achu.setts because of the 10 mile radius.
e ~ns for our concerns arc these:
A. Our children live two miles outside the ten mile radius but attend a region.al school inside the ten mile radjus. We have been told th.at we cannot be pan af the evacuation planning. This also applies to the
l"C$idents of Sea View Nursing*Home wbo arc transferred to a hospital located inside the ten mile radius.
B. Reprding.tbe Radiological Emergency Response Pian, Draft 3 4/86.Attachment.10.2-.2 which says
.. only those hOSpital patients and nursi,ng home residents who .-c deemed medically safe to move are lO be evacuated. Those patients/residents which cannot be evacuated should be sheltered in place.
(A copy is enclosed.)
In our. opimoci dill not only affects ouning home and bocpital resident< but it could affect anyoae who Md - opentioll wf. bad to be lhe1&ered in pAacc tUt day. .
C. -W.1118ltblit111CNude11rRepl.MaryCommieeioe'-bw111ti11*iaaot....,dllem1Chraavailable
..a me cMRs** ot beinc*** oe die is-. ia ow- IDWll. *Jt - * . . 1lbc1 IMlw * * * .1 rr :I dlil nuca-
. ..,.,_, very weJ1 bat they Mw DC( eec ,_ If d die . . . . .al . . p<< i 11 llilM ,,,_, DOC be far .cl EII" po* w or haw coocems foe Sllfety ia our --.
Tbua, we the* citiz=s of Row~,.Manactnnetts reCo.na~-.
A. 1lMl you ICt up a Clwnmisaioa*to tee if the Nudear ~ c.ommiasioe ii ldilla NJJatSibly in llJ 1111 f 'C w1 -uyilla lblit die llllcy Md ~**
IN bllill pwlipltly lil6dFI I 11 d far . . . . . . . o(
Rowley
well as. p<<lpk KZ"OU dais coumry.
B. Thal you ask fof' a moratorium oo the start up of aay new aucU- p1aml awairia1 licenees until you and we can be .a.uu.red*that we have the full informatioa bad from Qe.mobyl to make a responsible dcci&ioll to whether we should continue thinking that iwc}ear pOwer ii a safe alaernative.
C. That you remind the Nuclear Regulaiory Commiaion thM this l5 America not Rasia and they are bi1"ed by the people and arc accountable to* the people, not just the peq>>e in the nudear industry.
We were reminded on the 4th of July of what this country was founded for and we thank you for thac. We are seeing tlw our freedom of speech and freedom of ~hoice is being exercised. .
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We bsft the rcspooaibilit)* to sec that thi.J c.unpa.ign i.s compkted successfuJI~ and we need your help. Publi::
Brautc....,_ in S.i Frwil'Xl recenrJy did an int.en'linr with me u Direc::ior of B<<tluM w con ~t Row/~)' um YOU .... tWi- We The~** Kries wtuch tdeotffled thu iauc with the Vicmam uprWns where peddon.I stop~<
04 tbt ww, nO< tovemmttlt ortkials. Our JYStem in Ameri~ i.s a p:>d syunn. if onlr we UM it - p4eMt help w
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THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON
.:..ugust 15, 1986
Dear Mr. Comley:
In accordance wi*!:h your telephone conver-sation with my of:Hce, I am complying: with your request to pi.:.*; into writing the fact that due to the heavy demands on the President's schedule before he leave- for California he will be unable to meet with you.
This is to advise you that the informational packet you sent with your letter has been brought to the attention of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. **
Sincerely, **,**.**, ..... * ......... .
~REDERICK J. RYAN, JR.
Sirector, Presidential Appointments and Scheduling Mr. Steven B. Comley Suite 1517 The Sheraton Grand 525 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001-1527
August 27, 1986 Mr. Frede~ick J! Ryan, Jr.
Director, Presidential Appointments and Scheduling The:;,. Whi t.i!. }louse Washington~ DC
D.:!i:I~ Hr. Ryan:
Piease t'.ea<i th~: relea§.e ericlosed. . I *plan on retu~ning to Washiln9ton this Frid~y,,,?Au9q~t.. -~9 I l98G. l certainly tl:\ink bi this t,ime yot.r..l'\av_,, received c:orrespondenc~ 'from tne::secr~et ser.-.iice, from o'ffic:ers*~* Ooone and Horris._ It *.i**
goeS,. wi~,hout s*aying ifi"at t:r will~'. 'be neecU.ng to s~,_:you your next week at. . . conv:~~~~ce . :-;.. ' ('"
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CCMMISSlONIJll MOOR.ANOUM FOR: The Files F~OH: James K. Asse1st1ne SlJSJECT: DISCUSSION WITH PHEN B. COMLEY R£ HUctE.AR SAFm ANO EMERGatq Pt..ANNING
.On Friday, August.is, 1986,. I met'with* Hr. Staphen B. Comley to discuss hi concerns regarding nuc:lear safety and *emergency planning. Hr. Comley is a rasident of Rowley, Massachusetts.* Mr. ~mley is intarestad 1n the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant but is not l party 1n the Seabreok licensing proceeding. We did not discuss any contestad issues. in the Seab~ok 1ic:ensing proc:ff111ng. The following 1s I written swmary Of tzrf r-esponses to Mr. Comley's questions.
~estion t: Do you f~l that the p~ple of Rowley should have a voice i evacuation planning as it pertains ~* the Seabrook power plant?
Answer:
.. 2 the situation for Seabrook, and I have no opinion *on the issue at the present tilTlf!-.
Ouestion 2: Evacuation issue
oeo 1P- who can'~ P ~v 0 * *
Oo you feet some means snou oe pi-ov1aea ror peop e ~no cannot be moved, othe.r than ner!ly being shel t.ered?
-- Answer:
t, am not awec *brt
, 1 n in tth 9uezt19g biU b;;p 'as*a 'gplr-1:;..
an revious c:3s
As a genera ma ter, t e oam1ss1on s re9u ations require that emerge .
p1anning within the EPZ provide for a i-an9e of p~te~tive SUE.L.TERE:D actions. se can 1nc:1ude shelteMnc:r. but for at lea.,.
some acci ent s1~uat1ons evacuat1on mav oe necass~rv r r
~~5.U!_ or a o e oe~c - w1tn1n ne '* nus, emer9ency p ann1n9 measures nave be~n requi~a to include ne~ded transportation, particularly for those who are unable to evacuau themselves. I agree with this element of our emergency planning ~irements. For this reason, the Comnissian emphasizei'i the need for arrangements for ambulances and buses if evac:uation 1s nee<fed for a ca..-.
fac:il:1ty for elderly nuns near the Fenni-2 r-eactcr. The Coamission has also considered the n~ for sheltering and eva~~ation of pris~ners in deterrtion faeilities 1ccatad nea~
nuclear j)ower pl an.ts. Rowe:ver, I do not be1 isvt! ~h~). Sb&
ion ha fa ~ the sltUa'ti.on '" wn1cn ev*acua.,. ,
Question 3: t.ocatjon issue - Seabrook. Has the surrmer beach popu1ation been fully taken into consideration?
Answer: I believe ..that this is a contested fssue in the Seabrook proce,din9. My opinion on this.and other contested issues "Nill be based upon the fonnal record in the Seabrook case *
.* I have no opinion on the issue at the present time and I
cannot discuss it with you.
' \ / Ouesti on 4: ** As we have yet to receive a 11 of the information on
~ Chernobyl, what are your opinions on reducing the radius
from 10 miles to 2 miles?
Ans'Wer:
I' reductions in the radioactive source term (the estimates iJ the amounts and ~ypes of *radioactive materials which could be released during a serious nuel ear acciderft). The industry a~ues that these reduced source t-enns would justify relaxations in several NRC 1"'!9ulations. Chief amen those is a r!duction in the size of the emergency planning zone. perhaps to an area as small as two miles. The Mleric:an* Physical Society and others have 1dent1 fi ed a number of ams where additional won. is needed to previ de sound scient111c basis for any sou~ tum ?"!assessment.
They have advised that ac~s*s-the-board reductions 1n the source tann ar& not yet justified, and that specific numerical reductions are unwarranted. The Corrm1ss1on has na.t yet ta ken act1 on to, .reduce the source tenns, and our tachnical staff has advised that any across*the-board
~uc:tions *1n emergency planning zones an premature. The staff ha5 rejected at least orie site-speeif1c pn:iposa1 to reduce the EP! for the Calvert Cliffs plant on the gn:iund tMt the request is pr-emature. Of course, any licensee i ~
f~ to p~pose a site-specific reduction 1n the size of tt EPZ for the plant and the individual proposal would be ecnsidered by the Ccnmission on its merlu.
Question 5: I understand that the low level .licensing ~ui~errt.s havt been reducad as they per=tain to issues of evacuation problems that may arise in a c:ity or town. This change ha~
enabled question not to be resolved before a* license is tssu.U. Given .the Chernobyl. incident and the problems and questions that sun-ound the Pilgrim Huc:lear Plant in Plymouth (which has be*n branded *the worst-run plant in t:
us*}, do you think we should reverse aga.in and r-e~ui n tha evaluation issues be resolved before a 1o\li level license i grante<i to any new plants?
Ans-wer: The Cormiission's regulations require adequate emergency planning measures to be_ in place prior to the issuance of full-power- license, b~t no-c.prior to the issuance of a low-power- license (these are limited to no more than five percent of full power). This decision was based upon the technical judgment that a plant beginning operation and no going above five percent power fails to generate the quantity of fission products and decay heat which could po a hazard to the public requiring evacuation or other protective* action *.
I agree with this technical judgment that the ri sic to the pub 1i c from low-power opera ti on of a new plant is very low. Some have questioned whether the Chernobyl accident affects this judgment since that accide
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Ou.estion 6:
Answer: thl! HRC .ha a od r OT t e nu* ear indus'trv tl'lan tne o~t -tor- oi tn is., ese c:ase.s ave inc: u e tne om1 ss1 on s aec1 s ion
--*a*trcill!ow operation of the Indian Point plants in the fac:a of continued significant deficiencies in emergency planning; the Corrmis~ion's de~ision to reject the safety improvements recomend~d by the- NRC staf-f and the hearing ~card in the Indian Point Speeia*l Proc**dinq; the Co1m1ission's de'=ision ta allow the restart of TMl, Unit l; the~Coarnission's decision te end the seardt far further ~uc:ti ens in the risk of severe nuclear accidents in the Severe Accident Po11c:y Statement; and the C~nmis~ion's d~ision to r-estr~ct the HRC staff's ability to develop net!de<i ne'it safety requireneritl in the Conmission's bac:x1it rule. My views are well documented in my dissenting vi~s on each of these
decisions, and they.have bef!n '#idely publicized. For the most part. I am the only member of the current Cormtission who has opposed these actions; however, one other Coirmissioner opposed the backfit rule. Oe5pite my opposition to these key Corrmission decisions,,! b;1i;v t~;) 0 t~ NSC -~;t-a~ ... , m~l'W anlo and dodic~~:iA f"IAl"ll'\1Cl ':'91"1 :a .. a V \l"BfEBgrsacijpxra1¥~!f jg tU& i iE-- ;"4~e taz!n§~f; ~!nf vo r 2
'\.that thf! agency c:oyld pursue its regulatory responsibilitie~
in a manner that would ~stor"'! public confidence in the NRC as an objective and fair regulator that puts the interests of the public foremost.
Question 7: Has Chernobyl changed your thinking regarding nuclear po~er Answer: The Chernobyl ac:c:i dent has not dram.a ti c:a 11y a1 tered my views on nu el ear power o.r on the key regu1 a tor-y issues wh i (
are before the NRC. I -continue to believe that nuclear
.... pO\lfer plants can be operated, built,,and designed safely, and that they should be a part of our overall energy mix.
In rt1chin9 this judgment, I r-ecognize the subsunti11
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~corrmitment*to nuclear power which we already have in the U.S. The challenge 1s to ensur! that the approximately* 125 plants we have in operation or under constnJct1on. a~ nm
saf41ly. Hence, Chernobyl has undenc:ored my belief that a sevd~nuc:lear accident fn the *u.s. 1s unacc~puble, and that further r!9Ulatory. initiatives. are needed for the future if We a~ to "a the long-t!rm rlslc of nuclear power u, an ac:c!~table level. Jg a r;~ent 1ettT~ ~a .t~*
P"sident of the Atomic Industrial ForJm, f out inea mv °"'
.* , a e to no t.e
'P.!IJ!iljiilP!_...P.r*ll!!PW'-..911'!9'1Wllllllll!.,.!Pelll'~o~a 1 s Po 1i cy Statement the Coimrission ag~ to 4 statl!ment that an obj~tive of our
~qulatory pr-oce5s should be to p~vent the occurrence *of a severe nuclear accident -- that is, an accident causing damage to the. ruc:tar care - at any U. s. nuclear power
~lant. This statement~ together with the Cormrission's recent increased attention on the operating per"fonnance of U.S. plants, particularly those with a history of poor performance~ is an encouraging step in the right di~ction.
~ Question 8: Qq you feel* that oc!<!ole are rea11r Qf ~ne* gangers OT* nuctear .oowe~}
1nfo~d about andkno"-i Answer: r _am 99 ~ rnnx1ns*f tti;t th; qubH; 1; t1111x *ntsrn~s gt i-h'
"'J'Cs gf. pysl ear power. Tne ;ssues are often. ccmPTe.x, and the debate on tfie 1ssues is f~uently polarized and somewhat "dist.QrUd. In ttrf ~ent letter to the AIF, co~y atUched, I attempted to describe rrry viN of the risk of a nuc1 ear aci:i dent, including the uncarta inti es in es ti mating that rislc. As I noted in rtrt letter, 1 do ngt believ; tr;,;
we fullv understand that risk, and we snoura not oe arrai Question .9: C~st ~en.JS other funds - obsolete?
Answer: ..As I unders!and 1our que*stion, do I believe that nuclear power is obsolete based upon cost considerations? The Corrmission's regulations focus on health and safety considerations rather than on the overall cost of nuclear power. It is true that the cost of nuclear power has increased substantially in recent year1, particularly for the 1arge new plants. The cost of operating and maintaini the older existing plants-has also increas~ significant1) over the past several year1. Although there are many reasons for the cost increases, among the more significant are poor management of plint. construction, the l aclt. of standardization, & design-as-you-build apprcach to plant construction, and the need to &ddr~ss new and unanticipati safety issues, including those &rising frt>m the Three Hi14 Island accident. Whether nuc1ear pO'#er ~ins c:ompet1t1*
,. 0 -
rt gue5tion 10 How Many people were hospi~1ized .. in Russ1a?
Answer: I do .not know the ans-#er to this question. ~e ar-e.awaiting further deta11 s o.n the cv-rh'll accident at the upccmi ng meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency late this month.
OUESitON 11. How old was the p~ant-~ 3 yem? - Lt.":s '1'"AiJ:!@
Answer: The reactor which. had the accident at Chernobyl 'Was the n~est unit of the four-unit Chernobyl plant. Although I do not know the date on which the unit be9an oper~tion, J.
believe that the i:ilant had been 1n ocerat1on no mo~ tna)'
tfli§! f§df§, &Hd Q#.FHJbs tgss:; .
question 12: What are the d1fferencas bet:Aeen the Russian plants.and our nuclear pl anu as ,ou ?ff theat?
An$'#er: There- clearly are a number af design differences betw~n U.S. nuclear powerplant.s and the Chernobyl p1ant. Other Russian plant des.igns are more similar to oun. I do not believe that we have enough detailed de~ign information .
about the Chernobyl plant to fully undentand their des19:i or* the significance of the d11ferences bet-ween their design
_ ph i"-1 osophy and ou M. We a.re awaiting more deta i 1ed design info~.ation at the _upcoming_ IAEA meeting later this month.
However, quite apart from the design di fferenc:es between the U.S. and Russian plants, there are some broad lessons with.
applic:abi1ity ta the U.S. nuclear program. Qse cf *a*1e . ,
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to ensure tnat suT icient 1 9{ I ;sysr; a5tr1d;~p b@tt apd Sb* ps*p t . r * ..
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guest1on 13: Regarding future generations, would you rtcorrmend that iwe continue to build nuclear plants? *
- 1 ..
An~er: t teHeve that we should r~ta1n the nuclear power option for the futur! in this country. When I e.xami ne other energy arternatives, it appea~ at the present time ~at coal and nuclear are the principal means available for providing ,
1ar.9e central sbtion generating facilities. Conservation and other op ti o.ns ara having a s i gni fi cant impact; hC'Wever, it is unclear whether they can el iminata the nff<i for ne';lt large generating facilities at some point in the futur-e.
But if nuc1ear power is to remain a viable option for the futun!, three ccnditions must be met. F1Mt, the existin9 pl anu IJ'IJSt o~erata safely and there mus"t not Be a savere
!(
accident at any of the existing p1ants for the foreseeable future - at 1east the next 20 yean. ~ei::ond, we must
~stri;;c:tu~ the process for designingt ccns~ructing and ,
operating future nuclear plants. This n!Structuring must ~
include greater use of standardized design~; the development of essentially Clm?leta designs before the st.art of construction; bett!r, more c1ntralized management of the c:onstruc:t1on proe!S$; gr9*ater attention to construction quality assuranca; improved designs which emphasize greatar mar-9ins of safety, simplicity, ease of operation and easa of
~int~nance; better utility management; and improved ~
opent'fons and mainte11ance. *l'erlcrmanc:-.* ;gi1pt, ~ 1T1.lst make.;..~
-continued prognss toward developing a sare and ~
environmentally acceptable solution to the nuclear ~aste disposal problem.
Eac:h of these an!as, in ray view, is in nffd af atuntion if nuclear ptJWer is to remain a viable option for the future. *
~Question 14: .best i ntero<t?
Answer:
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September 4, 1986 Mr. Frederick Ryan Director, Presidential Appointments and Scheduling The White House Washington, DC
Dear Mr. Ryan:
I understand that you have been away with the President but have since returned. Referring back to the letter of. August 12th, I can just reiterate that it is imperative that I meet with the President. As you know, I am in Washington to meet.with the President because he is the only one.who has veto pO\lier over the NRC.
I have a deep respect and loyalty to *President Reagan but I also feel .a great responsibility for the safety of the American people. I have talked* to people high up in the NRC who feel that the President ia not aware of what has been happening at the NRC.
I have been in touch with Mr. Laxalt'a office and expect to 'be meeting with him next week regarding this matter.
You might also talk to Clarkson Binds at the Republican Task Force with whom I have been in touch with for the last month and a half.- "'
I suggest that you reread my press releases and you will better understand my position.
Respectfu'ily,
~.~=+
Rowley, Massachusetts Enclosures
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Seavi~~ Re~=~at l:'.c.
Ro.,.,.ley, HA 0!969 *
Dear MI:
_. Cclr.l ey:
c.n behai f o£ Se..~tor Hein::, I am wr1 ting to thank you for your ouu-ean:iing comit::11ent ta P-r*eside:it Reagan and his ltepublican Senate Majori-:.y a-oUih your m9ber:$.ip in the National Republican Senatorial Oub mi the Republie2Jl Presidential :Task :=orce.
I .
You: lcmitim support~ a.s a P~t Member of the Sen&toria.l Club
) and a.s a. Clw't.er Me=ber of the Task rcrc:e, has ~ valuable in our
battle to mai:it.ain c:~rittol of the U.S. Senate *
...:,rf.
We appreci.au: your exceptional :1enerosity, and we .look f'on;&r'd to workini vit.h you in the futUre. Good luck in all of your future end eavo rs.
Sincerely,
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UNIT£On"1r.a NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINCTO ... D. C. ?otU OCT ! 1986 Mr. Stephen 8. Comley, Administrator Se& View Nursing Home Mansion Drive Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Mr. Comley:
CM i ""'" Zich has asked
to respond to your letter to hi* of August 22,
1986. The questions in your letter focused upon sever11 issues including eMergency pl*nning at the Seabrook nuclear gene~atfng station, the Russian nuclear accident at Chernobyl and nuclear p~r in general.
Enclosed are answers to each of the quest1.ons cent.lined in your letter. If we can be ot further assistance. please let me know.
Sincerely.
for Operations
Enclosure:
Questions and Responses
NRC RESPONSES Question 1 Do you feel that the people of Rowley should have a voice in evacuation
.planning as it pertains to the Seabrook power plant?
Response
The Comfssion regulations provide th1t, genera11y, the plume exposure pathway energency p1ann1ng zone {EPZ) for n.uclear power plants shall include areas CJIEIM wf thin about 10 m11es of a nuclei*~ power pllnt. The ex&c:t sfze 1nd conf'1gura-tf on of the zone f s to be detennfned 1ri reh t1on. to 1oca 1 emergency response t9FFe::J needs and capabi1ft1es as they are affected by demography, topography, land t 11/f ~
cha racteri sti cs. access routes and juri sdi cti ona l boundarhs.
s r-ate ove'"'-ntal unit "111C:h 1s outsid - /11 viR Qyestion Z EYacvatton 1 ssue-~ple who can *t be l90Yed *** Do you feel sa. *ans shex1ld be provided for people who c1nnot be llOYed, other for than --~ly be1nt sheltered?
Response
3
Response
Yes. The guidelines 1n the reference document NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 specify that each licensee's plan shall contain time e~timates for evacuation within the plulM! EPZ based on population estilwtes that include considerat;on of transient 1s well as pe~nent residents ind specf1l facility populations (e.g., schools,
-h spftals, and nursing homes). Consider1tion is also given for both normal and adverse weather conditions in the 1nalysis. The Se1broolc Station Eyacuatjpn -~
Tine Esti1a1tes ind Traffic "'9n1 etnent Plan sut:ilfitted 6 Pu61ic*servi f N r . l As we Mve yet to receive a 11 of the fnfonNtion on CMrnobyl, what are your opinions on reducing tt'H! radius from 10 *iles to 2 *11es?
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n. .-C kas frw.ffea~ tMt ft 1RteMs to .betift a rHSHS_,.t of -rttne1 pla*iftl, in 1 f gltt *f arty new 1nsf,..ts -~r"111 .. frm
r ui.ttsht ,..sMrc:h on Stftre 1ee1dent releases or *source te1"'M.
We COftshler ft 1ppropr-f1tt tMt any wch reassess.ent s.hC>'lld also include pertfMftt 1nforMt1on fro. Chernobyl, t1~1ng into account ~ s19niffc1nt differences be~ the. Chernobyl design
u4 thlt of U. s. re1ctors (SH rnponse .to O-St1tft lZ). u they affect . *. .
Yer"*'" p¢gga::..
D cct.,.t risks. f!!a:: M"M:*!!*v"! !! ~= ?1 SM 11a st the RE!~1!!!!!!!! m::!~li !!!!::c~:>-.; "'?7 ~fls ,q;:;,
Question 5 -:-- * .. ~ ..,-e_.~
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I underst.nd that tht 1ow level 11censing requ1rt1111tnt~ have been reduced as they ~rt11n to issues of ev1cu1t1on pn:>blewtS that .. y 1rfse fn
city or town. This change has enabled questions not to be resolved before
l 1cense is issued. Given the Chernobyl incident an.d the probletns and questions surrounding. the Pilgrh1 Nuclear Phnt in Plywt0uth (which has been branded "the worst-run plant in, the us*), do you think we shOY)d r-everse again and require that evaluation issues be resolved before a low level license is granted to any new plants?
Ryponse The HRC's decision to grant low power licenses prior to*arr4v1ng at final positions on certain regulatory issues, including eMergency planning, is based on the conclusion that the risK to the health and safety of the public from low powr o~ration is not cMpra.iised. An1lyses of .uny phnts recently 1 icensed by the NRC shoiw that the risk fro. low power operation 1s several orders of.
ma9n1tude lower thin that 1t full power operation. This fs prfrMrf ly bec:ause (l) the ffssfon product inventory 1t tow power operation fs subst1ntillly less than 1t full power, (2) safety system requfrements (e.g., numbers of pumps needed to be av1f l1ble) are MUCh less at low power, and (J) operators have subst1ntfally more tfme to respond to events"and take corrective action. *
v. With respect to Chernobyl. the NRC's prelf*fn1ry 1valu1t1on of that accident has cone luded that. bec1use of unique design df fferences between Chernobyl and U.S. plants, there ire no f119plfc1tions requf ring f-.dfate regul1tory action on pllnts licensed fn .the U.S. We w111 be perfo,..fng 1 11are detailed evaluation over the next several .onths to confi1'11 thfs conclusion.
In s~ry. we do not believe there 1s any blsh at tllfs tf* to change our current r.gulatory policies and practices regarding low J>O'f"!r license requirements.
Do .)'OU f*l that the NRC has represented the ~plt as wl 1 as ft has repreMfttecl the nuclur fncklstry 1 *
r Tes. the WRC' s retulatfons .* ,.. des1fMd to protect tM t.H 1th ind stfety of the public, and these have been vigorously. enforcl'd~ During this fiscal year the IMC MS ulceft *"Y enfore-nt actions and proposecl f1nes lflf.nst the nuc:lHr industry for vf ol1tf ons of the MtC' s retUl atfOfts of a 1110st fhe
1111on do11ars. - .
THE~E llJUAUr4~/lt~ $rA,.,. rHilr F~XI.. ."/J161"&A. ~KrL-'I Question 7 His CMrnobyl changed your- thinking regarding nuclear J)OWer?
Response
Reviews of the accident an~ the Chernobyl design done to date by both the NRC staff and others have not identified any aspects of the accident wtlf ch show a clear-eyt nexus to U.S. cOWtRercial nuclear-power phnts requiring 1... dhte regu7atory action. However, fn or-der to* confin1 th1s Juclgllent, a more vigorous
. and syste1111tf c investigation fs ~fng perfoMltd to identify those areas and issues associated with the Chernobyl accident that werrant further investiga-tion. As such, our *thinking regarding nuclear power* his not ch1ng~.
Ouestion a Do you feel thit people are really 1nfonned about and know of the dangers of nuclear power?
. ,s
Response
The statutory responsfb111ty of the NRC is to provfde for the safe operation of c01r111trciaJ nuc111r power fn the U.S. In cirry1ng out this responsibility, we frequently are afforded* the opportunity to txph1n our regulltory
~ phflosophy and bises for safety ind licensing decfsfons. However, it is outside the HRC role and responsfbf11ty to utvfse the public 1bout the rfsl<s and beneff ts of nuclear power.* Th* respons1bflfty for tntf"9Y pol fey and develoi-ent of energy sources f s 1ssfvntd to the De,lrtment of Energy. The Energy Riorg1nfz1tfon Act of 1975 w1s en1cted by COngress to separate respons1bflft.r for- rqulatfon from respoRs1bf11t,r for tnerty policy to avoi*d conn 1cts of interest. E*rgency pl1nntn9 ret11lltfons do require that 1nfo,,..tfon be _.de 1v1fl1ble to the* public CNJ 1 periodic basis on.how they w1l1 be notified 1n an emergency and what their fnftfal actions should be.
Qyestf0n 9 Cost versus other fuels-obsolete?
TM JltC h responsf~l* for- tJte 11c.nsfftf 1"4 rtlltN ,....11tory functions fo,.
cc-itrcfal nvclur power plants fn tJte United States. 1ltt consfderat1on of t~,e eton011fcs of: nuclear power versus other IMJ-11 so.rraees does not fall under ther s;titutor;y responsf.111ty of the lfRC. We 1...-st that thh question C:04'ld best be 1nswr-M by the u.s. Deparm.nt of Enerv. . *
t=r 1:s Als ~ Nrr -rlle ~tsl'l'tf si/,Jt *ry 'F rNR Nile. 111 su,,.1t css
/~tflWl-ffl?o So rH.Ar THI! Pu,,,,.. 'f)IAr ~ .. E C..1N'r1t* *,
Ouestfon 10 ~<<-llV<< ,A Ll~N$ 6 AAID rHI/;' rll~y r""ltt~ .,..;: >f t:rA *
15 I )#611.. . . . ... **-*
How .. ny ~ple were hospf t1ltzed fn ""ssia?
Response
At the International Atomf.c Energy Agency Conference on the Chernobyl Accfdent held in Vienna, Austrfa, August 25-29, 1986, the Soviet delegation informed us that as of th1t date, 31 persons hid d1ed and 203 persons were hospit11ized with radfatfon-related injuries, all fire ffghte~ or pl1nt personnel.
Question 11 How old was the plant - 3 years?
Response
It fs our understandfng that Unit 4 at the C~mobyl ,.uclur Powtr Station went 1nto commercial operation fn 1983.
Question 12 Whit ire the differences between the Russian plants ind our nuclear plants as you see them?
Response
~ There are.111ny basic dffferences between the Soviet RBMK class of plants and the u~s. conaercf1l light water reactors. T1't most pro1tin1nt dffferen~es are (lJ a lick of 1 westetn*s~le contaf~~t wh1ch encloses the entire primary syst.. of the reactor, (Z) 1 core COllPOS~ of about 1600 fndfvf~al pressure tubes wf thfn a* graphfte .. tr1x, ind (3) 1 posftfvt cool1nt vofd re1ctfvtty
~fffcfent. CJ/l~1"1S'/l. }/All'~N"CD 9Q&l.AUJC (),-:' f/Ptfl'N E,.._,._ 11~0 :: ,t'1tow ~s #rHE/t.S TJIJ, rHAr WE Question 13 H~vz A Lor ~,J: )/1AtA!t" EleA.*ll /°J., WA~~1il'cs-rt>t, Son.£ a*/ihcr~,
Rettrdfng futu,... gerter1tfons, would you rec~nd that we continue. to build naclur plants?
ReSpo!!M As 1 ,oltey, tlte JlltC does not
a rec sA*tfeM. ,....N1"1 *Ulods for fwt.re ,._ratfOft of eltctrfal ..,.,..,. s.ctt ...c . ftdlt1on~ on national pol f cy are the responsfbf Jtt,y of the Deptrtmtnt of Entrv.
Q!!!stf on 14 *.
Do yw fHl thlt the public would l>e Justffftd fn t.elfevfn9 thlt the MC 1s not 1ct1n9 fn the public's best fntertst?
"o* see answer to Question 6.
\\"E WI LL SEE TO IT THAT MR. STELLO AS WELL AS THE REST OF THE NRC, K.'Wh'S HOW A.'IERICA DOES FEEL BY"WAY* OF A NATIONAL REFERENDUM WHICH WILL ALLOW THE ,\MERICA.'1
?EOPLE TO MAKE THE DECISION WHETHER THEY WA..l\T TO CONTINUE ON WITH NUCLEAR POWER I~ THIS COU:-.:TRY. TH"E CONSTITUTION WAS WRITIEN TO GIVE THE PEOPLE A SAY WHE:--i THEY KNOW SOMETHING IS WRONG IN THE GOV~RNMENT. THAT OBVIOUSLY CAN NOT BE DOSE U:--'T IL THEY GET ALL THE FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED BY THE ISDUSTRY, THE :\RC, A.'W YES, SOME GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS. WE THE PEOPLE, . INC. OF THE UNITED STATES 1'1'! LL SEE THAT THEY GET THOSE FACTS AS WELL AS PROVIDE VEHICLES THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO MAKE THAT CHOICE. IF WE FAIL TO DO THIS, h'E HAVE FAILED AMERICA FOR l't'HAT IT WAS FOUNDED FOR.
J C.,.I N We The People, Inc. HE PEOPLE, INC. * /,0 t1!'! .... rm of The United States
,............,._,toot 14 , , ........, 11* ....
.,.. ......~ oc )004,
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~~03:101 UO M.-,IN ITIUIT. IHI. IA 11.IY, MASSACMUSITTS 01tOI 4(!. :tr// MA: Ol7*Ml*7t11 1t0)1 Ut*~* 0-.C:.r ::IOl*Ul*l 100 1** ,, ...... n.>> 1zoi1 t.n-1111 October 20 i l 98 7 Mr1. Nancy Reagan Vhice Hou*e Washingcon, o.c.
Dear Mrs. aeagan:
. After apaaltia1 vi th you on P'riday. ~tober Utb at the Kaplavood Sc:hool 11\ 5oeeravort'b9 ..,, l.aapab1re, I fMl t a~ .fol~ on. our cocvara.ation a.ad re-affira ., vi1V8.
.......*ctwt*,.....,. ...... nnc t.MJ co Ml' tM>>aa .. vith
*nc -.... pralr**. 1, c., M-N _..a* ...... 1 *cc.eac co the Med.can
,..,la t* n.pc .die .. _ . l fMl .a . . ..,,_,. ac wleu . . . . 1 &h1Cr)' ... dlie Die....._
l11l11c lltalTITif C1;a:t**ioa* -I* M laea et ct...
c-.£cce4* tlaaa 7" c.e. a.a tMt c** .._ -
lldp .. *
HJ efforca to iuu-re. cbe Nfa **acuc:l.n of all ~ricaa *clc-i.a... 1a tb* n'*DC of a n\&clear
*accUaar: vill *C cuM uaUJ. *Cbere s.a fair_... --'ultl* cnaa.eac of the
.41LM~1. . ,. u.. *.w.17, ... ....._ Sa -.-icen. - 1. teal ,.. ... 11r *. IMp* vill
.-.rau.I ..... :n*llM .,. cwerM after. n1*t* CM .1.afft'ilatS- I J.efc ~th ..
~1 KartiMs.
I do ax,r ... wt aincara viahe1 for ,..r ,,_-, recovery atul t look forvard to hearins froa )'OU at ,our &&'t'l.it*C. cn..aieoce. I' ,. ~
Sincerely,
(} * ,J
-- '>#-. I 11 . ~ .
4J U..~1U. ;L J ** * ., ,._ t.~ i.;"
St.pheu !. Comley,
Executi"la Director sac: e11d Enc.
. .-. ,......... °" , .. ~ .. ,....
~ .. . .. . . . .
,fit..*::#1 OFFICE OF THE VICE ?RESIDENT WASHINGTON March 10, i9B7 Mr. Stephen B. Comley Executive Director Because We Care About Rowley and You 280 Main Street, Route lA Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Mr. Comley:
Thank you for your recent letter to the Vice President expressing your concern for the safety of nuclear power plants.
It was good of you to write to the Vice President, and he appreciates your having taken the time to share your views with him. I have been asked to share your letter with officials at the Department of Energy who are in the best position to advise you. I have asked that they correspond with you directly concerning this issue.
With the Vice President's best wishes, ly,
/JWJ;j" r .Mattke ieute ant.Colonel, USMC Military Assistant/Aide to the Vice President 1 - ..**
I .
JUIN ~ Vf~. I
We The People, Inc., of the* Un*ited.Stales "STOP CHERNOBYL HERE" THE LETTER WAS PASSED TO MR. REAGAN AT 12:37 P.M. 10/26/87 ALONG WITH FLA.ti. I GAVE
~MRS. REAGA~ THE SAME I~FORMATION ON 10-16-87 I~ N. H. ,
I I
FOR JM,\.IEDIA TE REL.EASE. I pres.s* contact: Stephen Comley, executive cfirector,
We the People Inc. of the Unlted Stites
. In Washington: (202) 62!-661 l.
In Rowley, Mus.: (617) 941-79
In Concord, N.H.: ('0.3) 221-~&* **
<t ' :: ' ; ' * * * *' I ,<t
-* *:;?. -... 1'ASlaNCTC>tf'."'-:-.Pnitldeii{it..pn" todat.IS~*1o'* - pteafttH
.. ~* .
-.~. * .* wt1h *****e- lhe P;1~~~~.:*'1..: S.t1--- ._C1pal~~'tj'ni=fft.,. .. ; . ~
--*-~W9-WP11,le ~**---:.=z*.~~,,Hli**.: .J:.*,. .* -~
. * *
P**hn a c**** ~ afetr ....... JI ti 11f1'(
' ' ' atlta ~* n char,. * ., plants w 'the*lallwe 9' ... , ...
.a
. Nuctur* a..-"'7 ~* to addrea ..._.. ...,.. *
* ... n
n. ,r**tation,. wh1da .Pteli4enc .w*.w *..-(.* '
=1 i* *****-~......_,.ii 11 Jt'p*R*mM: ***
at the
....,.::;;..*.1*'. 9m:1:****tW
,._'.~ *:. *:~
it.. RepuMlcan Senatorial Inner Cird* -at -.. Ollri *. _. . .
Hotel, 2'00 Calvert Street ln Northwest 'l'uhinaton.. - - .
Witt. lhe ~. ComJ~1 ls._ to 1ive Che Pretldeftt * .. i.tter*
(copy attact.d) and other materi&l (available frDftl,,c-&eJ) on the d&nser1 created by nuclear power industry and on the f&ilures of the industry's faithful servant, the .NR.C.
Comley &llO ii to seek & private audience witi\ t:he President to detail his c:h&raes acainst the nuc:lei.r power industry and the NRC.
... m Nat lieMI ,.,... I lelf. OtftMI I & I
~
" ' " M llU 14 & 'Ill., N.W. Ill. "4 WuPli,,OtOt\, 0.C 100*S (201) l:Me 11
~NHOUOt
-m.~ .
2 1"1111 It "*
Ov t> r
JOli\J . ~.o/~
We =-The People, Inc., of the Ur1Jfed States "STOP CHERNOBYL HERE" President Ronild Reagtn The Whlte House Washing:on, DC
Dear President Reagan:
Fo' the sdety o! the American peopte, you m1.:st see me
With my a:ttorneys, t can prove th!.~ the Nuc!:ar Regula~ory Commission :s being run for nuclear. industry interests who a.re placing t."lc lives of
millions* of Americ:ans in jeo~rdy. This !u.s been con!irmed to me privl.tely
by hlgh~&nking officials within the NRC *..
For the past year and a half, you:- sta!! has kept me *from giving you
!irsth.at')d my in!ormation. When you have it,*1 know you ... wiU !ind it so a.l&rminc-and-~ tellin& th&t you will act quic:kly. and decisively. .. *
../ . .. *.
Tivoush my *attor~ys, I can. prove ihat~. the)~RC:.~. broken *the law* knowingly.
'. and.*hu .. cov.ered. :up* hs" llle&aractlons*.. cOnlbteiallr;*~ lhe nuclear .*:
"*-~*to :Pt llce~ ~Or~ .~e**:su.nti: ~.~ ~:, 1n " " ~
HaMplhire and . ~...,. ..... lnJf~ ~AN~.~ .,,... ~1&?.
~~** ... ;,.,~***?'=' **, . .,,-:;~" * **1:od& .,,,,,*,**;,r*.-.-. :.; ** \ *
~\,. .: *,. .~**I ** ** * ., : * ~- * *: :. * : *I::-.*** .* * .
.It la vitally important that you 1et this infomatioft fr* me, now, to prevent panic due to *the* unsde nuclear power plants; *
. "' I My. concern ovei 1he'.need to pc::~tect ..*-lhe . ~icM p11;1e *fr* lhe daftsers of nuclear. power plants hu led me to tpeftd a ,ev. &M a* halt of lft'f time* and mor.11 d\an $1 '°,000 of my money. * : * .. .
On behalf* of myself and fellow c:onc:erned Americans who are rnel'l)bers of ";' e the People lne., thls *we t}\e People* tla1 is presented ... to you u a symbol of our . united stand. . /
As a member of your Task Forc:e since. 1'1'2, 1 have found you to be a man of
great strength1 commitment to what i.s. right and !a.hh in Cod. This is what is. needed to make* the dedsions that must be made il Americans today a:id
for generations to c:orne are 1oing ta be protectect from :he dancers of nucleu power.
Mr. President, I know that together, we can end these daniers. I am committed to this fight. I ask you to joi~ me.
Sineerely, /.J ~..l,
~.;;;ley, exeeuti **
l't tht People Inc. of the United States dirL lo* 271 l'owlty, MA 01MI
N111ot1al Pr111 llelf.
, 4 l , Sia., N.W. Ill. 914 Offtlel 5
' ,_.aMftt SI.
('1'7') 9"&-71St W11hl"Cl0t1, O.C. 200*! ~Ot~. NM Q.ll01 (617') t'-6-~!l (2C1l 611-6611 !&03) fll*l*U
Newburyport, Massachusetts*
ay. oc1ober2*i. ioa7 m Pages 1OOth Anniversaryll 881*_1981 :i.s cents I S1.50 wee*
~..:_~~~~~~------------....:..----~.~~.. --.. ~~*~---.----------------------~
N-plant foe says he gave flag to Reagan -#*
. WASIDNGTON <AP> - A cru- Reagan then motioned blm .to~ for nuclear Industry interests who s.ader agalnlt the Seabroot nu- come forward, Comley aakt. ~ .:- . an pladng tbe lives of rn1llJons of
clear power plant says be Sol a ... Comley aakl ReuUa pat tbe flai ** Amertcanl ln jeopardy."
brief opportunJty to press h1I cue under hia arm aml toot a. ietter Co!Jlley, who Uve1 about 12 direc:tly with Preaident Reapn. from tbe ac:th1it_ . . . m.Uel ft'Olll ~ ~ I
The eYtDl WU doMd to tbe pub. Sel.bnot bllrlDI: 1ut week lD New
~~ ,,, Stepbu Comley ot Rowley., Uc am_. prw. Comley Mid be la a Ha..,_lre. Lii{" ,ear, be wu ar-
"Maa., aaJd Mooday that he band- . . . Of tbe coatrtbuton* dub. n11i!1i1 after~ tbe lnaqu.
edananti-Seabrootletterandban- .In tbe letter, Comley Wd bl *nUon of New Hamplblre Gov.
i° e.fi! *~ ~m*-
_,; .Del' to Reagan at a Republlcan .. dprovethattbeNuclearftep. Jo tin Sununu; a. Seabrook I/
not~ It thiS momJ.na.
"w-. nm. pn~IS !NOD Ol;:-
Comley said he !Jnfurled a ban-ner that read: "We the People - /
WAs PAWOi<&l:)
200th Anniversary of the Con&titu-Uon - 1787 to 1967" while Reagan spoke to the Republican Senatorial In.ner Circle, a group of $1,000 con*
"PJY $1/Nll/JV !$
tnbutors. "We the People" is the name of Comley's organization. lJWr.J S1A F~
According w Comley, ~ presi-dent spotted him and after the speech asked, *'ls that for me?"
Newbu1yport, Massachusetts I I
I Novtmber 23; 1987) 1OOth Annivcisary I 1887-198 7 35 cents I S1 .50 weekl1
.J -*-
Comley gives-Reagan ,~,
message ~ttacking NRC1 ROYILElt~'lliiW= lo~N.............; *.c,.,i cher*~*stepben. i . de- ~--*
.. 'biatriitt:*~1 4"*
Uvli'ed'bllmw11ee . : *.*to 'atDee*tblfWtcitbe.Bowltf_....
PresldealReapm~Uy. . -
lnl .boinl'owQet'I tteO* ~\
At a brief encounter at a Repub- pal1n a1atnlt* tbe*:seabfook:
Ilea
""-'- - ID W-&l<ia.
-Beaan
....--.. ,_,,._. ....- u ~ plllll*...a.~ .... .. ~
~~ro~";t;* .111U&1U1,..idkii iaa;.t*t.. ;*p,,.i.., 1 b1m. * . *
"l amlcgly awalthtlreepome,
f:tiom to a ' - ' ftiwll Wbtte BameuratalR...--.i 11 I am sure many American cltJ. see Comley. * * -*
um do, 11 wrote COmley, tbe d1rec- "For u,e put yiV iDIS a ball;;
to-r o_f tbe *. ntl*nuclear yourltaftbakeptme=J::i orpntutioll We tbe People Inc., you firRbaDd my IDf :.
ln a leUetto'l'beDallyNen.. ~ ~. . * *'
His letter to tbe pr*ldeat aald ."Wbm )'Ou bn1 It, I ~
~ can ~l'O"le_ ~ by will ftnd lt 10 alannlnl .a:
.be J"f uclear Regulatory Commts- telling that you will ad qulctfy
'on and the failure of the agency anddecl.slvely." . ..
I,
f
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WAIHINOTON,D.C.~
D~errber 1, l 987 Mr. Stephen B. Comley Executht Director W. The P!ople 280 HI 1n Street, Rte. lA R.owl 91, MuSKhus.etts 01969 DMr
.Mr~ .*ca.le,:
n. ..1tt House MS me~ YfNf' letter to*Mrs. Augtn to the
-.C_l~ ""'l*t°"1 ec..tss1on.. By copy d tltts 1~. I u b* *ltt1ng ~ COlftS. . . . .CI to tlM lfllte1 1 1 ,_11c Doc'HIRt . . . for 1nc1US10ft 11 the *ltc cllcUt* f11* for the 511~3"* *Pf'OC8111int.
C-. L. J.,......,*......,_
Frtnk t.. Jngnm Ass1st111t*to the D11"1Ctor Publ tc Affairs, &PA
, * 'C'
/
cc:: Public Doc~t Roell w/1ncaning I met Mrs, Reagan on Oc;tober.i6, 1987 in New Hampshire and we talked for about 10 m.inute.s. ~ Gaye her an ear fui"l. She said she would defina.tely ge.t back to me. r saw hel' and P'tesident Reagan because* I do not want any 011 ie North's this time, meaning that both. have the. information first hand about the unsafe condi"tions ngarding United States nuclear power plants. Given my feelings toward the NRC, I feel it is irresponsible for the present administration to think the NRC are going to take care of this when I have been allegini that they are the very problem, '
.~.:- .
Concord, New H*mp1hire 180th l'e.tr, No. 289
~
111
.*~ I
~ L.-
WedneacLty, December 9, 1987 Anti-Nuclear . .
Protester
,., do.n't think we're setting to~ go.ad ah example to the Russian people that we're willing to stop freedom of speech in this country.'*
S t9phen Comley 1be ban mturi&ted Comley, wbo paid Sl,000 for a banner and plane tony over Lincoln Part in a resident1al secuon or Capitol Hill on Mon*
rounded During Summit cay a.tternoon. lar ratrlcUoas have been lmpoted in I.be pui "lt'a rtdk

ldoaa,," laid Comley, who owns a during other major Wub1ngt.on eveat.s., but bit nursblC bame ID Rowtey, Mau. "Now they're eould not cite an example.
puU.lnl a p t oa h'eedom of speech."
CerU.ln W uhlngton airspace I.I always pro-
l dan't tblnk we're setting too good an ex* hU>lted from ntibU. but tbe summit bu ap-
ample to tbe Rmalan people tbal we're willlng plla to unrestricted areu like LlncoUI Park.
to *P frMdom Of speecb la tb1a COUDtr)'. Commercial alrcralt wit.bout bannen are al*
Ia Cbl pelt. ~ SiU b1t'9d airplanes to lowed In tbe tl'.ciiUOnally unt"eatrtcted alrsp.ace CUTT bllaDlr'I ft'll' tbe New H*mpab.ire St.ate dur1nl tbe summJt, Stalford uJd.
. Home prea.tmL s..brook, Gov. Jobn Sununu and tlia NlldMr:AC"I' *tory ComnliSalon.
Comley ls founder or .. We The P~~ Inc.,"
an anU-nucltar IJ'OUP lb.at has focu.ed Its op-
~ dimlld ~*1 u.ertlon lhal I.he poliUOG OD lbe .subroo.t.
bM . . . . a"'*l poeeaueny emba.rraulnl aer* Coml11 said be had planned tony* banner u.1 di ......... wtlUe Sov1el te.ader M lkha U over I.be park. located between the CAplt.ol and
~**llltown. RFK Memorial SLAdlwn. The baJtMr read:
"We're dolDI It for seeurlty rea50ns," he "Mr. G<>rbacMY, Help Us Slop Chernobyl Here Comley paid t1,000 for 1 pl1n1 he uki, decllniq to elaborate Sta fiord ~1d glm1* - We The People." can't fly over Washington.
'E**M*. .
\
Jesday, December 8, 1987 /36 Pages 1OOth A~niversai-y /188 7-198 7 35 cents Seabrook foe barred.
fram banner flying htbltlng photo-taking excursions over Associated Press . Washington during the summit, he said. '
WASlllNGTON - The Rowley man .
who Is a vocal opponent of New Hamp-
Stafford said the. restriction would be shire's Seabrook nuclear plant Is fur- lifted when the summit ends.
loua over a federal ban on banner- The ban lnturtated Stephen Comley, toting airplanes flying over the nation's an anti-nuclear power activist who paid C!ll)ltal ~g the summit. $1,000 for a banner and plane to fly over 3
Stephen Comley, owner of Sea Vie LlncQln Park ln a residential section of unlng Home ln Rowley, aald the ban Capitol HW on Monday afternoon.
"a restriction offreedom of speech " * * ~
The restriction was imposed "for a "It's ridiculous," Comley said. "Now variety of reasons -- safety, security, they're putting a gag on freedom of
that sort of thing," Dick Stafford, a h " .
spokesman for tfie Federal Aviation * ** - ~
Administration, said yesterday. r;"l don't think we're setting too good ~
The order bars planes carrying ban- an example to the Russian people that ners from flying ln the so-called terml* we're willing lo slop lreedom of speech nal control area of NaU~>nal Airport, a In this country."
zone described by Stafford as f'.OUghly .
seven miles In radius from the northern Y.~r~~nia a_irport. The FAA also is pro- Comley, pageA14 Tl-IE ~esr**Asse:r- (JI( WEAPIN' r.JE HAV~ ,*,
Fiu*ibom OF ex.P1t.e.s.J1iN. T>IAr is rHC SY/tl#,ot.. 0 P II In E ~I (;4 ,
COMLEY: Infuriated by banner ~estriction CQntinued from page Al Certain Washington airspace is Comley said he plarmed to fly a Stafford denied Comlev*s asser- always prohibited from flights, but banner over the park, which is tion that th .... b:!!'! was* to avoid the summit ban applies to unres* located between the Capitol and po~entially embarrassing aerial demonstrations While Soviet lead-tricted areas like Lincoln Park.
Commercial aircraft without ban-ners are allowed in the traditional*
R.F.K Memorial Stadium. T .
er Mikhail Gorbachev was in town.
'.'We're doing it for security rea- ly unrestricted airspace during the ...,..,-~..;;...;eo=;.;e"-,;;.;;,;;=.;ea...;;;,sa~.
sons," he said, but declined lo summit, Stafford said. He has paid for other banners elaborate. Stafford said similar re- Comley is founder of "We The flown over Lincoln Park crttlclzlng strictions have been imposed in the People hie.," an anti-nuclear pow- the Nuclear Regulatory Commls-past during other major Washing* er group that has focused Its oppo- slon and warning about another ton events.
examplP.
UE squid gqt sHc ap sition on the Seabrook, N.H., Chernobyl accident ln the United atomic* reactor. States. *
.'":="':.
EMBARGO ED~11~
FOR RELEASE IE:DIATE F'RESS Rf.LEASE
EMBER 6, 1987
ss ~-coNTACT: . STEPHEN B. COMLEY OF WE THE F'EOF'LE, INC.
IN WASHINGTON 202-628-6611 IN MASSACHUSETTS 617-948-7959 JNER: MONDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1987 - OVER LINCOLN PARK, EAST OF THE CAPITAL BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL AND INDEPENDENCE AVENUE.
"MR. GORBACHEV - HELP US STOP CHERNOBYL HERE - WTP" 1E: *12-1 P.M. -- MR. COMLEY WILL BE AT THE ABOVE LOCATION AT THIS TIME.
nmy Carter,- when h* was President, acted very irresponsibly when he took the
mes ti on *f-rom Admiral Hyman Rickover to "cover-up what really happened at
~ee Mile Island because if would have destroyed the civilian nuclear power
~ustry". Had President Carter not covered up th* facts.of Three Mile land, part of Chernobyl may have been avoided.
th the upcoming summit*, Decemb*r 7th, we have the cpp6rtunity to all work gether to make responsible decisions regarding .the future of nuclear power ants in the Unit*d States. It is time to put our cards on the table.
eden has already made their move. Will America or Russia take the next ep? We need brave le&ders who can forget themselves and their own rsonal gains and who can make decisions that will benefit all of us here as 11 as future generations.
personally met with Igor Bulay, Press Counselor of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in 1ly and we discussed the possibility of my meeting with General Secretary khail S. Gorbachev in the near future. Since he is pianning to visit the iited States in the near future, I have again inquired as to the possibility meeting with Mr. Gorbachev at this time. CBS News, 60 Minutes and Time lgazine have all expressed a desire to attend the meeting. At this time I awaiting the reply of the Russian Embassy. During my meeting with Mr.
Ulay, he expressed that the Russians would not have to build any more ssiles; all they have to do is direct five shells at American nuclear power ants to accomplish the destruction of the United States. His point was rtainly symbolized when the Chernobyl disaster affected our cows as far ay as Vermont.
r org*nization, We The People, is dedicated to*educating the people of this unt~y about nuclear power and encouraging them to have a voice in decisions the issue. The fate of the nuclear power industry should be in the control the people. It is our right, and more importantly, our duty, to get this b done honestly. We could take a lesson from President Abraham Lincoln - he eed the slaves and w~-must free the people from nuclear dependency.
...,
PJAl.rt l<t r10t rttm*
\Ve The People, Inc .
of the United States
. . (1 1-f~~ . Stop Chtrnobyl Htrt A-ess contact:
rwllR..l/JI' /'H ~eyFOR !\,ELEASE DEC. 6.
St e(::ftn am~
1987 ( 617) s.e-7959
( 202) 6:11~611 M41f* .rMI,,,. ....., H'lllly MR. GORBACHEV: HELP US STOP CHERNOBYL HERE. WE .THE PEOPLE On December 'i a banner will be nown over Llnclon Park, east o( the Capitol between Independence and Constitution Avenues saying, "Mr. Gorbachev, Help Us Stop Chernobyl Here-We Tile People~ We The People is calling !or a national vote on the* issue o! r:~,clear power, and is part o! a suceess!ul ~!!ort to put the question oC nuclear power on the 1988 Ma.ssachutetts b&llot.
. ,.C~rnobyl affected the whole world," *wd Stephen COmley, director of We The People. "We had radiation in the milk in Vermont.. from that accident," he said.
James Asselstine1 while. he was still a Nuclear ReiuJatory Commisaioner, told We The People, "We will have a nuclear. .
dii*~t.;.. ln the u.S. wane than. . ChernObyL . It can happen any day. beeause* o! the way our plants .haft been ecnatructed-'And the
. way they are i-un." ..
.
After the 'Ilrff Mlle Ja1and. .eeident,* *rr11ideat c.n., under pn.ure trom Admiral Hyman Rickover, deleted critical ilirormatian trom tt. ~ report on the accident. "That information may have been help!ul in avertinr the ChemObyl accident." Comley said. "&l we will never know.*
We "Mle People believes. nucle1r dilar.mament la onlJ* the tint step irl frffine ....
the people of the world !rom nuclear -dancers. Chemobyl ii not the worst accident that can happen. Witf.) 100 nuclear plants in thiJ country, and hUndreds. more thrc>Uihout the world, people can .never be tree o! nuclear feat while those plants ar:e- operating. "We ~ People is fiyinr the bmmet" Oft!" Lincoln P*k because tt~se two world leadi!rs must learn from what Lincoln did when he made some .
hard decisions to !r~ the slaves. 'They must make similar hard decisions to free the people a~ !u.ture ge~rations from nuclear sla\'ft'y," Comley said.
The t:.S. would be devastated if even five U.S. nuclear power plants were bombed with conventional weapons. "Nuclear disarmament is a first step, but we won't have true security Crom such devastation until all nuclear pl.ants are shut down," Comley said. We The People i.5 committed to ,wducaUnr the people of the U.S. &bout the dangers of nuclear power. It is the rirfit and the duty of the people o! this country to have a say in this issue. IJ Albert 'Einstein said In 1946, "To the vilJ.aie 5qU&re We mu.st carry the facts Of atomic enernr ... from there must eome Am~ica's voiee."
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WE _THE PEOPLE, INC.
290 MAIN ST~l&T, ~T& ** 1A "0Wl.IY. MASSACHUl&TTS 01 H9 STW~ ** CO..UIY MA: *17*941*79S9
.... ~~-CTO't Ct1/lr~efc.*1J 9M' & t1&/ o.c.: aoa**ae*i100 AfJ't'f /YY/~7 Septeaber 10, 1987 Iaor B. !ula7 Pre** Counaelor Unio~ of Soviet So~ial1*t Republics Office of th* Eaba**1
1125 16th Street, l.V.
Vaalliaatoa, D.C. 20036
Dear. Mr. 1*1*1:
t*aa vri~i*a*t~ 70~ 1* .follov~., .. ot*a ~*17. 14 letter aad ***tins vit~*~t*,~** S. Coaley, lsecu~i** Dirictor, V~ the Pe~ple,"Inc~, *
~f th* Ua,ted Stat*** *"r* Coale7_baa*-de11**r*4 to rou a letter ad*reaaed to Ceaeral Secretary Mitllail S. C*orbachev reaardin-g t.he i**** of **~lear pove~.
si-ce t!a~t *t~ . . . Ml'..*CoaleJ Ila~~**.** replJ to either. the letter or t~*-~**ti*I* V1t~ Geaeral. Secretary Cor~acheY planains to visit the U~ited Stat** -1*. tile near *f*t*re, tbia*.vo*ld certainl7 be an o_pportu11e ti** to. further pureue tile **etiDI that you discusaed vith Mr. Co*l*7 on July 14. * .. *
A* I belie*e you are avare, CBS lev** 60 Minute*, ha* received a copr of Mr. Co*l*y'* letter to Ceaeral Secretary Gorbachev and has expr****d an interest in attendina any ***~1~1 that occurs. It is my underatanding that a repreaentati** fro* 60 Minutes h~s contac:e~
your !ab***1 an~-eoa*unicat~d thia interest to you.* Tia~: Magazine haa alao been aade avare of the letter-and h** expressed an inter-est in any follow-up contact.
If you *till ba** an intereat in p11rauin1."r. Coaley'a letter, I would aak that you coatact ** ao ve *a1 vork out the details. I aa7 ~. reached at 6i7-291-13S4.
I thank you for your attentioa to thia aatter and look forvard to your reapoaae.
cc: S. Co11ley 7
.fr//~~
lpswic *~* roniclc Thunlday, ~ 29, 1M7 Letters Comley .calls for facts to.be* exposed
,.. ca. ~= The attitude baa rorced the ded- tMr tm natioall electioa: ~
Wbea all the !acts get out about Goll oC nuclear power back into lbe
tbe l1~ St-. o1 America lba11
'nilw Mlle lllaDd. the Ruaiu ~ bandl o1 '"* the people. wbic:h m* :w' *pwmittt1e,._itiaao1 p6e . . , pnft to be upeet to learD my Clt'iDiaa is wbet'e it beiobp u it ,.... bf JMelll ol ...... power' that polUbly some part ol Cbei- threatens *every single UUni we plliM:a, both e*W1nc and in tM ~
DObyf mi.gbt have been avoided iC ha~ worked for and love. tare. * ...
they b.ad bad all the facts fro~ The fate of the nuclear i.ndust1')' . U we do DOt ~ tbe rilbU 1bree Kile laland. * ~be iD tbe CODtrol oltbe PeoPM tblit oar~.... Pl oridld UI with.
II r. 'Rea 1 an. on t be ;oo tb
oaly became it ii our rigbt. it.Dd tbe9 * ...,.. tailed America.
-am,liTel'UJ'1 of our Coaatitutioa, lnlft impOrtaatly, it ii our duty .*to P S9 ._ Cr*hy co+"!'Rli .. to recommeDi that the tee tbat .tbia cv.w-up ii expored. l!aciilliri Diii ehr decilioe ol DUdur po1l"ef' be in tbe wbieb threatens t.be survival or We TM P9efie. ble.
handl of the federal goveniment in- young .people and future g~- llewky
.stead oltbepeople. It is clear to* lot tions. Tbe people are the only ooes oC pie.ope that he baa been m~in- that will get this jqb done hooestly .1 Conned apin regarding the* NRC am a great believer that if the aDdtbenudearindustryingener"1. American people a~ given the
. 1be recct Mirkey amendment facts, tbey will act.
th.at was defeated shows that two-* Ourorganir.ation, WeTheP~le, thirds al Coagress is either misin*. Ioc., of the United States or Arner*
formed t.oP. or they ue just errand ica, is continuing to gather mOC"e boys rer tbe nuct ear industry. facts and guarantee that you .will The Democrats u Wdl as the Re- receive all the evidence that we un-publicam b.ave failed t.o give adequ- C9Vet'. We have currently set up ate oversight which incll.!Qe numer* o fCi ces in Massachusetts and ou.s allegations of fraud within the Washington and have been encour-indus:try as well as the corruption aged to set up other satellites in and mismanagement on the part of,.. California, New York. etc.
the NRC. The so-called favors that Our ancestors founded America had been owed to the industry by so we would have a say in our gov-the NRC as weU as some politicians emment when we know something has resulted in the suppression of tS wrong. OUr group, on the 200t.h evidence wbidl bu p~vented full a.nn.iverury of our Constitution, i.s investigation of the nuclear in* iwerting its right under the First dustry. Amendment o!that great document This has created an att1tu~ that to petition our government for red-wti.t ~people do not Know will not ress oC our grievances by request.
hurt lhem. We happen to believe ingiatheCormolanationalreferen-that what the people do not know dum th.at the (()llowing questJon be will k!ll them. placed on the ballot for the Novem*
INC~ I/~ © WE THE PEOPLE, aeo MAIN IT"l!T. lllTI. I A lllOWL.IY. MASSAC:HUSl"S 0 I H9 tT'l,.._CN 8 COMLCY MA: t 11*e..t*7'9ae 111cwr"'1 oi*cc:ro* D.C .. 202**21*1100 July 14, 1987 Mikhail s. Gorbachev General Secretary Union of Soviet Socialist Republics c/o Soviet Embassy Waahing ton, D.. C.
Dear Mr. Gorbachev:
I am V?"iting to you about a matter of utmost concern to both the American*
and Soviet people, ~mely, the safety of ou~ nuclear paver planes. Here in thia country we have, ao far, avo*ided the type of tragic accident that occurred at Chernobyl.* However, ve h&ve.experienc:ed many problem. with our nuclear
power plants and aany 'believe that ve run the riak of a aimilar accident in -
the fore*ee.able future.
I nm a nuraing.home that 1a louted 12 ail** fTOa the S..brook lfuclur Power Stacio1i-* pl.&Ac* tbat ..1 r*c*i** mi ~ratin.c lie-... ill th*. next ...,er.al

montha.. I aa conc:amed that, ~*th* eTent of a accident at the pluac. the..
hoee'
resideiat* and -ny people like thea would 1'* uuble to eac:ape th* effect*
of auch a cataatrophe. I>ue to ay ccmceni 1 I hrH .,.nt tbe paae 1earopposiftg the licanaiq of uty nev plant* until we b&Te Hell able to ...... all of tbe
effect* of the Chernobyl accident. I
mc-lo*Szla a packet of -t*riala vhich de.a-ibe* the act10ll9 ,,. haft* taka iil the State of MauacbuMtta to 1Daure the public baalth nd Nfety. My*ovn efforta.MYe iDClacled fOrsiftl d oqanizat1n, We the 'People; Iuc. , to bring tbi* :l.asue di-rec tly to the American people~ vho deMrve to 1cnov all of the fact* about nuclear power.
M -
Executive Director of We Th* P~ple, Inc .* , I have .orpnized a petition drive in the Town of Jlovley. More than 80 peTcent of the tovn'* reaidenta have joined me in ask*ing Preaident Reagan to declare a 110ratoriua on the licenaing of nuclear power plante until ve h&ve had a full Ol'J>Ortunity to ****~* the ef.f ec:ts of the Chernobyl accident. nie petition also request* that Pre*ident~R.ea~an appoint a special panel to tnve1tigate the *Nuclear R.e1ulatory Comai**ion, the govenmcntal body vhich reg\ilat** and licen*** nuclear plant* in America, to ensure that it is adequately protecting the interest* of the American public in gaf e and efficient energy. Rowley is the only town in >.aerie* to ~o on record as opposing the c:ontinu.d operation of nuclear pover plant* until w. knov all of the facts on nuclear energy.
I vould appreciate your thouaht* and opinion* on this issue and the .recent accident at Chernobyl. ~ve you had an1 1econd thought* about nuclear power as a result of the accident? In my lifotU.,, I have never heard of *a Soviet ruler more ag'kreuive tMn you in tryinR to li11it ar*m1 dev1lo'?1Nnt. I believe th.If all of u1 are encoura1ed by'the effort* of your11lf and Pr11ident RtaRan to end this threat to vorld peace, W0tsld I be iaiatak1n in uyinii that Chernobyl h** inf luenccd
l
. "=""*"" .?'4 .
your *11re*1iv1n*** in tryin1 to ain1.a1&* the develo,,.ent of nuclear arns1 beca'uu the SoYiet peoplt now tuve Urst*hand experience of th* ef Cecta o!
a nucle*~ dia.1ter?
There is no (!ue1tion that eliminat.ion of the threat of nucl**r war 19 1ot!lethin*:
th~c 11 d**ply de11red ~y the people of both*countri*** Hovever, if ve i~norc the threat of nuclur power, ve run the rt.le. tMt ve vill inadvertently brini ab¢"t the very destruction vhich w *eek to avoid *. AtNrica aad Cha Soviet Union
-oe*d to develop ut* aad e!Ucient !eras of enerr.. lut we aaat not let our ceed for *n*rSY jeopardize ovr own be.alth and .. tety. *I r .. lize there.are
..ny Ntter*a vhic:h d-.&nd your attmltipn. I uk that ~u 11** thi* oce your c:on91.deration. M the_ oncloMd aauriala a8;'11 det101tatrate. i vill not cease rq O..**!foru
t i l I feel that all people are r~unted a a u!a *~~iron=en:.
~ . ..
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\\'e The People, Inc.
or the United Sta~cs FOR IMMEOaTE RELE~ffE MARCH 17, 1988 PRESS CONTACT: STEPHEN B. COMLEY, E~ECUTIVE DIRECTOR 617-948-7959 THE NUCLE~R REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC), IN COLLUSION WITH THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, HAS DELIBERATELY ENDANGERED THE PUBLIC'~
HEALTH AND SAFETY. THE AGENCY HAS CONSISTENTLY IGNORED OR
~Pl?RESSEO EVIDENCE FROM WE THE PEOPLE ANO OTHER SOURCES WHICH PROVES UNSAFE CONDITIONS EXIST AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS FROM NEW YORK AND NEW ENGLAND TO THE WEST COAST. ~i /)J.llffT$ i WVCJ.VeD
. TD 1>ATE:
RUDOLPH W. GIULIANI, THE U. S. ATTORNEY _fOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, IS UNDERT~XING AN INVESTIGATION OF THIS SITUATION, BEGlNNING WITH THE SHOREHAM, LONG ISLAND, NUCLEAR PLANT. GIULIANI IS BEST KNOWN FOR HIS INVESTIGATION AND SUCCESSFUL PROSECUTION or IVAN BOBSKY.
WI THI PIOPLI HAS CONVIYEO SOBSTANTllL IMPORMATION TO GIOLtlNI REGARDING FALSIFICATION or NUCLEAR PLANTS SAPITY DOCOMINT'SJ COLLUSION BITWllN THB NRC AND NUCLIAR VINPORS SUPPLYING SOBSTlNDARD MATIRIALS TO llOCLIU,*PLUTI, . . IM8PIC:TOR8 WHO HAVI*
IGNORIO RAMPANT OROG OSI ANO SALIS *At MOCLIAR PL.Ul!I. tt !HS PIOPLI IS MllTING WITH GIOLIANI NIX'f Wiiie TO GIVI HIM MORI INFORMATION ON NRC AND NOCLIAR INDUSTRY CRIMINAL-MISCONDUCT.
STIPHIN B. COMLiY, DIRICTOR or WI.THI PIOPLI SllD TODAY,* *11 &Ri PLKASIO THIRI IS FINALLY SOMI ACTIOH*BIING TAKIN TO RIYIAL !HI NRC'S COVERUPS. WI ARI HOPEPOL THIS WILL LIAO TO AN IMDIPlllDINT INVESTIGATION or THi NRC. TH! NOCLIAR umo~'tRY, THI NRC AND YES, SOM! POLITICIANS STILL REMAIN DIAP AND BLIND TO THI NllDS or THI AMERICAN PEOPLE. WE THI PIOPLI BILiiVI GIULIANI HAS THI ABILITY, THE SBNSI A~D THI RELINTLISS DITIRMlNATIO~ IT WILL TAKI TO PROVE THE NRC AND THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY HAVE OELIB!RATILY JEOPARDIZ£D THE SAFETY OF THE.AMERICAN PEOPLE* * .
WE THE PEOPLE, INC. OF THE UNITED STATES WILL KEEP THE AHIRICAN PEOPLi AB.RE.AST OF THK FACTS DURING THI INVESTIGATION THROUGH OUR OFFICES IN ROWLEY, HASS. ~HAIN OFFICE), WASHINGTON, O. C~
(NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING), CONCORD~ N. H~, AND PLYMOUTH, HASS.
WE ARE CURRENTLY NEGOTIATING FOR OFFICES IN MANHATTAN AND SAN DIEGO, CALIF.
RM 277 Rowltv, MA 019M l"J11on1I Prr11 81,1~
I J A. i:. su., r..; w ~r Q~
Otlich 5 &. b 3 1'1uun1 S1.
tllP°> 941.7q~9 \ti ulwn111111, [) ( )l()J.H Co11~orJ. I'll 0))01 1~1*1Q~~.nl\ It*>>"~-** _ _ _ _ _ _ _f:.:;;til;.;_l,;,,:,1~.:.;;~A~*~~*.;..~- - - . - -
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Metropolitan New-s NEW YO~K. NEW JERSEY. CONNECTICUT /FRIDAY, MARCH 18, 1988 Lllco /nquj,.Y Lilco Sald to Be Impact on Negotiations "We [ind it curious that if there was ByGiulfani Target ofInquiry an investigation," said Mr. Lois, Lilco's-spokesman, "that Mr. Prospect. a Suf* ~
folk County legislator, now makes the
investigation public and not the Fed:**
Is Rep<;>rted In Criminal Case era I prosecutor or the Suffolk County's ...
District Attorney's office." .
It was also uncle~r how the county's
aMouncement would affect the negotl-"
alions between the state and Ulco or
2 Suffolk Officials sGy.\. ,
Continued From Poge*a1 : the dellberatJons by lhe Long lslandA-
~.,Wayne
. :* ,Power AutMrlty, the state agency con-Utility Lied to Agenci~ pi;psocc;t.. d_Gregory J; ,Blass 1 , sidertns
! 0 a talteo\'er of the ut.ility.
We.:.1re qµl~ ~*by Wajne's'~-
._ told a news conference today tha.t .
1 announcement." said Vincent Tete, thr*
four mon.lhs ago they decided that the*. ' presldeilt of the state's u~ Develop-::.
By PHILIPS. GVTIS ~vlde~ce accumulated by the COW'ltY'I .I ment COrporaUon and GoYemor * ..
SpKlal lo '!be l'I*"* Yortr. n- investigators "was of such magnitude *, Cuomo's chief representattve . to the HAU P PA UG E, L.l., March 17 -Two Sul* as to warrant the attention of a Govern- talks With Lilco. . :-..~ _ I ment prosecutor." "~ Ire. UJtnl to ucert.a!D tf mare *j folk County otrlciats said t.Qday that" UnJted States Attorney Rudolph W. Giuliani haS for lhe Last four months_ been lnvatlgatlnl Mr. Prospect and Mr. Blass said-they had arranged a meeting with Mr. Giu-Is an acttYt tnvestJpUCln under Mr. Te. said. "But If \here ii an
=r;: l liani, who, they said, was extremely invesUgatlcir\, the power autharUy criminal allegations that \he Lona lslaQd interested in what we had \0 Slly." '
U&ht1111 Company has repeatedly lied to* would have to take a Jona, bard look at Since lhen, Mr. Prospect said, the . it and IO do we."
regulatory commissions and filed fabe documents with the panels.
proseeutor's office has "enthuslastl*
cally and Vigorously pursued an In- *. * ' ~ Seelda& tt.Reco¥tr Rewmae .
1be officials also said lhe lnvesUpUan "1 vest\galion, reviewing the county's Mr. Prospect said he bad dedded to :
Mr. Giuliani, lhe United States auomey. tn documentary evidence and interview- announce Mr. GlullanJ'1 bM>tYeraent **
Manhcttan, also deals with actlam bJ Che ing several of its witnesseS. ; because he felt it was time the pU_buc* **:
Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. knew the company was under tnvestl-.
Withstanding an Earthquake gation. *
Suffolk County has filed a ctvll suit against Lilco, charging It with fraud In seek* ---! Suffolk CQunty, In a suit filed last Andrew J. Maloney, the United ing rate increases to pay for its Shoreham year. said ii h::id assembled documents States Attorney in Brooklyn, responded.
nuclear plant. Several of the coW!ty*s wit* that show Lilco's officers often misrep. angrily to Mr. Prolped's- anoourx:e-'
nesses, speaking on the condition they not be resented how quickly and at what COSL ment "We ate aware II Mr. Pt cwpect's ..
they could complete Shoreham as they identified, said today that they had beet sought special rate increases from the questioned by members of Mr. Giuliani'* state's Public Service Commission.
staff. ... The county also charges that Lilco Altll0ugh it remained unclear what Mn had falsified a report on Shoreham's.
Giuliani w *
ability to withstand an earthquake. Lil Its suit, the county charges that Lllco and the Stone & Webster Engineering.:
Corporation, Lilro's coMtruction man-.
ager for Shorl'ham. had altered a study and filed 1he r~porl wi1h Lhe nuclear*
commission.
Both char~r5 havr. ~n emphati*
callv and rrpt>alrdly drn1rd hy Lllco.
W11h no ronflrma11on from Mr. Glu* .
linni's offlrr, lt)(fay'~ comments from Mr. Pruspt-l"t und Mr. BIAss were me~
w11h 11m*n1.1111tv <ind i.k1*p\lrl5m. Ltlco, ror rx:implr. ~.11.r 11 w.1~ "ronfuSCi.I u
111 v.hy lhry would hr 1h1* ones to make I */
,,u1i.1nii~l~~"lt~; ~t -fH~ PEDPLE (!,
i*11rJ Uill.Ll l~J:.J\'VL
. __ Ne_w~uryport, Massachusetts lay, M1y 1C. IHI /21 P1gu ~t:! ~ / 3 NRC
. orders
. .... *' . .* .P!Jl~'!.9, check.**
CONCORD, NJL (AP) - A man
~
With ties lo two New tihm Fm:'
DrB ':" one o1
- Questions
~C'nnmt*
sion omdal stood by all the anep.
tions, howe\W'.
over whether the .
flanges, ftttinas and other matert:
als meet federal standards prompt*
tor .
ed the NRC to order 38 nuclniji
~roje<jt5 the mat{
tney receivand replace them u--*-
necessary. * .
~mc~de the stalled
~ t !:{ew Haam;
~hire and the Pilgrim p!apt iij Ei~ouiK Mw
lJP"DAT£ ON OUR..
a bulletin issued the week, the conunission cited potential
~foty proble~me of Q§Js may be thw:
iri syste
STot.y OF' ff1At.C I./ I BTJ.I *
~=ired lo shut reactors down safe- .
j in an acodent. the @c oMciit,
1!1,;n! H.1kl"r ..;,,1ic1. s~ e A rrAe..,11 c D.
nc 1 nc t*cop1c .
of the l:nitcd States ht!~tt/

~~~...;;:..~----~~~---...

S1:ip O:trnobyl litre I J1.1ly 18, 1999.
~
~* .. Hr. Victor Stello, Jr. .
E~ecutive Director !or Operations United.States Nuclear Re;ulatory Com~ission Wa&hin9ton, D. c. 20555 De a r Hr
S t'e l lo :
I'm -writing to you with re9ard to NRC Bullet hi No *. 89-0S, dated
Hay 6 ,* 19 B8, concerninq the "nonconf o rm inc; materials* supplied by cer~ain. pip1nc; supply ~ompanies.
Althou~h tha NRC has identi!led a potential problem in at. ~east. 38 plants, ~t. appea~s that this &ait.er is still under lnvasti9at.ion
.=,~
..... by t.h* A9eney. Obviously, it vould' ba preaature tor ** to eoaa*nt
~.
on t.ha Agency** invast.1c;at.1on
unt.11 such ti** a* it-ha* aad* *o**
or all ot it.* t*indinc;s public. Given t.h* NRC'* canclu*ion that. ..
pot.ent.!al ;aneric satat.1 iaplic:at.iona* axi*t. at. tJ\a.. p1ant*
identitiad', and possibly others,. it I.*. *b.oped that; th* i1enc7 *111~
viqorously pursue th1* a&ttar vit.h all reaourc** *t 1t.* d1*toaa1.:
I do ~*11eve, however, t.liat th* revelat~an* la 111tC lullet1a Mo. .
. .... 11*05 ral** a **riou t'Ml*t1on tbat. ue* aet.. await. U* oat.eee. ot* * -* .
. . th* a9enc1.. 1n***t.19at.10ll t.o **r~aat. a "....... Tb.at..* 4Uat4*.
re9arda vhen knovledte ot th*** potential* **f*tr *ro~l***
tirat brou;ht. to t.h* at.tent.ion at th* ante -..id vbat'ac:tioaa wa* *
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t.aken ** a result. and, finally, vhen t.ha... act.1_on* **r*. taken.
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I aa* aur* it. v11,*1 cos& ** no: *aurpri** t.o 7ou that. t.h* '"'~lie ha* .
l*** than 100 percent. contid*ncti S.n t.he HKC. I believe. t.hat 70U are nov~provided vith a uniqua oppot'tunit.y t.o rein*t.111 public confidence in the vake--of t.h*s* reva lat.ions. Fi rat., t.hat.
confidence aay be restored by conduct.in; a tharou9h investi;at.ion of t.h* situation and. proapt.ly takin; any and all nec1aaar1 c:orrective act.ions. Second, I believe yo\i ahauld dl1clo** to. t.h*
publi~ wh*n ~h**e concern* first. caa1 to* 7our at.t*nt.ion and vba~.
actions ~ou took v1th r*v*rd to the 1nfo~**tion.
I look torvard to your re1pori***
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l<.>J..J 1 J* '"OO l::llJQ Mr. Stephen B: Comley, Executive Director
~~ the People of the United States Box 277
. Rowley, Massachusetts 01969 *
Dear Mr. Comley:
Yocm letter of Ju.ly* 1s., 1988, r~quested information concerning NR~ BuJ.letin
No.*as-cs, "Nonconforll!ing Materia*ls' Su;>plieo by Pipjng.Supplies, *inc: (PSI) at
.. Folsom, New Jersey, i:lnd Wes*t Jersey.Manufacturing. Company (\./JI':) .at Williamstown, ll~w Jersey.
11 You asked when.knowledge of these potential safety problems was first *brought to tne attention of the* NR~~hat actions were taken-as a.result, and when those actions were taken. . . ,_,,,
of~anuary 0
'fh*e issue was. fi rst brough.t_to**the NRC's attention during the week lZ,,
~ f.
. f98~ by a telephone can from a mat'l!rial supplier.* Later* that week, personnel*

rom NRC's V!!ndor lnspec:tion*Branch eonduc.ted an inspection at Piping Supplies,-.
.i .
~ :~ ..
Inc. On February 24, 1988, NRC.subpoehaed documents from PSI* a.nd WJM and began .
an intensive record review. On May 6, .1988, HRC issued Bulletin Ho. SS-OS and on June 15, 1988, HRC issued Supplement 1. to ..the *bulletin. *Bulletin _SS:-05 required*
.!i.
~* . . 11 censees to review the1 r records fol" procurements frOll *PSI and WJM arid to *
. conduct tests of. any *procund Nter111s *.. tcRC allowed. continued o~ration of
nuclear power plants. during the record review and tisting period because CQllPOMnts
...
designed to the ASMt*-code &nd AHSI.B3I*.l standlr.d~have. inherent aargins of 3* to*
,. I e *4 ti*S design loads.
Also, piping syst*s 1n wM.ch- noncon.fona1ng utertals
* .may ;have bttn 1nstilled*.are require~ .to b.. hydrostat1callrwied* at 1.25 to

1.50. t1ms design pressures. whtch* prowifles. addtttOMl .11sunftCI' of tlM * ... *
structural-*1ntegr.1ty of these: systlllS .... * .Pr..11at.n.17 safety analyses of. au11ab1e data indicates no 1111Ded11te safety concerns. *
~ .~
. ::**) So far, 11censees.have conducted in situ hardness tests on over 1300 pieces of the" suspect material and destructive tests of 1b0ut 60 samples.* Eng1nHr1-ng 11n1lyses have been perfoT"ltd to demonstrate that snaterial that does not *~t*
c:erhin ~ardness values is still acceptable .fol"' its application in nuclear.
power. plants. All these activities by the industry are being coordinated by
~he Nuclear Management and R~sources Counci L(NUMARC). !n a letter dated ..
July 25, 1988, NUMARC stated that t*he .results of these activities demonstrate that there is~no public health and s,fety concern. On August 3, 1988, HRC
. issued Supplen1ent 2 to Bulletin 8S*05i temporarily suspending the requir.en...ts of Bulletin 88*05 and Supplement l for operating plants while the available data *1s being assessed. After completing the review, HRC will decide whether the requirements should be reinstated or *htther other actions ire wa~anted*.
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Sinc:ere1y, l'r ParY,.CH1$,Ly
ThONS E. Murley, .....
Offtce of Nuclur Reattor R19u\UtOA ... w; ~, ....
We l he People of the United States Stop Chernobyl Jfcre August lS, l988 President Ronald Reagan The White House *
~ 1600 Pennsylvania Ave *
.\..Jashington, D. C.
Dear Mr. President:
I am writing to you as a lifetime member of the Presidential Task force and Inner Circle. I have written to you in the past on the matter of nuclear power in this country, and.hav~ sen~-yo~ information on safety problems in the industry. I have also sent you information o~
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's inability to regulate nuclear power plants adequately. A recent Gen~ral Accounting Office report (enclosed) substantiates the belief of the.people of the Town of Rowley, Massachusetts, th.at the NRC does. not alw-ays properly investigate problems with nuclear plants and poo~ practices w.ithin the agency itseit. Two years ago, 90% of Ro~ley signed a pe~itio~
(enclosed) asking you to undertake an investigation ot the NRC's practices. The people of*Rovley are still w~iting tor an jcknowledg~~nt ot their request. *
+ I am the owner and administrator ot Sea View Nursing Home in
~owley, Massachusetts which lies just out*ide the Emergency Preparedness Zone for the Seabrook, New Hampshire, Nuclear Power Plant.
I fully agree with the State of Massachusetts' conclusion that. the population could not be evacuat*ed in* the event ot a serio.u* nuclear accident at the plant. I a* also th* Executive Director ot We-Th*
People Inc. ct th~ United States whic~ i* a non-profit orqaniz~t.(on established to educate t.he A*mer ican public about.,. ~uclear power.
Several years a90, regarding th*e Shoreham,., New York, nuclear plant, you said you would not intertere with the state's powers to dec{de it evacciatlon is posslbl~ in ca~e ot a nuclear accident.
(enclosed) Nov you are ~onsidering signing an executive order which would take that power away from th~ state ot Massachusetts for the communities near the Seabrook, New Hampshire, nuclea~ plant. I strongly urge you to avoid signing su~h an brder.
Apart from the fact that evacuation of those communitie~ is impossible, there are serious saf~ty matter~ at Seabrook Station still under investigation by the NRC and others. One is the stronq possibility that substandard piping fi~tures were built into the plant (see enclosed documentation-NRC bulletin No. BB-OS, May 6, 1988), such piping in the safety system com~romises the health and safety of the public. These pipin9 fixtures are currently failing testing and could result in a serious accident at any of the 38 plants involved.
Another problem under investi9ation at Seabrook Station is the inspection of important safety systems by an unqualified inspector.
(enclosed) Despite kno~ledge of the plant builders that this inspector did not have the proper credentials to perform the work, he was allowed to act in an inspectors' capacity for a year.
Oox ~77. Rowley, MA 019b9, (508)948-79S9 50 Court St .. Plymouth, MA O~lbl, (617) Hl>-9300 S.i111~nal PreH Rklg. 1-' & F. Su.NW., Wl~h1n11ton, DC.
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.":::"': 4 Another problem, *also common to military equipment, is substandard bolts which become malleable or shear off under stress. Although t~e NRC claims that the utilities' inspection proves that these "counterfeit" bolts are not built into Seabrook Station, the inspection was very cursory and incomplete.
. For reasons of safety, and also to uphold the idea that the fe'cieral government should not interfere in powers reserved to the states, I urge you to forego the executive order which would undermine Mass a ch us et ts' dete rm i na t i'on that evacuation a rou..nd the Se ab rook nuclear plant is impossible. . .
Last October 26, at the gala event for you hosted by the Inner Circle, I gave y~u a letter (copy of letter enclosed) with information and asked you to meet with me. I was trying to convey to you information we had about substandard materials, information which was 11*
not widely known at the time. I would still like to meet with you-because there is additional information available other th~n what has now been provided, and more will be forthcoming. Like the problem of the substandard equipment~ the NRC- also has the information we have about nuclear plant problems, but is doing nothing about it, ex..,._____.
perhaps to cover* it up. Lastly, the NR.f_ people that we have been ...
working with for the.past two years are willing to m11et wit.h YO';?.
privately to inform you of the corruption which has delibe~atelt jeopardi*zed t.he safety of the American people. These violations, L have been told, are just the soft und~rbell of the nuclear industr an t e N *
I am sure you can understand t~e concern of these individuals over the consequence~ of cominq forward and, I am ~~re you can understand that t.hase *individuals will*only coma forward it*there are some ~
reasonable *assurances that a full and fair investigation will ensue.
I strongly believe that. a full and fair investigation will uncover one of the biqqest violations of the ublic t s expe r enced. It is cl ear that, at this point i'n tiru, a l arqe seqment.,
if not a vast majority, of the American people have lost confidence in the ability 6f the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.to protect. their interest in health and safety over the financial interests of the large utility companies. An impartial investigation of the NRC will be a step toward restoring the confidence of the public in its government.
I know you have to be concerned about these matt_ers, and I want to thank you for your consideration of them. Please let me know when it would be convenient for us to meet.
Enc: G~O report, Rowley Petition, Shoreham comment, NRC Bulletin 88-05,
Seabrook Allegations, Letter of Oct. 26, 1967
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. -* . Newburyport, Mas.saf"~~~7 lay, August 19, 1988 /40 Pages
~ush, Quayle 'mean to ASSOCIATED PRESS PHOTO George Bush. surrounded by family and running mate, spreads his arms out after accepting his party's nomination.
Anti-Seabrook banner grounded shirt r,lles oi: ai,r:;;p::icf' aroW1d tl;e dorrie. byl Here." He also put signs beside the BY PA '11 F.i .A (;LASS /\t first c,_l!:tle\' '..\'HS told the baiu1er state flags in the Superdome of New
quid *Jnl:*. il\ thl* mill's L'rum thl' Suµer- Hampshire a'1d Indiana. home of vice l1 mH.:. ~tt** L1f thi* ,.,.)nvention. Th11t was presidential nominee Daniel Quayle.

**--*-*--*----------*- ctn;K\.:l*ptnlm*. ( u;ni1.*~ said. bL'CHUS<: "it Comley said "nuclear powcr is thP r\TW OH.i.:.A\~ . *::-.:; !H1:.:J1*;1r .i*. ::. \\11uld t1;1;*r* ;,t:: u~ 11; tlk sv;;.vnp \\itli r10s'. il'1DOiiant issue in the country and isl Stepl1<*n C11::1ir>y hi*;: his bic\ :.1 iir:r.~' !h~ snakr* . . :1 i'1ct a! l.:~.!~j lu;:-..

111;'" iPnders should start telling the.truth his nnti-Seal: ..1..:;\; l1~1t1\l; t11 t.l11* H,*;1u;,J. atrnit nuclear power."
c.an Nauon;p :*1:,*1*L1.1=m 'v\"*dn('"<l;\:- "1'hl'll l \*,;i- (,1:'.! .*.*.::.;;Id d11 i' \Vit.'1i:i r:omley, who has flown banners over when he W<1<, 1 ~t'ii'l'il !>f'l'llllSSllJI\ f(I '.I\' ;1 a mil!-.;:1:111~ >TlP*h:d:'. .. tt;* s'.uc: **nu: by t IF* th~* ~tatP capitols in Boston and Concord, banner on;t tlw ~i1jJ!*r <11 *t:1f* r.rn1t* w1* sira1~h;u11'd th.is out tl wa~. tuu :--.; H.. said he was upset he couldn't do it Comley. OP*'l'; 1*T*1J ;, !H11*;111g t111n11* 1!1 1
i3tl:. \n >.Jew Orleans.
Howley, said 111" n***.,*111 ~.1.,,*nts to hi' :* In~tu<:t1!. < '.11ml~'\' p<1SSl'<I (.1tlt bw11pcr
i didn't think there was a law agamst mlscornmunic:*1tiPll llf'!w1.*Pn tlw pilot 11!' stickers . ..;i_i.;.1" and rww': rf'lea.c:.cs wi'.h f'r,-.*dn:n of ~.peech in thlq r.nuntry. ** he the pla1w ;11:" ... , .:11: :***q1li- .d\I* ,,., tJ)t* nH*:-.:-. *.H'.i* "I I**\ ( rl'\;n.*1* s11m <"h .. rT.:. *...:*. . *
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THURSDAY, AUGUST 18, 1988 * *35 Cents llt newutand1 beyond 30 ml
II !'M REPUBLICAN CONVEN*TION*.
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The talk of New Orleans Not a banner night
$teplum Comley, a Rowley, Mass.,
nursing home operator* who claims to have spent more than $200.000 tn his .
battle against nuclear power. w~eea fully sought penntsslon to liave a~
tawed over the Supet&>aie TUelday. nflbt with the message: 'Hey, George. stop }
~byl here." "I didn't know~ * *
was a law against freedom of speech ln
this country," Comley said. Although Comley was denied aJr space. he busily distributed bumper stickers. signs and news releases. He also said he hoisted a "Stop Chernobyl" sign dw1ng Tuesday's T:\TERESTI~G -- convention address by New Hampshire GoY. John Sununu.
'fT IS LOOKS LIKE DISCRININATIC':\
TO YE. l*.llY \\AS~' T MR. JACK Don't pass him by LACK ARRESTED FOR SHOUTING
As the delegates to the Republican Na-
\ BOl:T TICKETS \*~EN I WAS tional Convention streamed out of the Su-
\!\RESTED FOR INFORNI:\G . "" perdome TuC'sday night, they encoun-THE ~\El,' HAMPSHIRE ~
tered an energetic young man on a mis-sion. "Please!" Jack Lack shouted to n:PRESE:\TATIVES ABOUT THE stunned delegates. "Anybody who has JA~GERS OF SEABROOK. passes for tonip:ht! Gov. Sununu of New England ls asking for them for souve-R E~lE~IBER r-:R. L,\CK, THERE nirs!" Lack said he Is a volunte<'r from lS A~ APPROPRIATE TIME A~D Ohio who had be<'n asked by the Republi-can National C'o111m1ttce to assist the New England delegation. And nfter Sununu delivered his address to the convention.
the governor ash<"cl him to C'ollecl thr passes, Lack -...1ld. l'inistwcl with his tak.
I.ark r<'l!1rrwtl I*' hi-. 1.1sk "Plrnsc*! /\n~*
l>1Mly wl\11 tu-.. ;*.I'*"'"* '1 i' 111111gl1I
~AT'l REPU~LICAN SEN. COMM, 440 FIRST STREET, NW NO, oOO WASHINGTON, DC 20001 oqPM
1*205451U222008 08/0q/88 ICS WA1bb14 BSNA 00121 MLT~ VA 08/0q/88 JN4844b
~
M~ STE~HEN 9 CO~LEV MANSION DR ROl'ILEY MA 01Qbq AUGUST e, 1qae DEAR STEPHEN:
AS CHAIR~AN QF THE REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL INNER CIRCLE, I AM DELIGHTED AND THRILLED THAT YOU WILl BE JOINING US IN NEW 6RLEANS FOR THE 3~TH REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, I WON'T HAVE ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO GET IN*TOUCH"WITH YOU BEFOR£ THE CO~VENTION ANO THERE ARE SOME IMPORTANT PIECES OF INFORMATTON I NEED TO PASS ALONG, FIRST* OF.ALL,* INNER CIRCLE CONVENTION*REGISTRATION WILL TAKE PLACE AT THE CROWNE PLAZA HOTEL*, 333 POYDRAS STREET IN DOWNTO~N NEW ORLEAN.S O~J SUNDAY, AUGUST 141 FROM 12 NOON TO b1oo***P,M~, ANO AT THE" HILTON RIVERSIDE AND TOWERS, POYDRAS STREET ANO iHE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, ON MONDAY, AUGUST 15 FROM 8100 A,M, TO 12 NOON, SHOULD YOU ARRIVE AFTER THE SCHEDULED CONVENTION REGISTRATION, PLEASE CHECK IN AT THE !1-J ~! E P. CI RC LE 0 FF ICE AT THE CR 0 WNE PLAZA H0 TEL ,
SECO~D, ~ITH PRfSIDENT REAGAN, VICE PRESI6lNT BUSH AND MEHBE~S OF" THE. CARINET AND CONGRESS IN ATTENO-ANCE, SECURITY WILL Bf EXTREMELY TIGHT, FOR THAT REASON, YOU MAY ENCOUNTER SLIGHT DELAYS AS YOU E~TE~ THE SUPERDOME OR INNER CIRCLE VIP EVENTS, WHILE I HOPE THERE ARE NO DElAYS OF LONGER THAN FIVE MINUTES OR SC, YOUR PATIENCE wILL BE GREATLY APPRECIATED, IF YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CU~TACT ANY MEMBER OF THE INNER CIRCLE STAFF AT 1-~0~*b2~*236°, I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU ON THE 15TH!
~ITH WARM REGARDS, SENATOR RUDY B~SC~~ITZ C~AIR~AN 20:21' E.$T
we 1 ne l'eople of the United States Stop ChernobytHere
( IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE PRESS CONTACT: STEPHEN B. COMLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WE THE PEOPLE, INC. OF THE UNITED STATES 508-948-7959 OR 508-~48-2553 DATE: WEDNESDAY, JULY 20, 1988 TIME: 6:30-7:30 P.M.
LOCATION: DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION, ATLANTA, GEORGIA BANNER: "HEY DUKE - STOP CHERNOBYL HERE, TOO!"
A M~SSACHUSETTS ANTINUCLEAR GROUP HAS TAKEN TO :HE AIR OVER THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION IN ATLANTA TO GET THE ATTENTION OF GOVERNOR MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS. A GIA~T BANNER WITH THE MESSAGE "HEY* DUKE - STOP CHERNOBYL HERE, TOO!" WILL FLY OVER THE CONVENTION ON WEDNESDAY FROM 6:30-7:30 P.M.
GREETING DELEGATES AS THEY APPROACH THE SESSION EXPECTED TO NOMINATE DUKAKIS FOR THE PRESIDENCY.
WE WANT GOVERNOR DUKAKIS TO HAVE A CONSISTENT NUCLEAR POLICY FOR MASSACHUSETTS AND THE NATION" SAID STEPHEN COMLEY, DIRECTOR OF WE THE PEOPLE, INC. "IT IS GOOD THAT HE OPPOSES THE SEABROOK PLANT IN NEW HAMPSHIRE, BUT WE DEMAND THAT HE ALSO OPPOSE THE RESTART OF THE DANGEROUS PILGRIM PLANT IN MASSACHUSEtTS AND SUPPORT A STATEWIDE REFERENDUM HERE TO BAN NUCLEAR POWER, WHICH HE HAS SO FAR REFUSED TO DO.
"BY URGING DUKAKIS TO STOP CHERNOBYL HERE, WE MEAN STOPPING NUCLEAR POWER IN MASSACHUSETTS, GEORGIA, AND ACROSS THE NATION. MIKE DUKAKIS WON THE NEW HAMPSHIRE PRIMARY BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO SEABROOK. NOW IT IS TIME FOR HIM TO EXPAND THAT POLICY TO HIS OWN STATE AND THE ENTIRE COUNT?.Y" SAID COMLEY, A REGISTERED INDEPENDEN~ AND NURSING HOM~ OW~E~
WHO LIVES NEAR THE EMBATTLED SEABROOK ?LANT. AME2!CANS, ABOVE ALL, DEMAND CONSISTENCY FROM OUR ?RESIJENTIAL CANDIDATES. WHAT'S GOOD FOR NEW HAMPSHIRE IS GOOD FOR THE NATION. IT IS TI~E FOR MICHAEL STANLEY DDEA~IS TC GET OFF THE FENCE."
Bnx ~77. Rowley, MA 01969, (*508) 948-7959 50 Court St., Plymouth, MA O:!J61, (617) 746-9300
!\i;itiomil Pr"°ss Bldg .. 14 & F. Sts., N.W., Washin~!l)fl, D.C. 20045 Olfo:cs 5 & 6, 3 Pleasant St., Concord, NH OJJOI. tl103l 22H-94X4
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Newburyport,. Massachusetts
!O, 1988 /36 PagH Comley to fly ba.nner i
~*
over :~Attanta convention*
The.Rowley.nursing home.own- between 6:3> and 7:30 tonjght
er who .has flOWD-<banners oppos- "Hey Duke - Stop Chernobyl
. ing- the Seabrook nuclear power Here, Too!" the banner will read:
plant over the White House, Mas- Gov. Michael Dukalds, the likely *. 1 sachusetts State *House, Concord, party nominee for president, has
N~H., and almost every major na* held up licensing of the Seabrook tfonal event is not about to leave reactor by refusing to participate the Democratic Convention in At* in the emergency planning re-lanta alone. quired of nuclear plants.
Stephen B. Comley, oWller of the "By urging Dukakis to stop Seaview Nursing Home and orga* Chernobyl here, we mean stopping nizer of the anti-nuclear group We nuclear power in Massachusetts, the People, said he plans an flight Georgia and across the nation,"
over the convention center Comley wrote in a press release. I
"~ .111.: r~up1e of the United States Stop Chernobyl Here
-.:~
IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE PRESS CONTACT: STEPHEN B. COMLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WE THE PEOPLE, INC. OF THE UNITED STATES MAIN OFFICE: BOX 277 ROWLEY, ~.ASS. 01969 508-948-7959 or 508-948-2553 (BEFORE THE 15TH AND AFTER THE 17th)
CONVENTION: NEW ORLEANS WEST TRAVEL LODGE 2200 WEST BAKK EXPRESSWAY HARVEY, LA 504-366-5311 (AUGUST 15, 16, 17)
DATE: AUGUST 16, 1988 TIME: 6:30 P.M. TO 7:30 P.M.
LOCATION: REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTIO~
NEW ORLEANS, LA BANNER: "HEY GEORGE - STOP CHERNOBYL HERE!"
"HEY GEORGE - STOP CHERNOBYL HERE!"
IS THE GIANT MESSAGE THAT WILL BE FLOWN OVER THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION IN NEW ORLEANS, TUESDAY, AUGUST 16TH AT 6:30 P.M. TO 7:30 P.M. SPONSORED BY THE ANTI-NUCLEAR GROUP, WE THE PEOPLE, INC. DURING THE LAST MONTHS DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION IN ATLANTA, THE GROUP BROADCAST A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO MASSACHUSETTS GOVERNOR MICHAEL S. DUKAKIS.
"WE WANT THE CANDIDATES FROM BOTH PARTIES TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE OPPOSE NUCLEAR POWER AS DANGEROUS AND EXPENSIVE," SAID WE THE PEOPLE DIRECTOR STEPHEN B. COMLEY, A NURSING HOME OWNER AND REGISTERED INDEPENDENT VOTER FROM ROWLEY, MASS. "VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT A CHERNOBYL DISASTER WILL HAPPEN HERE IN THE UNITED STATES IF PRESIDENT REAGAN AS WELL AS THE NEXT PRESIDENT DOES NOT ACT FOR THE PEOPLE TO STOP IT."
COMLEY SAID, THAT WE THE PEOPLE, INC., BY FLYING THESE MESSAGES OVER BOTH CONVENTIONS, IS BRINGING ATTENTION TO THE GROUPS' INVESTIGATION OF SUB-STANDA..~D MATERIAL INCLL'DING PIPE FIXTURES THAT l~'ERE SOLD WITH FALSIFIED TEST RESULTS TO 38 PLANTS THROUGHOUT THE NATION INCLUDING THE SEABROOK, N. H. NUCLEAR PLANT.
WHERE IT HAS BEEN TESTED, THE PIPE FIXTURES USED BY 3-8 REACTORS, FRO~! THE PILGRff*.
PLANT IN PLYNOUTH, MASS. TO THE GRAND GULF PLANT IN MISSISSIPPI, IS FAILING TODAY, SAID COMLEY, WHO IS ATTENDING THE GOP CONVENTION IN NEW ORLEAXS.
11nx 277, R1w.*ley. MA 01969, (508) 948-7959 50 Cnurt St., Plymou1h, MA o:!J61. (617J 74o-9JOO Prls Bldg., 14 & F. Sts .. N.W .. \\'a,fiing1on. D.C. :mo.t)
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~r. Stephen 8. Comley Executive Director We The People of the United States
. eox 277 Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Mr. Comley:
Your letter of August 15, 1988, to President Ronald Reagan expressing your concerns regarding Seabroo~ Station has been referred to me for response.
I share your concern about the potential use of substandard piping fixtures at nuclear power facilities. Therefore, NP.C issued NRC Bulletin No. 88-05 and Supplements 1 and 2 thereto (copies enclosed) to inform applicants and licensees of this potential problem. The Seab.rook Station licensee reviewed the Seabrook Station co*nstruction records *;n accordance wf th* the requirements of the bulletin and supplements and detennined *that 369 suspect fixtures were installed in the Seabrook Un1t 1 plant~ --A report of the licensee's review was submitted to NRC on August 25. 19.88. and is currentl.v being reviewed by the NRC staff. The applicant must demonstrate to the sat1sfact1on of the NRC staff that *all of
these suspect fixtures provide an acceptable level of quality and safet,Y.
A second conc,rn expressed 1n your letter was that an unqualified inspector had been used at Seabrook Station. An Authorized Nuclear Inspector (AMI) tr.a.inee was ass~.gned to the Seabrook Station fro111 Hay to December 1985. The NRC*rev1ew detenn1ned that the ANI trainee perforMd asstgraents in accordance with hfs assigned *tratntng progr111 and that qualified Altls had evaluated and.
monitored his training, progress. and fnspect1on work. The NRC concluded that there was neither a *noncompliance with the American Society of Mechanical Eng1nters Code nor P.v1dence of wrongdoing. .. ... * *
/
~OU also expressed I Concern regarding the thoroughness Of the 1fcensee'S inspection to determine that *counterfeit' *bolts were not built into Seabrook St~tion. The licensee's inJtia1 fospection, performed in response to HRC Ru11etin 'io. 87-02 (copy enclosed), detenn1ned that the fasteners used in Seabrook .Station were acceptable. After that initial inspectio~, NRC issued Supplel!'ents 1 and 2 (copi.es encl1:1sed) to NRC Bulletin* Ho. 87*02. These supplements requested and then clarified the request for add1t1onal infoMllation on the suppliers and manufacturers from whom the subject fasteners may have heen purchased. The NRC reviewed the information submitted by the Seabrook Station licensee in re.sponse to Supplements 1 and 2 to* NRC Bulletin Pfo. 87-02 and concluded that the actions taken by the 1icensee were both complete and adequate and that the fasteners installed in Seabrook Station are acceptable for their intended uses.
Thank ~nu for your interest in these matters, S1nc~r~1y,
. ~fl.<k J-'!f;~t:*~ .
lnJT homas . Mu r lf.y , ()I rrr. tu r
.... f'Mf;cr of Nuclear Pr,lrtnr Prqu\,ition
5.nurday, o.c.m~r 1o,191
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IF THEY ARE FAILING AT SEABROOK, TEEY ARE FAILING
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We The People of the United States Stop Chernobyl Here OJUNTERFEIT AND SUBSTANDARD MATERIALS IN U.S. NUCLEAR PLANTS INI'OODUCTION In the last year, the NUclear Regulatory Corrmission (NRC) has rep::>rted a wide variety of materials used in a majority of u.s. nuclear power plants has been falsely certified as meeting NP,C, American society of Mechanical En~ineers (ASME) and other required standards. 'Ihese flawed, substandard materials-include electrical corrponents; flanges, pipe fittings and o:her piping materials; and fasteners like nuts and bolts.
Agency rep::>rts demonstrate an NRC pattern of downgrading nuclear plant
_safety standards rather than requiring the substandard materials be replaced. Design and _construction standards are an essential basis for nuclear industry and NRC claims that redundant and backup systems make the *-
dangerous nuclear technology safe.
PIPING MATERIALS Substandard piping materials manufactured between 1962 and 1985 are part of safety systems at a majority of U.S. nuclear power plants. At least three piping manufacturing corrpanies routinely irrported foreign piping materials of a much lower quality than is required for nuclear plant construction, then falsified paperwork to say the materials met nuclear-gr'ade standards, according to NRC documents. These ooterials, falsely Ill*\ ~71. Rl1wlcy. Mt\ 01969. (508) 9-lK- 7il~.J
~fl C"11u11S1..1'1~11\llulh, M*\ O~.'til. thl"'r :.11... 1noo
. 06) cert_j,tied for use in safety systems, were then sold to nuclear~lants and to other manufacturers and suppliers who then sold the materials to nuclear .. plants ( 1).
This information undermines the "redundancy," "backup," and "in-depth
~ defense" theories of nuclear plant design and construction, theories Which admit it is a hazardous technology, but claim the plants are safe because of high standards required in building them. 'Ihese NRC reports reveal nuclear plant safety systems, designed in detail down to the chemical composition of metals to be used, are not what they are required to be.
certification of nuclear grade materials is a fundamental and critical method for ensuring the nuclear industry is following the stringent requirements for building nuclear plants. Falsification of certifications and inspections in this field is a crime with severe penalties since failure to adhere to NRC standards could result in a nuclear disaster.
During* nuclear plant* canstruction, *the massive nurrbers of inspections generate a paper trail for each system and corrponent. BUt if the certifications at the beginning of that trail are false, inspections thereafter are unreliable and possibly invalid.
'Ihe NRC itself actually inspects only a tiny percentage of a nuclear power plant. The agency depends heavily on self-inspections by nuclear plant licensees. According to Tom Murley, NRC Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, licensees are only required to test a certain percentage of components used in plants. He noted that once a percentage of conponents with a specific model number are tested, if more corrponents with that same model nurrber are reordered, there is no requirement to test those at all ( 2).
2
.)
.--:=-.: ..
'Ille NRC knew of falsified certifications on piping materials at least as early as January 1988, according to a letter from NRC Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Tom Murley to We the People Dfrector Stephen Comley (3).
It wasn't until May 6 that the NRC issued a general bulletin to all nuclear
~ plant license holders. Bulletin 88-05 told licensees they had 120 days to check their records; locate all pipe fittings, flanges, subassemblies and corrponents from West Jersey. Manufacturing co. (WJM), Piping Supplies, Inc.
(PSI) and 19 other corrpanies; test the rnaterials; "replace all questionable fittings and flanges;" and report back. At that point, the NRC named 3B plants ~ich had received these poor quality materials (4).
BUlletin 88-05, particularly the section requiring testing and replacement, was rret with disrray by the nuclear industry: nuclear po.ver plants are one huge mass of fittings, flanges and piping materials. For
places too radioactive for workers' health, the NRC_reduced requirerrents to a paperwork search (5), even though the root of the problem is falsified paperwork. 'Ihe nuclear industry, deeply concerned about the huge expense of carrying out the NRC program (6), set out to prove there is no problem, even though Victor Stello, .the NRc's Executive Director for Operations, announced that: tens of thousands of falsely certified flanges had been bought by nuclear power plants (7).
The NRC's Supplement 1 to BUlletin 88-05, released June 15, disclosed that carolina Power's Shearon Harris plant had just tested two WJM flanges from the warehouse, neither of which came close to the required tensile and yield strength, nor did they have enough carbon and rranganese. In response, the NRC abbreviated the reporting deadline from 120 to 30 days for licensees to find and test all accessible flanges and fittings from the 3
corrpanies under suspicion *
.7.: ...
Interestingly enough, at the same time they changed the reporting deadline, the NRC cut back ..on their requirements for rectifying the safety problem.s, despite the proof of substandard materials fran Shearon Harris.
If the questionable materials proved to be substandard, licensees had only to explain why continued operation with substandard safety corrponents was justified. The NRC also "reduced the scope" of the search to fittings and flanges, eliminating subassemblies and components. Nowhere in supplement 1 does the NRC require replacement of substandard parts as was the case in the original BUlletin (8).
The NRC's release of Supplement 2 on August 3 was a relief to the nuclear industry; it ordered a halt to any further actions by licensees.
'Ihe bulk of supplement 2 is an industry-generated study purporting to prove there is no problem.
BUt supplement 2 also said the NRC discovered at least 19 more plants with dubious piping materials, bringing the total so far to 57; .at least 9 more companies distributed questionable piping materials, a total of 28; and in addition to fittings and flanges, 27 other product forms involved, including couplings, plate rings, and socket weld boss (to Seabrook Stat ion) ( 9).
It is clear why the NRC saw fit to "temporarily suspend" further licensee investigation and action on this problem. As the NRC investigation grew more extensive, ever more evidence surfaced showing the problem with substandard nuclear grade piping rraterials was quite widespread.
The only way the NRC could genuinely protect the public's health and 4
safe~Y1 an NRC mandate from congress, was to require the defective materials be replaced with those which met the plants' designed nuclear standards. But that solution would cost the nuclear utilities enormous sums of money (10); they might even find it more profitable to sirrply close their plants.
Instead of opting for safety, the NRC once again lowered the standards.
In this case the agency simply had to accept the industry's computer analysis engineering away the problem. In a letter to Stephen Comley on August 15, Murley wrote, "engineering analyses" showed materials which don't meet required strength are still acceptable for "application in nuclear power plants {11)."
'Ihe Nuclear Management a_nd Resources council (NUMARC) was c~rdinating the activities necessary to demonstrate there really isn't a problem, Murley explained to Comley. According to Murley, NUMARC stated in a letter.
to the t-.t"RC July 25 t.hat "the results of these activities derronstrate there is no public health and safety concern.* NUMARC is a nuclear industry organization; Bechtel, a nultinational nuclear corrpany, produced the "generic lab analysis" report for NUMARC which the NRC used to justify cancelling further investigations at nuclear plants ( 12).
NUMARc's July 29 cover letter for the generic analysis report stressed the irrportance of suspending inspections. Utilities were making "expenditures of major proportions *.. without abatement" and further testing won't "result in additional insights." 'lhe NUMARC letter also noted the lab"*
testing program was not actually COITlf>lete.as it didn't include all of the information gathered by the utilities before they stopped testing (13).
Even though utilities reported that 8 of 108 item.S tested were below 5
=-.: ..
certification for operation is based on those inspections.
Given that the NRC is aware of these and other safety problem.s ..at the nuclear plants, the agency's acceptance of Bechtel's corrputerized assurrptions was rather hasty. BJlletin 88-05 and supplement 1 show the falsified piping certifications call into doubt assurances of nuclear plant safety. supplement 2 shows the agency willing to elevate utilities' economic concerns at the expense of safety, however flimsy the scientific basis might be.
Thi-s is the sort of behavior which led one honest merrber of the NRC to admit before congress in 1985 that there is a 45 percent chance of a core melt or other serious accident at U.S. nuclear plants every 20 years. A 1982 study corrrnissioned by the NRC said a nuclear plant accident could cause up to 100,000 first-year deaths and 600,000 injuries. That is an expensive price to pay for electricity.
NOTES
1. us Nuclear Regulatory cornnission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC BJlletin No. 88-05, May 6, 1988; supplement 1, June 15, 1988; supplement 2, August 3, 1988, Washington, D.C.
2. Inside N.R.C., Volwne 10, No. 16, McGraw Hill, August 1, 1988.
3. Thomas E. Murley, Director, USNRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Letter to Stephen B. Comley, Executive Director, we '!he People of the United States, August 15, 1988.
4. USNRC atlletin No. 88-05.
5. Ibid.
6. William H. Rasin, Director, Technical Division, Nuclear Management and Resources council, Letter to Thomas T. Martin, US'NRC Associate Director for Inspection and Technical Assessment, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, July 29, 1988.
7. Inside N.R.C., Volume 10, No. 13, McGraw Hill, June 20, 1988.
8
8. USNRC BUlletin 88-05, Supplement 1.
9. USNRC BUlletin 86-05, SUpplement 2.
10.Rasin Letter to Martin.
11.Murley, Letter to Comley, August 15, 1988.
. 12 .Bechtel National, Inc., NUMARC Generic Testing Program Response to NRC ailletin No. 88-05, Interim Report, for Electric POWer, Palo Alto, CA, July 29, 1988.
13.Rasin Letter to r~rtin.
14.Bechtel National.
15.USNRC B.llletin 88-05 and supplement 2.
16.US Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission, Region I, Report No. 50-443/84-12, Inspection at Seabrook Station conducted August 13-17 and 27-31, 1984.
17.United states of America v James v. Padavano~*-*tb:-as-16-0l-L, u.s.
District court~or the District o~New Harrpshire.
18.US Department of Labor', case No. 84-ERA-13, March 19, 1984.
19.'lbomas E. Murley, USNRC Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Letter to Stephen B. Comley, Executive Director, We 'l11e People of the _
United States, OCtober 4, 1988.
20.us NUclear Regulatory corrmission, Office of NUclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Information Notice No. 88-35, June 3, 1988.
11116 WAS IN RE'SPo N'Sc -ro f1 LEtT£R.
PRt:si Dewr RSAG-AN" 111 RE Pve, Ltc:A N 'PR.~t bENTl RL C....ONVE"NrtorJ IN NE:W O/J..LcAWS 9
C'OUNTERFEIT AND sussrANDARD MATERIALS IN MANY U.S. NUCLEAR PLAm'S
""'"'. -. PART 2 ---

~--~---::~

ELECTRICAL C'OMFONENTS An electrical corrponent manufacturer uncovered a counterfeiting scheme of national proportions when used circuit breakers, falsely ceritified as new, were sold to the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant in California.
Every circuit breaker tested failed (1). Square o, the manufacturer whose counterfeited label was on the circuit breakers, sued five California electrical supply companies for refurbishing and selling electrical colJl::>onents as new with false certifications.
In it's suit, Square D charged the counterfeiting has been going on for ten years: corrponents were supplied to the Department of Defense and NASA as well as to nuclear power plants. Members of the corrpanies being sued stated in depositions there could be more than 50 corrpanies nationwide engaged in similar counterfeiting (2). A S;{uare D official pointed out it is a serious situation when substandard electrical corrponents are built into NJ.SA and military systems, but "to think that these could possibly wind their way back into nuclear plants is very frightening (3)."
On June 3, 1988, three months after being notified of the counterfeiting, the NRC had u.s. Marshals seize 200,000 electrical items manufacturer trademarks, and Underwriter Laboratory certifications from the corrpanies named in the suit. During the raid, one of the owners told a deputy marshal circuit breakers were sold to nuclear plants in many locations around the U.S., including California, Arizona, Illinois, and the east coast (4). Westinghouse and General Electric are arrong the 12 manufacturers on the NRC's July 8 preliminary list whose names were l
possibly counterfeited (5).
c:~ .,_ er~ °')
The NRC examination of seized circuit breakers showed they were "of the type which could be used in safety systems of nuclear plants if they were new and authentic (6)."
In April, the NRC announced a different electrical supply company, Planned Maintenance systems, had supplied falsely certified corrponents to 34 nuclear plants, including the Pilgrim, Rowe and Seabrook nuclear plants (7). By July 21, the NRC discovered at least one nuclear plant had bought counterfeit circuit breakers for safety systems, and listed 24 nuclear plants, including Pilgrim, in Plymouth, Massachusetts, which received shipments from the 5 suspect companies (8). A draft NRC bulletin said,.
"'Ihese exarrples indicate that there is a potential generic safety concern regarding electrical equipment supplied to nuclear power plan~s (9)."
Despite this safety concern, the NRC exhibited great restraint in acting.
on this major safety problem. NRC Commissioner Kenneth Clark said he saw no need for imnediate action: the manufacturers would take care of the problems by suing the counterfeiters (10). BUt a S::!uare D official said, "If NRC thinks our lawsuit.*is going to clean up the industry, they're wrong. There's too rruch money to be made on these things---1000 percent or more profit on refurbishing (11)."
Tom Murley, NRc's Director for the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, also tried to pass off the widespread use of substandard and counterfeit parts as a pr9blem to be solved by the nuclear industry, specifically by the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), an industry organization. "NUMARC realizes this is their problem and they better get on top of it," Murley said. However, a NUMARC spokesman insisted it's role is simply to advise the NRC (12).
2
r
Another indication of NRC reluctance is the three-month delay* in notifying nuclear plant licensees of the problem after the agency had been told ab?ut the Diablo canyon counterfeiting caught by Square D (13). And even tho~gh the agency notified licensees, it did not require them to take any actions to resolve the problem ( 14).
In an August meeting memorandum, the NRC discussed the "dedication" process whereby corrponents bought for non-safety uses are upgraded to safety applications. 'Ihe NRC was worried that the dedication process at nucle~r plants was not uniform (15), indicating the problem extended into safety systems even though rrost of the counterfeited electrical equipment was initially corrrnercial grade (16). Nevertheless, the NRC acceded to a NUMARC request and exempted commercial grade circuit breakers from the investigation (17).
'Ihe August mem:> raised another major safety issue; one the agency downplayed by saying many corrponents were not used in safety systems. That is the "balance-of-plant applications,* where a failure of non-safety systems could "challenge" safety systems (18). 'Ihe NRC is very narrow in distinguishing between nuclear safety systems, for which there are many rules and requirements, and non-safety systems. For exanple, the agency does not consider a nuclear plant's fire protection system to be a safety system. In the memo the NRC acknowledged a safety-related connection between the two types of systems. EVen so it required no action from nuclear p<ft.ler plant licensees.
3
FASTENERS: BOLTS AND NUTS The NRC hesitates to order conformance to safety standards by plants wfth installed counterfeit and substandard parts because this problem.
permeates the nuclear industry. Resolving it w6uld require major replacement programs for piping, electrical components, and fasteners. In the case of the counterfeit nuts and bolts, NRC's Tom Murley admitted tha agency knew
-~bout them for two years before it ordered the nuclear utilities to investigate.-
Murley mentioned the counterfeiting problem extends to a "broad* spectrum of equipment,"including pumps, circuit breakers, and valves. Although he admitted some of these parts were used in safety systems, he said they posed no safety problem because of the large margin of redundancy in_
nuclear plant design (19). But if a variety of safety components do not meet design standards, there is a major reduction in redundancy.
Of 32 fasteners tested from three nuclear plants, 11 did not meet the standards (20). An NRC samp~e test of 137 fasteners from 16 plants revealed a 20 percent failure rate (21), and when the Calvert Cliffs, Maryland, plant found commercial grade fasteners had been use~ i~_safety systems, it tested; 1539 fasteners; 339 failed. In light of this data, the NRC's testing program for fasteners at all nuclear plants was exceedingly limited. The agency asked licensees to test 10 safety and 10 non-safety from their warehouses (22). Since the counterfeit fasteners scandal has b~en public knowledge for more than two years, it is ~ach more likely the substandard materials would be found built into the plants rather than in the warehous~s.
4
r*- --- . >' .. '
Tom Murley observed that past inspection requirements for materials
.:=-.: ...
built into the nuclear plants are not adequate. "We acknowledge that the quality assurance system is not perfect," Murley said in July, "It relies heavily on ... paper audits and prototype testing. It is aimed at finding errors. It is not airred at detecting fraudulent equipment (23)."
'Ihese counterfeiting discoveries have exposed a dangerous development:
ever greater numbers and types of nuclear plant corrponents are proving to be far below the design standards required. While the agency devises systems to try to prevent future inclusion of bogus parts in nuclear plants, the plants continue to operate. No real effort has been put into replacing those bad parts. Instead, .the NRC engineers away the prob.lem.s on paper. 'Ihe continued operation of these plants.,* and the continued profits of the nuclear utilities, are clearly of greater concern to the NRC than are the health and. safety of the public the agency is mandated to protect.
1. us NUclear Regulatory Comnission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information Notice No. 88-46, July 8, 1988.
2. Inside N.R.C., Volume lo; No. 19, McGraw Hill, September 12, 1988.
3. Ibid.
4. Inside N.R.c., Volume 10, No. 15, McGraw Hill, July 18, 1988.
-*- 5. US Nuclear Regulatory corrrnission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information Notice No. 88-46, Attachrrent 2, July 8, 1988.
6.Inside N.R.c., July 18, 1988.
7. US Nucle~r Regulatory corrmission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information Notice No. 88-19, April 19, 1988.
8. us Nuclear Regulatory corrmission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Information Notice No. 88-46 SUpplerrent 1, Attachment 1, July 21, 1988.
9. Nuclear Regulatory corrrnission, Region II Division of Reactor Projects, Memorandum to Gus t.ainas, Assistant Director, from James Stone Project 5
Manager, regarding NUMARC meeting, Enclosure 3, Draft sulletin; August 9, 198th 4
10. Inside N.R.C., July 18, 1988 *
.11. Inside N. R.C., Septerrber-12 ,---1988.-----
12. Inside N.R.C., Volume 10, No. 16, McGraw Hill, August 1, 1988 13.Ibid.
14.US Nuclear Regulatory comnission, Information Notice No. 88-46.
15.Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Memorandum to Gus Lainas.
16.US Nuclear Regulatory commission, Information Notice No. 88-46, SUpp le men t 1.. .
17 .Inside N.R.C., Volume 10, No. 18, McGraw Hi11, August 29, 1988.
18 .Nuclear Regulatory corrrnission, Memorandum to Gus Lainas, Enclosure 1.
19.Inside N.R.C., August 1, 1988.
20.US Nuclear Regulatory corrrnission, Office of NUclear Reactor Regulation, NRC Corrpliance BUlletin No. 87-02, Noverrber 6, 1987.
21.Inside N.R.C., July 18, 1988.
22. us Nuclear Regulatory Comnission, Corrpliance BUlletin No. 87-02.
23.Inside N.R.C., August 1, 1988.
6
Manager, regarding NUMARC meeting, Enclosure 3, Draft BUlletin*, August 9, 198-8';'
10. Inside N.R.c., July 18, 1988.
11.Inside N.R.C. ,. Septerrber 12, 1988.
12.Inside N.R.C., Volwne 10, No. 16, McGraw Hill, August 1, 1988 13.Ibid.
14.US Nuclear Regulatory Cornnission, Information Notice No. 88-46.
15.NUclear :Regulatory Corranission, Merrorandum to Q.ls Lainas.
16.US Nuclear Regulatory cornnission, Information Notice No. 88-46, SJpplerrent 1.
17.Inside N.R.c., Volume 10, No. 18, McGraw Hill, August 29t 1988.
18.Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission, Memorandwn to Gus Lainas, Enclosure 1.
19.Inside N.R.C., August 1, 1988.
20.us N\lclear Regulatory comnission, Office of ~clear Reactor Regulation, NRC COnpliance 9..lllet in No. 87-0 2, Noverrbe r 6, *198 7.
21.Inside N.R.c., July 18, 1988.
22. US Nuclear Regulatory Corrmi.ssion, conpliance 9.llletin No. 87-02.
23.Inside N.R.C.~ August l, 1988.
We The People
.~-- ...
of the United States Stop Chernobyl Hert Senator Robert Dole
u. s. Senate 141 Hart Washington, DC 20510
Dear Senator Dole:
This letter and the enclosed attachments detail the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRCl failure to protect public health and safety as is its Congressional mandate. The agency does not enforce its own standards and r~gulaticns for safe nuclear plant construction and operation, ncr does it ensure all residents near nuclear plants can be properly evacuated in the face of a nuclear accident.
Enclosure -1, Co~nterfeit and Substandard Materials <Parts 1 &
2>, analyzes information from sources including recent NRC reports. It shows that most U.S. nuclear plants <from New England to the We5t Coast> have been built with counterfeit:
mat~rial~ which a~e f~r beloK the ~gency's required.standardsc 1
for nucl~ar plant safety. These counter~eit materials include electrical components such as circuit breakers, piping ~-~erials, flanges, valves, and fasteners such as nuts and bolt*~... NRC documents Sihow these mate,..i al s repe&t*dl y failed tests of strength &nd r*el i ability. Th* *;ency did not order the counterfeit parts be replaced even though use of these materials means nuclear plants qre much less safe than the ~gency believed. Instead, the NRC lowered the safety standards.for thesg mate~ials.
As recently as a few weeks ago, the NRC raided four more Southern California firms suspected of selling counterfeit
~lectrical components to nuclear power pl~nts (see Enclos~re 2, S1-10r*n Affidavit bv U.S. Senior* I:o.vestiaator). With each passing day, the magnitude of .the problem becomes more alarming. The NRC is only now beginning .to address the problem, not because of its diligence in protecting the public health and safety, but because the proolem has become so widespread that the Commission can no longer igno~e i~.
This is a dangerous situation. The NRC and tne nuclear industry have al way-s c :i. ai m12d t.;-1 c,,t even though nuc 1 ear*
0 technology is dangerous, the plants are safe enouo~ oecau~e they a r* e bu i l *~ wi t h b a c ! :: up , r e dun d :.:i n t ! s c:i ..: e ':. y s vs t ems .
However., *:;1nce mC1.ter1als in the main s2r*:'ty :.yst*l'iT'I'; as~... ;:.:;
as in b3cL-up systems ar-*e subst<11-,da:*j .. .:.-l.::i1~s o-t ..-.,d;,:t_.,
becaus.: C'-t r*edund~nt svsl:ems ~rc. ir1v,.,l1cl.
<-;,,***!r~'! p1,111-111!h \1\ll~1t*l t'*1*1 ... ~,,.,:.,.1 l( ' ' ', ',\, I :*
f .
Since nuclear plants are less safe than the agency thought, plans for protecting the surrounding populations should be stren9thened. Such is not the case. Por e~ample, people with special needs have not even been identified within the ten mile emerg~ncy planning zone. Evacuation plans approved by the NRC have no provisions for elderly, deaf, and blind people, and others with special needs. Instead, most of these people will be left- behind. This is discrimination against the handicapped, in violation of federal law and the laws of many states. It is morally reprehensible to ignore persons who would most need assistance in time of emergency (see En~losure 3, Related Information, pages 12 & 13, We The People's explanation of the special needs issue).
Special needs people appear to be expendable in the agency's eyes; at some nuclear plants that notion of expendability extends to the entire population. In the case of New Hampsttire's Seabrook Station, the agency seriously downgraded required standards and rules for evacuation planning so as to be ab~e to ignore strong evidence the seacoast area north of Boston cannot be evacuated. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, after extensive study and deliberation, determined that evacuation was impossible. The response of the NRC was to label the state as uncooperative. However it is not uncooperative for the state to make legitimate.
de~isions about the welfare of its cit~zens. This situation resulted in a rule change that substituted a "best eftort" standard for safety standard with regards to evacuation planning.
The need for Congressional action has become even more pressing with the recent Presidential order on evacuation planning that overrides state and local powers to reject evacuation plans which won't work. The issue of nuclear power has become secondary with this action by President Reagan, which cracks the very foundation of American democracy, a government of the people and by the people.
These biief examples and the attachments supporting them, demonstrate an NRC pattern of allowing operation of nuclear plants at the expense of public safety. When the agency's rules and safety standards, established as the basis for protecting the public, conflict wit~ plant operation, the safety standards are reduced or abolished.
The NRC is answerable only to Congress, and to date, Congress h a s: -=-n"O t been a s k i n g s er i o us q u e st i on s o f the NRC
It is essential the body representing the people of the U.S.
investigate the agency and take action to ensure the public safety, since the agency itself has moved further and further from that r~sponsibility. There are a number of nuclear plants not yet in operation which have been built with counterfeit materials. Seabrook Station is one of them.
Congress must prevent contamination of any nuclear plant by preventing the issuance 0£ any licenses until all counterfeit materials have been identified and replaced. This will also keep open the option of conversion to much safer energy alternatives like gas. Plants already in operation must also be ordered to replace all counterfeit parts.
Until then, the people of this country are in danger. As the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident shows, even though it was not the wor~t-possible accident, radiation knows no boundaries. The industry and the NRC have refused to address the implications of the Chernobyl accident. They can't even properly address the safety of people within the 10 mile radius of nuclear po~er plants, much less outside that limit.
In August, 1986, 80% of the town of Rowley, Massachusetts, petitioned President Ronald Reagan to conduct an independent investigation of the NRC, (copy enclosed, pa*ge 14 of Related Information). To date, there has been no response to Rowley's petition.
Former NRC Commissioner James Asselstine, in an interview August lS, 1986, said nuclear plant accidents in this country are inevitable because of how poorly they are built and operated. The NRC is ~andated to tegulate the industry so as to prevent such accidents; but it is Congress which ~ust now enforce that mandate. In the absence of 0ongressional action, the NRC will be allowed to conduct "business as usual." This leads not only to a substantial risk of a serious nuclear accident, but exacerbates a crisis of public confidence in both the NRC and the Congress and their collective ability to safeguard the public health and safety.
We The People has co~tact with good people inside the NRC who are willing to come forward and expose the corruption within their agency if a Congressional investigation is gra~ted.
(see NRC quotes, page 11 of Related Information). The consequences of coming forward for these individuals will necessitate reasonable assurances that a full and fair investigation will ensus.
we Tne People has retained the services of Ernest Hadley, an attorney experienced in representing whistleblowers. He is a former acsociate of.the Government Accountability Project in WasnTngton, o.c. We The People can assist in bringing forward information to eKpose one of the biggest violations of the public trust that this country has ever witnessed.
The nuclear industry is both wealthy and powerful, but, neither of those factors give it the right to deliberately jeopar~iz~ the h~alth and safety of the American people.
I hope you will soon be able to find the time to meet with me
. and other merebers of our staff to turther discuss this matter. Please inform me of your response at your earliest possible convenience.
Sincerely, ~
~7+/;/ f3 ~
.. (]h.F'.'1"
//
<o,.c;'*/'/' t!/..:lf Stephen B. Comley ~-
Executive Director ~,
We The People, Inc.
S!3C/mk Enc:
Enclosure 1: Counterfeit and Substandard Materials Enclosure 2: Sworn AffidaV'Tt £l_ U.S. Sen*ior Investigator Enclosure 3: Related Information Packet: * .
Correspondence including letter giv~n to President Reagan August 15, 1988 and October 4, 1988 response to that letter from the NRC pages 2 & 3. The NRC's reply of July 18th which stated when they first learned there w~re counterfeit parts. The NRC stated it was January 17, 1988, but the agency actually knew earlier than that date.
Documentation of the enclosed materials is available on request.
SENDER: Complete ittms 1 *ncl 2 ~hen edditlonal MtYI~ ire dealrtd, 1nd complet1 ltltl'lt 3 end 4.
Put vour addrHI In tht "RETURN TO" ip:ice on the r9Ve'rM side. F1ilur1 to do this will prwent thll cwd from bel119 returned to you. The r!Wrn r~tlpJ fe wlll ~~you tht ntm* of ft.t!t~
d!llV!f!d to and the date of delhl!'(.* For idditone '"' ttli ng ~are,,.,. i eult portmastw for Gia and cheek bOx *) for lddltlonal *irvic.(1) requemo,
t. 0 Show to wtiom dellvered, dett, end tdd'"" ~. 2. 0 Rntrlc~ 0.1
3. Artk:le AddrM1ed to: 4. Artlole Number Sen. Robert Dole Type of S.rvlcd:
U.S. Senate 141 Hart Washington, DC Z0510 ,_*
§ Reglmf'9d.
Ctrtiflld Exprea M.til 8 lnJUred COD Alwayi obtain slgMture of ~rffiW or,
O-nt Ind DATE OELIV,ER&O.
5, Si;natur1 - AddreUH x
PS Fol'l1' 3811, Feb.1986
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Put YOAlf address In the "RETURN TO" spac9 on the rwtrM aide. Failure tQ do thla wUI Ptwent 1hls card. from being murned to you. The mum~ lei1i~rovldl you the name :f.ithL~
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P.I 3.*_. Artf?I Addnaecl to: 4. Article Number " ':'!(_-}>.
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~- Sen. Pete Domenici
~* U.S. Senate ii~*,, 434 Dirksen it. .
~: :}laShington DC 20510
. .. ::** Atw.ys obtain "11Ntun1 ot .sctrl111 I or
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6. Signirwr~ - Addres.e e. AddrMMt'I Addras {ONL i X ___ requnted 4nd fH paid)
PS Form 3811, Feb. 198'6 DOMESTIC RETURN RECEIPT
(
UNIJtU :>TAlf.S OF AMERICA v.
The Premises Known As TO:
Any Spe~!al Agent(s) *or the U.S.
panel board ~specialties ~arshals or any other authorized 29885 Second Street, Un!t E and I officers.
Lake Elslnore, California Atr~avtt(1) having bttn madt btfor1 rnt by tht bilow*l\lt'l'\td a~iam tt\at ht/al\t hu rtnon on the prl'lrl f s u *.nolt'n as * *
'° btlitvt that Panelboard Spec1alties, 29885 Second Street, Un1t E and I, Lake Elsinore, caiir. Unit E and I are one story masonry structures approximately 50 feet from each other sharing the building with other businesses. Unit r and ha3 the letter ! over the door and a sign reading Panelboard Specialties Sales Office. Un1te E has the letter E over the door and a 5ign reading Panelboard Specialties Corpo~ate O~fic~. . .
. f'n the CENTAAL 'D1.stdct of CALIFORNIA there is no~ bef ng concea1td certafn proptrty, namt1y:
and u t arn st1istied that thtre la ptebablt e&UH IO btlltvt that tht property to d~ ii being concealtd on the person or pttmltes ~crlt>td a~ IN grounds b' ~ication tor luuance of lht March warrant t:icilt aa N!td in the ~rting affid1vtt(1),
YOU AAE HEREBY COMMANOED to uaTi:ti on Ct btfort _....;;t;..;;;e.-n--:...(l;;,.O;;.. !.):.. ._;:d:;.;;;a:.. i.y. .;;;s_ _ _ _ _ _ __
(not to txce~ 10daya) lht ~ 0t plaet r.amtd abov1 for IN ptl)ptrty *~~. Mrving thil warrant and maJdng
'° tilt ..arch (In the daytimt -e:OO A.M. 10:00 l'.M.) (11 any UN in the CSay Of f\igkl)' L1'd If~ proptrty.l>e tound
'&htr1 lo utz1 tt, kavir"IQ 1 C¢lj1y of tnia warrant and r9Qllpl fc>t h ~oPtl'T)' \&Q,,, and prtp&r* a wrttten lnYtntory o1
~ proptt1)' N!ztd a~ pt0mptty re11.1m.lhfJ warr~ 1e _!he dut.Y U. 6 *. Magistrate
&s ,..qu 1red by l *w. * * "*' . .-,. ., ......_ '
DATl/tlll'l IUUCO
~lrp~ --
WILLIAM J. ?V:cNULTY Novemt>er 4, 198 g
't I MAl'd\ II IC ti. ~~~Id thy \ltl'lt In .... ,., et
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~ Sut9ll ~a ~ r;l j Sln O::ii.11 d ~
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( ' ... - - - ....
UNllED STATES OF "-MERICA ooc.-..r1 .. o.
v.
~he Pr~m1ses Known As TO:
Luckow Circu~it Breaker Any Special Agents of the U.S.
2708 South Grand Avenue ~arshals or any other authorized Santa Ana, California officers Mldavtt(s) having bee" rr.a~t before me J)y tN t>ilow*l'lll'Md 1H11r"ll that l-../11'\t h.a* ruaon 10 btlit't't that on the prtmhu kno.-n is Luckow Circuit Breaker* 2708 South Grand Avenue' sa,ta Ana, Calif., further described as a single story building or ~asonry coristructior. ~1th the number 2708 over the entrance and a sign reading Luckow Circuit Breaker and 1060 LCB affixed to the building, which is located in a small office park.
fn the CENTRAL *01.st r 1ct of C>..Ll!'Ol\NI~
there 1s now bein~ concealed cert~tn property, nlme1y:
See attachment A.
and as t am s1ti1fttd that thtrt ts proba!:>Jt CIUH to bttih'* ttiat \tit propef1)' .o delCftlitd II belrf . ..-don the person or P'*"'iH~ lbo'Jt*dn~ al'\d TM grounda for application fOf llauanct of tht Marcf'I .-arrant t1is1 u Nttd in \ht 1uppor\i~ t!fidavtt{l}.
YOU AAE HEREBY COMMANOEO 10 wareh on or t>ttor.-...::t;..=e;.;..:n~(.::.1~0"-)-=d-=a"'"y.:;.s_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(not lO txe.~ 10 day&) \ht perjon ~ pfaeit l'\&mtid abovt for Chi property *P9C'f~. a.Mn; tt'lil warTanl and making tt\f uareh (in tht ~ytim. - S:OO A.M. to 10:0:> P.M.) Cat any til'!'ll in tt'-e day oc ~W Md ti h property bt tour.d thtr* to utza It, '91vir.g 1 copy of d'Va warrant and reeetpt tot IM P!'OPfl1y \lktn, Ind prtp.&rt a M'ftltn ll'wtl'ltoty of
~ ptoptrty Hl29d and ptOmptty return this warrant'° t.h* duty ll. S. M1g11 tr ate
as rtqu1red ~Y hw. . u.,.,.. . .,.... .
WILLIAM J. YicNULTY
OOC:"-'T ,.0, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v.
The Premlses Known As TO: Any Special Agents ~f the U.S.
Dan Lucko\rElectric ~ar&hals or any other ~uthor1zed 7760 Oloria Avenue of f.1cer.
Van Nuys, CalifQrn1a Affldavll(s) t\6.vfng bttl'\ MttJt btfor. me by N btlow-n&n'l9d aff~nt that ht/IM hU rt.UOt'l 10 btli*Ye that on the prtmf s1s known as Dan Lucko~ Electric, 7760 Gloria Avenue, van Nuys, California, further described as a single story concrete type building, et the corner or Gloria and Stagg Avenuee 1 with the number 7760 af f1xed to the exterior of the building and a large sign bearing the name Dan Luckow Electric.
1'n the CE:NTAA.L 'Ohtr1ct of CALIFOPJ\IA there is now bt1ng concea1ed certa1n proptrty, namely:
.SEE ATTACHME-NT A.
and as ram aautrted that 1Mrt probable caUH to ~-.V. tt\lt tht p'°"rty 10 ~ It being conceaitd on the peraot\ or pttml111 abovt-0.Si:rlbed a.r.d the groundl for applic.a1iotl for IPuanet cf the Naret\ warrant exist u alat1d in the aupporllri; affidlvtt{a), *
'° "OU AF\E HEREBY COMMANDED N*rct'I on or before _ .... t .... n.,...l,;(l;;..O;..:):.__;;;d~*;.c.~-*-------
(nol to e.-CHd 1o d1y1) lt)f peraon 0t plac. narntd abovt fOt N property aptClf.!9d, .. rv1rig tf'lla warrant and ~ing
~ a.a&rch ("tn ttlt d.ytlmt -e:OO A.M. ta ,0:00 P.M.) (al &ft)' tlmt '"""'day Of No"W and II h property be found thtrt to ffizt *It, "*vln; a copy of this warrant and rtotlpc tof tnt ~r!)' 1a1ttn1 al'd ~,. a wriUln k'WtnlOIY or hproptttyMlndandprompttyrewmlhilwarranteo the duty u.s, H1;1*t.r~t* *
as required b,y law. "",...,..,...,...
WILLIAM J. ~cNULTY
~ _._.____ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
' .. v.
TO: Any Spec 1al A&ent of the U.S.
The Prem16eS Known As ~arshals or any other aµthor!zed Rosen Eleclric EquipMent c..!'ficers 8226 East Whittier Blvd.,
Pieo Rivera, carifornia Mid1vtt(1) h1Vit\g bun m1ca btf~t mt by tht btlow*nl!!'ltd aHi~ril that"'-~ hU tt*~ to btlitvt that on the prtm1ses known u *
Rosen Llectr1c Eq~~p~ent, 8226 East Wh1tt1er Blv~., Pico Rivera, ca11r., rurthe~ described as a large, single sotry building o!' masonry cor.struc t1on w1 th the r.urr.ber 8226 affixed to the left or the door, and 1n large letters on the front of the building, the
~ord~ Rosen Electric Equipnent.
fn the Ct'NT.RAL *ohtr1 ct of c>.t1roirn1A there is now being concea1td certain proparty, namely:
SEE .P.TTACHMEtxT A and 11 1 am aatiafitd lha1 lhtrt II pt'Obablt c.au .. IO belirn l'\at tht pr~tt)' 10 dffCrlbtd II belnQ CON*alM on tN
,eraon or ,Pr1mlH1 ~ *~\ht 9founcS1 for applieatiOn tor luual"Ct of tt')f March watra"C exist u "
stat1'1 In tht tupporting 1ffio.vtt(1}.1_
YOU ARE HEAE!Y COMMANOEO '° Har~ on Ot btft>tt _ _.t.....
e..;...n__._(.; .;.1. ;. .o*.:. >_d_*;;;.YL..;*;:__ _ _ _ _ _ __
(not to exceed 1o daya) the p.rion 0t plaeie na~ abovt for tht pr~rty ~*'* MMl"IQ th1I YrlrT&nt and l'ftlklng the a.arch (In tht d1ytim1 -1:00 A.M. io 10:00 ft .M.) (11 any timt In lht di)' 0t NghW and WCM property N foul"ld thert IO Hitt ll, lea'iing a copy or &NI warram &/'Id rtetJpt tot thf P._rOPtrty taken,.,., prp~rt 1 dtn lnvtntor; of flt pt"Optt't)' .. !zed al"ld promptly r.tum lhis warrir4 as required by law.
'° th~ d\ltY V
S, Maa 1str
t*
OATlfTIW& tUVU>
WILLIAM J, McNULTY ~.'"~~
Novenft>er 4 ,1988
w t M&ldl II IO bf *ll'lhot LI t<1 "II{ ~ time Ir\ ... t.a y Of tau .. l'ltft+or.
~ *~ .1qr ~ >.o;, ~a Stn CAil r:I ~
~:Jc
ATTACHMENT A @__D
l. All items and documents related to the sale and/or distribution of circuit breakers, including but not limited to1
a. Purcha~e orders, ~nvoices, re~eiving report*, change orders, letters, correspondence, customer liata, sales journals, and bills of lading.
b. List of employees. or any other documents identifying employees or management.
2. .All items and document* related to the manufacturing of circuit breaker&,
including but not limited toz
& *. , P~cha1e orderi *
invoices, receiving report*, change orders, I
letter1, correapondence, *Upplier*liats, material purch***** and j I bills of ladins. * *

* .--*---**--***---::.~-,+---_-, .. *,::::-:.*cc*****-.: * :***.-:--:::.:--.*

./
3. All items or doc\Jmenta related to the quality certification* for
-'- -~,
c... i reu it ..b--~*AA*r*.
.,. *' . / "'*,... *.~~.: .-~~ '.'
~. Any manufacturer'* label or labei1.
S. Any ciTcuit brea'knr *** in the proce11 of bei-ng reconditioned or re-labelled.
l ~illiam J. McNu1ty, dtci1r1 and stete:
l am a Senfor Investigator w1th the Region. V Office of IrTVtstigation*s, United Stete$ Huc1ear Regu1atory Corrr.i1ss1on (NRC) and hava been so
. e~p1oyed since January 1988. Prior to that, t was employed as a Spee1a1 A~ent of the Burtau of A1coho1, Tobacco, and F~rearms. for 12 1/2 years.
2. I_m4ke this affidavit based upon persona1 kno~1edgt ~a1ned as a result of
my 1nvestig~t:!ve ac:t1v1tfes and documer.ts obtained during these l ct i-v 1U es *
3. In* Aprf 1 1988, I 1n1tiated an 1nvest19ation 1nto tht sale ~f substand1rd counterfeit .*:ic1rcu1t breakers so1c! to Oiablo Canyon Nuclear Powet-Phnt~
Sa1e of substandard counttrfeit c1r,u1t br11k1r1 at nu~1ear power p1ants
~!'l d ~onst1_~utt I serious threat to the Uft conduct Of tJ\e ftU~1t~r .
. .. - ... . . . ~.
fac111ty and~ -& vio1-ttf-ott -of Tit1t 18 USC 100h T111t 18 vst-ntO;: ~
Traff1ck1ng of Counterfeit Goods or Services~ Sect1on 206 cf the Energy Reorgenf zation Act of 117*, as Amtnded and Implemented pursuant to i1t1e 10 Part 21.Zli and tht Atomic Energy Act as ~romu1gated by Tit11 '2
use 2213.
~. Because of the required h1;h re11ab111ty 1n qua11ty standards for the use cf e1tctr1cal circuit breakers in n~c1ear power p1ants, th* NRC requires an approved procurement system to bt fo11owed by each of th* nuc1tar
\
r
p:>"'*er pien;.s. r.atn 1yHe;:; i!T'\tra11y re11~ ..,..,, ...... u "' y ....... - -
tt,ttd prod~cts of known qua11ty t~rou;h 1uthor1zed ~tndors/d~itr1butorl o(na~ brand products. In rr.a,..y 1nHanct~, tn1 namt brand producU hevt bten tested 1nd the system of manufacturing has been txam1ntd by th!
nuc1 u r ut i1it1es and the NRC for COMp1 hnct with proper ."'.anufaeturini processH. ThBc processu ruuit 1n rusonab1e assurance that th~se proc:h:cts manufectured by the nalT\E brAnd rnanuhcturer ~et the desired performance and Quaiity standards. When the nll'l\f brand pl"'oduct 1s purchasP.d through the approved proc1,1rtrnent system, there 1S a re1 fa nee by tht nuclear util1t1es and the NRC that the product is authent1e and meet5 prede!ertr.inee ~ua11ty standards of that produet.
s. On July 6 and 1, 1988, as ass1g~ed ~*se agent, J ~arttcip&l!d 1n obte1nf ng
. and ex!cut1ng s~x feder11 search warrants 111u1d by the U.S. District Court of tht Centra1 District of caiifornit. Magistratt Case Number
- ~ .
88*922M, .,~-g231i4, 88-924M, 88*92SM. 88-PZ6M, and 88*927M. These warrants signed *by Honorable Joseph Rtfchnian. Unfted States Magistrate, *~thoriztd
stare~---of. __ the fo11ow1ng fh't compan1u for businus records and
' ~ ..
counterfeit 11b11s r11at1n; to tht sales and d1str1but10ft of T'ltondi1ioned and counterfeit circuit braakirs: 1) Generai C1rcu1t lreaker, 2) HLC Electric Supply, 3) CaHf'ornh Breakers, ti) AC C1reu1t !T"taktrs, tnd
5) Genera1 Magnet1es C1reuit Breakers. After r1v1ew1ng doeUTntnts seized curinc;; these se~rc.h warrants, I detent.1ntd that the f'fvt c~pardes SUl"'cned hed 'o1d hundred; of reconditton1d circuit breakers to nueiur
~ower plant' throughout the United 1tat1s and 17 ether United States Governmtr.t agtncies to 1nclude the United StltH Stcrtt Service. e'ftl\*er throu9h manufacturer authori?ed t1e:tr1ca1 supply ~ouses or d1rtct 1a1ts.
~. on July 7, l~B~, aur1ng tr.e txecvticn or Feaera1 ~earcn w1rr1n~ ~~*)'~~.
at Genertl C1reu1t Breaker, 11740 Clark Street, ~rca~1a, Cal~fprn1a, 1nttrvi*~ed Xav11r Contreras, Prts1dtnt of Gtnera1 Circu1t lreaker.
Contrer*' de~cribed h~s business *~ a ~gray ~arket" operation that recond~tior.s end rt11bels c1rcu1t brtakers which art typ1ca1ly sold to cornmerc1e1 e1~ctr1cal supp1y out1ets. Based upon ~Y r1v1ew of document'
. and field reports, I have deterrr.1ned that the other four companies searched a1so rtcond1t1on and re1abe1 circv1t breakers. The labt1s are often printed by local print shops or ere photocop1es cf authentic man~f actur1ng lebels.
7. D.n ~uly 7 1 1988, Xav1er Coritreru prov1dtd me with a lht of comper.1es who lho 'reeonditiOI'\ and re1abe1 t1rcui*t \ruk.erJ, Atnong tht Cr>mperliH I
on that 1ist were:
. - - ... I
Ro11n'E1ectr1c
Den Lutltow Electric
.. . '!.**I. *,, Luc\*~*;C1rr::u1t lnaktr'
Pane1 lo1rd Sp*c*a1t1ts
8. As
rtsu1t of the arches conducttd on Ju1y 7, 19S.S. and the fnfonnation obtained during the cou~se of r~ 1n~est1gation, tht MRC 1s1ued an lr.fomibtion Notice a1ed1n9 t11 Unit.td St&to nu:lur pOW!r ~hnts of the pottntiel safet1 hazard' prtstnted by defeetivt recondit~oned e1rcv1t brea~ers with tounterft1t 1abeis.
f
~. ~,! rtsuH of the NRC lnfol'l',llf on N~t fct, General Eltctrf c Supply ~
Company caused t search of purchase orders from approx1mett1y 130 Genertl Electric supply houses to bt made to de:trm1ne to what extent their dtstrtbutton system may h1v1 been 1nfi1tr*ted by the c1rc~it breaker "gray market."
10. Initial revitw of docul')!"ts provided by General E1ectrtc Supply Com~any indicate that Rosen El~ctrfc his sold circuit breakeri throu;h a Genert1
£1H t ,. i c s up p1y ti ouse to a nu ci e1 r pow er pia nt an d a1s o ma de s e ver al sales to National Aeronautics end Speee Ad~inistratio~ fac1lit;e~.
I *
11. On Novtl'Jtbtr 2, 1988, I r1ceived copies of c1v1l filings made on bthalf cf
~es~inghouse £1ectric Corporation and Underwr1ttrs L1boratcries. Jne.
which were filed 1n L1.S. District Couri9 tentra1 District c*f Ca1tfornh,
. _. ' I . -- *--. *--*-:--..--. --** *-- . _* .. *-------*
under C1v11*.Cuts 88*060.25Wt>r. and 88*06028,AR. As 1 ruuit of NV1twfng these filings and sworn dec11r1tions. J believe that Ro11n Electric, 8226 East Wh1ttiir.tov11vard, Ptco l1vtra. ta1tfort111i Luckow Circvti lf'tat1rs, 2708 South Grind Avenue, Santa Al\l,. C111fornf1; .
Da" Lu~k°" E1ectt1c. 7760 Gloria ~venut, Van Nu1s~ Ca11for.n1a; end P1nt1 Board Spec1a1tits, 29885 St~ond Street, Lite Els1nort, Caiiforni1 1 *re engaged 1~ tht rteondit1onf~~ of used c1reu1t breakers to 1nciude rt1abe11ng thtse circuit breakers with counterfeit labe1s and 1e~ling these breakers as new. I base this be11tf on the fo1low1ng sworn d1cl1~at1ons;
On October 2S, 1988, act1n; on b!!'laH of Gel'\era' Ehctdc and.~
~~5t1nghoust, undercover optratfv1 David Perticone purchastd 1 General Eltctric circuit breaker fro~ Rosen tiectr1c. Wh1lt p1ck~n~ vp the breaker It Rosen Electric' bus1ness ~rtmf ~es lt 8226 East Wh1tt1tr Bov1tvard, Pico ~1vtra, Pert1cont ob,erved c1rcu1t brt&kers being reccnditioned. Ht aiso observed whit appeartd.to be photocopies of General Eltctr~c and W1~tinghouse )abe1s next to the.brtakers wh1eh wer~
bei~9 re:ond1tfor.ed. The'e 1abe1s ~ere arrayed 1n such a manner that Pertf cont concluded that ~&ch labe1 was to bt placed on breakers bein; r~conditioned. On October 2~, 1988, undercover operative Michael Camp11n purchas;d a circuit breaker from Rose~ tiectric tnat was detenTlined by Wu-t1nghou5e En9111eer, Rona1d Ring,er, to !'lave bun aHemb1td from Stver&1 I
~ifferent types of circuit breakers and was labe1ed ~1th a counterfeit Westinghouse iabel.
~ . ." '
.'. . ..(: .,.
- ~--- .....* 13. At to hne1.. loard Spec1&lttes:
i*:**
..,: ... On Oct~~5, , 1"8, Dennis ~ohnson stated that btt~een Junt Zt, 1987 and.
': *. ~..
~"'uary 22, 1998, ~t was ttn;>loyad as 1 Shop Su~trv1sor at Petit, l~ard Spte1a1ths. Dur1n; Ms ttnu,..1 at* P&ne1 Bo*rd Sp1ei1H1es
Johnson said that !O percent of ali- c1reu1t..brukers 'old b.Y Panel Board Speth1t1es W!tt ustd ~ircuit breakers that had been rteonditioned and 'o1d as new.
The~e break!rs were rthbthd w~th ~-~otoeopi~d 111beh *Mch ~tre store~
on tht premises. Bttwetn October 19 and 25, 1968. u~dtrcov1r operative
p*~ticone purchased two e1rcu1t braaktri wh1eh we~e repr1stnttd as
r1eor:_d~ t 1oned frorr. Pane 1 Board Sp!C hit 1ts wh t ch were det.erm~ ntd by ~ii;)
General Electric and ~!St1nghou't tng1n1ers to bear counterfe1t 1ibei~
l*. As to Oan Lucko~ E1ectr1c:
Bet~een October 19 and 25, 1988. Pert1co~e purchased two circuit breakers from Dan Lvckow E1ectric, 776C Gloria ~vtnue, Van Nuys. Thue circuit brtaktr1 wtre t~amined by Gentrt1 £1ectrfc and Westinghouse eng1netrs and deterr.iined to be ncond1t1ori~d t1"1d bore what appeared to be courittrft1t 11be1s.
lS. As to . Luck.ow
. Circu1 t !ru.kers:
~On October 3, 1988, ~~eh*ei Stravss, in 1 sworn dec11r1t1on, stated that
~etliietn Ftbrv1r1 and Mly 1987, ht was ~1oytd by Luckow Circuit Brta~trs 1s 1 Purchn.tng / *-*
A~ent. Strauss u td that Luck.ow C1 rcui t lr*atars
. I .. -
pu~eh1std u.td circuit ~reakars, recond1t~Ol\ed th,m, and in ,..ftY. instances so1d them as.new. 5tr1us1 aiso ia1d that durfng ~ht r1eondit1cnfng .
process, phoiocoptes labe1s Wirt 91u1d onto U\t ~reak1r1. Thtlt 1abe1s wert stored in t workbtneh an 1M ,,._,.,,. .On-OCtDlr -ZO~...UU, *
P1rt1con!.purch1sed
W.est1nghouse JA type c1reu1t breaker from iuctow Circuit Bru ktrs wh1 ch was rtprtsenttd to bt reconditfor.ed by LucttO'fl' C1rcu1t ereaker5. Ana1ys1s by Westinghouse engineers detennined that the breaker ~~s ~n f*ct a KA ser1ts breaker wh1ch had be!n ccnv1rttd and "ade to look i Ht 1 JA breaker. This broker wu used and thtrt was l'IO evidenct of rteond1tion1ng as was reprtstnttd by Luekow C1rcuit 8ri1kars.
On October 24. l988, t"'o Gener1l Eltctr*c Circuit Breakers wt , rt purchased
f
frorn. Luc~ow t1rcu1t !rulers bt Pert1cont, T~t1e bruters w.ert u1~1nej6>)J by Gener&1 Electric eng1neer1 who determined
.-:="".::""'
t~at one of the brt&k!rs ha bten rtc1ltbr6ted fro~ a 100 amp br1aker to 1 110 *~P breaker. This recaitbr*tion effect1vt1y 1ncreases the 1mp1rage levei at ~hich the br1aker wt1' trip, In the tngineer*s op1n1on, this brea~*r wouid itke1y f&il to cperate as 1 110 1mp breaker 1s dts1;ned and could Tupture the
~ ta~e ccus1n~ a ha?ardo~s sttuatCon, The other breaker, a1though so1d *~
a 110 a~p breaker had not been rec11ibr1ttd an~ was in fact a 100 amp breaker, if utilized 1n 1 110 l~? app11cat1on, this breaker cou1d also rupture cre~tin; 1 hazardous s1tuat1on. Both of these breaKers were 1!'1Hil'l9 factory ~nHailed 1r:su1ation r"aterh1 wh1ch ccu1d-r!SuH 1n se . . er inj~r~ti or eltctrocut1on dur1nQ operation.
1£. On Novem~er 3, 19SB, l spoke with Jostp~ let, an attorney who represer.ts the Squire J) Corporat,on, Wtst1f\ghoust Corporation, and the GtMra1 Elec:tr,c Co,.poration. 1'ttort11y lee advhtd that after consu,taticn wi~h his cl1e~~\* Square 0 Corporat1en, Wtst1n9hou$t torpor&t1on, and tht
.,;:~* ::.* .
. :. > ; : Gtntra1 E1tctr1c Ccrporit1en tMt l)jn Luckow tl.ct'fic, luck°" -C1TCU1t lr11kars 1 and Pane1 Board Spec1t1ties *e¥e not authorized distributor$ of SQuart O, West~nghouse,and Gener1i Eh::tric products. Lee further advised that Ro*en Electr1e ~as 1n authoriztd Ganera1 Electric d1str1butor but was not tuthor1ztd Square O or We5t1nghouse d1stributor and further that none of these four co~p~n~es ~ere autho~ized to affix or reproduct
~d U$t 1n aMy ~ey tradt~arks 1 11beis. or etrt1f1cat1ons for any Square O, Ge~eral E1ectr1c, or We5t1n9hou5e products.
substandard e1ectr1cal CO~?Or.t~ts to nuclear power piants 11cenltd by the N~*
nd u 1es to other 9ove rn~tn t 1; t n: i es , H wtl 1 bt nt cu ,.*ry to {:;.D';J search the premises of the four business 1ocat1ons for business records~
and automated records and programs that ~111 estab1fsh the*11l1s
d1str1but1o~, shipping, menufactur1ng, mat~ria1 pureha5tS, Accounts rect1vab1e, accounts payable, and QU~l1ty -cert1f1eat1ons for any saies of circuit br~aker~ to distributors and supp11ers of the nuc1ear power ind~5try *nd/or direetiy to nuciear power p1ants. It w111 also be "ecessar~ to starch tht pre~f ses for the presence of eounterf11t labe1s ind rt:or.ditioned circu1i bre~~ers bearing counterfeit labe1s.
£xtc1,1ted -this 4th _day of NO't'e!Tlber, 19De, at Los Ange1es. C.Hfornh, I
- - . -* */- -***-.- ;'\ ~
Q~ tlt*m J. McNulty, Senior 1nvuU9ttor j -~~ .o,_.t*nv11ti91t1on1 Field Offfet, Region V
u"f te~ States Nuclear R*guiatory Co=iss1on Sworn end subser"fbed to befor"t me
- thf s - - - - d a y of kovember 1988.
Ontt!d States fia~istrate
1 HE cut. .1~~UNV'vt:.AL l Hut- MA~~,...vnu..JL.. ** <J DE.-t.r.rr.'ENT OF iHE ATTORNEY GE~JERAL Jv~"-W McCORVACK S7AiE OFFICE e **n1.::1~G CNE ASHBURiON PLA~E. ecsrcN 0210&*16~8 JAMES M SHANNO~
no111"'£Y c;c"'l~*1.
Dece~be= 6, 1988 Ste?hen s. Co~:ey We the Peo;::~i:
Box 277 Rowley, MA 01969
Dear ~r. C:
ley:
hank you for yo~: !etter .to Attorney General Sha~non cated Nover.~er 30, 1988. I have raviewed the analysis by ~e the People. In order to complete our review, I would appreciate the original re?orts footnote.9 at the end of your analysis. I
~ould also appreciate any additional inf~nnation you could give me concerni::*g the confidential informants vi thin th* );JtC.
I look for.,..*ard to hearin9 from you shortly.
Very truly youra,
/Vp_g-*
tt.Qa. eM**
.... O.puty AttOhef---G.neral Chie!, Public Protection Bureau SAJ/BT i-.'E A.':\.E. ALS::i ~o:~ Fi."l~G E\"ERY C. S. SE?iATOR, CO~GR.ESSXA.N. GO\.ER~OR ( INCLt:Dl~G T!-:E "Pt:S5":'CAT") .:O.:.\"D ~,-:-;::;: :~C'~"SE S7AFF TO E~DOi'SE THIS co~:c:F.ESSIO~AL
!X\"£s:-:GAT:o~.
U11ul!J S1a1es 1lt1umty BLW: CWQ LTR12-6C District of Mary/IJnd l.1'1ittd St*tt1 Cowtltou1t, £itlttlt Floor JOI /.~Jr;.:1 JOI Jtlnt ~/>>NJ Si'fttt
,.,,._,,.,.,,* ., moi-!691 r;.. ~. . F'TS 'yo:..1.~
December 6, 1988 ~
Stephen B. Comley Executive Director W~ The People of the United States 5 o Court St re et Plymouth, Massachusetts* 02361
Dear Plr. Comley:
Thank you for your letter of October l.l,. ltll.
I h'ave reviewed the aaterial you."*" f'6raiabed tllia office, and your requested *1nctependent ia"st~atio'a of tu
Nae*. I trust you realize that ~ juriadiction la 11111.ted to the investigation of suspected criainal acti*ity within the District of Maryland! In your . .terlal, I fail t.o di*i . . any allegations of auch conduct occurring within thia_Di~lc~.
Your aaterials do refer to reporta of a\lNuadard.and
. falsely certified parts being u. .d in ftulear power plant*. You should be aware that aeveral criminal in***tigaton* of the manufacturers of sue~ itetas are currently underway in districts that have jurisdiction over such runufacturera.
I appreciate your taking the time to share your con~erns
'With us.
With best regards.
cerely, inrid~lcox d State* ~ttorney
1:1.nittd ~tatts ~mate WASHINGTO~J. CC 2CS 10 e
Dacember 19, 1988 The Honorable John Breaux Chairman Senate Sub~o~~i~tee on Nuclear Regulation 458 Dirksen Washing~on, DC 20510
Dear John:
I am sending to you an analysis prepared by a constituent group in Massachusetts regarding suspect materials used in the Seabrook and Pilgrim nuclear power plants.
I would appreciate your thoughts &nd ideas on*hov to
.proc . .d with this troubling information. If your commit'tee could help in addressing these concerns i~ would be vre*tly e1.ppreciated *
. . .7/L7 John Kerry .
UllllLU ~ldlt..::J e--JLlkl&.l.
WASHINGiON. CC 2CS10 Decembe= 19, 1988
~.
The Honorable John Glenn Chairman Senate Committee en Gove=n:.iental Affairs 340 Dirksen Washington, DC 20510 Dea= John:
~ am sending to you an analysis prepared by a constituent group in Massachusetts regarding suspect materials used in the se*abrook and Pilgrim nuclear power plants.
~ I would appreciate your thoughts and idea. on hov to proceed with this troubling informat*ion. If your ccmmittee could help in addressing these concern. it would be greatly appreciated. -- ... *-- --*---*-.-*---------- --...,----------
CJ./.L , _ _ _
John lt*n:y* .... __
7
.lin1tco ~car£.s ~llluLt:
WASHING":"ON. OC 20510 Dece~ber 19, 1988 The Honorable Quentin N. Burdick Chairman Senate CoITu-:-:i~~,:e c:-. E:i.viror..'ilent and Public Wo:?:ks 458 Dirksen Washington, DC 20510 Dea= Quentin:
I am sending to you an analysis,prepared by a constituent group in Massachusetts regarding suspect ma'terials used in the Seabrook and Pilgrim nuclear power plants *.
I would appreciate your thoughts and ideas on hov to proc-d vith this troubling information. If your committee could help *in. these *concern.. it would be greatly appreciated.
in1.1Yi. ' .
.John Kerry 7
<Bnital ~tatts ~matt WASHINGTON, OC 20510 January 2, 1988 I
I
~r. Stephan p. Comley 5o c our- t st r*e et Ply~outh 1 M~ 02351 Dea; Mr. Co~ley:
I have forwarded the analysis that you sent me re~arding substandard materials in nuclear power.
plants to'the appropriate com~ittee chairmen.~*
I will keep you up to date as they respond to this information. Thank you for sending me the report.
. .. ... . *- **-* ----* -*- .. **- -~--* .. **-*-**--**--*-* ..... *-**-*--**- *--* . ------*--*-
enc ..
/
- **** ... *r-**~** ....
LL: 5AF: fern lf'osh11111011, D. C. }0.5JO JN~ 3 198.9 Mr. Stephen B. Comley Executive Director We the People of the United States, Inc.
Box 277 Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Mr. *Comley:
Your letter* of December 13, 1988 addreaa*d to Attorney General 'rhornburqh has been referred to the Criainal Di*i*ion.
We have reviewed the *aterials you encloaed. The Department is aware of the alle<Jations you have aade concerni!MJ cOa.at.erfeit and
ub*tandard aateriala, and* ia taking appropriat. . .&Mire* with re*peet to the situation. Accordin9ly, ve-4o n~ beli. . . it ia necessary to meet with you at this time. Pleaae do not he*itate to forward to us any further information you may cSevelop concerning poaaible federal criminal violation* at nuclear power plants.
Sincerely;*
Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.
Assistant Attorney Gen4:ral Criminal Division By: /\ :rt' ~-
()(e;___ ~c Lawrence Lippe, Chief General Litigation and Legal Advice Section Criminal Division
STATE: OF' New YoRK EXECUTIVE CHAMBER
ALBANY 1222'4 M.o.AIO M. CUOMO Govc""o" January 3, 1989
Dear Mr. Cro~ley:
The Governor has asked me to respond to your rece~t lecter to him requescing a mee~ing r~garding che Nucl~ac Regulatory Commission.
I have forwarded your le.tter to -Frank Murray, Deputy Secretary to the Governor tor Energy and Environ-ment, for appropriate action. Mr. Murray can oe reached at 518-474-1288.
Thank you for taking the tJ.Jn. to forward this informa-tion to the Governor .
Mr. Stephen B. Comley Executive Director We The People of the United States Box 277 Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
WASl-<INGTON. 0 C. 20~10 January 10, 1989 Mr. Stephen B. Comley We The People, Inc. of the u es I Box 277 Rowley, Massachusetts Oi969
Dear Mr. Comley:
Thank you .very much for sending me .. information on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's activities. . --- .... --*-------
! value your thoughts and apPreciate 1our takin9 the tiDN to provide ae with this infor. . tion. Thia infor11ation will be helpful in my consideration of leti*lative*propaaala in thia area. *
. Again, thank you for takin9--tbe--ti*a.e*-*tc;***e:c:miac:t- --~- ----------*-
Please feel free to send me any other aaterials you .., wish to bring* to my attention.
Bill !radley United States Senator BB/msz
THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON January 18, 1989
Dear Mr. Comley:
Thank you for your letter of Dece~ber 30, 1988, requesting an appointment with the President to discuss your concerns regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's position on the safety of U.S. nuclear power plants.
Unfortunately, due to the many demands on the President's time before-he leaves office, we are unable to schedule any additional appointments. **
Aqain, thank you for your interest and concern.
Sincerely, FRBDEJUClt J. RYU, Jlt *.
Aaaiatant to tlae Preaidtmt
~ . ".
Mr. Stephen B. Comley Executive Director We The People of the United Stat*s, Inc.
Box 277 Rowley, MA 01969
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IA**EY GUA .. 0, ""0~1TY STAii 01 .. ICT;~ COMMITTEl ON ENVIRONMENT >-NO PUBLIC WORKS WASHINCiTCN, CC 20510-6175 January 31, 1989 The Honorable John Kerry 358 Russell Senate Office Building United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear John:
Thank you for forwarding to me information provided by ydur-constituents regarding the use of substandard or counterfeit materials by U.S. nuclear power plants. I apologize for the delay in responding_. to this material. The Committee on Environment and Public.Works has been undergoing a reorganization, and it was unclear until last week that I would be continuing in my capacity.as Chairman of.the Nuclear Regulation Subcommittee.
As you know, counterfeit o:r*-substandara*-materials have shown up in a number of sensitive* applications, including nuclear and defense applications. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has been working with the industry to identify the scope and severity o*f this problem, and has issued a nwnber of bulletins regarding remedial actions when
problems have been discovered. I have requested a variety of documents from the NRC in relation to this matter, and will be happy to forward to you those that you may find useful in responding to your constituents.
Please know that I have directed the staff to review this matter further, and will keep this issue in mind as we develop the agenda for the Subcommittee. If I may be of further assistance, please let me know.
J BREAUX nited States Senator J3:8C
-~= ...
PUBLIC CITIZEN8 Buyen Up D Congress Watch o Critfoal Ma" DH,./th R<sea<'Ch Group 0 Lltigatlan Group February 28, 1989 Stephen B. Comley We the People P.O. Box 277 Rowleyr MA 01969
Dear Mr. Comley:
This letter is to confirm that Public Citizen joins you in calling for a Congressional investigation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) failure to adequately address the use of counterfeit and* ~~bstandard materials bein§ used in u.s. nuclear power plants~
Although the issue of "bogus parts" affects ~any u.s. industries (including the airline industry and the military), a counterfeited and substandard valve or circuit breaker can have particularly severe repercussions in a nuclear power plant. Although Vict6r Stello, the NRC's Executive Director of Operations, has stated, *This is a very serious issue," the NRC has done little to address it. A series of NRC notices on the issue to nuclear power p_lant operators included few new requirem~nts, ~nd the NRC has since weakened some of those.
Currently, the NRC is publicly aware of bogus parts being_used __
in a number of areas including circuit breakers, motor-operated valves, piping materials, and fasteners. Although the agency has issued notices on each of these issues, it has failed to address the over-arching problem -- intentional fraud on the part of materials suppliers and the lax attitude of nuclear plant operators in inspecting the parts they purchase and install.
The NRC is deferring its regulatory responsibility in this area to the nuclear industry itself, a strategy that has failed thus far.
A Congressional investigation is necessary to uncover the extent of the bogus parts problem and NRC's unwillingness to correct it.
Public Citizen joins you in cafling for such an investigation.
Sincer-ely,--
-~)(
l (_ I (. ,) . 2 Kenneth Boley Nuclear Safety Analyst Critical Mass Energy Project of Public Citizen l 1.5 f'r.nns)*lvonic1 Ave. SE :..J Wushinston, DC 20003 0 12021 !i46-4996
.* EDWARD M. KENNEDY Wniteb etatet> i>tttate WASHINCiTON, OC 20510
~
1 a J' 18 t 19 8 9 The Honorable Johr. Breaux Chairman Senate Subco~mittee on Nuclear Regulation 458 Dirksen Washington, DC 20510
Dear John:
In re-cent months, actions .. taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission relative to the licensing of the Seabrook Nuclear Power plant artd the restart of th~ Pilgrim.Nuclear Power Station have generated considerable concern among residents of Massachusetts.
Certain constituent organizatione, including "Citizens urging Responsible Energy" and "We The People" have requested that Congressional investigations be undertaken to eiamine the ac;:tivities of the NRC Region I Off ice in relation to .the restart of the Pilgrim p_larit, and* the use of cc>unterfeit materials at a number of plants,* including Seabrook.
We ate f orwardin9 background material prepared by these groups for your ieview. We would appre~iate your evaluation and advice on desirable courses of action to t~ke with tegard to this disturbing information, *tf your Subcommittee wo~ld deem it
approptiate to address these concerns, it would be deeply appreciated,
With.best wishes, Since:rely,
~-----*---------I Edward M. Kennedy Studds
EOWARD M. KENNEOY Wnitcb &tatr.~ i>enate WASloilNO'!ON, OC 20510
~ May 18, 1999 The Honorable Quentin N. Burdick Chairman Senate Committee on E~vironment and Public works 458 Dirksen Washington, DC 20510
Dear Quentin:
~ .
In recent months, actions taken by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission relative- to the licensing o! the .Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant and the restart of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station have generated considerable c6ncern amotig residents of Massachusetts.
cer~ain constituent organizations, including "Citiz~ns urging Resporiaible ___ Energf11
an*a-n*we*Tne *People" have *requested* that Congressional investigations be undertaken to examine the activities of the NRC Region I Off ice in relation t~ the restart of the Pilgrim plant, and the use of coun.terfeit mat*erials at a number of plant&, including Seabrook. ~
We are forwarding background material prepared by these groups for your review. We would appreciate your evaluation and advice on desirable courses of action to take with regard to this disturbing information *. 'if youx: committee would deem it appropriate to address these concerns, it would be deeply appreciated.
With. best wishes, Sincerely, ~
Edwa~nedy
. _. _. .- . -.- . -.-------* ____t - r John F. Kerry
.*F.DWARO M. KENNEOY
' ooMt.<CHJOfT"l Ul niteb j,tates j,enatc WASHINGTON, DC 20010 M~y 18, 1989 The Honorable John Glenn Chairman Senate Corn~i~tee on Governmental Affairs 340 Dirksen Washington, DC 20510
Dear John:
Iri ~ecent months, actions taken by the N~olear Regulatory Commission relative to the licensing of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant and the restart of the Pil9rim Nuclear Power Station have generated considerable concern among residents of Massachusetts.
Cextain constituent organiz~tions, including "Citizens urging Responsible Energy" and nwe The Peop~eu have :equested that ..
Congressional investiqations be undertaken to examine the .
~ctivities of the NRC Region I Off iae in relation to the restart*
of the* pilgrim plant, and the uae of counterfeit materials at a number of plants, including Seabrook.
We are forwarding background :na tar ie. l prepared by these*"-** * --*---*--
groups for your review. We would appreciate your evaluation and advice on desirable courses of action to take with regard to thia disturbing information *. -rf your Committee would deem it appropriate to address these concerns, it would be deeply appreciated.
we also want to commend you and the Co:nmittee for the ongoing examination of the NRC's actions taken in regard to Mr, Roger A.
Fortuna, the former Deputy Director of the NRC's Off ice cf Investigations. Perhaps, within the scope of the Committee's cur:i::ent investigation,* consideration might~.be given to sotr.e of the allegations raised in the enclosed material, wit~ best wishes, Sincerely,
~
Edward M. Kenne~y
. Studds . ~
EOWA~O M. KENNEDY MASSACHUSETTS WASHINGTON. O.C. 20510
~lay 23, 1989 Mr. Stephen B: Comley Executive Director We The People-of the United States, Inc.
Box 277
.... **1: .:**.* ... *:* .. *.**: Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Mr. Comley,
In response to your request for a Congressional investigation into the possible use of counterfeit materials at nuclear power plants, Senator Kennedy, Senator K~rry and Congressman Studds sent the ~nclosed letters to the appropri.ate members of the Senate who chair Committees or Subcommittees with jurisdiction over this matter .
. .~ .* .-****. *.... .,, ...* . ..... ***~ ': .
ou*r off ice. will provide you with copies of the responses from Senator Glenn, Senator Burdick and Senator Breaux once they have been received and reviewed by Senator Kennedy.
Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the important issues relating to nuclear power plants.
r*
Sincerely, . ,,,,.--,_
i)
I/
l / **1 t /' '\ . ,
*.; .';** **r (\.. * ..__ ., . ) ' . £.\. ,/.-l .* .* * ./ . , ..
Kathleen R: Anderson Mafes. Legislative Director
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~"' *~ UNIHD STAHS
/~,***

:\
NUCLCAn nEGULATORV COMMISSION o . . )o WASHINOTON, 0.C. 20!ill!i
~.....,
April 4, )990 OHIC& ()II THl UC"ITAIW
( Mr. st.ephen o:nlf!J'j WA 'Iha ~le, lr'J:,
Ebe 277
~ley, Mas&a.chU.set:t.9 01969 Dau Mr. c.anley:
'Ihis i.s to cxn!im that the xrat.erial ycu gave~ at the Nuclear ~tort O:lnn1.s.sionts March 1, 1990, ~ on Seabrook was hardl.ed as toll.CMS:
.- a r.:cr;tf ot all m?lterials, inol\Xlin;J a xarc:oc CJ:1fi1:1 ot the ~,
- was given to the ottice of the Chairman a.rd to the . ottioe& ot each o::mt\i.Saioner, tha Office or the General CDln88l, tha,.
ottioa of .tr. ~ve Direct.or tar cpen.tiaw, am to tha O!tioe of ~ic Attain.
a copy ot all atarials, inclmin:l a xcac OOf!i ot t.he ~ *
. WU piac:.i in the ~ 1 a official ~ file for Seebrook and. placed in tha Public J:)OQ..-it, lccl:I.
- a et:1fH ot all matui.a.19, in:lu:Un; t:bl cri¢nal cf. tM ~,
. . . M1t to the JR: lnlp9ctcr c:.m:al tor ~ -=tic:n~
'Ih8 In8peCtar General wa ldv1-1 of ~ clai:a tMt tha P10tO wu a pictm:e t.a>c.n of YQ1 in OCtc:bm: 1911 ¢Yin.J f~
P:wsus.nt ~ a letter 1.ti1d\ 1nSicat.s tbat tmn wa a pitelm with ~ pert.a il\ the nx:l*r ira.t:r.i*
C-I! ycu haw tu.rt.her quaticns re;ardin:J e:nJ toll~ ~' )'m stalli1 *refer them to the O!fioe* ot the I1wpeCtCr ~ (301-492-9093) *
' ' \.- I II \.: T l' 0 JJI l' , I I H: *
- - - - - - - - - - - of the L' n i tcd SI ut es - - - - - - : - - - - - - - - - ,
.-:=- ...
~ .\11111 ('111:/'lln/lrl 111'1'1' September 14, 1990
~ Mr. David Williams Office of the Inspector General Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington o.c. 20555
Dear Mr. Williams,
On October 26, 1987, during a luncheon held in Washington, o.c. by the Republican Inner Circle of which I am a member, I handed President Ronald Reagan a package of in_forJnation about counterfeit, substandard materials built into u.s. nuclear power plants. At the time this information was known to the U.S. Nuclear Regul at*ory Ccmunission, but was being kept secret.
Although the President denied the exchange took place, a photograph of me handing the information to the President shows that it did.
We gave a copy of these photographs as well as some documents to members of your staff during our meeting of August 10, 1990. I am asking you to investigate wby the President denied receiving this information. I would also like you to investigate why the NRC tried to keep the information about counterfeit substandard materials .,a public secret" instead of taking immediate action to protect the people who live near the affected nuclear p6ier plants. It is my belief that. the only reason the NRC'finally admitted the serious safety probl~m exists. is because We The People made a major effort to publicize the situation, (see New York Times article March 18, 1988 enclosed), forcing the NRC to finally afert owners of nuclear power plants which contain the counterfeit, substandard materials. -
Please let me know as soon as possible what action you intend to take in this matter and if I can help in any way with this investigation.
Sincere! y, (1 st phen e.~:mle~
Executive Director
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- - - - - - - - - - - of the C n i tcd St at es - - - - - - : - - - - - - ,
.?'".: .. .\111/l CIH:m11/Jr/ llL'rc September 14, 1990
'* Mr. David Wi 11 iams Office of the Inspector General Nuclear Regulatory Corrunission Washington o.c. 20555
Dear Mr. Williams,
On October 26, 1987, during a luncheon held in Washington, D.C. by the Republican Inner Circle of which I am a member, I handed President Ronald Reagan a package of in.for_rnation about counterfeit, substandard materials built into U.S. nuclear power plants. At the time this information was known to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but was being kept secret.
Although the President denied the exchange took place, a photograph of me handing the information to the President shows that it did.
We gave a copy of these photographs as well as some documents to members of your staff during our meeting of August 10, 1990. I am asking you to investigate why the President denied receiving this information. I would also like you to investigate why the NRC tried to keep the information about counterfeit substandard materials "a public secret" instead of taking immediate action to protect the.
people who live near the affected nuclear p6ier plants. It is my belief that. the only reason the NRC'finally admitted the serious safety problem exista is because We The People made a major effort to publicize the situation, (see New York Times article March 18, 1988 enclosed), forcing the NRC to finally af~rt owners of nuclear power plants which contain the counterfeit, substandard materials. -
Please let me know as soon as possible what action you intend to take in this matter and if I can help in any way with this investigation.
Sincere! y, ~
B.~~rnl~~
Director
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 May 31, 1991 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL Mr. Stephen B. Conley Man'sion Drive Rowley, MA 01960
Dear Mr. Comley:
This correspon9ence.is provided in response to your request of Special Agent Kent E. Walker concerning the status of an allegation you f orward~tl to ~he Inspector General concerning former President.Ronald Reagan. You alleged that in October 1987 you provided President Reagan with information regarding the use of counterfeit and substandard parts throughout the nuclear industry ~nd that the former President subsequently refused to acknowledge receipt of that information. Your concerns were provided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Silver Spring, MD, on Decereber 13, 1990.
Sincerely,
~/~~
Leo J. Norton, Assistant Inspecto~
General for Investigations
He. would. not, however, comment dlrecUy on the status o(
tho lnvesUgatlon but said "If we
~b:.:;,'::!,~.!ooking beyond Mr. Nort.on said If there are technical conterns at a nuclear l>lant ~arding health or S..!ely It would be the NRC'1 responsl-bWty lo determine what course to tab.
h~*~~~il hl~dth~';n~t':.'i°o~
inadequate components in nu-clear plants may be an ln-vesUgaUon !or U.S. Atlornoy General Richard L. Thornburgh.
11 0f course Mr. Thornburgh was the governor of Penn-
~~~~~~Q sylvania during the Three-Mile
~[fill!Jt:'.ffi~~t"ltsland covcrup,** Mr. Comley
,., said. /
t:F~: *.-. . .; .
..~fli/:?.[Ook (?rdered own shutdown
..
J:>ORTSMOUTH -* In 'a Page : electrical grid. .
.i' t~*<lll;bllday, May 7, concU- The senators, *including Sen.
nbii'lhe request to Gov. Judd Elaine Krasker of Porlsmoulh Qr\!ilil ftom six DemqcraU~ state said in Lhe letler queslions ol
senators seeltlng. a, probe of mechanical inLC!'grHy a nc mechanical
anil aperatlonal. opera.Uonal management Med le problems at Seabroolt StaUon, It be answered and oo incl<!pcndr.n ll'llated the latest shutdown was iovestlgatlon by an urganizalio1
ordered by the Nuclear lte1nda* such as the congrcs.o;inoal c,:n
, '>lilly Commission after turolne era!' Accuuntint1 O!Or* or th*
Yltiratlans exceeded allowed *state attorney general's orric*
11m1u. as the reactor reached 8 *wou1d* lell what 1-emC<lial st~p
.. w~capatjt)', oeedlobelaken.
Ran Shei-, a New Hampshire laa;t'i:'t=t:'~t.sald Tues* co~n~~ u!"\~h::;~y,.;,;
.*. Tbe Nuclear Regulatory and prosperity of the P<Ol'I* a*
Commission did not order Lhe are 'nOl acting *as a p:1rtlso
=
Seabrook Station shutdown organitallon In the debate ovc Saturday, April 28*, be said. *~~';:' powpshler.re Yankee sa1'd
Seabrook StaUon engineers and Ham aenlar management made the
b, "ih: ~u*i~~~l:~i0j
. declllllll to delay testlJJg for lour stalllnu lour new solld*rncl."11 ro Jo abt w~ In order to make ....
mod!llcaUom to \be plant' a blr* ~b.J:..~!~~ r!I'.ui:;,i.:~~ :~:
bine."' .i
1*' .. ' * ,.
of the turbine blades In one sc
fi,t* ~:~1""~.~b'!ll;,:~~ :I:'
._pm11a but that Seabrook.Station
.~11::..:~~*~ u~:1~
blnablades
.;~de~ that elec* * * .
I ..... _ _ .: feedback Jor:c;ea *.from* the J!ecause or the length o! hr
'j * **
elec **JJ<JWer grid ,,jn.qq!r:ed. to malr.e the mo<li!I*
IN PERSON
And-nuclear activist StePhen Comley,* low* ** 'a . or:*..tlon~ lo the turbine, seni
' * * <l!l!loa~ent decided: to sl left. p,sa~ lnfonna11on on Inadequate.. ~lea! r8ac\or safety;..>
components to fol'll\!!(~Lf'.l'ealdr.! Ronal.d Reagan*.~*.* ; ,
~~nfundral~2.8 1 \987.: __ -** . ~".'.f&l *
>-~.~~~reac l M 'THE EYES OF. THE AMERICl4N PEOPLE, EVERY DAY THAT FORMER PRESIDENT REl*GAt~
11.iNDRED MY CONCERNS, HE JEOPARDIZED NOT ONLY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE'S UVES Blll GIVEN CHERNOBYL, THE REST OF THE WORLD. I THINI< THAT HE HAS A LOT OF EXPLAINING TO DO. THERE WILL BE NO OLLIE NORTH'S IN THIS ONE. IT'S GOil~G ro Mf1KE WATERGATE LOOI< LIKE A JACK AND JILL STORY. AS IN THE PRESEN~ AND Pl1ST ADMINISTRATION, THE ATTITUDE HAS BEEN WHAT THE PEOPLE DON'T KNOW WON'T HURT HIEM WHEN IN FACT \4HAT THE.PEOPLE AREN*T AWAR!:'. OF lHLL LIKELY KILL THEM. n *~;
TIME MIL BUSH CHANGED POLICY BY LISTENING TO* HIS BOSS, THE AMERICAH PEOl>LE INSTEAD OF CONTINUING TO l4LLCIW THE NRC TO PLEDGE (~LLEGIANCE TO THE NUCL((1R 0
INDUSTRY'S PROFITS. SOME PEOPLE WILL CONTINUE .TO TRY TO STIFLE \~E THE PEOPLl, lNC. EFFORTS BUT 1 DIDN'T SPEND $300 ,ODO fi'ND :,60 WEEKS IN WASHINGTON IN THE PAST FOUR YEARS TO EXPOSE PART OF THE TRUTH. (STELLO'S WITHDRAWAL-HE'S JUSl ,:,
SMALL UNDERBELLY OF WHAT'S REALLY GOING'ON-°THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE A RIGHT TU 1
KNOW THE TRUTH NO MATTER HOW UGLY IT IS.) THE FINES, $273,SOO AS OF 5/11/90, THE COURl 'S THREAT OF IMPRISONMENT* Il-ll'IMIDATlON BY THE NRC AS WELL AS SOME POLITICl{,NS, WILL NOT DETER MY COMMITMENT. WE THE PEOPLE HAS THE BALL NIJ~I AMO , l F ~JL:: DON 'T FUMBLE IT , UUR I\ IDS M(\Y W\VE A CHANCE AT THE 1 R FUTURE * ( I HUNK I ( 'S t;l)Jl*IG TO. BE A l.Dtm' HUT Sl.11111ER FOR 11R. BUSH rn KENl~EBUNl<PORT. llOPE 11 r: rn~'':** li~::J lY.. :n 1nr=tcE). l ... '°**:fr**~ ** ,,:.:*ii1*:,.~ ,S. ~o.,..,Lt:>t
1i1Is 1 1 1.-:'
.:==""";; ..
1. \.;ill u ~ \)1'...U1:.
\)./.X..\..V.l j,t u.l.11 fV-t1()1-'f.l l r
lj ;~~ '- ,.; J.
appeal al Maeaachu ..tt. Attorney C.ner-Jame* Shannon i1 expected to the NRC decision according to ScoU Denman,* director of ..the
Saf1 .. En.trliY~Oommurilca.tlo1;'
d M 11 r:0 lfl90 The Dnily Reporter, Mon oy, nrc * * *
Seabro'ok licensing not \,*!}~~~;*~;aiftl*
. . t t . Jallili"ift':Mim&~
without moving pro. es s .L~~~~t~~=.~~f:,~e~~-~~-,~*
Editor's note: RC'.porter corres- Dnd Posters Which creates loud or '~,-~,.,J...,utt I *. w a ff',..., '"m' lnu*~)t'<,j ...)~nN~<r..
..,. *Y**.ru I" ..... ::\! ~~
pondent Gudren Scott attended unusual noise or a nuiaance 1* ouulalrii lhe brlitht it.iiuhiiui incl'.
~=:~~~tto~~aria!:~~r:.~ou~le~;. :!:c~88o;:4i:i~t~~:i~: e;r~~; ... ~~W~11~:~::a:t'l~~~~;
Wnshington D.C., Thursday at which the Seabrook Nuclear Rene*
tor received its license.
commlsaion or its ataff are not .. * *
He \lfaA lWy MorrllOn otWatnti'1 *.
permitted ...*
However, as aoon as the com~ia-N.H.~~k.. pem*
?aJUaii!t*~>>~'I. :;I~ .lt;.~ ~
~Clamshell/,
aionera commenced tha meeting, : ; .Mo~s~tJliaCl ~ot . .eiveil al,l~e .~
Dy GUDRUN SC01T
one person in the front_row s~d or lmpriaontnent tor *]>4!8ldnr oui::
Reporter correspondent up and announced that the pubbc thiia.~ * 'i*rH~;'waa toldihl~'~ulf,{~01'\1 MARYLAND - Th e Seabroo k to perpetrate a great evil .** ~.am*
has a risht to speak, you are. here . r. .
'**.. a !HU ne t JU!h..*ia~1
.;,,;}d*\.* ;ei* .* .
pen~
~t1~:l*l;*_:..i.
nudenr pow.er*reador received Its. pling on Pemocncy... dec1112" 1 jail imCei"You hia\'e.-to i~d~.. io~:
full-power licence Thuraday at the* cannot be done in secrecy. A de!*itd: '**~atmtlncf\n\ist: ... it~~:
h ea dquar ter9 n( the Nu clee.rRegu .
coupe t o!pollca uu.1ce!".
..Id 1edth
man
. h*'ii¥.* .*** *ci~*
11 ~~,-!**.~*~,...!-~+.e.~1.:..-
.: t~ .*. ;.,.~*:**J,,;:.~~~;;*,.._ :l h1tory Commi9aion in Rockland, 0 t. * * . *.-InJrelieq1~ o~t l!~nir,,,~a.v*c Md. . Next, another man in the front beiii' ~var !1.0 ilrreite or. C2Jiiiish*11 *'*
For 20 years New England citi* rowheldupapieceofpaperineach
me~~ii~l~dritNUa~~;nY&~tf~~*j zena have been protesting the hand for the commi111ioner'* bene* ,H~d1thlmGdfl,trQ~fj ~S~a~ . ,
building ofthia reactol' at a eeasid . fit_ the .audience could not nad Hoii~l;Ol!ti'*at\er~dlniandthg tta.U?.t bench inhnbited by up to 100,000 it. tma.nt~j:,)ibl'~!iV~fJC.il:ili'~...
who cannot escape except by a two- I wa. IC&l'ed and 4Bs~~d and. 11uci1~'1~tioltpll&il~,. ~~*
lane road.
wondered wha~ the police would do * . -J.:Cliftfdill'4m'itnh9r~"'i),eU~
The rules for emergency exit* with this guy. Ho,...ever, nobody * . ***~on\iSt'"ie\f6Hi*byftht7*eb\Ji't***,to~~!
plans were lately.changed to etoppedhim.Ittumedouthewa* ~veriUtilNRCv6t.li.ndth41Mliil.~.~
exclude locals and have been deve- teve Comley, owner or a family it4't':f6\\'id.:lnnnigaUoi\':hO~
loped instead by FEMA govern* urifor home. (complete with *tin **. 7*1f>Yt*Ri~~~Petet '~6~n~
ment officials. A handful or protea* greenhouse and birdhouse* for the terstTaveled!romNewHampsbire pa.tienta) near Seabrook, well to Washington fOt' tlU* henring. known to the commisaionera. He One official who entered the heads an organization called "WE
'rif
m_,.f. <P.~.~a;) to'll\ tlf th~ ~t. ' .
~h't"J1*~11tf.*the &abrdol..a U~Q' m"dal*r-<~ .**1<:11; !iv;f~.r
plush conferen~ room said 'There the People* and nunea from his nre 1ome folksingers outside but I nursing home wilt . answer any think the people in here outnum~ Inquiring pbonecaller about his ber them."
organization.
Security was nerve-racldngly *
Comely to14 me afterwarda he tight. The room was ~pfered with* was holdini up a copy or the police despite a meta detec~r Constitution and a photo ofhimeel(
walk througl1 for everyone. and Pre1ident Reagan. In the Eight overhead TV monitors photo he was handing the presi-displayed R computerized message dent' an envelope containing to the nudience that said: e\1dence of many inferior, impro-
"Commission meetings are open per parts inetalled In 69 reactors.
for the public to observe. Mem~rs NRC has stated that they knew oC the public nre not allowed t about theae defective parts.
participate by the COll\rnission 'fhe meeting itself consisted of pursuant to regi.ilntion promul- some nervous older men reading gated by the general se~vice~ o~mi- rom some prepared papers u quick nistration for conduct m buildings preamble about the full power 41 CFR 101.305. license and-then had a quick vote.
Disorderly conduct or other They did however add that the conduct including display of sign* licence would not go into e(fect until March 9, 1990.
111. No.' 4 - . I O l"iOM Comley seeks federal investigation of the NRC By Michael Freeman . sponse from only a few politicians.
Stephen B. Comley. an anti- The only governor to contact him nuclear activist and executive was New York Gov. Mario Cuomo.
director of We The People.In~:. is . Comley has also been notified by calling for a congressional inves- the office of U.S. Sen. Jesse Helms ligation into the Nuclear Regula- CR-North Carolina).
tory Commission <NRC). The letter from Cuomo's office
. Comley,whoisthedirectorofthe was signed by Howard B. Glaser, Sea View Convalescent and.Nurs- special assistant to ~ governor, ing Home, sent out letters m De- who stated that Com.ley's letter ha~
cember to every U.S. senator, con- been forwarded to Frank Murray, gressman, governo! and the White deputy secretary to the governor House staff requesting that they en- for energy ind the enviroru:bent; dorse the congressional irivestiga- The letter from Helms' 'omce, tion.
signed by the senator hims~lC, In bis l~ter. Comley stated that stated that "lam genuinely grate.
the NRC has failed "to protect the Cul to you for taking the time to Pl.lblic health and safety as is its write. Your thoughtfulness in send-Congressional mandate. The agen- ing the helpful material you en-cy does not enforce its own stan- closed is also *appreciated .. Please i dards and regulations for safe nuc- be assured I will give tbis carefUl ,.
lear plant co~ction ~ opera- coasideratioll."
lion, ~does ~t en.sute all ~ts Ho"eYer, it wu unclear from the near D\lclear pl~ts can be properly letter whether Helms favored or evacuated in the race of a nuelear opposed the investigation. Barbara acddent. . Lukens, administrative Ulis.tan~ to However, Comley's target is not Helms, said the office bad no com-just the NRC, but also the Seabr~k
ment Qll the matter. "We communi-nuclear power plant in New Ham~ cate With our constituents and not shire. with the press," Lukens said:
"We have a serious situation on Comley also said he had been con-our hands," Comley said last w~k. tacted by the office of Sen. John "l tpink the R~agan Adi:ninistrati~n Kerry m-Massachusetts). "They should turn its attention to thel1' have expressed support for a con-own packyard and to what's en- gressional inve5tigation"*into the dangering our children's lives. We NRC, Comley said.
could have another Chernobyl on our hands," Comley Said, referring Larry Carp~an, press seer~~
to the nuclear reactor in the Soviet for Ke_rry, said the senator b u
stated 111 the past that he would look
~~*g~al.or We The People is "to *into the .P~ssibilitY,.of investig ata~
shut them (nuclear reactors) all the dec1s1on-making pr~e ..
down. We need to have safe ener- the structure of the NRC. . '*
55 gy," Comley said. "We can't keep "We have asked the other sena-endorsing unsafe energy systems." tors to comment." Carpman said.
RNc:tlon1 trom Cuomo, fWma "We are waiting for their re.
So far, Comley has received a re- sponse."
.~-* .
I .'
\\' e The People of the United States, Inc.-----------.
Stop Chernobyl Htrt
. DATE: THURSDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1989 TIHE: 9:30 A.H.
~
LOCATION: 1324 LONGWORTH HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING WASHINGTON, D.C.
PRESS CONTACT: STEPHEN B. COMLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WE THE PEOPLE, INC. OF THE UNITED STATES 508-~48-7959 OR 255~ .
On Thursday, October. 12, 198*9, Steph.en B. Comley, Executive Director* of We The People, Inc. an anti-nuclear~ fact~findinef organization will attend the Oversi9ht Hearing by Congressman Kostmayer on the Actions of
. NRC Officials in.the Agency's Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) in its Inv,stigation of Mr. Roger Fortuna, Deputy Director of NRC's Office of Investigations (OI) *
~
r Stello has been involved in a aix*aaonth Conore11ional inve1ti9ation a 1u1h fund he u11d to P*J' fonHr nuclear worker Douo llliaon. for incriminatino evidence a91in*t an MIC in1peetor. llliaon *** paid .
S6,000.00 in caah by Stello'* ataff for teati*ony which i.,lied that Inspector Rooer Portuna 1uppre11ed evidence of probletn1 at a n~clear plant.
OVefl A .......... tll ...... ~--._...,,..
Ma-1tff
'lox° Coun 277. bw\ty, MA 01 .... ('°9)
S1.. '1ymouth. MA 02>61. nOI) l~lOO .,
AB . . . . .- . . . . ' . . , ..
THE NEW YORK TIMBs NATIONAL FRIDAi*~uousr -1,*198'*1:~,:-
. . . ,. .. .. ..... .... *'-*~*: *~...:..: *: . **. ** .~*.-
pan el Sees Animosity Behindlni,Uii}~~iilfi{c/~1!/:/BaifJ~ I:~,;** * *~* . .
n~ 1~1.Hl III. \l. L w/\LU i rrl ' . asserted that he receives confldentlaJ *111£ P~ JSSUE
.\:-;;1* *<Ulllll\llll'('S<lllly1::tprday iecomm1"ttee Information from nuclear plal)t work* . .
ersandcnnnotdoanythingthatwould A CtNelaJP, AND Pl *I ar,s.
" 1:::c*111.d 111\t"',ll{:-o111 1nat nw t~ll-
r t*:i*g11l,,tory ( umru1~:.Hm Of Sal
'd t lJe i.' damagclhclrconfldencelnhfm.
Recently Mr. Comley was fined $200 ~U * ~: t
. ~ALAN WPC /nvi
' *. , * ! r;11~l *>1lll11r1 t1y n tngh*rank* , *
a dny by a Federal judge In Boston, and (U(IJ.. /'JI..
.'f,.i.d ;ij-l*<<

i1vd l\lOll\';Jtr*<J as
. . , ! * .- 1"-'"'**:.ii ;11111 p101<*,.;s1011:il 1nvest1gat1on >
theflneSCOU)dfncreasef0$},000ifhel does not comply. We the Peo~le wal In-e ti.fo ft
.. rtJ
. ,, 1! ! ... ;-; t,:... Ill)'
: ..*. .-.***11r.111*111 h*g111111.11*** ll('l'\I.
lil\'ul\'('u a pay*
wasted rnoney
umcntnl in brln In toi ht 1 ~s 0~
u lt'\\
11
. : . : :*. n u 111 1.1':11 10 an 111fornwr. *****--*-***-* ... uclcnr planls around thes;ountrv
1 1
1-111:i.u.1y ** * *.idi*d '"i*l*~; of lclc*- ccording 10 the Senate repon, ilie
. .. ' * .1 >1*1 !--

11111n~ n111l n*mnHr,sum satf'ty protilr.ms, had not nclequntcly Information that Mr. Fortuna mlghl
: :, : ;
1:. :'.1;~ :*, l*.,: h ullifl~. s:11c.I a re* hamllt*d safely complaints Mr. Ellison have c,Hsclosed trnpropcrly to Mr. Com-
, *j: 1 .c1<-.l l1v the S1*natc (,ov1*rnmc:n1 hall rxprr.s.srd. Icy w1~s that the former technician had
* :.::1"1"'Cnmm111r*r. . J\111ongthep<mcl'sfindit!gslsthatln pleaded guilly to attempted sexual I:.** 111***~11g.111un has aroused mlr.r- .sr.eking information derogatory lo Mr. nbuse of a 13-year--0ld girl. It Is nol
.- 1 :,. '.,:1,<* 11 w,1s app1 ovi*J hy the Fonuna, Mrs. Connelly asked the ?gen-
clear what Jnformalion. Mr. Comley l .. :::1:,1,<11111';; lop ~tarr offidal, Victor cy*s top lawyer if she cou.ld hire an in- might have given Mr. Fortuna. ...,
.: * '.\:i J1 . whom l'rc-;icknt Bush re* formant as a"consultant" and pay him Jn lhe disputed Investigation, Mr. El****
... : i, 11u1~1111a1<*J li1 I.le hrad of produc-11 .. 11 :*: the n;Hion's troubled nuclear for information and tap!!S of telephone conversations. The lawyer told her thal Jison, the Informant, was paid $6,000 and put up in a hotel near Washington 1\tlS HUSf HA'
, .. * *' i 11<> rnmpl<*x. Mr. S1<*llo has not 0
t .. *,li
11nL1mrd l1y the Sen:>tr, but he she probably could not unless public hr.allhandsafelywasinvolved.
for two weeks while Mrs. Connelly and twootherstaUmembersmetwithhim. '5EaJ ~ l'ffi
--:.1: 1* J th<* jot. cm an acting basis last
Mrs. Connelly gave him a code name ~-
.... 1 '. ~
Informant's Allegatlons Limited and arranged her vacation for the time Senate invesligators later questioned Th~-N;~ York Tim~;- he was there, the report said.
'Lack of Good Judgmrnt' the lawyer, William Parler, the com* Victor Stello Jr. as the top-rank- nie commission has asserted that Sf'ruror John c;knn, an Ohio Demo- mission's general counsel, and he said ing staff official at the Nuclear Mrs. Connelly wanted to pay him
'ra1 v.ho ischairnrnnofthec*ommiltee, that in hindsight he should have urged R C0 mmis 8 ion
3 _ rnlher than subpoena the tapes be-
..;;,i:J thc- anvrstigation showed "an un- the commissi\111 to subpoena the tapes egu 1atory ~ cause Mr. Ellison had threatened to de-.
.,,*<*mly li!Ck or good judgment" by rather than pay* for them, the report proved a $6,0~ cas~ payment (or sfroy the tapes. But the Senate report h1g11-1evcl staff mC'mbers at the com* said. an informer m an internal com- said that there was no evidence for that m1~s11m, which oversc..::s civilian nu- The* report docs not center on Mr. mission investigation. an.d thnt "to the contrary, he was ..
< k.sr plants. Stello. but it says th al he ruled that the threatening to 'go public.'"
I hl* mvcstij?.ation under scrutiny was informant might have information on .
\"II -.111*.J try Sharnn R. Connelly, thrn reaccor safety. The safety allegations the alle allons made by The
Scnnte comrnlllee concluded
!w:1d of lhe commission's OJfice or In* the informant provided were so lim- vesllgatlon of
g h d Id that the Investigation was unfair to Mr.
iLed the Senate report said, that "the the technician, Mr. Fou~I ~r snll *a.ti g
'\*.:*nor and Aud11or, against Roger r:o1 l\IO:l, then 1\l*puty director or the Of-f1r1* uf lnvestigatiorr rns~ could equally be made that this But the judge Is sl I nves safety rationale mcrn prc;ividcd a con- whether Mr.. Fortuna, mprorer Yb ;
r drs Fortuna, violated established prlncl-pies of internal lrivestlgalions and should not have.: so hef(vlly !nvolved top l wo yc:;1rs ago, Mr. Fortuna leslifit'<J venicnt cover to do somethin that the closed derogatory In ormat on a ou manngemcnt. The lnvesugalion. the
i~amst Mrs. Connelly when she was N !{ c general counsel had ~lherwlse the lnforme~ to ~nr antl-~fcle

r ado~ committee said, "represented a waste
.H l u,.,c*d of trying 10 shield her deputy in.di~a-ted. could nol be done - putting cate or received 10 ~d~a on somcone on the a roll to rovide in* activist that he shou ave pass roi:d on of government funds;" the lnvesllga-lion was "Incompetently conducted, f10111 rh:irRes of sexual harassmrnt.
I .1t<> last year Mrs. Com1elly, whose formation pcrtai~in~ lo an ft1ternal af- to others at the Nuclear! Regulatory punctuated by manage'?!ent lnterven*
oll1l*1* handles the commission's intcr- fairs investigation." Commission.
ti~? and other problems.*
11;11 in****stigations. received a com- /\spokesman for the commission, Jo- The activist, Stephen B. Comley. has In sum, we found very lltlle reason pl:.111H about Mr. Fortuna from a for- seph Foucha rd, said that his agency been subpoenaed and ordered to turn for the .~ourse of conduct of this lnvesll-mc r IC'( hnidan at lhe NinC' 1'.1ilc Point 2 had received the study yesterday and over tapes he might have of conversa- gallon, the committee said.
rr*:11 tor. ni*ar Os*....*rgo, N.Y. was studying it. lions between himself and-Mr. Fortuna. Mr. Fouchard said that the commJs-
111o.* (1*1 nwr tC'chnician, Oou~las Elli- A judge chosen by the r.ommlsslon to Mr. Comley of Rowley, Mass., who slon could not comment further be-sun, s.uJ Mr. Fortuna. whose office is investigate has concluded thal Mr. For- heads a group,* 'We lhe People, ha! cause the matter ls sllll under Internal rbpu11s1ble for looking into reactor tuna had acr~d appropriately in his fn- refused to testify or provJde tapes a~d fnvestigaUon.
~ WOUll>-N<rr1fSll~D
~I:IX>.N:rr Ut.
-ll> I .
Y H-Pr'lt: JO PAY M_,Et
ynght 0 IHI The New York Tames t:ORK, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 13; 1989 ~o cents beyond 75 mUc 1 rnm New l-PLANT NOMINEE ADMITS MIST AKES x-Official on Nuclear Panel 'olay a role.,
Says He Delayed Inquiry
Testimony About a Tape*
j Among the other tilghlights today Into Safety Allegations i was extende4 discussion of a tape, i which the commission received from i the informer in exchange for the $6,0QO _
! and which did not appear to implicate .
By: MATTHEW L. WAl,.D ~Mr. Fortuna after all. A judge hired by;- ~***
! the cpmmisslon to investigate Mr. For- * ..
tuna said ln testimony that the tape ap-. -,,,.; ' .
I peared to hav~ been.edited.
~ ..... * * ...
. Despite a spirited exchange between Mr. Kostmayer and Mrs. Connelly, wh
t: .ti. ..........
also appeared as a witness, it w~.~- .. ~. * ~* * "..
I neve~ made clear exacly what Mr. FoJ'il. L -~- *~ .....~ . *"
11
r..-;:~rt .,~~~+il*'.'*
Victor Stello Jr~ right, foriner chi*I of s~I .ol the safety pi'obtmis ,in a N.w Yoric State nuclear p
1., 'Nuclur Rqulatory.Corpmjuio.,, &oid he "'-d.tccpl He 'Wai.I~\!~. ~~fy at hearinJi with.Dennis Darr secret !or scven*monlha*a!lcg:itions of drug ...Se and ceneraJ counsci~ or the commission.
N\}T - NP.'i.\O~p,L PAty4. A f '7 tuna was being accused of. j tic!\, Department about falsifica!jgn oi But the investigation was not secret, I . Mrs. Con. nelly, whose job is to inves* P.apcrs in the construction of the Sea; t1gate wrongdoing by commission em- rook nuclear *!ant in New ployees, said one ~ocus of the jnpuip* Mr._ Fo:tuna. who is a former assist-was Mr. Forruna's relauonshjp with an ;mt district attorney and prosecutor, anti.nuclear activist .m Massachusetts . said in an interview that Mr. Comley m
i p en. . om1ey. c ta e 1n ues- had . provided important safety in for-
~cause investigators tipped their , e ep one conversation o~ mat1on and that he was cultivating the I
ands when they sought to question Mr.
ortuna on the allegations only weeks : ! ** wo.
man as a source,
!ter the technician made them, ac- I I Mr. J!~rtuna was deputy diret:tor of Also testifyicig was Ben B. Ha>*cs. the ording to testimony 'Wday by other -**- the ~fflce of l~vestii!alior.s; wh1::h i ui:*ector of lhe Office of Investigations, ommission officials. looks mto allegal1ons of wrongdoing at I who said, "In m~' '!.7 years of Govern-:
Dl!clear plants. He has been on leave ment service, I have never seen an in-Questions on Stella's Judgment for seven months and is now assigned VE'~tigation as perverted." He praised Mr. Stello agreed with a comment by ! . to a job in the :igcncy's Freedom of In- Mr. Fortu1rn.
1c chairman of a House Interior sub- formation Office. Mr. Fortuna .said to- The h~aring today follows a report
>mmillee, Representative Peter H. , day t,h£1t he has spent $60,000 on legal hy the Scnute Governmental Affairs ostmayer or Pennsylvania, who said I and other expenses, most of it bor* Committee that also cast doubt on Mr.
was a "stupid oversight" not to ask ' rowed from his parents. Stclio's judgment. The chairman or 1r n prompt investigation of the alle- i Mr. Kost mayer said the jn!erjm re-. that committee, John Glenn, Democrat i ations, which concerned the Nine Mile I Gort bv the 1udge found that Mr for- of 0!110, has not taken a public position I una fuld used rough language jn the o~ the Stello nominal ion, although he oint J nuclear plant in Oswego, N.Y.
I I
conversat10n and a a red 1m ro er
sus on the Senate Armed Services sub- I Witnesses repeatedly cast doubt on *, ogive a* vice to Mr. Comley, who Wa§, committer thnt will take up the rnutter Ir. Stella's judgment In approving the i 1 i ehmning tQ prescnl evidence to lhc Ju;;, first.
1vestlgat1on of Mr. Fortuna, which :
as an unprecedented procedure for i te Nuclear Rcgulatqry Commission '
\at Involved a $6,000 cash payment to le technician, secret meetings In hotel
>oms and apparent violations of the ommlsslon's handbook on respecting te rights of u1rgcts of lnvestlgatons.
Mr. Kostmayt*r aml others said the eason for the invesilgnlion of Mr. For- 1 ma was n longstanding feud btalwcen ,
f 1r Fortuna and a proll.'~C of Mr. Stel- 1
hw. NE\\' YOUJ< TIMES NATIONAL \.-\'EVNE.':>UA\'. Jc'.'VJ:_~!~-
Nuc.lear Agency Aide Gave Fals.e Report, Inquiry Finds
ayMAlTHEW i..:-w*ALD *---**** ------. ....
The former chief of staff at the Nu* Fortuna was suspended from his job clear Regulalory Commission gave* and then transferred to less Important false and contradictory information to work for several months. After subse-Congress, says the commission's In* quent investigations, he was reinstat* .
spector general, who has sent a report ed.
on the case to the Justice Department N for possible cr\rninal prosecu\.lon.
0 Apparent Reason' for Delay The report said the former chief, Vic* ln the report obtained yesterday, the tor Stello Jr., al110 Improperly delayed Inspector general, David C. Wlll\am11, an investigation bf unsafe conditions at concluded that the $6,000 payment was a nuclear reactor ln upstate New York. Justified. But he found that "there was The inspector g~neral's report Is the no apparent reason" for a delay in ln*
latest twist in a complicated tale of In* vestlgating the allegations, which in*
trigue at the agency, which oversees volved falsification of tests, and drug the safety of civilian nuclear reactors. and alcohol use.
TbeNe**'l'ar'cTtmea The affair has already cost Mr. Stello Mr. S!ello had maintained that the Victor Stello Jr., the former chief another job; he was nominated last primary reason for paying the in* .
year by President Bush to be In charge *forme~ for the tapes was concern for of staff at the Nuclear Regulatory of the nuclear bomb complex as Asslst* health and safety, but, Mr. Willlams's Co~ssion, gave falae and con-ant Secretary* of Energy for defense report said Mr. Stello had dela ed tradictory information to Con-programs. But Mr. Stello withdrew his sendin the a e at ons. or name from consideration In April, aay- ton.. r. te o a assert test gress, the commiaaion'i inspector Ing In a letter td the White Hous_e that mony to Congress that he delayed be- general baa found.
the controve~y.lover his tenure lri his cause~h~e~d~ldgn~ot~wgang!t~t~I~o~f~f~M~rr:=-:**!;
IF~or~*r-:-"-~-~-~-----"7"""-t previous job possible.
made I
confirmation Im* tuna e comm1ss190 com* ..
mun cated with the informer, but the . appr:oved by Mrs. Connelly, a CommlJ.
'Doing an Outstandln& Job' report obtained yesterday .said that slon official in charge of finding wrong*
. "this argument Is not credible." The doing in the agency. Mr. Fortuna'* dlvl*
Mr. Stello now supervises prepara* delay continued even after Mr. Fortuna slon investigates wrongdoing by*hold-I lions to reopen several nuclear weap- had been told about* the Informer, the ers of licenses issued by the commis*
ons plants thal have* been .shut for Inspector general noted. slon. Mr. Fortuna .said he had appar-safety reasonsl The Department of Mr. Williams called the Investigation ently earned her wrath by testftying
.. "untimely, disjointed and incomplete." against her some years earlier, when j Officials of Sharon R. Connelly's of* Mrs. CoMelly was accused of trying to The latest twist !!!f:i1:i~ ~~~ct~~fd~::~a~:; ~~e~~P~~~ ~=~u~8 ~~~ ~fue:1 gi;~
ln a tale 0f :rights," said the report, adding, "this rassment.
\failui:e violate~ al~* pririciples of fair* A spokesman for the Office of De-ness in conducting investigations." fense Programs at the Department of intrigue involving thatIn Information a cover Jetter, Mr. Williams said Energy, where Mr. Stello now works, m ~he re rt had been said yesterday that Mr, Stello was an U nsafe reactor *.._La_rebasis er o for e usuce Department "as traveling and would have no comment.
ssible criminal rosecu* Mrs. Connelly said that she could not r.!!2L . ~-report sat at some a ega* com irieril,oecause -ro-00-strWould-vto- - -. ---***-- -- *-**
I t1ons, 1f true, would constitute perjury. late Mr. Fortuna's privacy.
- In addition to Mr. Stello, the report Energy said in a statement yesterday contains evidence of possible wrongdo-that he is "doing an out~tanding job," ing by two Investigators in Mrs. Con- ..<*Lie- j 1l 1VOU/f.D 11tE. COON~'(
and that trie inspector general's report nel\y's office.
1 n _, \J .. 1 raised no new issues. The department 511n~1Dt1..YH\ .PA-R.'fS 11\f\I ~~I~ /r~
said, "This re rt will finall brin *Dallas, With Radiation* v o:::i 1111--. n "-lJ tJ!.
theseissuestoacose., Woven Into the investigation. is a. 5q (\f.\NTS IN TH~ U.S. iNCUJOI 4 At the center of the conflict at the story of conflicts that one Congress-I J.. r110*1" '-R..OUP commission is whether high officials manlikenedtoasoapoperaatahear*i Sfl\el(OOK WnlL-M v"-.\..\ /
there, with the approval or involve- Ing last October. " 'Dallas,' with radia*, wt- cn\ .p ~tilt. .6RoU6.HT lb u~ H-1.
ser q.. Ll,.,. oq I\{ at I \loo~
r ment oi Mr. Stello, tried to oust an inde* lion" ts how the case was described by I 1\:'Pf"'n..c.Jro
. - pendent safety investigator, Roger Representative Peter H. Kostmayer, a* ~ "" 1 1 11 r' 'C I D '\J tA\N 1 "--
Fortuna. Pennsylvania Democrat who is chair* f\()..-.-l Lt When a former instrumenl techni* man of a subcommittee of the House 11 MES nK. I C
c1an at the Nine Mile Point nuclear Interior Committee.
complex tn Oswego. N.Y., told.the com* r. Stello had a public confrontation mission that he had. information about with Mr. Fortuna's superior, and was safety problems at". the reactors and hostile to the independent investiga-tapes of telephone conversations that tor's office, according to testimony be*
demonstrated wrongdoing by Mr. For* fore Congress last year. The conflict tuna, officials flew the technician to apparently stemmed from Mr. Fortu*
Washington and paid him $6,000 In cash na'1 efforts to lay the groundwork for for the tapes. even thouah the commls- crtmlrtal prosecution of utilities that slon had the power to subpoena the violated nuclear safety laws. Mr. Stello tapes. sought to bypass prosecution In favor Eventually, many di the -charges of correcting physical problems, and were substantlatt(l and tnagara Mo- keep1n1 reactors running.
hawk Power Corporatlon, ... whtch owns The lnvesllgatlc.n of the Mr. Fort the reactors, paid a fine of ~.000. Mr. Iand the New York nuclear plant was
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A~AA*D win its return. A SOCIA . D PA SS lie said the bmmer is worth Stephen Comley, (far right) executive director of We 'fhe People was stopped in Kennebunkport. Mai
$2,000, :md taking it violated his by secret service, local police and state troopers when he tried to walk his banner past Presidt!
tJF. -rllG right to freedom of expression.
Comley said ho refused a re-quest from Pease otlicials to put in Bush's home last Friday.
ly were asked to leave and refused. they won't evacuate me. Join We permission to fly it at Pn~i Bush's Walker's Point ho1:;,
The banner's message associates the People. Stop nuclear power."
yn6S$A~C.
wiitin1~ his request for the ban- opposition to the Seabrook plant Sanborn and Ehrenberg were Kennebwtlcport.
ner's return. With the Chernobyl nucJear power held until the arrival of state po- (',apt Spence said Pease sen plant disaster in the Soviet Union. lice, who took charge of the pair is tighter when Bush stays at Sanborn and l~hrcnberg were 'l'hc banner shows a woman in a amt released them soon after. vacation home in Kennebunki holding the 10-hy-20.foot banner at wheelchair and reads: "Mr. Bush, 'fhe protesters took the banner But she added. *'They were the front t!afo wlu~n they re1>0rted- when Chernobyl happens here, to *Pease after tlwy were refused passing on base property."
Se~ c1v1L Jine1>r1<:.s IN N1rl, .JT4 rcMeH/ ,;,, AA~~ (oVeJ(
'1-We The People ~.:;IId !j of the Unite<! States, Inc. _ _ ____,..._ _ _ __
Stop Chernobyl Here*
IMMEDIATE PRESS RELEASE DATE: r.* SUNDAY OCTOBER 22, 1909 TIME: \. ,I 1:00 P.M.
LOC A't I o1r~ KENNEBUNKPORT, MAINE, WALKER'S POINT -
OVERLOOKING PRESIDENT BUSH'S SUMMER WHITEHOUSE BANNER: "MR. BUSH WHEN CHERNOBYL HAPPENS HERE THEY WON'T EVACUATE ME. JOIN WE THE PEOPLE.
STOP NUCLEAR POWER."
PRESS CONTACT: STEPHEN B. COMLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR WE THE PEOPLE, INC. OF THE UNITED STATES 508-948-7959 OR 2553 SONDAY MORNING CAN BE REACHED AT OUR OFFICE IN KENNEBUNK, MAINE 207-967-5111 Oh Sunday, October 22 at 1:00 p~m. members of We The People and othe~s w~ll display a banner along the road at Walker's Point overlooking President Bush!s summer Whitehouse in Kennebunkport to call President Bush's attention to the dangers of nuclear power. The 10-foot by 22-foot red white and blue banner depicts a woman in a wheelchair and says, "MR. BUSH WHEN CHERNOBYL HAPPENS HERE THEY WON'T EVACUATE ME.
JOIN WE THE PEOPLE. STOP NUCLEAR POWER." (This is the same banner that was confiscated by Pease Air Force Base when members of We The People tried to display their message to Mr. Bush when he flew into Pease Air Force Base from the Whitehouse 9-1-89. (See enclosed article). The authorities falsely said we were trespassing when we weren't. Clara Ebel, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Hampshire (603-225-3080) is pursuing this matter.
The banner dramatizeG the fact that in the case of a nuclear disaster, there are no plans *for evacuating the special needs population including senior citizens who are homebound, in nursing homes, or in hospitals and who cannot easily be mobilized. Ins{~ad, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
~as dec!ared that these Americans be ,eft behind ta drin~
potassium iodine to be administered by volunteers willing ta stay behind in the event of a nuclear ac~ident.
"!t is blatant discrimination to plan to leave a whole sector of the population Liehind. If mur:e peopl~ knew duuul the government's discriminatory plans to leave our elders and handicapped people behind during a nuclear accident, they would understand what little regard the NRC and the nuclear
industry has for the American public in general," said Steve Comley, Executive Director of We The People, an antinuclear fact finding ot*qanization.
A non-profit. tax cl\emrt organi1a1io11 Hox '277. Rowky. MA 01969. (508) 948-7959
.'iO Court St.. Plymouth, MA 02361. (50K) 746-9300 l* 1,J**'l Ir ' ,, h'I I!' *1 Natinnal Press Bldg .. Suite 994, 14 & F. Sts., N.W., Washington. D.C. 20045. (202) 628-MI I }" t"*'*t*{1:1H)' :,1i 11.L I*,\
nu;~***"' Ji, Al"'""""' l'oneord. NH 03301.(603J22!!-94ti4 . 1,' ' I ~It I I ., I\! * ,
"In all due respect to *Mc. Bush, he is not only not up to speed on the safety of the Seabrook nuclear power plant, he is not up to speed on his nominee, Victor S*tel.lo, w.ho he wants to take charge of the Energy Department's tr6ubled nu'clear weapons plants. Victor Steli'o, the former Chief of Staff of the NRC, was summoned to appear recently at a hearing in front of Rep. Peter H. Kostmayer of Pennsylvania, and a mitted that he kept information secret for 7 months he A}.nerican people. (See New York Times article 10 In s doing he deliberately jeopardized ~he safety of n people as he has done many times in the past.
federal agency accountable to the American people President, persists in protecting nuclear industry profits at the expense of pu~lic health and safety. We want to inform the ~~esid~nt that this agency's policies are a direct danger to his family and neighbors in Kennebunkport."
We The People was instrumental in bringing to public attention, as well as forcing the NRC to finally admit, that there are tens of thousands of counterfeit defective materials built into a majority of nuclea~ power plants across the country including Seabrook Station. (See New York Times article 8-4-89 enclosed). When the NRC discovered that.
many counterfeit valves, circuit breakers, piping materials and fasteners did not meet safety standards, the agency lowered safety requirements rather than ordering nuclear utilities to replace the defective *materials.
"Mr. Bush should listen more to the people who have scrutinized the facts instead of relying solely on John Sununu, his very biased Chief of Staff," Comley said.
We The People is organizing a petition drive in Kennebunkport, gathering signatures asking Bush to support a Congressional investigation of the counterfeit substandard parts issue and of the NRC's handling of this most troubling information.
To date, Governor Cuomo of New York, U.S. Senators Kenn~dy and Xerry and Congressmen Mavroules and Studds of Massachusetts as well as responsible groups including Clamshell Alliance, Republicans Against Seabrook, Citizens Within the Ten Mile Radius and Ralph Nader's group Public Citizen have endorsed We The People'~ call.
"If Bush truly supports what the flag flies for, democracy, he will support our call for .a Congressional investigation which will show that he belie~es the health and safety of the American people is more important than nuclear industry profits," Comley concluded.
We The People will continue to inform the President about unsafe conditions at Seabrook as well as other plants containing these bogus parts and about the corrupt practices of the NRC. The NRC has gone from its mandate of prote~ting the safety of the people to nothing more than a guard dog for the nuclear ind~stry.
(ANYONE INTERESTED IN PARTICIPATING IN THE PETITION DRIVE SHOULD CALL OR WRITE THE WE THE PEOPLE OFFICE, ROUTE 9, KENNEBUNK, M~INE, 207-967-5111).
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September 26, 2002 MEMORANDUM TO: Samuel J. Collins, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: John R. Fair, Senior Mechanical Engineer IRA/
Mechanical and Civil Engineering Branch Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
DIFFERING PROFESSIONAL VIEW CONCERNING THE PROPOSED 10 CFR 50.69 RULEMAKING The purpose of this memorandum is to document my differing professional view concerning the
. proposed rulemaking to add new section 10 CFR 50.69, "Risk Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components'." My specific* concern is that the treatment requirements specified for RISC-3 SSCs are not sufficient to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety.
The staff in NRR has spent over two years developing the 50.69 rule language. This effort included numerous internal staff meetings, review by internal oversight groups, and public meetings with external stakeholders. This effort resulted in the July, 31, 2002, version of the rule pubiished or{ the NRC web site (posted on August 2). The July 31 version of the rule represented the balance of categorization and treatment requirements necessary to achieve a staff consensus to go forwar:d with the proposed rulemaking. The Division of Regulatory
\Improvement Programs significantly altered the July 31 version of the rule without any input from the technical reviewers that were involved in the development of the rule for the past two years. Critical portions of the treatment process were eliminated based on the nebulous assertion that the rule language contained too much detail. The accompanying statement of considerations (SOC) indicates that the Commission expects licensees and applicants to satisfy many of the treatment provisions that were eliminated from the July 31 rule language. The current rule language is not consistent with many of the SOC expectations. As discussed in the ensuing paragraphs, portions of the July 31 rule language were eliminated without a valid technical justification.
The following language was deleted from the general treatment requirements for RISC-3 SSCs specified in the July 31 version of 50.69(d)(2):
These processes ;, :ust meet voluntary consensus standards which are generally ~
accepted in industrial practice, and address applicable vendor recommendations and .
operational experience. The implementation of these processes and the assessment of
their effectiveness must be controlled and accomplished through documented
procedures and guidelines. The treatment processes must be consistent with the assumptions credited in the categorization process. * .
C!]
Section 111.3.2 of the SOC contains the statement: "Thus, collectively, RISC-3 SSCs can be safety significant and it is important to maintain their design basis functional capability." It is important to recognize that, although on an individual basis RISC-3 SSCs may have low risk significance, collectively RISC-3 SSCs are safety significant. The failure of even a small number of these RISC-3 SSCs could lead to serious safety consequences. Therefore, in order for the staff to conclude that 50.69 provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, the staff must conclude that the RISC-3 treatment requirements provide an adequate framework for assuring that RISC-3 SSCs maintain their design basis functionality: As stated in Section V.4.4 of the SOC, "It is necessary for a licensee to consider the impact that a change in treatment (as a result of removal of special treatment requirements) might have on the ability of the SSC to perform its design basis function and on the reliability of SSCs." The SOC further concedes that this assessment may be either quantitative or qualitative. This is a weakness in the categorization process. A key cornerstone of the robust categorization process, the sensitivity study, may hinge on individual judgement. Safety-related SSCs are assumed to be highly reliable. A change in unavailability by a factor of 2 to 5, such as recommended in the NEI categorization guidelines (NEI 00-04) for the sensitivity study, still requires that the SSCs remain highly reliable. Monitoring normal operational SSC performance will not provide reliability estimates of SSC performance during design basis events. In order to have reasonable confidence that high reliability of SSCs is achieved for all design basis conditions, the RISC-3 treatment processes must meet standards that are generally accepted in industrial practice along with applicable vendor recommendations, and must be accomplished using controlled procedures. It is difficult to understand why these general requirements were considered too detailed for the rule language. Consensus standards and vendor recommendations are developed considering past performance of SSCs. The consensus standards and vendor recommendations contain essential criteria that is necessary to provide confidence in the functionality of SSCs. If licensees and applicants don't use available consensus standards and don't even follow vendor recommendations, the staff will not have a basis to assess reliability assumptions used in the categorization process.
The following bracketed language was deleted from the design control requirements specified in the July 31 version of 50.69(d)(2)(i):
Design functional requirements and bases for RISC-3 SSCs must be maintained and controlled ["including selection of suitable materials, methods, and standards; verification of design adequacy; control of installation and post-installation testing; and control of design changes'J. RISC-3 SSCs must be ["have a documented basis to demonstrate that they are'J capable of performing their safety-related functions ...
Post-installation testing is an essential step in establishing the functionality of newly installed SSCs. Section V.5.2.1 of the SOC contains the statement: "Licensees would be expected to perform sufficient post-installation testing to verify that the installed SSC is operating within expected parameters and is capable of performing its safety functions under design-basis f"'nnrli+h~s." 1+ ;.,. nnt r-!n~r '*""! thp ror111\-o!'Ylont fr.r nr"ld--i!')~blhtinn to-::tinn lf./::J<:; rlplof,:>rJ from thP.
rule language if licensees are expectea to perform post-instaiiation testing.
The current rule language does not require licensees and applicants to have any documentation to show that design requirements have been met. This is a significant deficiency in the current rule language. Without documentation, there is no assurance that 2
SSCs meet their design requirements and, consequently, no assurance that design basis functionality has been marntained. Maintaining documentation to show.that design requirements have been met is a relatively simple common sense requirement. It is not clear why this requirement was considered overly prescriptive and removed from the rule language.
~ The following additional language was removed from the design control provisions specified in
\ ) ~the July 31*version of 50.69(d)(2)(i):
"Replacements for ASME Class 2 and Class 3 SSCs and parts must meet either: (1) the requirements of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel (BPV) Code; or (2) the technical and administrative requirements, in their entirety, of a voluntary consensus standard that is generally accepted in industrial practice applicable to replacement. ASME Class 2.
and Class 3 SSCs and parts shall meet the fracture toughness requirements of the SSC or part being replaced."
Proposed 50.69(b)(1 )(iv) allows licensees to replace ASME SSCs with non-AS ME SSCs. This constitutes a change in the design of these components since the ASME Code contains design requirements. As a consequence, it is necessary to establish some criteria for the design of these SSCs. Section 111.3.2 of the SOC contains the statement, "For the specific case of repair and replacement of ASME Class 2 and Class 3 SSCs, the Commission concludes that it would be acceptable to allow these SSCs to meet a voluntary consensus standard that is generally accepted in industrial practice ... " However, the current rule language does not require these SSCs to meet any standard. The July 31 rule language is necessary to achieve the stated objective in the SOC. Section V.5.2.1 of the SOC also contains the statement, "Another example is a requirement for fracture toughness of particular materials that is part of a licensee'.s design requirements; such a requirement would continue to apply when repair and replacement of affected components is undertaken." However, the fracture toughness requirements are specified in the ASME Code. If a licensee does not use the ASME Code for replacement SSCs, then fracture toughness requirements will be lost. That is the reason the fracture toughness was addressed in the July 31 rule language. If SSCs do not possess adequate fracture toughness, then multiple brittle failures could occur when the SSCs are challenged by a design basis event such as an earthquake.
The following language was removed from the procurement provisions specified in the July 31 version of 50.69(d)(2)(ii):
"Upon receipt, the licensee shall verify that the item received is the item that was ordered."
r The purpose of the rule language is to assure that licensees and applicants maintain some control over procured items. Lack of procurement control could result in the installation of SSCs that are not capable of performing their design basis function. Section V.5.2.2 of the SOC contains the statement: "In addition to appropriately specifying the procurement of the desired component, the licensee/applicant would also be expected to conduct activities upon receipt to confirm that the received component is what was ordered." It is not clear why the requirement was considered too prescriptive for the rule language if the Commission expects of licensees and applicants to confirm that a received item is what was ordered.
3
Commission STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
~ecretary CAKL f-'At-'t:klELL0, Deputy t:UO JON JOHNSON, Deputy Director, NRR DAVID MATTHEWS, Director, Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs GARY HOLAHAN, Director, Division of Systems Safety & Analysis TIMOTHY REED, Senior Project Manager, Policy & Rulemaking Program JACK STROSNIDER: Deputy Director, Office of Research THOMAS SCARBROUGH, Senior Mechanical Engineer, Division of Engineering DAVID FISCHER, Senior Mechanica Engineer, Division of Engineering: Division of Engineering JOHN FAIR: Senior Mechanica Engineer, Division of Engineering: Division of Engineering (This transcript produced from electronic caption media and audio and video media provided by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission)
P-R-O-C-E-E-0-1-N-G-S Good morning. On behalf of the Commissioners I would like to welcome everyone on today's briefing on risk informing our special treatment requirements.
As I suspect everyone in the room recognizes, we have been embarked on a long-term effort to re-examine the foundations of our regulatory system. With the advent of the tool of probabilistic assessment and its development and several thousand reactor years of experience with plants, we have deep insights into the risks associated with plants.
And the Commission has sought for a number of years to find various ways in which we use these risk insights to shape our regulatory system in new ways. Option 2 of this effort was to focus on the requirements dealing with safety-related structure systems and components or SSC's as I'm sure they will be referred to throughout the rest of this morning.
safety, reducing unnecessary regulatory burden. And we believe it will better focus the staff and the industry on safety.
In developing the staffs position, there inputs over an extended period of time. In this regard, the office was provided, on September 26, with three differing professional views.
The filers believe that the treatment of RISC-3 components is not sufficient to maintain safety and protect the public health and safety. The rule package acknowledges the receipt of these differing views and indicates that the normal agency process would be used.
However, upon reflection, the office director concluded that circumstances were not conducive to convening a normal review panel. The range of views, the level of detail of RISC-3 components were well known and fully vetted during the
~-development process.
Nevertheless, the more detailed version of the rule suggested by the filers has been placed in the Federal Register notice for public comment and review. We believe that the public comment will be valuable to develop the final rule, and it will
provide abetter understanding of the staffs position and the basis for the proposed technical requirements.
I would like to note that the filers have stated that there were inconsistencies between the statements of consideration and the proposed rule.
there's no change to the rule making package necessary.
I would like to thank the Commission for providing the opportunity for the filers to present their views. We have had a lot of debate, but it's been a healthy debate. And it has contributed to the quality product that you have before you.
We believe that the continued involvement of the public will only improve the product.
Mr. Reed?
TIMOTHY REED: Thanks Jon.
Good morning.
Staff appreciates this opportunity to brief the Commission on the proposed 50.69 rule making packag~.- We will provide a pretty high level overview of the proposed rule making package. We certainly hope it supports you in your efforts to make a decision on whether to publish the package for public comment.
There are issues that remain to be resolved in the implementation guidance. We recognize that.
But we think the most efficient way to move forward and get to a final rule filing guidance is to put this thing out for public comment and get the external stakeholder feedback.
Slide two, please.
This slide shows basically what I plan to discuss today. I want to start with a little bit of background and then go to a high level discussion of the proposed rule, discuss some of the significant issues we had to tackle in putting this package together, then summarize and wrap up.
Slide three, please.
Prior to the package that is before you today, there were three Commission papers that pertained to this effort. It started really with secy-98-300. That paper identified what were termed options, as has already been mentioned by Chairman Meserve for risk informing the activities and regulations of the Commission.
We are here today to discuss Option 2.
That's risk informing the special treatment requirements and now, of course, proposed 50.69.
Under this framework, licensees or applicants using a risk-informed process to categorize structure systems throughout this briefing -- can remove these SSCs from the special treatment requirements. Then they come in, of course, under a 50.69. That's how they're addressed.
These special treatment requirements, they reside in parts 21, 50 and 100 of the Code of Federal Regulations. They, of course, are intended to provide a high level of confidence that this equipment is capable of meeting and functioning requirements under design basis conditions.
What are we talking about when we talk about special treatment requirements when we talking about equipment? Qualifications requirements, documentation requirements, reporting requirements.
It can be maintenance testing, surveillance requirements, quality assurance requirements ,just to name some examples.
In June of 1999, the Commission directed the staff to implement Option 2 of secy-98-300. We went forward and developed a rule making plan and
advance notice for proposed rule making. We provided that to the Commission in secy-99-256 in October of 1999.
The Commission approved the rule making plan and the ANPR. We then subsequently issued that ANPR in March of 2000.
Next slide please.
The ANPR generated more than 200 comments.
The staff looked at those comments and provided its preliminary responses. Those were contained in secy-00-194. That secy also discussed, in a 1.ittle more detail, our thoughts on the regulatory framework.
We briefed the Commission in conjunction with that secy. That was briefing on September of 2000. And we also discussed our ideas on the framework at that time.
Then in June of 2001, the staff briefed the c~r:nmission again. This time it was in support of the issuance of the South Texas exemption review and approval. It discussed both the South Texas review and approval and, of course, the 50.69 framework and our efforts to develop it.
As you are aware, the South Texas review and approval, that exemption request, laid the
groundwork for 50.69 by demonstrating that was, in fact, possible to risk-informed special treatment requirements. Of course, that was an exemption we heard on today on the rule making.
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addressed, or we had to address under 50.69 were, in fact, first addressed under the South Texas review.
Finally, I would like to add that we also met with the ACRS on September 13th of 2002, this year. And we have got the ACRS' endorsement to put this package out for public comment. Now, I say they endorsed putting out the public comment. They didn't agree with all the technical issues. But we need to work some of this implementation guidance out. But nonetheless, the ACRS agreed the best way to move forward was to get this thing out for public comment.
Slide five, please.
Throughout this effort, we have had extensive really interaction with external stakeholders. And it's certainly been constructive.
We have had several workshops in supporting the rule making effort. And additionally, and importantly, the industry, through the Nuclear Energy Institute and the industry group have been very supportive of the rule making effort. NEI, in fact,
has developed implementation guidance in the form of NEI 0004 and the owner's groups use that guidance and actually different draft revisions of that guidance and piloted that as part of our pilot program.
They used the feedback that was generated by both the staff and industry participation in the pilot to improve the NEI guidance. And, of course, we used that feedback also to help us put this framework together, as well as generate our issues associated with the implementation guidance.
So it benefited us as well.
In addition, staff has also issued three versions of the draft rule language, and put that out on external web. And we have got a lot of good interaction and feedback on that draft language.
It helped us to identify and address issues, questions, and certainly helped us improve the language that resulted in the proposed rule language that's before the Commission now.
But I would note that external stakeholders were somewhat handicapped in the fact that we could put the language out but could not put the supporting statement considerations out at the same time. So they really didn't have a good idea of some of the
intent behind the language. So that sort of handicapped their reaction in that respect.
Next slide, please.
I would like to now go to the rule. And we r* ; I 1_, ,:!* _,.} _... t t. "'.' l : ._ ,. ..
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jump into that, I want to remind everybody, including the Commission, of course, that proposed 50.69 is only about risk informing special treatment requirements. These are the so-called assurance requirements. I will say this several times throughout this. But what we're not doing in 50.69 in Option 2 is we are not changing the design basis functional requirements.
In fact, this became a key constraint on this entire rule making effort and a challenge we had to overcome. We had to risk-inform special treatment requirements while maintaining design function requirements.
So an overview then, what are we doing with proposed 50.69? We are establishing a risk-informed categorization process in which a licensee or applicant then would categorize SSCs, they adjust the treatment, depending on their categorization to apply that treatment, and then you maintain the validity of that process over time.
So that's basically the way the rule works.
It starts off in paragraph A We define the key language. You will see there the risk-informed safety classes or RISC. That's the acronym for risk-informed safety classes. RISC-1, RISC-2, RISC-3, and RISC-4. These are the bins into which the SSCs are categorized. And this is dependent on where is SSC is coming from and where it's going to.
And as a deterministic regime. These SSCs are defined as either safety related or nonsafety related. And, of course, in 50.69, we are going to take them and we are going to move them into safety significant, low safety significant and that results in the four boxes.
Real quickly, these RISC-1 SSCs are safety related safety significant SSCs. That's the bin for those. RISC-2 are safety significant nonsafety related SSCs. Down at RISC-3 we are looking at safety related low safety significant SSCs. And finally, RISC-4, we are talking about nonsafety related low safety significant SSCs.
The rule goes on to define safety significance function. And we define that as functions whose loss of degradation could have a significant adverse affect on defense in-depth,
safety margins or risks. And this was chosen to be entirely consistent with the philosophy of Reg Guide 1.17 4. And that's a philosophy I think you will find embedded throughout this rule.
definition of RISC-1 risk categories because, in fact, safety significant SSCS are SSCs that perform safety significant functions.
Next comes paragraph B. What we were trying to do in paragraph B is really three things, trying to identify to may implement 50.69 first.
Secondly, we provide you a list of special treatment requirements for which 50.69 offers an alternative.
Finally, we identify there what a licensee or applicant must do to start the process in terms of making a submittal that the staff then reviews, looks at it, and approves it, versus the paragraph C requirements, then does that prior to the implementation.
First, regarding who may adopt this rule.
This is a voluntary rule. It may be adopted by your holders of reactor licenses, that includes both your standard or part 50 licenses as well as the renewed part 54 licensees. It may also be adopted by
applicants, and that includes both traditional part 50 applicants, as well as applicants for the part 52 licensees.
Secondly, in paragraph B we have the list there of the special treatment requirements I won't go through the entire list. You can read it, of course, for yourself. It starts with part 21.
There's numerous regulations noted there. Like 50.55(a) pieces, appendix B, Part 50, just to name a couple.
Finally, the third thing we are trying to do in this paragraph again is to identify what you have got to do as an applicant or licensee to start the process .and get it going.
Licensees must submit a license amendment application, following the provisions of 50.90.
That's the license amendment provisions. And any information you would provide to us is identified in paragraph B. But essentially what it is, it's a description of the categorization process, a description of the measures taken to ensure PRA quality, the results of any PRA review process done, and then a description of the evaluations that are going to be conducted to show that the paragraph C
requirements are met. The requirements I am talking about here are the requirements that show that you have a small change of risk associated with implementation of 50.69.
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paragraph C requirements. In fact, if they meet that, then we will prove it, and that allows you to go forward and implement the rule.
Applicants basically will do the same thing. They submit the same sort of information as part of their application. The NRC would then act on that as part of its action on the license application.
Next comes paragraph C, what I view as the heart of proposed 50.69. These are the categorization requirements.
Fundamentally, implementation of proposed 50.69 categorization requirements involves the establishment of an integrated decision making panel.
It's a panel that, in fact, ultimately determines whether SSCs are safety significant or low safety significant.
This panel often is referred to as an expert panel, and it essentially provided all the relevant information pertaining to safety
l.
significance, and that comes from both the old deterministic world of qualitative information that's available as well as any information you have from a PRA, quantitative type information you may have.
And this also includes information fr'om such assessment tools as seismic margin analysis, shut down analysis, vulnerability analysis, like five, for example, what you have available. In other words, it gives you an idea of safety significance.
As such then, what you will see in paragraph C is you have got the PRA requirements, the categorization requirements, the requirements to have this expert panel. And notably requirements to show with some reasonable confidence that the change of risk associated with the implementation of this rule is small.
And we talk about what small is in the SSC.
And we talk about terms really -- the terms we use for risk are CDF, core damage frequency or large early release frequency, LERF.
With regard to the PRA requirements, you need a plant specific PRA which at a minimum must model severe accidents scenarios resulting from internal events at full power. So you need an internal events full power PRA. This PRA must have
. \
been subjected to a peer review process against a standard or a set of acceptance criteria accepted by the staff.
And the categorization process itself must events and all operating modes, regardless of what your PRA is restricted to.
So I just mentioned maintaining with sufficient confidence the small increase in risk as measured by changes in CDF and LERF as a key requirement to 50.69. In paragraph C we require the licensees to conduct the evaluations to support their conclusion that this requirement is being satisfied.
In paragraph C also places a limit on the freedom to selectively implement 50.69. And although you have to implement the entire regulation as a whole, you can't pick pieces of it, we have developed a regulation to have significant flexibility in terms of you can implement it for any or all of the special treatment requirem!;lnts that are listed in paragraph B and you can implement it for any number of systems in the plant.
What you can't do, and where the restriction is, you can't implement it for a component within a system. And we have reasons for
that. Essentially, we want to make sure you identify all the functions, for all the different modes. If you do it on a systems basis, we think you capture that.
f'lext slide, please.
Next we come to paragraph D. These are the treatment requirements.
What we do is apply, of course, treatment requirements to each of the risk categories.
Starting with RISC-1 and RISC-2 categories SSCs --
again these are the safety significant SSCs. First, they remain subject to any special treatment requirements that are applicable. We haven't removed any special treatment requirements from either box. Of course, most of them are on box one, RISC-1 SS Cs.
But in addition if you look into the proposed rule, you will see a requirement in D-1.
And that is to have requirements there to ensure that the SSCs perform their functions consistent witb the categorization assumptions.
Since current special treatment requirements are more than sufficient, in fact, provide a high level of confidence, to ensure that these SSCs perform their design basis functions, the focus here is really on assumed performance beyond
I design basis conditions or situations.
Specifically we want to make sure that the treatment applied to these SSCs is sufficient to support the key categorization assumptions that design basis situations.
Now, RISC-3, going down to the RISC-3 bin now. What we have there is high level requirements to implement processes to provide what we refer to as reasonable confidence in the capability of RISC-3 SSCs to perform the safety-related functions.
In developing this portion of the role, we took a more performance based approach that recognizes the low safety significance of the SSCs to which these requirements apply. We have established the minimum requirements that provide this reasonable confidence in the capability of RISC-3 SSCs.
It should be noted that the treatment applied to RISC-3 SSCs needs to be sufficient to support the evaluations that I previously mentioned that were performed up in paragraph C that showed the small changes of CDF and LERF. So that's another constraint on the RISC-3 treatment.
Given the low safety significance of RISC-3 SSCs, there's a reason to ask why we, in fact, have
requirements in the proposed rule on these SSCs.
Individually, RISC-3 SSCs are not safety significant.
In other words, they wouldn't get Jnto this bin if they were. But we need to recognize that collectively they can be safety significant.
So it becomes very important there to maintain the design basis function requirement. So
this goes back to this. whole idea of maintaining design. basis, at least design base fun?tion requirements that was built into this framework.
So as a result, and you look into this, you will see we have problematic requirements in D-2 of the rule. They go to design control, procurement, maintenance, inspection, testing, surveillance, and corrective action.
And the proposed framework relies on the licensee to develop and implement programs that meet these high level requirements. Unlike the approach that was taken for the categorization requirements, which, in fact, we have a review and approval built into the framework, here we are not reviewing and approving the RISC-3 treatment programs. Our primary regulatory focus is on the safety significant SSCs and associated activities. And, of course, this is principally on assuring robust categorization. And
we have a reduced focus on RISC-3 activities associated requirements.
And this is how we think it should be.
This is the risk-informed focus.
Next comes paraqraph E.
This is another key piece of the rule. And this paragraph incorporates monitoring and process feedback requirements. There is another key piece of the framework. And they are the means by which you maintain the validity of the categorization process over time.
Licensees are required, basically, in E-1, to provide any kind of data that can affect the PRfl, model itself. This can come from design changes, procedure changes, operational experience, even industry operational experience that can affect the model itself. That's what E-1 is trying to do, bring that data back into the process. It's done on a periodic basis.
E-2 and E-3 are basically feeding back in performance data. E-2 is the performance data for RISC-1 and RISC-2. In fact, it's requiring you to monitor these RISC-1 and RISC-2 SSCs and feed this data back into the process, the categorization process.
E-3 is requiring you to consider the data that's actually collected under D-2 of the rule. If you go into D-2, you will see a maintenance protection inspection testing suNeillance requirement. The court requires you to collect data.
Okay. That dat.a then will be looked at in E-3. What you are doing there is you are really examining data to determine whether, in fact, an evaluation for delta CDF and delta LERF remains valid. That's what E-3 is doing for you.
All of this data is being fed back in the categorization process. The process itself must be adjusted to maintain its validity.
That means you have got to do one of two things, essentially, either change the categorization or change the treatment. But you have got to maintain the validity of the categorization process.
That's the way paragraph E works.
Next comes paragraph F.
Paragraph F of 50.69 specifies requirements for documentation and change control. Licensees are required to document the basis for the categorization of SSCs and are required to update the FSAR descriptions in accordance with 50.71 to reflect the progress and implementation of 50.69.
With regard to change control requirements, we haven't developed any unique change control requirements.
So we would be relying on the processes that exist today.
from 50.59. And this is relief for those changes that are in the FSAR that are direct results of the changes in treatment as applied to SS Cs that fall out of this process, recharacterization.
Again, any changes that involve nontreatment aspects of these SS Cs must go under all the normal design change control requirements. That includes 50.59. So anything outside of treatment gets the normal design change control. Again, we are not changing design basis functional requirements of 50.69.
Finally, the rule ends with paragraph G.
This paragraph specifies the new reporting requirement applicable to events, conditions that were prevented in RISC-1 and RISC-2 SSCs from performing a safety significant function and that are now otherwise reportable under current requirements that are in 50. 72 and 50.73.
Now, 50.72 and 50.73 are more than adequate to address anything within the design basis. So what
are we looking at here? We are really looking at beyond the design basis safety significant functions.
And that's what we want reported here. And you would follow basically the provisions of 50.73 paragraph B.
And I am submitting a LER in this regard.
Next slide please.
Actually, Jon Johnson has already mentioned this a little bit. . So, I will just hit it again here. This slide is really discussing some of the challenges that we have had to address as we have come along here in 50.69 .
As I'm sure the Commission is aware, this has been challenging, it's been time consuming. It's truly, I think a first of a kind rule making in developing this framework. We wrestled with numerous technical issues. These issues really are all related, and I kind of view them in a sense as a tug of war. What we tried to do is balance categorization requirements on one side and treatment requirements on the other.
We have really driven this thing to be toward the robust categorization. In other words, we want the requirements in the rule to be such that a licensee implementing processes to comply with it, it will be a robust categorization process. And by
robust I mean you will have a high confidence that the SSCs are being put into the correct bins.
So we have tried to derive on the categorization process. We think, of course, we are there.
On the treatment side what we have tried to do, well, if it's safety significant, we keep all the special treatment requirements. We have a requirement basically to maintain the validity of the categorization process for beyond design basis. We think we have the sufficient treatment requirements there.
And what have we done down in the low safety significant SSCs? We have tried to be performance based to the maximum extent possible and have the minimum requirements that basically provide a reasonable level of competence so that these SSCs maintain their capability of design basis functions.
Of course, throughout our base our major concern is safety. We think this framework maintains safety.
Additionally, we think we have got the right balance here in terms of robust categorization and our treatment on the other side of the issue here.
We also think it's also consistent with what we have told the Commission in previous secy papers we are going to do, and we think it's consistent with your expectations of what you are looking for from the staff in this effort.
A key piece, of course, is this delta CDF and delta LERF issue, this piece of it. We don't want a, of course, implementation of 50.69 to result in any more than a small increase in risk. Really, the technical challenge here is evaluating this due to implementation. In other words, assuming a performance change in RISC-3 SSCs thatresults from some change of treatment and then having a basis to support that. We are going to have to continue to work with this. This is really an implementation guidance issue. This would be something that would be addressed in NEI 0004.
We are going to have to continue working with external stakeholders in the industry to get there on this one. But we think we are going to do that and get to the final rule and reg guide and have this issue addressed.
But the bottom line is, the staff feels that it has achieved the proper balance in these technical areas in the proposed rule package.
' 1 Next slide, please.
In summary, the staff believes it has developed a rule making package that the proposed 50.69 that first successfully risk informs the special l1 eatrnem icy ..i1rc;, i'-'lilS.
Secondly it's consistent with our agency goals and most importantly, it maintains safety.
Thirdly, we think it's consistent with our previous statements to the Commission and Commission direction to us on this effort. So we think it meets expectations.
We recognize that there are issues that remain to be resolved regarding the implementation guidance and the associated draft regulatory guide.
And we are going to continue to work in interactions with stakeholders and industry to get those issues resolved as we go through with the rule making process.
But we feel at this point and time, it's important to get the entire proposed rule making package issued for external stakeholders feedback, and we request that the Commission decide accordingly. We, in fact, believe this is the best, most efficient way to get there to the final rule and final reg guide.
Thank you for your time and patience today ..
CARL PAPERIELLO: This concludes the staffs formal presentation.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Thank you.
We can see the size of the package that we have in front of us. This is obviously a very
complicated matter.
Let me say that one of the challenges, I think, that we all have is that there is -- I perceive that there's sort of a special vocabulary that's been developed by people who work this field.
So there's a problem of communication that we have to deal with.
Let me say that my reaction, my question here may reflect some misunderstanding of vocabulary.
We have~- the whole point of the categorization process is, of course, is to be able to bin the SSCs, with the new elements here being particular the RISC-2 and the RISC-3 categories.
RISC-2 categories are the ones that, of course, that you have determined as a result of this process, are the safety significant things that are not captured under existing rule.
And as I go through 50.69 as to those items, safety significant items about which we have
-- don't have,. don't capture under existing special
treatment requirements, the only thing we impose is a single sentence that is on page 139 of the rule making package.
Let me read it. It says the licensee or perform their functions consistent with a categorization process assumptions by evaluating treatment being applied to these SSCs to ensure that it supports the key assumptions in the categorization process that relate to their assumed performance.
That's a difficult sentence to interpret.
And that's maybe probably a vocabulary issue here.
But I take it to mean that the treatment -- you have certain assumptions in the PRA part ofthis process, that is, certain assumptions that you have made as to these components, these SSCs and you need to make sure you have treatment that is sufficient to -- that is at least self-consistent with your assumptions in the evaluation process as to their availability.
As I look, I think that's all there is in this rule for RISC-2.
You made a point on RISC-1 that we felt it necessary to go through and to retain everything that exists in part 21, part 50, and part 100 for the
RISC-100 category.
So I would like to get some comfort on RISC-2. I mean, this is a new element here that we have said -- these are safety related things that we are not capturing now. And we have basically a self consistency requirement that is a certain degree of vagueness associated with it. And I'm a little puzzled, quite frankly. And I would direct this to the DPVers who have a lot of focus on the RISC-3 categorization and concerns that we are being too vague in how we are dealing with that. Whereas it seems to me that their concerns, if anything, are greatly amplified or ought to be greatly amplified, unless I'm misunderstanding this, with regard to the RISC-2 category.
I would appreciate it if you could give me some comfort that we are really dealings with the RISC-2 category in a serious way. This is one of the new elements of this process, is that we have learned something about some things that we are not treating today as being safety significant that we have learned that are safety related, that they are very important. And everything is hinging on one rather difficult short sentence.
JON JOHNSON: Because those two are not
part of the PRA evaluations that proceed the categorization, I think the answer is probably best answered by Tim but I'm sure Gary would like to add something.
can add.
I think that dividing it into two pieces into box two SSCs -- we are maintaining any special treatment requirements over in box two, for example, maintenance rule. There can be part 100 requirements there. There can be other requirements on box two.
I'm not going* to go through all of them but there are some. There are not nearly as many as box one.
So if there's anything in design basis that there's for those, it's going to be maintained.
Now, what about beyond the design basis issue? And that's where you are going to.
If you are taking credit for these things in your PRA, then you need to maintain that credit, okay. And make sure that you feedback monitoring data to maintain that credit, and that your treatment -- and that feedback, by the way, is in E-2
-- and that your treatment in D-1 is sufficient to maintain it.
I think Gary can go into a lot more detail
about how you do that. But what we are really saying is, in a sense, in a broad sense is that whatever your risk is today is acceptable. We are not trying to lower the risk or enhance safety here. Your risk, basically, you are assuming in your PRA or you are having in your PRA is basically a function of how you are accrediting these SSCs.
Now, I'm not going to enhance the treatment here. I'm going to make sure you maintain it, essentially lock it in place. And that's really what is going on here. There is an awful lot to this, but I will let Gary take it here in a second.
But really to me I think it comes down to, are your assumptions and your PRA actually valid.
And this will make sure, in fact, they are valid.
JON JOHNSON: Gary, you can add to that.
GARY HOLAHAN: The statement of consideration attempts to expand on this thought somewhat.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: If you look at page 105, which describes this. It says, as to this point, for SSCs categorized as RISC~1 or RISC-2, all existing applicable requirements continue to apply.
This inclu-des any applicable special treatment requirements. Which says to me that for RISC-2 you
get what's there, which is maybe minimal and not anything else, other than what you get from D-1.
GARY HOLAHAN: I think also if you look at page 22 in section 33-1, it talks about what in the categorization process. It refers to availability, capability and reliability of equipment. So what it's doing is it's bringing two new aspects under regulatory control.
It's bringing, first of all, a severe accident function of this equipment. And in the past we have really only controlled design basis requirements.
And it's also specifically addressing availability, reliability and capability, which are really key elements that the PRA uses to judge the safety significance of the equipment.
What it doesn't do is it doesn't prescribe to the licensees how they should maintain the reliability, avai_lability and capability. So it's much more a performance oriented approach.
But it does bring un~er regulatory controls a number of aspects of the RISC-2 SSCs that were not there before. Even the existing maintenance rule, which addresses some of these components, doesn't
really cover availability and reliability. It only covers maintenance failures or maintenance related activities.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Well, let me ask the question this way then.
lfyou have emphasized that the real focus of this rule is make sure the categorization process is robust and you have a process that's operating, are we -- does the staff believe it's necessary to see what is proposed to handle the RISC-2, to meet this RISC-2 obligation? As part of this process, do you anticipate you get any filing that's subject to review and subject to oversight on that issue or not?
GARY HOLAHAN: No.
The staff would not get a submittal on the treatment of RISC-2 components. What it would get is the assumptions would be in the submittal.
Then, if you remember as Tim mentioned, section E of the rule has a feedback and monitoring requirement so that, in effect, in a performance based approach, the licensee has a flexibility to meet those assumptions that are in the analysis.
Then they have an obligation to have a monitoring program in place tc -ensure that those assumptions are really coming true in practice.
And I think what the staff has said is we are satisfied that if the feedback process is showing that the assumptions are correct, we don't need to involve ourselves in exactly how the licensee made that come true.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Well, that may well be a completely satisfactory answer. But I'm a skeptical member of the public, I might ask the question, well, gee, if you found it necessary to maintain all of these specific requirements for the RISC-1 category and the RISC-2 categories are the same degree of safety significance; how can you justify the inconsistency?
GARY HOLAHAN: I think the inconsistency or the difference in treatment comes because this is option 2 and it treats the design basis with a certain level of respect. And, in fact, that is why RISC-1's get more treatment than RISC-2's. And RISC-3's get more treatment than RISC-4's. And it's really the design basis aspect, and a desire to assure people that we have not abandoned the design basis that calls for even the hi~h level of treatment for RISC-3 components. It's the reason that they are not done on a performance based approach.
So I think it's really the design basis
concept that drives both RISC-1 and RISC-3's to have a certain level of prescription that we are willing, on RISC-2's to treat in a more performance based approach.
Tli\.10THY F~EED: I think I would also like to add, you mentioned that they are basically the same, RISC-1 's and RISC-2's, because we call them both safety significant. In fact, they really are not.
When you look at the boxes, they kind of lead you to think they are the same.
If you look over in box two and you ask yourself is there anything over in box two that if I didn't have requirements on it would result in loss of adequate protection? And you find that there isn't anything over there. eecause if there were, we would have imposed requirements to achieve adequate protection to 50.59.
What you will see over there is stuff like station blackout or whatever, is requirements that were imposed to safety as enhancement, cost beneficial enhancement type requirements.
So, in fact, how I look at it is, if you give me box one, you give me the principal product barriers, the engineered safety features, the protection system, I will save the world. You won't
even get close to losing adequate protection.
Now, box two stuff does certainly make it safer. It lowers your risk. And if you are crediting your box two stuff in the PRA to get that essentially locking that into place. You are saying now you are going to have to maintain the validity of that, _and you have to treat it accordingly. You have to feed back data into the process under E-2 and maintain that over time.
So it's actually a lot. That's a pretty big requirement that's there. Maybe it's a short sentence, but it carries a lot.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: I have a lot of other questions. This is in light of the time, I'm not going to pursue them now. On another occasion I will.
Commissioner Dicus?
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: Let's continue on the RISC-2 issue.
In light of the fact that we are bringing some new requirements in or potential new requirements in, particularly with severe accidents and mitigation of severe accidents which you have mentioned, which should provide an increase in safety, but it
also, presumably, provides some increase in burden, potential regulatory burden. Tell me what kind of feedback we are getting on this from our stakeholders, industry and public, et cetera? Or has that gone into this?
GARY HOLAHAN: I think the best feedback, the most direct feedback we have gotten is from the South Texas experience, where they have not implemented this version of the rule, but they have done something similar enough so that we can make some judgements about the relative burdens, conceptually of how much additional analysis is necessary, how much additional monitoring is necessary, versus the savings in procurements, maintenance, activities. And the net savings reported by South Texas project, even through relatively modest implementation over the first year, has been substantial.
Both reduction in cost and a reduction in dose to the -- you know, industrial dose to the workers, primarily from the reduction in the amount of valve testing that needed to be done.
You know, some of us were at a meeting a week or so ago where South Texas*~made a presentation that, in fact, they were able to replace some
components which they normally cost $17,000 for basically the same components for $431.
So the net savings for many components in the RISC-3 category is substantial. Okay. There are But the fact that there are many more RISC-3 components then there are RISC-2 components, I think, tilts the balance very much in the direction of reduced burden, dose and dollars.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: So even though we are adding something in RISC-2, we haven't done --
the savings in RISC-3 offsets it?
GARY HOLAHAN: Yes.
TIMOTHY REED: I would also like to add to what Gary said. If you look in the regulatory analysis, the Westinghouse owners group was kind enough to do a lot of work here and get into a lot of nuts and bolts on the potential cost and cost benefits of implementing this. And this is now for Option 2, and this is getting away from South Texas, which is a little unique three-train plant. So this is a little bit better, I think, from what we are talking about here today.
Certainly the set-up costs are substantial.
I think you will see numbers in terms of about 2 to 3
million to set this up. And setup, it can be very expensive in terms of procedures, the PRA, the submittal, the review, as well as actually conducting this thing. It's costly.
But then you look at how much you are saving. You are getting savings roughly on the order of about a million a year. So this thing pays back pretty quickly, on the order of two to three years.
Of course, that work was done using a draft language. The people, unfortunately, didn't have the benefit of the real language in the SOC. And I hope, in fact, that they go back and look at that and adjust it and see where we come out.
But at this point and time it looks like, from all the information that's available to me, that this is actually very cost beneficial, even considering the additional burdens that pieces of this rule doesn't apply.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: So the STP experience seems to be positive. But what about the industry overall? Or are we hearing about this yet.
and will we hear about it when the rule goes out?
TIMOTHY REED: I'm very confident that we will hear.about it.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS I think we will
hear about a lot of things.
TIMOTHY REED: So far it does seem to be pretty positive.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: Let me go to of the DPV authors and their concerns that they will raise with us in the next panel.
It seems that wa are dealing here with two options. One option is to put the language back in that was in an earlier version or not to put the /
language back in.
Are there other options that could be considered? And could someone tell me something about what they are and what the merits would be?
TIMOTHY REED: You can do this a lot of different ways.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: I'm looking at two or three in particular.
TIMOTHY REED: You can adjust this thing a lot of ways. This is going to that last slide about how we think we drove this process towards robust categorization, and I think it's something like 15 pages of issues with the implementation guidance.
And we tried to remove detail in RISC-3, as you can see, really "how to" requirement detail out of the RISC-3 and
became much more performance based there. At least a little bit more performance based I Should say.
That's where we are now.
Now, the previous version, I think, had more how to or detail then RISC-3. And at one point in time we didn't have those 15 pages of issues associated with implementation guidance, so we were not as robust.
Now, you could put more treatment in RISC-3 and allow more SSCs to go down into the box. And not be so robust so your safety net is, in fact, that you are not really changing too much treatment, but you are allowing a lot to go in there.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: So you are trying to do this balance between categorization and treatment?
TIMOTHY REED: Exactly. There's a lot of ways to do it. We have put together a way that we think meets the expectations. And this is why it's a good reason to putthis out for public comment, this piece, because there are more than one way actually to adJust this framework.
And I think we will get some good stakeholder feedback on this.
JON JOHNSON: We have had a tremendous
amount of dialogue. And we used our new initiative to put the draft rules on the web site to get some reaction, as Tim indicated.
This is the -- I think -- correct me if I'm rule that we have been able to get all of our division directors' concurrence in, get concurrence from the Office of Research and get support from the ACRS. We have had several meetings with the ACRS to discuss a lot of the issues.
So I think to answer your question, there is a balance. There's a trade-off. And at this point, we think we have a very good product.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: Okay.
I want to follow up then on your statement about the ACRS because I'm not real clear based on what you said on what the ACRS has said.
You say they agree that this language and they disagr~~ with the differing opinions?
JON JOHNSON: I will let Tim discuss that.
They have recommended that we publish this for public comment.
DAVID MATTHEWS: Their focus was not associated with anything on alternative language. As you might imagine, their concern was the PRA quality
issue and its use and how it's embraced in the rule to address issues of PRA quality. And the sensitivity studies that we were expecting to be done to show the impact of alternative treatment.
But they were not focused on the rule language associated the treatment. I don't even remember getting a question in that regard.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS Fine.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm tryihg to put my thoughts in order here. Let me see, because I had some of the same concerns and I'm trying to get them. Let me see if I
-- please interrupt me if I say something that is not correct.
First, this rule is a risk-informed and performance based rule. Is that -- no, I mean -- I'm saying, I'm asking is it this type of rule?
DAVID MATIHEWS: Yes.
JON JOHNSON Yes, sir. In part.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: See, that takes two hours.
Ii GARY HOLAHAN: What I mean by that is clearly, there are some prescriptive elements in the proposed rule also.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: But if you were performance based rule?
GARY HOLAHAN: Yes, sir. I would join you in that generous description COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Okay. Thank you very much.
Second thing is the main constraint in how to deal with RISC-2 and RISC-3 is the preservation of the design basis with consideration of beyond design basis. Is that correct?
GARY HOLAHAN: Yes. That's correct.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: I'm trying to get myself right.
DAVID MATTHEWS: Maybe if I poll the panel each time to give YQlJ the appropriate answer.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Could you please.
I don't mind.
TIMOTHY REED: I think you described it accurately.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: So the fundamental issue between RISC-2 and RISC-3 is, we cannot make
RISC-2 part of the design basis because they are not right now. And we cannot abandon RISC-'3 functionality bec~use they are part of the design basis. So you are dealing with trying to make the best of this thing. Okay.
Now, my next question is a little more complex. And the next question is I know that, you know, we have these goais of maintaining safety. But I really believe that we are going to make a major rule and a major change that the net have to be a little better than maintain safety.
So this is the question. If we really consider and pay more attention to RISC-2, even if they are not in the design basis, and therefore there has to be an effort to systematically make RISC-2 structure systems and component fit some categorization that they have been undergoing and we take RISC-3 components, maintaining the design basis, have design control, document control, all of the things that are appendix B, but we don't do it at the appendix B level. We do it at a functional level, and this is done well -- let's assume we have a super utility and this is done well. Is the net result going to improve safety or just maintain safety?
GARY HOLAHAN: There's no question in my mind that this should make an improvement to safety.
There's also no question that we probably cannot calculate many of those intangible benefits to
...rh..-...,! \#*". ",....'" .-.1-..-. - -.L =*-- . . . . --... ,. . . . . . . :,....~ \**....-.. tl,....f. he DAVID MATTHEWS: Or challenge the licensees to articulate that improvement.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: I understand that.
But I need to see this. I mean, if we are just going to do this thing, I just don't see going through all of this, because the reason -- and I believe this, that we have undertaken risk-informed regulation and now put them together. Remember, I keep saying that and it is a very, very difficult risk informed and performance based.
We are now going a step forward and we are saying, we can have -- and by the way, I don't like the word "robust." You know, my English is very limited. I like the word, "rigorous," because robust is just a little better, more complete. But rigorous has a different meaning to it. So I call this a rigorous treatment. You call it robust, but I call it rigorous.
It has to be rigorous, because if it's not rigorous, then your categorization is not sufficient
to justify the change in the rule.
So if it's a rigorous treatment of the categorization process, that requires, of course, a PRA quality. How are you going to address the PRA quality in a manner that RISC-2 -- see, I'm more worried, like the Chairman was in RISC-2, that RISC-2 is actually going to contribute to enhancing the safety of the plan, which I think should be, you know, a consideration when we go to this rule.
GARY HOLAHAN: I think there are four aspects of this. One is that the rule language itself calls for a certain level of scope and depth of review.
Second, and probably more importantly is that we don't today have -- but we are very firmly on the path of -- having guidance documents, regulatory guides, ASME standard, not so far in the future, an ANS standard, the industry peer review process, all of these contributing to the quality of the PRA and the -- a comfort that is being used appropriately in this process.
Thirdly, there's the staff review and approval process for which I think we have been very successful over the last few years, both through training and staffing to have very high quality staff
who are very capable of doing these reviews.
And lastly, there is the process built into the rule where there is a feedback process. Where if something isn't quite done right, the update and periodic basis.
So I feel comfortable that this is a rigorous process.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: How much time do we have, Mr. Chairman?
RISC-2. We did some sparring about performance base. The treatment of RISC-2 is essentially performance based. There's no deterministic component on that.
GARY HOLAHAN: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Okay. All right.
I stand corrected. Go ahead.
GARY HOLAHAN: No. Yes, sir. You are correct.
DAVID MATTHEWS: Let's be clear. There's none imposed by this rule that are deterministic.
But those components may find themselves under the maintenance rule. So there are other --
and the certain category of appendix B requirements is applied them as part of their quality assurance
plan.
So there are deterministic requirements t_hat are components in the plan, they are importa*nt, but they haven't been treated as safety related within that context of our regulations up to this point and time.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: I understand. I know I'm repeating something that the Ch.afrman on a couple of things, because I have a cold I'm a little slow today.
Would you repeat how once you establish some expectations of performance for RJSC-2 system, how are you going to ensure that the licensee meets those performance expectations, since there are no deterministic requirements?
GARY HOLAHAN: Well, if you just look at section E-1 of the rule and E-2 of the rule, specifically, with respect to RISC-1 and RISC-2 SSCs, it requires the licensees.shall monitor the performance of RISC-1 and RISC-2 SSCs.
The licensees shall make adjustments as necessary to either the categorization or the treatment process, so that the categorization process and result are maintained valid.
That's a direct quote from the wording of
the rule.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: How do you manage the treatment with the categorization?
GARY HOLAHAN: Each time the licensee does reliability, availability and compatibility of the systems.
In fact, our expectation based on the quality PRA is that those are not arbitrary judgments. Those are based on plant specific or generic data that support those.
And so periodically, the licensee is going to monitor those same assumptions, the reliability and availability -- they may or may not have actually beginning experience on the capability of the system for severe accident role. But they are certainly are required to have information on the reliability and availability of those systems down to the competent level.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: And how do we monitor?
GARY HOLAHAN: The rule doesn't require the staff to look at that. It would be part of the normal reactor oversight process.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: So instead of the
reactor oversight process, that has to come in and fill in for monitoring that RISC-2 systems are being treated consistent with the categorization?
GARY HOLAHAN: I would think so. We haven't really laid out in any detail how that would work.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: You would expect that it would?
GARY HOLAHAN: I would expect to. This would be my expectation.
And because the reactor oversight process is, in fact, a risk-informed process, it seems to me that that would be quite consistent with the approach that we are already on.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Is that something that you believe should be spelled out in the final rule to some extent?
GARY HOLAHAN: I think the staff needs to work it out as an overall plan for)!Jlplementation.
Perhaps not in the rule but in the guidance process.
COMMISSIONER _NILS DIAZ: All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Commissioner McGaffigan?
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Like everyone else, we have more questions than we have time. So I will just try to get to the heart of a couple items that perhaps help the next panel as well.
raise is the July 31st draft included the following requirements: RISC-3 treatment processes must meet voluntary consensus standards which are generally accepted in industrial practice and address applicable vendor recommendations and operational experience: The implementation of these processes and the assessment of their effectiveness must be controlled and accomplished through documented procedures and guidelines.
Why was that dropped?
DAVI D MATTHEWS: As one of the first management level reviewers of that rule, when I read those portions and then discussed it with the executive team, it was clear to me that that was a how as opposed to a what with regard to these rules.
We were focused on developing performance based requirements.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: One of the troubles with performance based rules is you can't enforce it. I mean, we have had staff testimony to
that in the past. It's very difficult to enforce vague requirements when everything is tossed into guidance.
DAVID MATTHEWS: Again, sir, my expectation wasn't that we would be attempting to enforce treatment requirements. We would be attempting to respond in the oversight process to performance problems that were generated by failure in RISC-3 components if they were to occur and result in a problem.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: Well, doesn't that affect -- I mean, we are chasing -- in the oversight process, one of the dreams was once that we would somehow get ahead of those issues.
That guarantees that we are always behind issues.
I mean, if there's a failure, the oversight process identifies it and we go after it.
DAVID MATTHEWS: We would have trouble justifying, I believe, enforcement resources relative to treatment for RISC-3 components by virtue of the fact that it would be inspection recourse dedicated to the lowest significant components in the plant.
So therefore, it seemed appropriate to put a performance based requirement relative to its treatment that would be responded to in the event
that you did have subsequent failures. And hopefully they would be indicated in a trend.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: I'm going to get short answers, because I'm going the ask the
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And if you have already read the viewgraph I won't read it. But it bears on the need for ASME 2, class 2 and class 3 SSCs parts must either meet the requirements of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code or other generally accepted voluntary standards that are in industrial practice, et cetera. Why was that all dropped?
DAVID MATTHEWS: For the same reason.
Essentially, the answer is the same for all of them.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: So these are all how-to's for stuff you don't think is very important?
DAVID MATTHEWS: Yes.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD ,MCGAFFIGAN: And therefore, we don't need to have how-to's for things that are not important?
TIMOTHY REED: Let me just also add with regard to the use of risk-informed code cases, ASME standards, what have you. We talk about this in the
SSC. We recommend that these are -- these are, in fa~t, approaches that would, in fact, comply with our role requirements. So if you put yourself in a licensee's seat what do you see?
I think you see that from a licensing risk would I adopt these? Of course I would. And the NRC has told me that this is what it complies with.
Would I adopt them from an engineering perspective? Absolutely. By the ASME saying this is a good way to go, I feel a lot better from an engineering perspective.
And I think as NEI has indicated, they are going to suggest to the industry in their guidance that goes out to industry, not submitting to us, that in fact they follow these standards and cases.
So do I expect a licensee to do this?
Absolutely. It's available. It's probably the most cost beneficial way to go.
But it is, in fact, a how-to. I think I fully expect them to do it. I don't think we need to get into the how-to's here. I think we can be performance based. It's kind of difficult.
JON JOHNSON: It is difficult, you are right, to inspect performance base but it's our understanding that's the Commission's policy.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: The Commission's policy -- I think on risk informed, there's a policy statement. On performance based, we have been pretty --1 don't think there's ahy to be flexible.
I, for one, think the deterministic requirements are just fine a lot of the time. So, it's performance based to the extent appropriate, I think are the words. You are determining that this is a place where you think it's appropriate for performance specific.
I will go back to the Chairman's question on RISC-2, you are being pretty performance based there as well on some things that are allegedly very high safety significance. You know, environmental qualification for RISC-1 's we have all sorts of rules and they follow them, et cetera.
For RISC-2's, I guess when something fails in the performance monitoring thing, since it is high safety significance and if they didn't have an adequate environmental qualification thing and we determine that's a problem, what? They get a yellow or a white finding or something at that point?
What is it that they actually have to do
for environmental qualification of a RISC-2 system?
GARY HOLAHAN: Well, I think they have to continue to do corrective action to put that component or system in a condition that's consistent with the categorization process. So they may need to take corrective action.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: Did you ever consider saying, if something falls into RISC-2, then all of the prescriptive requirements elsewhere in the regulations that would apply to the RISC-1 system hereby apply to the RISC-2 system?
GARY HOLAHAN: I think we did think about that. There's a fundamental problem with doing that, and that.is RISC-2 components are important from a severe accident point of view. And most of the special treatment requirements are not targeted to severe accidents. And they serve better, they work better in the RISC-1 box where they were originally intended then they would serve in the RISC-2 box.
So what we thought was, you could do that and I think it would provide you perhaps some higher level of assurance. But it would be a rather heavy burden. And we thought that we could more directly target what was really important from a severe accident point of view, capability, reliability, and
availability of equipment to provide a better balance between what's required and what the safety benefit was.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: Thank you,
.c*,.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Can I just for a minute -- if the rigorous categorization process were to determine that somehow one of the system that is RISC-2 should really be RISC-1, we would move it to RISC-1?
GARY HOLAHAN: I think what would happen is, if such thing were identified, certainly it is possible, the backfit rule is available. And we could certainly impose additional requirements in that case.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: So there is a difference between RISC-1 and RISC-2? And the difference is that RISC-1 have to deal with the entire set of design basis accidents, plus severe accidents. And RISC-2 really doesn't have to deal with the entire design basis, it's just beyond design basis?
GARY HOLAHAN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Is that right?
TIMOTHY REED: It stems from the fact of safety related versus nonsafety related.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Is it possible to conceive that when you do a PRA, that you will find that there is some nonsafety related component that, in fact, is important for a design basis accident?
GARY HOLAHAN: It would not be necessary for a design basis requirement.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Would it be possible to find such a component - SSC, excuse me?
GARY HOLAHAN: It wouldn't be impossible to find one that might provide some additional protection for design basis requirements. But it wouldn't be possible to find one that is necessary for a design basis requirement, because the complete set of those is included in RISC-1 --
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: We need to understand these things well enough to be able to say that.
GARY HOLAHAN: And if we were to find that the design basis were deficient, I don't think that a voluntary rule of 50.69 would be the appropriate way of dealing with it.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: We will say, fix it.
That's what my question was.
GARY HOLAHAN: We want to keep RISC-1 and RISC-3 as the design basis requirements. They should be fully capable of fully addressing all of the design basis requirements. And if they are not, they COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: I want to ask one question if I can. The cost of these RISC-2 system structures and components, you know, something finds itself in RISC-2 -- you have a lot of data, you pointed out on Westinghouse owner's group about how cheap things become if you can just get away from the current requirements for safety-related systems structures and components.
Do you have any idea what the extra cost is? I mean, is it a cost free something? Something gets into RISC-2 but it doesn't cost them anything other than having to monitor it? Or are they actually going to have to have some additional requirements in terms of the quality of that part or component? Is there any data on that?
GARY HOLAHAN: I don't know. I don't believe we have seen any data.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: We always have this double-edged sword stuff. And if the sharp edge of the sword is actually cost free to these
guys, other than monitorin~ and paperwork -- which would cost something -- then what is it that we have done?
GARY HOLAHAN: I judge the sharpness of the safety edge of the sword by the safety impmvr.::rnent not by the cost that it has imposed on a licensee.
So, some may, in fact, be low cost.
But if they have a net safety benefit, I would see that as supporting this as a safety rule.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: But the reason the safety equipmeflt costs so much is it presumably goes through a lot of extra testing, certification, whatever. And we are saying we don't really need to do that stuff for the RISC-2's.
GARY HOLAHAN: That's right. And from the examples that we have heard, it's not unusual for the cost to differ by a factor of four or five or so.
TIMOTHY REED: Remember, in RISC-2 what you are looking at is how they credited that SSC in beyond design basis situations. So if a licensee is crediting something to operate in beyond design basis conditions and the treatment isn't there, in other words, to support the capability of the component to do it, then that's basically, either they get that treatment up, which would be costly, or they change
the assumption in the PRA and take a risk hit.
So that goes to the requirement that Chairman Meserve was looking at. So it could be costly. So some of these costs that you are talking
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your PRA, and whether in fact it's valid. Those are the kinds of things we look at in the submittal, the peer review findings, the output of that, and how valid it is. So there could be substantial costs.
But having said that, if someone has a PRA that has a lot of invalid assumptions, are they going to try to pick that up Option 2? I don't think so.
I think the people that are going to pick this up are people with good PRA's. They wouldn't have a substantial additional amount of cost involved for bringing them up to what we have said is a very high standard on quality really for this application.
GARY HOLAHAN: I think it's fair to say that we don't expect licensees to be spending a lot of money adding new components to the plant in their RISC-2 area in order to reduce risk.
The examples we have seen have to do with existing equipment in the plant for which they can now determine some severe accident role. But it can be worked into the accident management guidelines.
It's available.
So the costs are mostly analysis costs, monitoring, and upkeep costs. They are not so much, you know, new construction type costs.
DAVID MATTHEWS: Or dramatic changes in the way they have been treating these.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Commissioner Merrifield. Sorry to take so long in getting to you.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: No problem. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Two quick comments I want to do up front.
Frequently, on this side of the table I have made comments about the need to make sure that our presentations to the staff are in plain English. It would be only fair to give a credit to Tim for providing what I think was a very good plain English presentation this morning that worked through a lot of acronyms, a lot of descriptions, but did so in a way that I think stakeholders could understand through our video streaming and everyone here in the audience. So I wanted to credit that.
The other comment I wanted to make, various commissioners have made comments about RISC-2.
need not add to that. And I think part of what the staff made take from this is a need for perhaps some
additional clarity in explaining what it intended on RISC-2.
I do want to counterbalance that by the notion that brevity is -- and, comments made by the Commission, thP .c::t::::iff feels sornetimA" that it h::::ic; tn bring us a rock. The issue of brevity is not necessarily a bad thing in and of itself.
And I use as an example President Lincoln's Gettysburg address, which was known as probably one of the more shining examples of speech in certainly our history if not world history versus the presidential address of William Henry Harrison, which had 8,000 plus words, which were known to lead to his death of pneumonia some 30 days later. So I caution the staff, lots more is not necessarily better.
A significant portion of what the staff and what we are attempting to accomplish here does require a very robust living PRA to take advantage of the categorization process.
There are, I think, a couple things associated with that. One, it's my understanding that the staff is still working on a draft reg guide to address PRA quality. And I wanted to get some sense of the status of that. Because that is certainly a key in this process.
I am also aware of a significant effort on the part of NEI and its membership t_o go through a peer review process of existing PRA's. So I would like to get a little better sense of how all of that works together, because this obviously is significantly interconnected with that.
JACK STROSNIDER: I can attempt that. Jack Strosnider, deputy office director in research.
With regard to the draft reg guide, 1122, our expectation is that we put that out for public comment within the next month or so and that it's on a parallel track for final issuance on the same sort of schedule as 50.69.
The current reg guide would reference ASME standards, also some NEI guidelines on how to do peer review relative to those standards.
It would also -- there would be update of this reg guide to include -- future updates to include some other areas such as fire, external events and low power and shutdown risks.
And I would just comment that in the research concurrence for putting this package out for public comment, that we also commented that we think this area should be addressed, perhaps more thoroughly, with regard to the upcoming changes and
how they are incorporated.
But as. was stated earlier, we do expect those, the standards to be -- guidance to be available, consistent with the schedule for 50.69.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: What about our interaction with NEI and its efforts to peer review the existing PRA's?
JACK STROSNIDER: There have been a number of meetings on that and perhaps Gary can give more detail on that.
GARY HOLAHAN: I think it's an integral part of our draft reg guide 1122 that Jack mentioned.
There have been a number of meetings. My recollection is the staff members did observe a number of the peer review activities. We sent staff out for a week or so to actually observe how they were being done.
I think all of these things are steps in the right direction. You know, we are not at a point where we are done and can declare victory on PRA quality. But I think they are all very fundamental steps being taken in the right direction.
And I think the Office of Research has played an absolutely pivotal role in getting where we are and where we need to go. JO
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: Thank you.
On page 48 of the Federal Register notice, it talks about removing RISC-3 SSCs from the scope of which I have spoken to the staff about and in public on various occasions.
What standards -- is there a sense that we are going to? Is there an ISO type program? And can you clarify for us -- Commissioner McGaffigan talked about the issue of some of the cost differences in the inspection requirements, is there a significant difference in the manufacture of these products at the end, or is it more a function of meeting our quality assurance requirements that drives the cost of -- appendix B requirements that drives the cost differences that are associated with the information that has been provided to us by Westinghouse?
TIMOTHY REED: I will take a shot at the last piece first. I am probably not the best person.
You probably ought to be talking to an industry person involved in procurement who can certainly give you a better answer. But I think it's a combination of two major factors, at least, that really drive up costs.
One, appendix B and the other is part 21 requirements. Those drive up those costs enormously.
Of course, equipment qualifications, seismic qualifications are also other aspects that can drive up this.
So all of those would come off and that would reduce the cost substantially of procuring a
replacement piece.
As far as ISO 9000 or something like that, a licensee would utilize -- I'm not sure what licensees might utilize in their commercial programs today. But I do know I put the programmatic requirements right into 50.69(d)2.
What I'm concerned about from my perspective in the 50.69 centered universe is that they meet those requirements. And if ISO 9000 meets them, fine. Whatever it takes. That's why we basically established what are called a floor of requirements in D-2.
If your commercial program is good enough to do it, great. If it is not, you are going to have to bring it up to a level that does meet it. That's the best I can do with ISO 9000.
Did anyone else have anything to add on that?
GARY HOLAHAN: Can I just add a few points?
What it looks like is when there was procurement of essentially identical components, there was a substantial cost associated with quality assurance and documentation process. And it can be a tactor oi* two or iour or more on ii-1e cost.
There is a sensitivity to components which look similar or might, in fact, be identified with the same number. And I think when you hear from the staff on the next panel, I think they can speak to this issue as well.
We do have a sensitivity to replacing, you know, metal components with plastic components, something that would, in effect, change the design, although it would be done in a subtle way and might not be noticed, which could, in fact, impair its function.
So the substitute of nonappendix B components for appendix B components needs to be done in a way that preserve the design basis. I think we all share that concern.
But a substantial difference in the cost is associated with appendix B itself, not necessarily that this is a cheaper, you know, modified version of the components.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: I think
part of what I was trying to get through with that question -- and we have seen any number of examples
coming out of the Pentagon, the substitution of commercially available component does not necessarily result in a component that has a lesser quality.
Is that a fair assumption?
GARY HOLAHAN: I think that's a fair statement.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: I want to go to the STP experience.
Obviously South Texas put a significant amount of time, effort, and money into going through the effort that they did on the exceptions. And I'm wondering if I can get a couple of different observations out of this.
One, is there a -- we viewed this in the comments. We viewed South Texas as a proof of concept prototype for the rule making.
Are t.here any significant differences in terms of where we went with South Texas versus what we have before us today? And do you all consider that effort a success? Was that pilot a success and a model for how we might do things in the future or not?
TIMOTHY REED: I can start.
Comparing South Texas to 50.69, of course they were exempt to rule making, it goes without saying. But some.other significant differences between the two efforts. South Texas' PRA was 1eviewea in subs1c:tr1ua1 dt;tdil oy t11e stall. UT course, we are going to rely on PRA reviews, the PRA guide and a focus review in that respect.
South Texas ultimately ended up with a detailed FSAR, there were pretty strict change controls on the FSAR and put them basically in a box.
What do we have?* We have a regulation instead.
South Texas never even requested, because they didn't need it, relief from appendix B, design control, that Criterion 3 and 15 and 16 which go to corrective action.
So those are some of the substantial differences between South Texas and Option 2.
Now, I'm forgetting, I think, the rest of your question.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: Was it worth it? Was that pilot a success?
TIMOTHY REED: Yes. I think proof of concept is the good word not pilot.
One of things that happened with South Texas is I think we were searching for what Option 2 was. They came in early. We were first.
They tended to be a little bit more toward Option 3 early on. And I think some of the things they were looking for were really bordering on design changes. And we kind of dialed them back. And you see that through the history of dealings with South Texas.
It certainly was successful in helping us to work through a lot of issues. We had a lot of excellent dialogue. And a lot of stuff that we considered in South Texas really helped us to put this package together.
You may not see it explicitly, but certainly, working through the thought process helped us enormously in putting this together.
GARY HOLAHAN: Let me say that I think it was a succe,ss. It was a valuable thing to do.
But because it was done without this level of guidance or requirements, it was some sort of thinking out loud being done. And some of the things that South Texas suggested, especially early on, as Tim mentioned, I think were inconsistent with Option
2. And to a certain extent, some of that discussion process made the staff very nervous about what is
.South Texas really trying to achieve* and how well this all worked out.
So in part, that issue of discomfort for what South Texas was really achieving and the working through of, you know, how much treatment and what's in and what's out, I think it came out at a good r*.,...,; *..,J.
But going through that process, I think, made some people nervous because, they saw that, if it weren't for some of the staffs decisions, then, in fact, South Texas would have chosen something that probably would have been incompatible with Option 2.
So I think that, in part, has lead to some of the staffs concerns.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: Well, there was a dynamic process. That was understandable.
My final question for the last couple of minutes, we are going to hear from the DPV panel in a moment. And there are two, it seems to me, significant things that they will be raising, at least in the presentational materials that we received beforehand. One is that there were significant changes made after the July 2002 version of the proposed rule.
And the other one is that there is an issue associated this proposed rule regarding common-cause
failures.
And I was wondering if the panel would like to have an opportunity to comment on those issues?
DAVID MATIHEWS: I will take the first one.
I think Tim can address the common-cause failures.
We have focused on that aspect of our concern -- I mean of their concern, and now it is our concern with regard to common-cause failures of those three components.
With regard to the first issue about the significant changes between the August, I think, 2nd version of the rule which has been presented to the Commission, the August 2nd version has been misrepresented, I think, as representing some sort of uniform consensus. The consensus only existed only at the working staff level with regard to there being a risk management team who considered alternative approaches to this rule and basically came out with a universally -- by them -- accepted compromise.
And when it began management review and concurrence review, it was greeted with, good job, wrong answer. By virtue of the fact that we didn't believe that it was consistent with direction that the Commission had given us in SRM's. And so we worked with the team that was leading the concurrence
process to put into concurrence a package which hopefully balanced out for the purposes of gaining Commission and public involvement the concerns that had been expressed and tried to be alleviated by And namely, to put out a rule that we thought was responsive to Commission direction and, at the same time, appreciated that there was a tension in the staff over this step forward, and that that tension is represented primarily, not solely, but primarily by the treatment of RISC-3 components.
So we decided to put out the alternative ruling and be very up front in the Federal Register notice with regard to the fact that it represented an alternative view for which we were seeking public comment.
That is the package that we forwarded to the division directors finally and to the other offices for concurrence, and it did gain concurrence.
And the EDO forwarded us the staffs recommendation.
But, you know, there were two different versions of the rule. The Augu~t version differed primarily from the current version in front of you in that RISC-3 treatment area, although there were several other changes that were made during the
concurrence process to improve clarity and to focus the wording associated with this evaluation process that needed to be done to ensure that your categorization process remained valid in the face of changing reliability of all classes of components.
So we did make some other changes.
I think they can be summarized in four areas. But the major one was treatment of RISC-3 components.
TIMOTHY REED: As you point out, the common-cause failure is at the heart of the concern here. And if you remember back when I was talking about, from a specific SSC basis, RISC-3 SSCs are important. They can fail.
What you get concerned about is when you have a lot of them failing. And common cause is the one way to get a lot of them failing. And so, what you look at naturally you want to look at common-cause failure and making sure, in fact, that's not an issue in RISC-3, because you can get to a safety issue. So, that is the heart.
So when you look at that, what have we done in this framework? If you recall, in paragraph B, there's a submittal requirement. The submittal requirement is to look at, to tell us in part, what
are you doing as far as evaluating this delta CDF, delta LERF? And a piece of that is looking at what kind of degradation can be effective to RISC-3 SSCs, and what that means in terms of time and cost.
So rinht un front \NP ;:ire noinn tn h;:we to have the licensees think ahead proactively about this whole issue and their submittal.
Then after that, if you look at that actual CDF and LERF sensitivity, you will find that what we do is we change t~e reliabilities, making them less reliable for all of these RISC-3 SSCs simultaneously. But we also increase the probability of common-cause failures all simultaneously, each in their own system at the same time.
Now, is that cross system CCF? Of course not. But it's sort of a way of getting there. We don't actually look at cross system common-cause failures. And there's actually a good technical reason not to.
That's why a lot of it is not modeled in the PRA.
to get into a situation where you have a common-cause failure, you need common cause. So when you look at SSCs across systems, what do you see?
You are going to see different susceptibility to common-cause failures. And you need inputs.
I'm thinking in terms of identical
environmental conditions, identical service conditions, identical human actions in terms of procedures and maintenance. When these all add all, you can get the common cause.
Well, in a sense when you look at the equipment we are talking about in box three, what are we really reducing this thing down to? We are really looking at stuff that's not self-revealing in terms of its failure. If it's operated and it fails you are going to know it.
You are looking at the stand-by design basis equipment down in this box and whether in fact v
you can get cro$s system common-cause failures. If you look at that closely, from a purely technical perspective, is it all in the same environment, does it all see the same service conditions? Does it all get the same procedures, maintenance and what have you? And that's from a purely technical*
perspective.
Nonetheless, we still looked at this in terms of the CCF and -- okay, I just mentioned that delta CDF and LERT .. And remember, when you get these failures, you have got to feed this data back into the process in E-3.
E-3 then would bring this data back in.
If you are getting these kinds of failures that's not going help you at all. It's going to hurt you. It is going to also potentially indicate you are out of whack with what you told you were doing in J I , ' ****. ,,I.,, "f.( ** I 'I/' *.
and LERF risk sensitivity that you did. So, in fact, you are going to be in trouble with complying -- in fact, you are not maintaining the design basis either in D-2.
You are probably not complying, frankly, with about three different provisions of the rule.
And you can probably in a programmatic issue here as far as programmatic breakdowns so our reactor oversight process would get involved.
All ofthat are very, very good reasons why licensees do not allow common-cause failure to develop. And I think we have the right provisions in place to address that.
And then I have also spoken to the technical reasons why I think it wouldn't develop.
I'm not sure if that get to --
JON JOHNSON: One last thing I would like to add --
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: You may but I do have to apologize, because I didn't expect
to get quite this answer. But it's useful to know.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: We do want to leave time for the DPV.
JON JOHNSON: I do want to point out that I think our management team could do a better job providing expectations at the beginning of these efforts. Our leadership team has initiated a three-year initiative to improve how we understand risk principles, how we use them, how we communicate them measures. And it doesn't just affect our rule making efforts, but it also affects our inspection efforts and so forth.
And I think we have made a lot of progress in this area. And we will continue to dq so.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: I would like to thank the staff. This has obviously been for all of us-a very interesting discussion. I appreciate your work.
We have a second panel this morning that consists of three staff that have filed differing professional views. And we will ask that they come to the table.
They are Mr. David Fischer, Mr. Thomas
Scarbrough, and Mr. John Fair. All of them are senior mechanical engineers with NRR.
And let me say that I have no idea how the Commission is going to proceed with regard to the .
I very much appreciate the effort that you all have put into submitting your views.
It's very important that we have an open climate in which we are prepared to think outside the box and to deal with issues as they come forward.
And this is the process as it should work.
So I would like to thank you all for the obviously very substantial effort and thought that you put into this activity.
PARTICIPANT: Chairman, I would like to add that these three senior engineers have extensive NRG experience. They are all members of the mechanical and civil engineering branch in our division of engineering. They are valued members of our team, and they have participated considerably in the development of this rule making. And they would like to share their views.
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Thank you Tom.
My name is Thomas Scarbrough. And with me are David Fischer and John Fair.
We appreciate this opportunity very much to meet with you to discuss our safety concerns regarding the 50.69 rule.
Could we have the first slide up there, please.
It's a little background, Mr. Fair, Mr. Fischer and I are senior engineers in the mechanical and civil engineering branch at the NRR Division of Engineering. Each of us have served the Commission for over 20 years.
In our engineering assignments we have evaluated a wide range of licensing activities related to competence and performance, including implementation and risk-informed testing programs.
In particular, we were the principal reviewers in the division of engineering for the South Texas risk-informed exemption request. And we are currently the principal DE reviewers for the Option 2 rule making.effort.
Next slide, please.
We talked quite a bit about the Option 2 and what it is. I will just add there that, as discussed in the Commission papers describing Option 2, licensees will be required to maintain functional capability of the RISC-3 SS Cs.
. @)
And an effective categorization process will ensure that RISC-3 SSCs have low safety significance on an individual basis. However, small groups of RISC-3 SSCs can have a significant impact G.*1 ~1d11*L ~~1-.:;.1.y. r\liU UcvaU;:;,'-..'... *.....,,Lilt.: 1v...iu0~ l10lU11._. U1 nuclear power plant design, experience with risk-informed programs has suggested that up to 80 percent of the safety-related SSCs may be categorized as RISC-3.
For example, RISC-3 SSCs might include most valves used to provide containment isolation, feed water, service water, residual heat removal and air to start the diesel generators. And RISC-3 SSCs may also include the pumps and values used for containment spray and the spent fuel pool systems.
As we have discussed this mornin'Q, treatment can have a widespread affect on comparability and reliability. Sensitivity studies typically assume a general incre_§l~e in the equipment failure rate to evaluate whether treatment reduction will cause a significant increase in core damage frequency. Nevertheless, sensitivity studies continue to assume a high reliability for RISC-3 SSCs.
For example, motor operative valves assume
to have a reliability of 99.9 percent in the PRA might be assumed to have a 99 to 99.6 percent reliability in the sensitivity-study.
Some aspects of equipment capability cannot be evaluated based on performance monitoring alone. We talked about performance based this morning. But it all can't be monitored using sort of performance monitoring techniques.
For example, seismic and environmental capability will not be evident during the daily plant operation. Therefore, it's not possible to rely solely on feedback of performance information to validate the effectiveness limitation of the treatment process.
We believe that the 50.69 rule should contain a minimum set of treatment requirements that provides reasonable confidence that RISC-3 SSCs will be capable of performing their safety functions under design basis conditions.
Clearly understood requirements are important because the staff does not plan to repair implementation guidance for the treatment of RISC-3 SSCs nor to conduct inspections of the effectiveness of the RISC-3 treatment processes.
Next slide, please.
Our safety concern is that, as currently written, we believe that the proposed rule does not provide sufficient requirements to make a determination that its implementation will maintain Our basis for this belief is that key lessons learned from performing plant specific risk-informed reviews, including proof of concept efforts at South Texas, is the need for clear requirements for the treatment of RISC-3 SSCs.
Next slide, please.
Over a year long period, NRC's technical
. staff developed a draft rule, dated July 31, 2002, based on several factors. First, RISC-3 SSCs receive sufficient regulatory treatment such that they are expected to meet functional requirements, albeit with reduced assurance.
Second, there are different levels of compliance -- different interpretation of treatment requirements.
For example, the proof of concept licensee initially interpreted general requirements in a manner that would have led to ineffective treatment processes. The staff resolved these issues with the licensee through specific provisions included in the FSAR and the NRC safety evaluation.
Third, a recent generic study of commercial practices in nuclear plants and equipment vendors described in NUREG 67.52 found a wide range of practices that applied to nonsafety-related equipment, depending on its perceived importance.
For example, stand-by equipment might receive attention only if a problem is identified.
And RISC-3 SSCs use for accident mitigation would likely fall into stand-by category.
Fourth, the staff placed drafts of the rule on NRC web site and conducted public meetings to allow stakeholders to have early input into the rulemaking process. The technical staff considered those comments when preparing the July 31st draft rule, provide a minimum set of treatment requirements to eliminate unnecessary burden where possible.
Finally, the technical staff applied its experience in component engineering and from its participation in generic indU§Jry activities, such as ASME code.
Following the development of the July 31st draft rule, the proposed rule deleted several significant treatment requirements. No technical reasons were provided for the deletions except a simple assertion that categorization enhancements had
reduced the importance of RISC-3 SSCs.
Based on our review, we have concerns requirements. We are also concerned that the statement considerations do not reflect the requirements of the rule.
We would like this morning to briefly discuss the deleted requirements related to consensus standards, design control, and corrective action.
And this is the bulk of our concerns.
Next slide, please.
The first area that we would like to discuss relates to consensus standards and documentation. These treatment requirements in the July 31st draft rule were, RISC-3 treatment processes must meet voluntary consensus standards which are generally accepted in industrial practice, and address applicable vendor recommendations and operational experience.
The implementation of these processes and the assessment of their effectiveness must be controlled and accomplished. through documented procedures and guidelines.
Next slide, please.
The staff based these requirements on the following factors.
The industry develops voluntary consensus standards through the participation of hundreds of technical experts. The NRC staff participates in this effort and reviews numerous standards itself.
The result is the establishment of well understood treatment methods for plant equipment.
With risk-informed methods, ASME has been developing standards in this area for over 10 years.
On the other side, industry -- individual licensees do not have sufficient expertise to develop appropriate treatment for RISC-3 SSCs in areas of design, construction, installation, operation, testing, repair and replacement as part of the categorization process.
With respect to operating experience and vendor recommendations, the staff b_~s found that licensee attention is necessary in these areas to prevent common-cause problems from impacting multiple SSC functionality.
For example, the staff issued several generic letters in response to operating experience with valve performance, and similarly, the staff has
issued numerous information notices that addressed vendor information with common cause implementation.
Finally, the proposed rule includes almost no requirements for the documentation of the treatment of RISC-3 SSCs. For example, there are no requirements for documenting the design, procurement, installation, testing, repair, or replacement of RISC-3 SSCs or any related procedures or records.
The proposed rule also does not include any requirements for self-assessment of the treatment process by licensees. As a result, in our opinion, it will not be possible to rely on licensee internal programs to manage, document and audit the treatment process.
Next, John Fair will discuss some design control requirements that were deleted from the draft rule.
JOHN FAIR: Next slide, please.
This slide just shows the design control requirements that were deleted from the July 31st draft. The reason that we had a number of design provisions in that draft were that several provisions included within the scope of 50.69 also addressed the design requirements. Most of the language shown on this slide add:ress these design requirements.
For example, t~e first item contains a requirement that replacements for ASME components meet a single standard in its entirety.
The second item requires replacement components meet fracture toughness requirements.
The third requires documentation. And I underline documentation that SSCs meet environmental and seismic design requirements.
And the last item just lists elements that should be controlled by the process.
The next slide provides the basis for including these requirements in the rule.
Next slide, please These requirements were based on the following considerations.
The proposed rule allows licensees to replace ASME section 3 components with nonASME section 3 or commercial components. Since the ASME code contains design criteria, it's necessaryto include requirements in the rule to provide a reasonable confidence that the replacement components are designed using acceptable criteria.
There appears to be some staff confusion regarding the actual rule requirements for these replacement components. Mr. Reed stated earlier that
licensees must maintain design basis functional requf rem en ts as part of their rule. But he did not say that the licensees must maintain design requirements.
The current rule language does not require the use of ASME code design criteria or any other design standard for these replacements components.
South Texas proposed to replace ASME section 3 components with commercial components and perform no further evaluations. This would result in a commercial -- component constructed to a commercial standard and qualify to ASME design criteria.
The staff found this proposal unacceptable because there would be no basis to establish functionality or reliability of a component designed to such a hybrid criteria. The purpose of the July 31st language was to ensure that replacement components meet a single standard in its entirety.
The current rule language does not provide this assurance.
The second item requires replacements for ASME class two and three components to meet fracture toughness requirements. The staff considers fracture toughness requirements important to preclude potential brittle failure of components done to
the design basis events such as earthquakes, which would give you a very common-cause event. These fracture toughness components are part of the ASME code requirements.
The statement of considerations indicates that the fractured toughness requirements continue to apply. The statement is clearly inconsistent with the rule which does not require compliance with any of the ASME code requirements for these replacement components.
South Texas did not propose to meet ASME section 3 fracture toughness requirements for replacement components. Retention of fracture toughness requirements was required by the staff
_ before the licensee was granted the exemption. We would not expect licensees to meet fracture toughness requirements if the rule does not contain this requirement.
The third item requires licensees to have documentations to demonstrate their SSCs can perform their safety-related functions for environmental and seismic design conditions. Documentation is necessary to show the design requirements have been met.
Our experience with the South Texas review
indicated that the licensee did not intend to perform any evaluation of the replacement SSCs to determine that environmental and seismic requirements have been met based on the assumption that commercial experience has demonstrated adeouate performance However, staff discussions with component vendors found that some commercial components were not suitable for environmental and seismic design conditions.
Licensees cannot simply replace safety-related SSCs with commercial SSCs and just assume they will function. There needs to be some documentation to show that these SSCs meet environmental and seismic design criteria.
And the final item lists several important elements that should be included in the design control process. These elements are similar to those proposed by stakeholder comments on previous drafts of the rule language.
The July 31st language allows licensee complete flexibility on implementing these aspects of design controls.
Next, David Fischer will discuss corrective action requirements deleted from the July 31st draft rule.
DAVID FISCHER: Thank you, John.
Next slide, please.
Good morning. I would like to talk briefly about the corrective action portion of 50.69.
The proposed rule would replace the corrective action requirements of appendix B criterian 16 with this statement, conditions that could prevent a RISC-3 SSC from performing its safety-related function under a design basis condition should be identified, documented, and corrected in a timely manner.
This proposed rule language only requires the specific degraded or failed RISC-3 component be repaired or replaced. The proposed rule does not require that potentially generic common-cause problems be evaluated and corrected.
The July 31st draft rule included a requirement that, in the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and the corrective action is taken to preclude repetition.
This language would require licensees to address potentially generic common-cause concerns.
We believe that licensee's treatment processes must
guard against common-cause failures, because experience indicates that changes to treatment, such as change to maintenance, test, and inspection practices can have a significant and widespread effect on component capability and reliability that might invalidate the safety analysis performed to justify the changes.
The proposed rule needs to more clearly require monitoring, corrective action, and feedback to address potential common-cause concerns, to re-establish treatment if treatment related performance problems are encountered and to ensure that changes to core damage frequency and to large early release frequency are maintained acceptably small.
We discuss these concerns in our DPV's in more detail.
Thank you very much.
Now Tom Scarbrough will discuss our conclusion and recommendation.
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Thank you. Thank you, Dave.
Slide ten, please.
In conclusion, we believe that the proposed
rule as written does not contain sufficient regulatory requirements to provide reasonable confidence that licensees implementing the rule will establish effective processes for the treatment of RISC-3 SSCs.
We believe that the proposed rule should be revised to incorporate treatment requirements sufficient to make a determin~tion that its implementation will maintain adequate protection of the public health and safety.
We recommend that the proposed rule be revised to incorporate the July 31st draft rule that addressed ASME, NEI, and other stakeholder comments.
We do not believe that adjustment to this statement of consideration will be difficult, because the SOC was originally prepared for the July 31st draft rule.
Rather than simply including the draft rule language in the SOC as currently done, we consider it important that the proposed rule represent the best judgement of the technical staff.
Public comments could then be requested on the July 31st version of the proposed rule with specific requests for suggestions to further improve the rule language.
Thank you. And we will be happy to answer
any questions you might have.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Thank you very much. I very much appreciate your views.
Commissioner Dicus?
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: I'm going to just ask one of the questions that I put to the first panel. That has to do with, we are looking appaiently, at two options here. We put the language in or we don't put the language in. And I'm wanting to think there is a third, a fourth, or a fifth option. And there are other possibilities.
Would you like to discuss what you think they are and what the merits of them would be, including the NRC looking at these on a case-by-case basis?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Well, one of the areas that would be possible would be to conduct some type of limited review of the submittal. There already plans to be a very detailed categorization review when it comes in.
You could do something where you had a much more simplistic rule language, but then with the idea that licensees when they did come in to ask for this 50.69 usage, we could do some limited type of review through engineering to make sure that there's an
understanding.
Because one of the things we found was that there was quite a bit of misunderstanding among the staff members, d~pending upon which division you are in as to component engineering, testing, and things of that nature.
I think we have seen that with the fractured toughness and the understanding of what that is, and component engineering in terms of what type of testing, where there's been a suggestion that
-- attempted to be suggested that just a simple type of stroke time would be adequate ... because these were low risks. Well, those components may not work properly.
So you need to have -- you can go that route and then have a very focused review through the engineering staff that would allow us to simplify the rule language quite a bit. And there might be some interest in industry to do that rather than having language that they would have to interpret because we don't plan to have any guidance in terms of how to interpret .this high level language. And there might be interest in doing it that way.
JOHN FAIR: Can I add one comment to that?
In the previous Commission secy paper
discussing the 50.69 -- that's 00197 or something like that -- there was a discussion that said that staff was developing implementation guidance for the treatment. And that was subsequently dropped at a later team.
So there was an alternative that was originally proposed a while back.
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: That was the second part of my one question.
A possibility that guidance could clarify this.
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: If you develop the language --
COMMISSIONER GRETA DICUS: With the language staying out that's out now but guidance clarifying the issue.
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Well, part of our concern with that is that, as we mentioned that there's very little requirements for any documentation on things. What we were trying to do when we wrote the statement of consideration for the July 31st draft rule, was to flush out some of the language that was in the rule that was very high levet But we felt it necessary to have rule
language that at least had a way to reference that guidance to. Because if there's not a tag to something that's in the rule, there's not a real clear indication that utilities would interpret the same way that we would.
So I think that's possible. I think we could probably cut down -- we have like eight specific requirements that were taken out that we had a concern with. I think we could probably adjust that if we had a way to have a regulatory guide of some type which flushed out the high level requirements.
So I think that's possible.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Commissioner Diaz?
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let's see. I'm trying to understand the depth of your concern having read your comments.
You don't have any problems with rigorous categorization process, the way that it's stated in here?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: No, sir. We believe that the categorization process does very clearly indicate the level of importance of various
components. It does indicate very clearly which components, on an individual basis are less important than the others. We think its does a very good job of doing that.
that a rigorous categorization process would actually tell you which are those structure systems and components that belong on RISC-3?,
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Yes, sir. We have confidence in the PRA staff with that.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: So those components going to RISC-3 are not necessarily --
although they are classified as safety, relate a safety significant issue that is only on the treatment side? You do believe there is significant benefit in the categorization process as far as understanding the safety of the plant?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Absolutely.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Fine.
I was listening to you attempt -- and I read the dci"cument, and I think the issue comes into what is a high level requirement regarding the treatment, right? Because if I read on page 23 of the proposed rule, it says at the bottom here, the proposed rule contains high level requirements for the
treatment of RISC-3 with respect to design controlled
-- clearly stated -- procurement, maintenance, inspection, test and surveillance, and corrective action.
So those elements, I think, are good elements to have. But the issue is, what is a high level requirement? And the high level requirements that the staff is considering, you do not believe it meets your expectations of what a design basis structure system component should have?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Our concern is that these categories -- and we helped to develop these four or five categories. And we agree that that is the major categories. Our concern is that a lot of times they may just say, have design control or have maintenance and test surveillance.
There are times when it doesn't give you enough information for a licensee to interpret what is that minimum. And we found, through South Texas, that there's quite a variation and interpretation of a high level requirement. What is reasonable to one person may not be reasonable to another.
And only through a lot of discussion with South
Texas were we able to come up with s<;>me level of understanding of what we meant. For example, South
Texas, at one point, was going to eliminate all of their commitments related to RISC-3 SSCs to the low risk category based on risk alone.
They weren't going to look at what were those cornrrnm1ents, regulatory commitments they made relative to the functionality. They thought, well, they are low risk. We can just push them away.
JOHN FAIR: There's a little more than just treatment.
If you look at design control area where we have a number of concems, again, it was the fact that several of the rules that are included in 50.69 also cut across the design area. And what we are trying to do with the ruling, which is to make sure we maintain adequate design levels in these areas.
DAVID FISCHER: And what I wanted to add is having a high level treatment objective that simply requires that licensees ensure that their equipment remain functional under the design basis condition, that alone does not provide a technical basis that
would ensure the functionality of a component.
Whereas, if you had something like -- used voluntary consensus standards, that is a technical reason to believe that licensees will, in fact, ensure functionality.
But just requiring that they maintain them functional doesn't give you anything to hang your hat on really.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: So it is an issue that! you know, you think the lack of specificity, combined with the potential for misinterpretation are not following by the licensee? So it's an issue of the capabilities of the licensee to deal in the design control space that gives you the most concern?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: I would say several areas.
One is we thought there were design requirements that were inadvertently deleted. Like fractured toughness, and we pointed that out.
Another is, we want to make sure that licensees understand what the requirements are so that there isn't any misinterpretation.
And lastly, we want to make sure that when the review is done, it's done in a way that's appropriate for component functionality. And we did not want to push this into where you had a team of people, sort of deciding, well, is this good enough for now.
We really wanted to make sure that the component engineers understood what the
as"Sumptions for the reliability was up front in the PRA.
So they can say, if we are assuming this is going to be 99.6 reliable, we just can't go back and just stroke timP this stuff or do srirnPthin11 likp tfy:if or never test it. We have to have a mechanism to be able to maintain that functionality at that sort of roughly at that sort of level.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: At the regional appendix B level or at the level that is commensurate to the RlSC-3 categorization?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: The RISC-3 category.
We went through appendix 8 and said, if we were trying to break this down from all the criteria of appendix B down to what we would think would just be appropriate for RISC-3, this is sort of the groups that we came up with. If we just had these, we think we would have less assurance in appendix B but we would still have this sort of this minimum floor that we could go in and say yes, we have confidence that licensee, if they follow this approach, they are going to have reasonable confidence in the capability of this equipment.
JOHN FAIR: I just want to add again, on the design control area, when we did the proof of
concept review and were trying to grant the exceptions to these rule requirements, we found that the licensee without guidance and requirements from staff were going to implement processes that the staff found technically unacceptable. And we would not accept them in the South Texas review.
And these are a number of the items that we essentially put into the rule requirements in 50.69 that were in the July 31st version.
COMMISSIONER NILS DIAZ: Well, I want to thank you for coming and briefing us; I personally appreciate your comments. I've gone through them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Commissioner McGaffigan?
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I do also want to compliment you. I think its a very good thing that you have done, to bring these issue to light. I think you have all learned a lot of lessons from the South Texas project, that experience, and not all positive I'm sure. And you are trying to bring those into this rulemaking.
You answered earlier, Mr. Scarbro4gh, that you were confident in the PRA staff and this
categorization process. Speaking as one Commissioner, when it comes to PRA and its application, I don't have as deep a confidence.
see SDP's that get changed by a factor of 10, 100, 1,000, as we wonder tnrougt*1 a process. Ana i don't trust any of these delta CDF's better thah a factor of 10.
You also mentioned seismic. I mean, as I understood Mr. Strosnider's answer, we are going to have guidance for this ASME thing, we are going to have guidance for the ASME code or whatever for PRA quality.
But that's only internal events. Whereas you are with more external events, earthquakes, things like that, it's n~t all mode. And I don't know when we are going to have categorization guidance available that captures all modes, both internal and external events. Maybe it's all going to come together.
All I heard is that internal events is going to come together in time for the final rule, not the whole thing.
But is part of this that you all -- I mean, have some concerns about the categorization process?
I read some of the documents. One of the issues
that came up in SOP was the shades of RISC-3, high versus low RISC-3.
How confident are you in the categorization process that it's going to give -- you know, all of these things a1e going to be weli identified?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: John, do you want to take that first?
JOHN FAIR: Yes.
I think Tom was saying he was confident that categorization process did a good job of doing a relative risk ranking. The reason that we have technical concerns is we don't think that the categorization process by itself can cover all aspects of treatment.
The reason we are trying to maintain some treatment requirements is to give us some assurance that the reliabilhy of these components is not going to be significantly altered such that these assumptions that are going into the categorization process such as sensitivity studies are somewhat valid.
DAVID FISCHER: I'm pretty confident in what the staff is doing. They said, the previous panel said that they thought they did not need as much treatment requirements because they have this
l very robust categorization.
But the robust categorization isn't really in the rule. The robust categorization is in the draft reg guides, and it's in these other documents 1-*I***-*
And I think it's important for the Commission to understand that that's kind of like betting on the future. And I think that you shoulc;I consider keeping some minimal treatment requirements in the rule before you say the categorization process is so robust that I don't need to say anything more than the equipment needs to function.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: The ACRS itself, is -- at least members of ACRS have emetic words about high quality level to all mode, internal and external event PRAs as something that you sort of need in order to do this rule, haven't they?
I'm not sure whether that's a consensus ACRS position, but I think I have heard it from at least one member.
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Yes, sir. They raised some of those concerns.
One thing I did want to say, I wanted to say in response to Commissioner Diaz's comment was we are not anti-PRA. We are not pure deterministic
folks who won't believe in anything else.
We have been doing risk informed in service testing -programs and such, motor operated valve programs, risk informed, for many years.
So we have confidence. We have watched the groups do some of that in terms of risk ranking.
But we are also aware of the weaknesses of it and respect that in terms of the common-cause aspect. There have been studies on how to deal with common cause. Some of that is have procedures, guidance, design control. That's how you get around the concern of common-cause problems.
So with that, we think marrying the two together of categorization with all of its strengths and weaknesses and a minimum level of treatment will allow us to go forward with a rule that we can say yes, we are stepping out a little bit here, but we think we have enough checks and balances that we think we will be all right.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: And in the South Texas process, in the end, you got the check.s and balances that you felt were appropriate through the FSAR changes; right?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: Yes, sir.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: But some
of those checks and balances that you got in South Texas are not in this rule?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: They were taken out.
We had them in the July 31st rule with the explanation and the SSC, the two to9ether, hut thi:>v were taken out at the last minute.
DAVID FISCHER: And our management thinks that some of this level of detail, these eight minor areas, including them in the proposed rule would be inconsistent with the Commission guidance.
And my reading of the previous secy paper doesn't say that including use of consensus standard is inconsistent with the Commission's previous standards.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: There's a law to the effect that we should encourage the use of consensus standards. The 1996 Technology Transfer
. Act.
I will tell you. There is a tendency, that I have seen here in the six years to sort of project what we say in some delphic SRM -- sometimes there's a lot of projection that goes on that they slip -- there's something in a paper buried on page 35 of appendix B that wasn't highlighted. And because we did not object to it, therefore, it's Commission policy.
Jib
I just say once again, it isn't Commission policy if our synapsis are not connected on the matter.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Commissioner Merrifield?
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: I think the flip side of Commissioner McGaffigan's comment, though, is that there are opportunities where individual members of the Commission who had an opportunity to weigh in on specific provisions of an SRM do have an opportunity in our discussio,ns with management to refine and reflect on what we have said. Knowledge which isn't necessarily available and open to the staff. That cuts both ways.
That's why we have a management around here to do some of these things.
COMMISSIONER EDWARD MCGAFFIGAN: But that does lead to individual Commissioners interpreting what the SRM means.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: It's not an instruction. It certainly defines an understanding of the basis of why the elements were in there.
On slide nine, you have got the last line that talks of design control, including selection of suitable materials, methods, and standards,
verifications of design accuracy -- no, just a second.
I'm on page 7. I apologize.
On slide nine, you have in the case of s1gmi1cant conditions adverse to quality, measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and correction action taken to preclude repetition.
Now, that language is very similar to the last lines of appendix B, criteria 16. And I'm wondering if you can elaborate a little further on your concern regarding the current proposed rule language as it relate to the corrective action requirements related to RISC-3 SSC.
DAVID FISCHER: I think that we intentionally took the language from appendix B because we felt this was an important aspect of the corrective action program.
It was an aspect that South Texas project licensee felt was so important that they decided they did not want an exemption from this particular aspect of the regulations.
And it is the piece of appendix B which broadens the licensee's responsibility for looking beyond the failure of the individual component.
Because this regulation deals with treatment, which is really -- treatment is one of the mechanisms you use to guard against common-cause failure. Because of that, we felt it was important to include this piece in the proposed rule so that licensees would be required to go look for, you know, significant problems to make sure that they did not apply to similar components of the plant.
Say, you stop greasing a motor operated valve as part of their maintenance program. They should decide whether that's equally applicable to other components of the plant. Because if your maintenance practice goes around -- and the previous panel suggested that they had to have identical service conditions, identical this. It almost painted it to be an incredible scenario to have common-cause failures across system boundaries.
When you are dealing with special treatment requirements and practices which go across systems boundaries, it's not incredible to have common-cause problems develop. In fact, it's extremely possible to have common-cause problems develop because you are mucking with things that go right across the system boundaries. And to try to say the current way of dealing with common-cause failure in a PRA where you're looing at (11
,I failures within the system, it really -- and that's a part where licensees that read the current proposed rule, they are going to see, dealing with common-cause failure, they are not going to click to say we have got to go and consider across system boundary.
JOHN FAIR: There's a history behind that.
What we are trying to get at in that language is if a licensee finds something that's failed or there's an identification of some generic problem, to go look and see if it's generic at their plant, not just fix the specific problem they found.
We tried alternative languages at various points in the development in the rule. And we got criticism back it was even more restrictive then appendix B or required you to do more than appendix B.
So we eventually said, okay, the only way to do thisJs to put the appendix 8 language in so we don't get criticized for being more stringent than appendix B and still do what we want to do.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: The language on slide 7, your preferred rule language for RISC-3 design control requirements as outlined, that seems to be reflected in the alternative treatment
/J6
requirements that are included in 50.69(d)2, and D-2 I.
If you can reflect for me what you perceive are the significant differences and why what is proposed here does not adequately address your concerns?
JOHN FAIR: Well, in the area of design, one of the things you are allowed to do in 50.69 is to replace an ASME component with a nonASME component. You are saying you don't have to use the ASME code for replacement.
The current treatment requirements do not have any requirement on what you do with these replacement components. You could fabricate them at the shop or you could buy them at the hardware store or do anything you wanted based on the current rule language.
The attempt here was to get some kind of criteria, alternative criteria in here for replacing these components.
The other aspects, as you go down there, there's an aspect for documentation on meeting design requirements. And we are not doing anything different, except for requiring them to have some documentation that they meet the design requirements
it .. -
on seismic and EQ.
Because if you don't have any documentation, how's anybody going to ever go back and determine whether you do or do not need them?
And tnere*s been problems in tile past and i will bring up an example of it.
Diablo Canyon, when we had significant design deficiency which required a licensee to go back and reverify the entire seismic design of the plant. If you have a bunch of components changed out, then you have got no design documentation whatsoever, how does anybody ever accomplish this, how does the staff go back and look and see if what they did was right?
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: What I don't understand in that answer. You reference the notion that you could -- you know, that a licensee could fabricate something in a shop or somebody go buy something off a hardware shelf. Even with that, your alternative treatment requirements under D-2 are going to require the licensee or applicant develop and implement processes to control the design, the procurement, the inspection, maintenance, the testing, the surveillance, and the corrective action to provide reasonable confidence in that RISC-3.
Why doesn't that -- it seems to me that that captures a process, a confidence greater than you just go basically fabricating it in the shop and not worry about it.
JOHN FAIR: It captures a process, but the process won't do anything more than what you put in it. If you don't put anything in the process for the design of these components, you are not controlling anything.
The reason we put it in -- and we cited the example of South Texas in this particular area, when Sout.h Texas was applying for the exemptions, they proposed to do things within these processes which we found were technically not acceptable. And that's what the specific rule language is trying to get at, is to prevent that from happening on people implementing 50.69.
COMMISSIONER JEFFREY MERRIFIELD: I want to join the other Commissioners in thanking you for participating in this. The DPV process is an important one. It's one that we are highly supportive of.
I think the staff who participate in it ought to be congratulated and certainly highly regarded for their willingness to do that. I want to translate that as well. Thank' you.
Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: in light of the hour I'm going to keep this to just one question.
At least one of your major concerns is that there's the rule tnat nas been presentea tu us, ll\a'l there's not enough in the way of prescriptive requirements that give you confidence that the right things are going to be done.
Let me ask the question as to why you don't have the same concern with regard to the RISC-2 components which has a very , very broad statement?
THOMAS SCARBROUGH: There's a lot of discussion regarding RISC-2 as we started down the process of Option 2. There was significant discussion regarding that. We did have concerns in that area.
Part of our resolution or our decision that, okay, let's sort of try this approach was, one, some of the -- we thought about what were some of the areas that might fall into the RISC-2 category and what we believed was the ATWS equipment, station blackout, would be in this category.
And the rule does not apply to those. So whatever requirements that are currently under the 50.62, 63 requirements would still be applicable to
that RISC-2 equipment, whether it's,RISC-2 or RISC-4, if it happened to fall down to RISC-4.
We said that's good. That's a good idea.
We tried to get some similar adjustmenrin 50.49, but we weren't successful.
So those were two areas that we wanted to make sure had happened.
The other place was in the SOC itself, one example we had was the PRV block valves, where they might go into a feed and bleed flow. And those valves are typically designed for steam flow.
In this case, with feed and bleed, you can be putting water through them and they are not designed to handle that. Or the block valve -- MOBs are not designed to open and close many times in just a few minutes, if you get to that mode where you are operating in that way.
So in the SOC there was language put in based on so~~ comments that we had made that they need to deal with that. If you have valves that are dealing with water flow, you need to understand what the function of that is for RISC-2 and deal with it.
So we thought, overall, you know, we had some concerns in that area. But we thought that the small amount of equipment that's going to fall into
\ \
\
\
the RISC-2, the use of the 50.62, 63, sort of nonexemption that they get, and also the language that we tried to put in the SOC, we thought, well, this is good. Let's try this approach, let's see what happens, let's see where we go tram here.
That was sort of how I reconciled my own mind of why we did not raise to the level of DPV with the RISC-2 equipment.
JOHN FAIR: There's a little more to it.
The RISC-2, there's nothing being reduced on RISC-2.
And so, you know, if there was a concern on the level of treatment currently on RISC-2, we should raise that now rather than with 50.69.
But with RISC-3, we are planning on making major changes to the treatment of a vast quantity of components which we don't know whether we have adequate data to support some of the reliability assumptions if we don't keep a certain level of floor treatment there.
CHAIRMAN RICHARD MESERVE: Well, again, I appreciate the effort you have put into this. This has been very helpful. Thank you very much.
With that, we are adjourned.
Department of Energy Washington, DC 20S85 April 12, 1993 Mr ** S:tepn~ comJ.ey E.xecutt'Ve*oireci:or we The p~ple, It1c.,
of the United states Box 277 Rowley, Massachusetts 01969
Dear Mr. Comley:
our office has rec~~ed.:yqtj.l:'** <;~i-X-~~~ndeAc~ 'q;*~;-t$:d'. Mez-Ch .25, 19 93 conce,rniiig po~~!pie W:x;-Q1lgd6ilrig. ~y .forli\ez(. anC::L pl:'e$erit I
officials of the Nuclear R'egul~:tory;. Comm.:tssion. Due.' to** the nature of the allega1:ions,. o.1.1r o:ftice lii:)s. referz-ed tN,s matter to the Federal. Bureau *of Il'lv~stig~:tion. \>{e. wil,l,: m.S,i,nitain liai:son with the F~I to cori;~<?t: aqY qe~ic.1,eti<::;f~l:i* no*:ted'. during their investigati*on that relate'* tcf t!l.e D.epa#tmefrti 0£ Energy .
. ~-
We appreciate yo~ b~ingin9' these, gpn~~'fl:i.~ . *~9> 9µ~. ~ttention.
Please forward any-. 'otheX' . all$qat:LC)n$'.: you *~~~o~.~~ regarding the
Department of Enel:'Q'Y °to' ou,r offic~~ If'*:y!Z),'.?.'.**',fi~~~;f any questions regarding this matte.r 1 pl~asa do not. n~~i:t::ate t;'(l contact Special Agent Mark K. McDonough on ( 202) 5'$6""tf!43 Sincere.lv:,
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Fau1 M. Misso Assistant Inspector General .
for Investigations
a
.... - " ' ' Nlf (OllGAIH August 3, 1989
'l'he Honorable Sam Nunn Chainan Armed Services Comm.ittee u.s. senate 221*Ruasell senata Office Building WUl:lington, o.c. ,.._2QS1.0
~ Cha!rm.an Nunn:
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr. , was recently nominated for the sensitive and important position of Assistant Secretary tor Defense
~ at the Department of Energy (DOE)
Because the manaqement
~ailu:res ot past Assistant secretaries tor Defense ProCJratns have reduced our nuclear weapons proqram. to a shambles, I cannot think ot a more critical nomination.
Based on the Su.bcommittee's extensive experience with the DOS's Defense Proc;raxns and Mr. Ste11o'~ actions at the Nuclear ft*.1U1~~ory COJDlfli&aion (NRC), I believe Mr. Stello is not a wise choice. The only bene~it o:t movinq Mr. Stello to the Department of Bnu;y is riddinc; the N'RC of Mr. Stello ..
1'he Oaf'ense .Pro<;rams job brinqs with it awesome responsibilities which, if they are to be fulfilled, require a rare individual. The Assistant secretary must be outstanding with respect to personal integrity and with respect to his or her ability to make sound, mature judgments. Be or she Must be able to weiqh national security interests in. light ot the very serious health and environmental impacts resultinq trom. the weapons
program. Tb.is Assistant Secretary must be able to take proper acaount of oipoaing views and priorities and to recoqnize the OOE's history of l p service to health and satety and safet;uards concerns as it pul:'sued with zeal the development and manufacture of our nuclear w*apons stockpile. In my opinion, Mr. Stello is unqualified by skill and temperament to undertake the task.
First, I question whethar he has th* oxpert.ice and manaqe.ment skilla neeesaary ~o~ this job.. His mana9eMe.nt experience to date has been acquired larqely at the NRC, which is a completely different situation from that which he will have to deal at tho DOE. In my.mind, there is little similarity between directinq a
The Honorable Sab Nunn August 3, 1989.
page 2 primarily protessional staff of 3~000 people with a budc;et of lAsA tban*$500 ~illion and ~anaging the $10 billion weapons program with its diver:se entities ranging frcm national laboratories and the Nevada Test Site to a complex of bOmb factories a~d nuclear waste disposal sites. I think it is important to know the basi~ for inferring from*Mr. Stella's NRC experience ~at he is equipped to run the weapons program.
In additi.on to questions as to his ability to manage the enterprise, there are several a.ttitudina.1 111atters that concern me.
Among these ara the lack ot candor displayed by hilll and his staff in dealinq with the Conqress. 'l'h* Subcmnmittee has conducted extensive hearinqs on the NRC's record in regulatinq the Nation's commercial nuclear enterprises. These hearings have convinced me that NRC mismanac;ement has undermined public confidence in the nuclear option and, ~~r.eby, has been a major cause of the tall of the ccmmercial nuclear proqra.m.
Mr. Ste1lo has been a hiqh level nuclear requlatory ot!icial
!or more than a decade and for the past sev~ral years he h~s been
( the NRC's .Executive Director. In this capacity, he bears a siqnif ic.ant ?"esponsibili ty for the widaspread skepticism that the NRC is villinq and able to assure the hiqh level of nuclear safety required by the ~tomic Enerqy Act.
In my view, the Administration has made a serious.mistake in nominating Mr. Stel1o tor this critical position. Whi1e r fu11y ra~ocpi~=* tho Pr*s~dant'a authority to make such appointlllents and the difficulty of findins qualified people, I think this is one nomination that deserves special scrutiny, not only because cf the importance and di~f iculty of the task, but because oversi~ht of the weapons proqram, even by the Administration, is difticult; problems vill tester tor lenqthy periods betore they are detected and by then, as the present predicament shows,. siqnificant damage may have occurred.. The Subcommittee's clo~ed hearinq with the DOE on July 20, 19S9, has shown this to be absolutely true.
I hope that reason will prevail so that Mr. Stello's nomination will not be Approved. I suq;est that you review Mr. Stallo's role in certain situations where I believe the NRC has pert or.med badly. bong these are the failures to deal approPl:'iat.ely with widespread noncompliance with NRC requlations at the Zilmnr plant, at Comanche Peak, and*at the Tennessee Valley Authority. It would also be worth inquirinq into Mr. Stello's role in toning down proposed fire requlations and in sidetrackin9 proposed requlations intended to decrease siqniticantly the likelihood of a major radiation relciasa in the event ot a severe
gcident at any Of the 2~ commercial Boiling water Reactors
The Honorable SAm Nunn Auquct 3, 1989 Page 3 we have been told by a fo~er Department of Justice official that. several years age, Hr. Stello was a subject ot a grand jury inquiry conducted by the Departlllent of Justice. This inquiry a.rose from failurea to enforce NRC requlations at Zilnmer and Three Mile Island, for the ca¥-=ip of inf omtts;an pe::talJiing *to tJ\e Tb.tee Hile Island accident, and tor impaif'inq e.nd muzzlinq referrals to flie Justice Department involvi.nq criminal violations ot the Atomic EnerCJY Act by regulated utilities. I recommend that you obtain from the Department of Justice's criminal Division the memorandum.
t trigqered this invastiqation and the termina~ion memorandll:m
. ' tha*t describes the difficulties in prosecutinq thia ..case. I .have recently requested these documents from the Department of Justice.
I am aiso very much disturbed that Mr. Stello may h.ave participated in a vendetta conducted by the NRC' s de facto Inspector General for .. ~e purpose of riddin9 the NRC of an official, who by virtue of doing his job, had become an annoyance to the CcmmisaiQn. I fear thai; this ~ortunate episode (which has been investigated by another Subcommittee of this committee) is I,.... indicative o~ the treatment that Mr. Stal.lo may direct tcvarcl e2Dployeea who hold views that differ i!rom his own. This matter is
.t (** under current investiqation by _that subcommittee. '!'he Defense Programs problems ~ill not be corrected by manaqers whose minds are closed to dissent.
In the course of considering Mr. Stello's nomination, I recommend that you have your Committae staff. contact fonner NRC Com.miaaioners Victor Gilinsky, Pet*~ Srad~crd, and James Asselstine. I also recommend that they contact Mr. Julien Qreenapun, a former prosecutor involved. in the Justice Department inquiry involvinq Mr. Stello.
I truat my concerns will be .of assistance to you in your consideration of the fitness of Mr. Stello to be Assistant Secretary tor Defense Proqram.s~-....
- John o. Dingell Cha.irJDan .
Subcoui ttee on Oversiqht and Investiqations cc: Members. Committee on Armed Services United States Senate
\
UNITED STATES NUCJ.EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
-* '---------------------------------------~
In the Matter of: ).
~******a
)
INVBSTIGATIVB INTZP.VIBW: )
)
a~ ANTHONY.FORTUNA )
.)
(CLOSED) )
Paqes: l throuqh 211 Place: Bethesda, Maryland
~~t*: March 22, 1989
--* *------------~----------~------------------------*
. '"'I
\ I J HERITAGE REP.ORTING CORPORATION OJJL:!ol Rq>artas 1llO t Street. N.W.* Suite 600 Wuhlncton. D.C. 2000!
'?0020201 ::::'.3 :::90:::::22 FD;:. P1DOU=. 05i)(ii)22(> (101) 6214111 I F[I(.
1 BAC_~GROQ.N.P Q.tf. 80..9.~R f_QRTUNA Roger Fortuna worked as Assistant U.S. Attorney in Syracuse. He then went to the Justice Department as chief prosecutor in the criminal division for a number of years.
Some people in the Justice Department were concerned that there was wrongdoing within the* NRC and that some of their employees were not doing their job to protect the safety of the American people.
Roger Fortuna's first job was to investigate possible wrongdoing pertaining to the 1979 Three Mile Island accident.
Mr. Fortuna charged that Victor Stello conunitted possible wrongdoing, but unfortunately, Mr. Stello was never prosecuted for this charge.
~EGARDING THIS TRANSCRIPT:*
This transcript concerns a tape recording which was purchased by the NRC under secret contract. The paid informant, whom I knew prior .to this incident was soft touched away because he was free-wheeling on how the situation should be handled.
ON THE ENCLOSED, YOU WILL FIND HIGHLIGHTED POINTS WE HAVE MARKED AND COMMENTED ON WHICH ARE OF.PARTICULAR INTEREST.
P.~G.~ ~_Q.
REGARDING ROGER FORTUNA:
12 The NRC allowed and encouraged the utilities to conduct wrongdoing. This certainly gives them every opportunity to cover up. This is also a policy Fortuna never agreed to in most cases.
13-15 Taylor is now taking over Stella's place as Chief of Staff at the NRC. Fortuna asks for this off ice to investigate wrongdoing at the plants-Taylor and Thomson wouldn't let him do it.
76 Questions Roger Fortuna about Comley.
77 Regarding the nursing home.
78 More about our relationship.
79 Roger Fortuna alleges I was trying to set up a little Government Accountability Project (GAP) organization in Washington who represents wrongdoing.
80 First mention of counterfe.it, substandard parts.
Fortuna is really covering himself. Understand the way Fortuna operates-he's been around a long time and obviously tries to protect himself in every way possible as I would do (See page 90).
90 It alleges on this page that might have given information regarding counterfeit,. substandard parts, but because of the lapse of time,. Fortuna could not be absolutely positive in his mind.
Also mentions We The People's attorney, Ernest Hadley, who represented We The People in their harassment case, which they won 9/18/90. This case was a result of Victor Stello, then executive director for the NRC, then commission chairman Lando Zech and the NRC's Atomic Safety Licensing Board Judge Iv~n Smith singling Comley out because they did not like the message he was conveying to the American public regarding the presence of counterfeit~ substandard parts in U.S. nu~lear plants.
Page 2.
91 Keith Christopher was the man who did the investigation of Padavano, the case We The People tried to get reopened 1/14/87 when we met with Justice. This is the first time a welding inspector was tried and j~iled for falsifying welds in nuclear plants.
92 Roger's recollection of this case.
93 Rosenthal asked Fortuna why he instructed me to go to Justice-because the.NRC doesn't do a good job, and you go to Justice when you feel that way. Roger is ech-0ing other people's conunents, by saying the NRC is a lapdog.
96 ** Rosenthal asks Roger how he feels about me taping him on the telephone.
97 ** Rosenthal asks Hayes (Roger's boss) if Carnley persuaded him to testify in front of Glenn.
98 ** *More of the same. Testifying in front of Congress.
99 Fortuna alleges that the tape of 1/14/87 which Ellison sold to Stello was altered.
102 More discussion of the 1/14/87.tape.
105-108 Discussion with Roger Fortuna about Matakis at the Office of Investigation.
Matakis is the investigative officer who handled Padavano.
Alleged that Fortuna should not have spoken to me about his own man because Matakis was going to be at Justice.
109 *o* Discussions why Go~ley went to Justice-because he didn't trust the NRC.
111 I asked whether Matakis was true (meaning can we trust him).
114 Discussions about me flying a plane over NRC Headquarters and the closest I can get to the White House; Why I was discussing it with Fortuna and whether or not he was approving.
Page 3.
123 Rosenthal implying Fortuna tried to discredit Ellison here-trying to say it was improper-trying to get him on anything.
125 Rosenthal criticizing Fortuna because he was advising me on how to handle myself in front of Justice.
126 ** Fortuna laying our how deep I thfnk the Padavano case went. Padavano taking the fall for a bunch of people who were also falsifying, I suspect.
127 Rosenthal criticizing Roger about advise to Justice 128-129 Mr. Greenspun, Fortuna's attorney, take exception to Rosenthal's attitude toward Fortuna.
132 Fortuna's explanation of why he took the position he had on me going to Justice, pertaining to Padavano~
134 Rosenthal asks why he suggests We The People's attorney, Ernest Hadley go with me 135 Steve Burns, legal counsel for commissioners.
Refer to Mr. Burns when personnel can advise people how to file a 210 or Department of Labor case. His referring to incident where Burn's and commissioner could advise people what to do.
He was* basing his* view on this instance.
136 More of the same-the NRC's response to Fortuna's explanation.
137 Fortuna's attorney~ Greenspun, criticizing the way Rosenthal.is addressing Fortuna. Loaded questions.
i38 First enters the Wampler case. Haven't got the name right. Level III inspector at Seabrook station who found 20% reject rate with welds after they were inspected by PSNH and Pullman-Higgins. Wampler found x-rays could not be read or welds were bad. Wampler's name mentioned on the January 14, 1987 tape.
139 Still trying to figure out how to spell Wampler's name.
Page 4.
140 This was later investigated by Kennedy and Kostmayer after We The People gave them information. We will provide the transcript if you want to review the case~
140-142 Trying to find out what the Wampler case was.
143 Fortuna mentions that he is not pleased I taped him 144 Expresses that he still likes me though, under the circumstances.
150-151 Still talking about the Padavano case.
152 Still talking about the Padavano case. Fortuna expressing I thought there was more to that case.
155 Alleging Fortuna holding back information.
156 Mentioning Bille Guarde and Hadley were involved in it.
157-158 Roger scared. Asking whether he is being loyal to GAP and me instead of to the NRC.
163 Bringing up in the tape why he told tne he wouldn't mention the Wampler case to anyone.
Question his loyalty to the commission.
165 Alleges Fortuna gave me the impression things were going on in the NRC. Roger didn't discourage me one way or another.
166 Again, it doesn't discourage me from perception that the NRC is corrupt.
168-169 Fortuna's explanation of why he didn't discourage me from thinking the NRC is corrupt.
170 Roger gets mad. States that he will never say the NRC is true and not corrupt.
0( 171 This is TMI incident in which Fortuna speaks regarding coverup at TMI. His way to get information out to you.
172 ** Especially this page.
Page 5.
173 Rosenthal mad because he even brought it up.
174-175 Roger covering himself.
180 Asking Fortuna about my relationship with
Ellison.
184 Felt that I would come through eventually because I was so persistent.
189 Asking Fortuna whether he ever gave me information-stated he is pretty sure he never gave me any non-public information.
190 He states he may have given me .information.
191 Asking Fortuna whether he knows if I spoke with other people within the NRC.
192 Ellison alleges Fortuna gave information to Christie Institute. He is now answering that he never did.
195 NRC is asking Fortuna about Ellison case.
When was it closed out.
197 Pavone acquaintance of Fortuna's in New York who might be interested in Ellison case.
208 Legality of taping. Good.
210 Fortuna's attorney, Greenspun, talks about the cost, especially to his parents, for Fortuna to defend himself.
211 Rosenthal-As a taxpayer it does not appeal to me to have people drawing salaries doirig no work.
1 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of: .-. )
)
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEW: )
)
ROGER ANTHONY FORTUNA )
)
(CLOSED) )
. Wednesday, March 22, 1989 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 536 4350 East-West Highway Bethesda, Maryland The above-entitled matter came on for hearing, pursuant to notice, at 10. 00 a. m.
APPEARANCES:
on behalf of the Nuclear Reaulatory Commission:
ALAN ROSENTHAL
~ o. en,* ESQ.
SUSAN S. CHIOAKEL, ESQ.
on behalf of the Witness:
JULIAN S. GREENSPUN, ESQ.
1150 17th Stre.et., N. W.
Washington, o. c. 2.0036-4652 Beritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628 4888
79 l with leads?
2 A Sometimes, he'd just shoot the breeze with me.
3 He's a very pleasant fellow, a very personable fellow. He's 4 fun to talk with. tou know...4.talked about kids, family, s doqs, baseball, football, what have you. And you know, 6 data. He qot over a period of months and years very 7 interested in the nuclear power thinq. He set up an 8 orqanization called "We the People." He's written letters 9 to all different places. ,I thitik he's trying to solicit 10 money he told me he's tryinq to solicit money to, you 11 know, to fund an or9ani:ation.
12 tou know, he was thinkinq if maybe he could work 13 with whistle blowers who*were afraid to come to NP.C, they 14 could come to him and maybe he could, you know, brinq them lS into the NRC to our orqanization because, you know, he l6 trusted us. Or maybe he*could qet people to trust u!. Th~t l7 type of thinq. That's why*I started off with he sounded 1*8 you know, over the months and years he developed hims.elf I 19 think where he wants to be little GAP, a littl.e Governmental 20 Accountability type of situation.
21 Q You.had these contacts with him, were they all on 22 the *telephone apart from that first visit to your office or 23 did he come to see again.
24 A I' think I've seen him physically two times. Over -
25 here when we used to be in the South Tower and I met -him on Berit~ge Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
80 l the street with Ben Haye1 when --
2 Q You mean he was with Ben Hayes and you met him on 3 the street?
4 s
A Q
No.
I I'm sorry.
-I was with Ben Hayes, excuse me.
see, when you met him on the street.
6 A And said hello to him briefly.
7 BY MS. CYR:
8 Q Has he ever in fact provided any information he 9 wished to become the basis for an OI investigation or 10 inquiry?
ll A Well, he's talked to us about s\lDstandard parts, 12 you know, boqus parts and things like that. And I quess in.
13 the grand scheme of things he has tried to.be very helpful.
14 He's given us stuff, but I would say for the most part, we 15 probably al_ ready knew about it, but he was very sincere 16 about it. And to be honest with you, -I thought someday he 17 may_ come through. He may come through.
BY MR. ROSENTHAL:
When he gave you information, did*you put any kind 20 of memorandum in the files reflecting the fact that on 21 such-and-such a date he called you and provided you with 22 information?*
23 A No.
24 .Q Was there anything at all to your knowled9e in OI 25 records memorializing contacts of one kind or another that Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
84 2 BY MS. CHIOAKEL:
3 Basically, you would consider him perhaps as a 4 source that you were cultivating.
.- Is that a fair 5 characterization?
6 A Yes, ma'am. Hindsight, maybe he was doing the i same to me, I don't know. But that happens.
8 BY MP.. ROSENTHAL:
9 Q Well, the quest~on that I asked was not addressed 10 to whether you had warrant for being in contact with ll Mr. Comley and cultivating him. The question was whether 12 contrary to my own practice*at Justice, even though it is 13 not that necessarily of everybody, you maintained or put l4 memoranda in the files with **respect to these contacts, at 15 least when Mr. Comley provided you with some information 16 that might conceivably be* of use. I think your answer to 17 that ques~ion was no.
18 A No. And I was tryinq to give you the background 19 because I didn't want you to take away a n4a:gative 20 connotation from that. That's all.
21 Q Well, you background didn't 96, at least in my 22 mind, to why it is that you didn't maintain the files. But, 23 anyway --
24 MR. GREENSPUN: Oh, excuse me. I think it does.
25 And my only point, Judge, I know that there are people that
. Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
90 l Q Who is he?
2 A He's an attorney in New Enqland, in Massachusetts.
3 Q How did you become acquainted with him?
4 A He, at one point in time, and I still think does, 5 does some legal work for Comley.
6 Q Oo you have any direct contact with him?
7 A Oh, sure. I've talked to him.
8 Q Did he call you?
9 A I can't -- my guess would be he called me.
Q You don't recall for what purpose?
1 A Oh, tha*t I've talked to him? Oh, sure. He represents Comley. He told me he works with Comley.
Comley's got a lawsuit suing the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for back fe.es that are owed to ~*omley and I 5 think some other nursing home operators.
He also is assisting Comley in setting up his, you 17 know, little nuclear grouP. there, the "We the People" thing.
18 I'm trying to think if he ever, quote, gave me any data 19 regarding potential wrongdoing matters, thi."nqs of that sort.
You know, my guess that he might have.
Q So, when Mr. Hadley contacj:ed you this would have 22 been on behalf of M.t'. Comley.
23 A Well, I think -- again, I'm guessing, but my 24 initial reaction would be this guy, you know, calls me. He 25 has to identify himself. He's going to have to explain who Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
92 l it. That in fact his manaqe~ent was aware of it, encouraged 2 it, and condoned it. And that the matter should, you know, 3 if you had really looked at lon9 and hard, you'd find there 4
5 was a lot more people than Patavano involved in the situation.
6 Q Are you aware of the fact that Mr. Comley went to 7 Department of Justice complaininq about the way the Patavano 8 case was disposed of?
9 A Uh-huh.
10 MR. GREENSiUN: Was that a yes or a no.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. Excuse me. Yes, sir.
12 BY MR. ROSENTHAL:
13 Q And what is your recollection of that?
14 A He went down to the General Le9al Advice Section.*
15 In fact, I remember him talkinq to me a.bout doing that.
16 You know, "God bless. Do what you got to do." That's 17 putting it very generally speaking.
18 And then he went down.there and he told his story 19 to the Department of Justice. And if I'm not mistaken, and 20 again, please, all this is a.quess. It's the best that I 21 can put it together ... It was an ever recurring concern with 22 he, Ellison and a lot of other people that come to OI, a lot 23 of other people that lodge alle9ations with the NRC. And 24 that is: Look, this aqency really isn't going to give me a
.25 fair shake. I come to this agency. I give them my Heritage ~portinq Corporation (202) 628-4888
93 1 alleqations and before I Jc.now it, I'm in trouble with my own 2 utility. Th* NP.C doesn't don't *do a 9ood job. I think the 3 Nl\C really isn't desiqned to do-the ri9ht thin9 so far as 4 punishinq and/or finin9 or whatever of utilities .
5 It is that whole biq ball of wax that we run into 6 over and over and over, again. And one of the .ways to 7 resolve that is: If you don't like the NP.C, and you think 8 there is a matter of criminal wrongdoinq, you can always go 9 to Mother Justice. And if *they are crooked, I don't know .
10 what more I can do for you.
ll So, I think that's* the context he went to Mother 12 Justice.
13 Q That's Comley. Now, Comley, of course, was not an**
14 employee of utility.
15 A No, but I'm saying this is not an unconunon theme 16 that's been played to OI and I'm. sure even technical l7 inspectors or what have you in the agency, you know: The 18 watch dog is really not a watch.dog. It's a lap dog.
19 So, who do you turn to? "I'.m no~ going to qo to 20 the utility. I don't want to go to you. I'm very 21 suspicious. That's why there's .GAPs." I guess that's why 22 Comley is trying to put himself in a situation where he can
23 be a GAP type organization. And they fe.el they serve a role 24 or a function. You be the judge or other people be the 25 judge of that.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
96 l Q All. riqht. Are you aware of the tact that. both 2 Hr. Ellison and Hr. Comley taped* telephone conversations?
3 A I was suspected it of Mr. Ellison toward, I would 4 . quess, toward the end. An~. Comley? No. I figured that out
5 6
7 in the last few weeks, but I sure didn't know it before.
Q A
Well --
How much he did or how often, *I don't know.
8 Q Mr. Ellison, you suspected it?
9 A Toward 1;he end.
10 Q. Toward the end.
ll A Toward the end.
12 *o Because?
13 A Well, because I think Chet White told me -- well, 14 first off,* he said abou~~ you know, the V? knew he* taped the 15 quy and it didn't dawn on me. At some point in time, Chet
.16 White let me --* you know, he had been talking with Ellison, 17 too, as best I recall.
18 And he said, "This guy, I understand," now who he 19 understood from, I don't remember, "tapes *. n*
20 "Oh, terrific."
21 At some point in time, durin9 one conversation I 22 think I said to him, "Are you taping me? Or aren't you 23 tapinq .me?" Or something like that. I don't remember what 24 his answer was. But I just had the feeling*that that's what 25 he was doing. Whether he acknowledged that to me or not, I Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
97 l don't remember anymore. I really don't. But I think that's 2 a fair statement now that he was. Yes. And the same for 3 Comley, I guess.
4 0 Oo you have any ;tcollection of Mr. Comley 5 persuading Mr. Hayes to give testimony to the Glenn 6 Committee?
7 A Comley?
8 Q Comley.
9 A Persuading Hayes?
10 Q Yes.
ll A To give some testimony? No, sir. I don't 12 remember anything like that.
13 Q So that if Mr. Comley had made certain statements 14 to that effect in a telephone conversation with Mr. Ellison, 15 you would say that that was just puffery?
16 A Oh, yes. Yes, sir.
17 Q That would be your best estimate.
18 A Yes, sir. Oh, yes.
Q And as far as you're aware, Mr. C6mley had no role whatsoever in endeavoring to get Mr. Hayes to give testimony or any other OI official to give testimony to a congressional committee?
MR. GREENSPUN: tou mean from Mr. Comley's 24 perspective or from Mr. Fortuna's perspective? Mr. Comley 25 may think he had a role.
Heritage Reportinq Corporation (202) 628-4888
98 1 HR. ROSENTHAL: I understand that.
2 What I am askinq is whether I am askinq whether 3 Hr. Fortuna, himself, is aware 4
5 THE WITNESS:
MR. ROSENTHAL:
No.
of any endeavors by Mr. Comley 6 to get --
7 THE WITNESS: I'm not aware of any.
8 MR. ROSENTHAL: -- to get Mr. Hayes or some other 9 official of the Office of Investigation~ to testify before a 10 congressional committee?
11 THE W?TNESS: No, I'm not aware of any effort on 12 that -- you know, that he did anything like that.
13 MR. GREENSPON: You don't know one way or the 14 other.
15 THE WITNESS: No, I don't know one way or the
16 other.
17 MR. ROSENTHAL: .I just asked him whether he* knew.
18 THE WITNESS: It doesn't make sense, but no, I 19 don't.
20 MR. ROSENTHAL: I'm not askinq him, obviously, the 21 warrant that that didn't happen. I'm just asking whether tc 22 his knowledge.
23 BY MR. ROSENTHAL:
24 Q All right. Now, we have a tape of a t*elephone 25 conversation, actually two telephone conversations that too
Berita9e .Reportinq Corporation (202) 628-4888
99 \
l .Place between you and Mr. Comley on apparently the eveninq 2 of January 14., 1987.
3 Now, that tape was transcribed.
5 4 A Q
Uh-huh.
If you want to, for the purpose of assuring the 6 accuracy of the transcription, we will be .happy to play the 7 tape for you. we have played the tape and we followed it a word for word on the transcription. And we are satisfied 9 that the transcription is an *accurate representation of 10 what's on the tape.
11 Now, you can either accept our representation or 12 we will play it for you. In any event, we do have copies --
13 MP.. GREENS?ON: Are you sure the tape is accurate 14 and authentic?
lS MP.. ROSENTHAL: Well, the tape -- this is what 16 Mi. Fortuna can tell us. If Mr. Fortuna believes that this 17 tape has been altered in some fashion or that it's an entire 18 work of fiction, he can tell us that. But what we have, we 19 hav* two additional we have two copies of the 20 transcr~ption, one for each of you. And we have certain 21 questions on them. Now, it you want, we can take a recess 22 and let you go over that and then we can come back.
23 MP.. GP..EENSPUN: That's a good idea, Jud.ge.
24 MR. ROSENTHAL> I want to be totally fair to you.
25 I might just say, Mr. Greenspun, for the record, that while Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) . 628-4888 .
102 1 so on. *--*--**-*--- ----
2 Q But there is nothinq that you can recall from that 3 telephone conversation that might possibly have been omitted 4 from this tape. .-.
5 A I couldn't tell you that.
6 Q All right. Let's turn to page 123 which is the 7 second page of this transcript.
8 For the record, once again, this was a transcript 9 o~ a tape which we understand represented telephone 10 conversations on the night of January lS 11 MS. CH!OAKEL: 14.
12 B~ MR. ROSENTHAL:
1.3 Q 14, excuse me. January 14, 1987 between 14 Mr. Comley and Mr. Fortuna. The tape was transcribed by a 15 recording service at the behest of the NRC. It is our 16 understanding that the te.lephone conversations were tape<:i b*y 17 Mr. Comley. And I gathe~,.Mr. Fortuna, you didn't tape 1'8 them.
19 .A No, sir.
20 Q Very good.
21 A Because I think, based on the particular 22 jurisdiction, it's illegal *.
23 Q Well,* I don't know about its legality. That is 24 something we haven't inquired into.
25 MR. GREENSl?tJN: We don't waive any objection as to Heritage Repo.rtin9 Cox:Poration (202) 628-4888
103 1 the legality.
2 HR.. ROSENTHAL: I understand.
3 HR. GREENSPUN: Just as long as~we know that.
4 5
MP.. ROSENTHAL:
I understand that and that is something, as I say, that we haven't inquired into.
6 BY MP.. ROSENTHAL:
7 Q All right. Would you turn to the page 123? That's 8 the second paqe of the material. And there is a colloquy 9 between Mr. Comley and yourself, Mr. Fortun~, in wh1ch 10 Mr. Comley inq\iires as to whether you know who was coming to 11 *this meeting at Justice. You have referred to the meeting
12 or the interview or whatever it was on the prior page. And 13 you acknowledge that you do it was coming and Mr. Comley 14 asks you if .it was coming from OI. You responde that it 15 will be Matakis and Hutchinson.
16 And Comley says, "Matakis?"
17 And you resp?nd,. "Yes, that 1 s all right. You can 18 ask him to step out. That's why I asked if they'd send 19 another quy."
20 Now, I would like your explanation, if I might 21 have it as to those statements as to why *you requested that 22 another person be sent and why*you were tellin9 Mr. Comley 23 that he was free to ask your investigator to step out if he 24 wished to do so.
25 A "That's all right. You can ask him to step out."
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
109 l baf ore the house was the way the Department of Justice 2 disposed of the fatavano case, wasn't it?
3 A I don't know that for a fact. I don't know if 4 Mr. Comley, if it was clear in his mind. Again, I'm working 5 off this transcript, not totally independent recollection.
6 Q All right.
7 A Mr~ Comley was suspicious of the agency. Anything 8 that was handled, he had a concern* about, as are many other 9 allegers that ~e deal with. They have a hard time 10 distinguishing in their mind that alt~ough this part of NRC, 11 in their mind, is not doing the right thing, that OI is 12 doing the right thing. or if OI talks to the Justice 13 Department, maybe they are not doing the right. They don't 14
'---~--=-~~~--=__:..---=--_:__----~-::...
have the clear lines of demarcation. They don't have that 15 kind of experience and sometimes they suspect everybody.
l 6 So, I am not real 100 percent clear whether he was 17 just worried about Matakis, if he was worried about the i8 Justic*e Department field not doing a good job, whether he 19 was worried about main Justice not doing a good job, but I 20 don't know where you go from after you go to the Justice 2l . Department.
22 Q All right, let's go down if we might further down 23 in that page where you are asked as to who else will be 24 going from -- you're asked apout Mr. Hutchinson. And you 25 point out that he works for you and Mr. Comley asks if he is
Bedtage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
143 l reaches that level -- would come in, and when* you're one of 2 the more recent hirers, you'd run complaints. When people 3 walk in off the street and relay situations out to you and 4 they're absolutely convinced it was a crime, you just, 5 "Thank you, very much." You didn't make a record or it.
6 You jus~ made a judgement in your own mind, and disposed of 7 it *in your own mind.
8 Q Let's_ 90 on to 136. In the conversation in which 9 Mr. Comley refers to somebody, "He's just a Joe citizen."
10 And your response, "He's a good guy." Mr. Comley sa:ys, "All 11 right." Arid you say, "Joe six-pack trying to do the right 12 thing." What is that referring to?
13 A It sounds to me like Comley saying, "Would you be 14 sure to tell your people that I'm a good guy." He's
.15 himself, just a regular Joe. Fine, okay is the answer. I 16 think that's what the situation is.
17 Q You were satisfied that that was the case.
18 .A Yes. Comley, I think he's a pretty regular guy .
19 20 convinced me; I must have been wrong.
I'm really not too pleased that he tape-recorded me. He 21 Q At the time you characterized him as a Joe six-22 pack, 1ou weren't really faith in you.
23 A I still think he's a Joe six-pack. I think he's a 24 very nice person. I think he's incredibly sincere. I think 25 he believes a lot of this stuff. And sometimes, someplace, Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
144 l somewhere, now I think.with all t~is notoriety and stuff, 2 Mr. Comley may have had people confide in him~that wouldn't 3 be willin9 to come directly to the NRC. I me.an that 4 sincerely.
BY MS. C"iP.:
6 Q Are you still having on-goin9 discussion 7 periodically with Mr. Comley?
l MR. GREENSE'UN: Only if he tapes them.
THE -WITNESS: The last time I talked to him was 10 three, four days ago. He called me up and said, "! want to 11 wish you a lot of luck." I said, "For God sake, please, I 12 don't think I want to talk to you." And he was sincere.
13 He mailed me an inspirational book a couple of 14 weeks a9o. I haven't 'had a chance to read it yet. You know 15 when thin9s get tou9h -- one of those kind of books. I 16 think he's very sincere. Maybe I'm full of beans.
li MR. ROSEN: All I can* say is, it's neither here l8 nor there. But you show an unusual level of tolerance. If 19 I found someone who was tapin9 my conversations without my knowledge, there would be no sympathy for that individual at
,...\I 20 all. He would not longer be a Joe six-pack; he would be Joe
~ 2l 22 arsenic.
~
23 THE WITNESS: I like the 9uy a lot. I think .he's 24 a regular guy. I really do.
25 Heritage R-eporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
lSi l with or at least thinkinq about doinq that, if you're 2 dealinq with those people you've qot to be candid with them 3 and up front with them. Because these two people are 4 attorneys.
5 Q What is this office?
6 A Meaning GAP. This organization. Wait, let me 7 interrupt again sir. I'm on the telephone in my kitchen 8 tryinq to cook dinner, trying to watch TV, and you're trying 9 to put me in a situation where I'm.carefully and lO thoughtfully thinking out ~ach and every word I say and 11 p~rdoh m~ french, I'm all ~hitting* and golly gee whizzing 12 and JC and stuff like that. That is the tone of this 13 conversation. It's a very loose, disorganized, rambling 14 type of situation.
15 I understand that, but would anybody be suggesting 16 that your first loyalty might be the GAP? You~ the Director 17 of the Office of Investigations?
18 A Your means Comley's loyalty.
19 MR. G~ENSPON: The line we're referring to, 12 20 through 15, that's why I get.3cared.because you know if they 21 ever find out they will sa~ you" should. ha.ve been telling us 22 your first loyalties to this office. In quotes, who is the 23 "they" that you're ~eferring to there?
24 THE WITNESS: The GAP types that he was apparently 25 working with, or thinking about woiking with. The Hadley's Heritage Reporting . Corporation (202) 628-4888
158 l and the Guards of the world that they, and ¥OU ought to keep 2 them informed~ Because they'll tell you look, if you're not 3 -- if we're workinq with you and you're not telling us 4 what's going on that's not ?air, that's not being loyal to 5 us. *If they' :e t:ying to help him.
6 MR. GREENSPUN: Your refers to Comley not to you?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 MS. CHIOAK;EL: Well why should you get scared of 9 something lik~ that? Why do you care?
10 TR~ ~I7~ESS: Because I care abou~ this person, 11 because if he saw *sincerity and he is deeply troubled, and 12 if at a later date int.me he's goinq to come up with some 13 su~er ~~:orma~ion or bring allegations or people to me, I am 14 concerned that he should play straight up with the people 15 he's working with.
ia MS. CHIOAKEL: How does that.fit in with where you l7 say Chester thinks I shouldn't know about anything?
18 THE WITNESS: Where is that?
19 MS. CHIDA.KEL: In between the mums the word and 20 then Chester thinks I shouldn't know about anything.
21 MP.. ROSENTHAL: That's written in hand.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I think it corresponds to the 23 tape.
24 MS. CHIDAKEL: And then it says that's why I get 25 scared because you kno~ if they ever find out, etcetera.
Heritage Reporting Corporation
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170 THE WITNESS: I think you're readin9 so much into 2 three or four words. I'm sorry, I don't mean to be 3 arqumentative with you. You know, I've got to just stop for 4 a second. We've been goinef through this for some time and 5 it's clear to me based on the questions you've asked, the 6 tone in your voice and the demeanor which doesn't come clear 7 through on this tape recording once this is transcribed, 8 that you think that when you're in the *investigative game 9 when someone ~alks to you, or you're working with them you've got to say the NRC is great, wonderful and gooq,.
~

~~~~~-------- -----

ll MS. CHIDAKEL: No, tha~'s not true. I disagree 12 with you and I want to make that clear.
13 TP.~ WITNESS: Yes, okay.
14 MS. CHIDAKEL: . I *just want to give you an 15 opportunity because reading a transcript flat, it has 16 implications in it. And I just want to make sure that you 17 have an opportunity to explain any point where there is this 18 que.stion about where you see these words in this context 19 that you have plenty of opportunity to ~x~iain that .
20 MR. GP.EENSPUN: The question is do I have secret 21 information I'm holdinf:1 .back .on wrongdoing being conducted 22 in the NRC. I guess the answer there i's no I don't. If I 23 did prints of the city where al~ the cops were corrupt and 24 if somebody came to the police department and said can I 25 trust you, everybody's corrupt, and everybody knew that the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
l"71 1 New York City cops w*ere corrupt and you said no the New-'fo-r~--
2 City cops are the most honest people, do you think that 3 informant would trust you?
4 MS. CHIOAKEL: Th*at' s not the point. I think 5 Roger, I'm trying to give interpretations in terms of 6 raising questions where people reading this, just reading it 7 flat out, and who may not be professional investigators to 8 make sure that you have an opportunity to explain to those 9 areas where when you read it there's a question raised in 10 your mind that you have an ~pportunity to explain. And I'm ll asking questions to clarify why it's appropriate to do that.
12 !'m not trying to say yes I agree or disagree with that.
THE WITNESS: When TMI was -- 10 years ago, so 15 we're talking 1979, in 1979, talking a.bout information that 16 I was --- the Harold Hartman issue came up. Harold Hartman 17 was a control room op.erator of Th.ree Mile Island. When all 18 those teams were put together, one of the people that went 19 up there was Johnson.
20 MS. CHIDAKEL: I can't hear you.
21 THE WITNESS: One of t)'.le people that went up there 22~as Jo~in~ He was investiqator at OIA at the time, 23 he later came over to the Office of Investigations when it was formed up. \Now as a supervisor in an IG shop I think he' s in Commerce. When John went up there we had heard*
Heritage Reporting Corporation
<202) 628-4888
173 l other control* re.om operators to admit that this was 2 happening. He said Roger, CU?N't\ings is up here and he's 3 trying to talk these people, Hartman in particular, out of 4 the confession he's giving me.
5 He says Roger, you've got to do something, this is 6 serious, what do we do? I picked up the telephone. I 7 called up Mark Richard who has been th~ Deputy Assistant 8 Attorney General of the criminal division and my first level 9 supervisor in the criminal fraud division, who I have worked 10 cases with on in the past and I told Mr. Richard 11 ~ MR. ROSENTHAL: We've got t~ get on with it, this 12 is going on --
13 THE WITNESS: The point.I'm getting to is if I 14 thought there was something that was horribly_ wrong I would 15 try to get it to the right person. Because I say to you 16 now, okay well maybe some or something to somebody, if I 17 thought there was something wrong I would get to who I 18 thought was the right person. And my only point is I just 19 wasn't trying to discourage the guy, to shut him down.
20 MR. ROSEN'l'HAL: Mr. Greenspun, I've been trying to 21 indulge your client, I certainly .don't want . to cut him off, 22 but this was an example of three or four minutes of, in my 23 judgement, a pointless anecdote that could have been 24 summarized in 10 or 15 seconds. Now I am prepared to be 25 here all night, bu~ I think some of the others are not and Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
172 about a fe,llow named Harold Hartman who suppose*dly was 2 bumping hydro9en to make the le*ak rates come out in such a
. I .. (. . I 3
4 if l.).nidehl!f!ld fealag.e was u.nab+/-e .~ be Seermined as to 5 how and where it came from, then the plant might have to be
**1rr*muu1.J*.*u ***.:* 111*as:umaaa1u1 r-.u u.
i I 4 I I 6 shut down. 11 -
7 Mr. Sinclair went up there, condu.cted some 8 interviews and in his judgement, based on a phone 9 conversation he had with me, he said " you know what? I think that Harold Hartman is confessing, I think he's
':el ling the c.ruth. ". He says, "you :='lso. know that r~.qion l
r 1 rt* nr1*-11. a *,ar r Ii a before w.e went:. up there says that Harold Hartman is probably a bit of a nut, in fact I think some of the technic~l people said he needed psychiatric help and/or had had psychological or psychiatric help.... That's number one.
Number two they said that, what else was there o~
Harold Hartman? That he was technically incompetent, or what ha~e you. He said "Roger I believe him, this guy bumped the hydrogen and he is convinced that by bumping the nydrogen he masked unidentified leakage," and on and on and on. I 1::.old. that to my supervisol:', .. Mr. CU:mrnings, who has been the Director of OIA,. Mr. Cummings went up there. When he went up there, I think he went up the next day. Sirtclair called me back and he said.Roger; Hartman was leading me to 5 a point where I was going to start cracking some of the Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
~ ..
174 1 it seems to 'me that it's not* unrea*sonal:fie'To--ask Roger to 2 stick to the point.
3 (simultaneous conversation) 4 MR. ROSENTHAL: r want to be fair to him, I 5 understand your point, he has a lot at stake here, and I 6 certainly want to give him full opportunity to present his 7 views in response to the questions he's asked.
8 MR. GREENSPUN: Well, he was just trying to 9 demonstrate th~ point that if he knew of really bad things 10 he would take appropriate steps. But he wanted to use an ll example to* demonstrate that.
12 This is also~ h~'s got to be afforded some 13 latitude because you know, ii:'s an interview. If you're an 14 agent sitting here taking notes you would be asking 15 questions. The only difference is you've got a court 16 reporter. This is not a trial. So what is the harm in him 17 explaining, . really? What* is the harm?
18 MS. CHIOAKEL: I would like to put the question
19 once and for all. Have you ever obtained any crucial 20 information provided to you by Comley which pertained to 21 official NP.C matters? Have** you ever obtained any crucial 22 information from Comley a.bout anything within the NRC 23 jurisdiction? Anything that you would consider important 24 information?
25 THE WITNESS: Like a violation about a plant?
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
188 1 any orqani:ations with sensitive information or maybe-some -
2 documenta a.bout an onqoinq 0% investigation or some other 3 non-public sensitive NRC matter.
4 THE WITNESS: Aq3in, I don't know wnat you mean by s sensitive. I really don't. That has -- that's a term of 6 art, I guess, sometime in the agency. And the reason I say 7 that is a MS. CHIO.AKEL: All right, well let me narrow it 9 down then. Have you ever provided anybody information a.bout 10 an on9~inq OI matter or non-public information, non-public 11 documents or non~public information.
p 12 13 THE WITNESS:
investigation.
Let's go to the non-public Yes, I have provided to people outside the 14 N!lC information reqardinq ongoing OI investigations.
15 MS. CHIDAKEL: What about non-public documents or 16 non-public information.
17 / THE WITNESS: All right, well let me j.ust explain.
18 I qet phone calls from utilities. They say what is the status of your investiqation? We try to qive them the best that we can if it won't jeopa2:?ize the case. What I am 21 su99estinq is after a certain a.mount of time has elapsed in
\~
\ 22 an inv~stigation you qet a very good feel that people are
"'23 24 aware of what's qoinq on. And they'll sit there and answer an attorney for a utility or a utility for anything and say 25 I'm not going to discuss this with you. I think it's about Heritage Reportinq Corporation (202) 628-4888
189 halt done, wi'"ve-go-t~-some-*more witnesses to talk to, we'll 2 try to get you a witness list as soon as we can.
~
3 Look, nobody is ever sure of where this case is 4 9oinq to lead, but based on what I know I hope we can wrap 5 it up in a few weeks and things like that. Sure, I'll do 6 stuff like that. I think we all do.
7 MS. CHIOAKZL: Have you ever provided Mr. Comley, 8 on any occasion other than whatever was said during this 9 phone call,_ have you ever provided~him with information 10 about an OI investigation or any type of documents?
ll THE WITNESS:* Documents, no, not that. I could be 12 wrong but I don't think so. As far as data on other 13 investiqations, to the extent that it's public information, 14 I'm not sayinq I did because I don't know, but I had too 15 many conversations with the guy to be able to hold myself 16 totally responsible. I .don't know.
17 The answer would be, if the stuff was public 18 information and he makes reference to it, I would tell him.
19 MS. CHIO.AKEL: I'm not talking about public 20 information, I'm talkinq about non-public information.
21 THE WITNESS: I don't think so.
22 MR.. GUENSPON: What investigation, one that 23 Comley's already familiar with, that*he knows, that he's 24 done research about?
25 MS. CHIDAl<EL: Just asking a general question.
Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
211 1 all concerned because I un-derst:and-*the stress that* it is 2 producinq for you, Mr. Fortuna, I'm also a taxpayer and.-5' d' 3
taxpayer, quite frankly, i) "P'IPOt *pp**l ta ma to have
~
a z 4 'eople drawing salaries doing no work. And so I would lik!
5 t.o see this matter come to a head and be resolved as quickly 6 as possible.
7 I can't give you any kind of finite time. We a still have some inter.l'iews to conduct and we're goinq to 9 have to sit through still a reaso*na.l:>le amount of material.
10 If there's nothing further on that score we can now close ll the record with my thanks to you, Mr. Fortuna, and your 12 counsel for forbearance and endurance both. We're off the 13 record.
14 (Whereupon, at 4:40 p.m., the interview was 15 adjourned.)
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Heritage Reporting Corporation (202) 628-4888
I
/
EHc UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 February 15, 2011 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2011-*01: COMMERCIAL-GRADE DEDICATION ISSUES IDENTIFIED DURING NRG INSPECTIONS ADDRESSEES All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor issued under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," except those who have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All holders of or applicants for an early site pennlt, standard design certification, standard design approval, manufacturing license, or combined license issued under 1 O CFR Part 52,
ucenses, Certifications, and Approvals for N_~clear Power Plants."
' issued pursuant to All holders of or applicants for a license for a fuel cycle facility 10 CFR Part 70, "Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material," or 10 CFR Part 40,
oomestlc Licensing of Source Materlal.'1 All vendors that supply basic components to NRC-licensed facilities.
PURPOSE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this inform9tion notice (IN) to summarize the NRC staffs observations and findings in the area of commercial-grade dedication (CGD), as it applies to operating reactors, over the previous 2 years. The NRG expects recipients to review the iQfonnation and to consider actions, as appropriate, to revie\\
/'lessons learned and avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are n ar requirements; therefore, no specific action or written respon 1s 1
/ DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES
-=>
~
This IN summarizes NRC staff findings from vendor inspections related to CGD performed over oo the last 2 years. The NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and Office of New Reactors perform vendor inspections; one of the areas covered in these inspections is CGD. CGD is the acceptance process undertaken to provide reasonable assurance that a commercial-grade item to be used as a basic component will perform its intended safety function and, in this respect, is deemed equivalent to an item designed and manufactured under a quality assurance (QA) program under Appendix 8, "Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,* to 10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization ML103220180 i '
' j .
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 April 7, 2008 NRC IN FORMATION NOTICE 2008-04: COUNTERFEIT PARTS SUPPLIED TO NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ADDRESSEES All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors and applicants for combined license to construct nuclear power plants under Title 1O of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 52, "Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.h PURPOSE The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to inform addressees of the potential for counterfeit parts to enter their supply chains. Addressees should review this information and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. The ~
suggestions contained within this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is require<!; .
DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES Counterfeit Valves In November 2007, NRC became aware that Hatch Unit 2 had discovered a counterfeit valve (5" 150# Ladish stop check valves) on the stator cooling water skid. The licensee at Hatch later determined that it had two counterfeit valves in its facility: one in the warehouse and another one installed in Unit 2, as the "B" stator cooling water pump discharge stop check valve. The valve installed on Unit 2 had been in service for 8 months as of the time of discovery. Upon discovering the counterfeit valve, the licensee began to closely monitor the performance of the valve and plans to replace it during the next refueling outage in the spring of 2009. The valve installed at Hatch Unit 2 is being used in a non-safety related system.
Counterfeit Circuit Breakers NRC is aware that on December 27 and October 30, 2007, and November 16, 2006, the U.S.
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) had announced a recall of counterfeit circuit breakers labeled as "Square D" distributed by North American Breaker Co., Inc., Connecticut Electric and Switch Co, and Scott Electric Co. Inc. The recalled circuit breakers labeled "Square D" were manufactured in China and distributed from March 2003 through April 2006, February 2005 through August 2006, and May 2005 through May 2006, respectively. The counterfeit circuit breakers can fail to trip when overloaded, posing a fire hazard to consumers.
MLOB0790266
IN 2008-04 Page 2 of 3 A licensee database search indicated that Catawba, McGuire, and Oconee nuclear power plants had purchased Square D circuit breakers during the suspected time frame. After inspecting their Square D circuit breakers, Oconee and McGuire Plants confirmed that the Square D breakers that they had purchased during the suspected time frame were genuine. Catawba Nuclear Plant, however, could not confirm the authenticity of four of its Square D circuit breakers that it had purchased during the suspected time frame. Subsequently, Catawba removed these circuit breakers from stock. The NRC is not aware that the counterfeit circuit breakers have been installed in safety-related applications. The CPSC reports are available at http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml08/08151.html, http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtrnlOS/08054.html, and http://www.cpsc.gov/cpscpub/prerel/prhtml07/07036.html.
BACKGROUND Over the past two decades, the NRC has issued several generic communications to inform licensees of counterfeit or misrepresented vendor products. In March 1989, the NRC staff issued Generic Letter (Gl) 89-02, "Actions to Improve the Detection of Counterfeit and Fraudulently Marketed Products" (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML031140060). The GL informed licensees of program elements that are effective in detecting counterfeit or fraudulently marketed products and in assuring the quality of vendor supplied products. A.dditionally, in October 1989, the staff issued IN 89-70, and a supplement in April 1990, "Possible Indications of Misrepresented Vendor Products,n to inform licensees of misrepresented vendor products and to provide information related to the detection of such products (ADAMS Accession No. ML031180470).
1*
DISCUSSION Although none of the counterfeit items described above were installed in safety-related applications, these examples demonstrate the need for licensees to remain vigilant and maintain effective quality assurance programs to reduce the potential for introduction of counterfeit parts into their supply chains.
In recent years many vendors, including foreign companies, with little to no experience in the nuclear industry have entered the market to supply parts and components for both safety and non-safety applications to nuclear power plants. It remains the licensees' responsibility to ensure that all suppliers use standards and processes that conform to US standards. Effective oversight of suppliers becomes increasingly more important as the nuclear industry begins construction of new nuclear power plants in the US.
As discussed in GL 89-02, three characteristics of effective procurement and dedication programs are (1) the involvement of engineering staff in the procurement and product acceptance process; (2) effe~ctive source inspection, receipt inspection, and testing programs*,
and (3) thorough, engineering-based programs for review. testing, and dedication of commercial-grade products for suitability for use in safety-related applications. Licensees may want to consider the applicability of these characteristics to their programs to reduce the likelihood of the introduction of counterfeit or fraudulent products into their plants and to assure the quality of procured vendor products.
IN 2008-04 Page 3 of 3 CONTACT This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below.
IRA by TQuay for/ IRA/
Michael Case, Director Glenn Tracy, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operational Programs Office of New Reactors Technical Contacts: Omid Tabatabai Robert Pettis NRO/OCIP/CCIB NRR/OE/EQVB (301) 415-6616 (301) 415-3214 omid. tabatabai@nrc.gov robert.pettis@nrc.gov Richard Mcintyre NRO/DCI P/CQVB (301) 415-3215 richard.mcintyre@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room1i0ocument Collections
IN 2008-04 Page 3 of 3 CONTACT This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contacts listed below.
IRA by TQuay for/ IRA/
Michael Case. Director Glenn Tracy, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Division of Construction Inspection and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Operational Programs Office of New Reactors Technical Contacts: Omid Tabatabai Robert Pettis NRO/OCIP/CCIB NRR/DE/EQVB (301) 415-6616 (301) 415-3214 omid.tabatabai@nrc.gov robert.pettis@nrc.gov Richard Mcintyre NRO/DCIP/CQVB (301) 415-3215 rich a rd.mcintvre@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRG public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections 1*
DISTRIBUTION:
IN File ADAMS ACCESSION: ML080790266 OFFICE CCIB:DCIP:NRO Tech Ed. TL:CCIB:OCIP*.NRO BC:CCIB:DCIP:NRO BC:CQVP:DCIP:NRO NAME OTabatabai HChanQ Rlaura RRasmussen JPeralta DATE 03118108 03/10108 03119/08 03120108 03/24/08 OFFICE BC:CQVB:DCIP:NRO BC:EQVB:OE:NRR O:DE:NRR OGC (NLO) LA:PGCB:NRR NAME JNakoski DThatcher PH ii and SBrock CH awes DATE 03/20108 03/24/08 03/24/08 03126108 03/ 108 OFFICE PM:PGCB:NRR BC:PGCB:NRR O:DCIP:NRO O:DPR:NRR NAME DBeautieu MMurphy GTracy TQuav for MCase DATE 03/ 108 04/03/08 04107108 04/03/08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
l"H\.L: mrormatton Nonce No. 93-73: Criminal Prosecution of Nuclear Suppliers for Wron ... Pagel of 3 U **s***.NRC
.i United States Nuclear Regufacoiy Commhsio11 Protecti11g Peop/4 Olfli tlte £m:*ito11111ent Home > NRC Library > Document Collections > Generic Communications > Information Notices >
1993 >IN 93-73 Information Notice No. 93-73: Criminal Prosecution of Nuclear Suppliers for Wrongdoing UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 September 15, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-73: CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS FOR WRONGDOING Addressees All*NRC licensees.
Purpose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to inform addressees of the results of the criminal prosecutions of two cases of wrongdoing that the NRC staff referred to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). Licensees and their suppliers are also reminded of the penalties that could result from the intentional violation of Federal regulatory requirements and criminal statutes. In particular, suppliers, licensees, and individual employees could be subject to criminal prosecution by the DOJ if they intentionally violate Federal regulatory requirements. I t is expected that recipients will review the information notice and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances Case 1: In May of 1993, the president and vice president/manager of Satin American Corporation were sentenced in United States District Court (District of Connecticut) on criminal charges; specifically, Section 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code (18 o.s.c. 371), "Conspiracy to Traffic in Good§
.Bearing Counterfeit Marks." They had pled guilty to artici atin in a 1985 to 1987 in w ich circuit breakers and related e ui w:ere re at t eir elton, Connecticut, facility. This equipment was sold to various NRC licensees and others bearing counterfeit nameplates made to look like those from the original manufacturers. The Satin American president was sentenced to 4 years of imprisonment, which was suspende&., and ..__ll 3 years probation. The conditions of probation were restitution, a $2~0,000 .7("
J( . finet 400hoursof community service each year of probation, and barring of http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/1nfn-nntirP<:/1 QQ-:i,/;na10T~ ht...--1 (: /0/"lf\ 1 A
l'IKL: Inrormat1on Notice No. 93-73: Criminal Prosecution of Nuclear Suppliers for Wron... Page 2 of 3 the president, Satin American Corporation, and any related or successor companies controlled by him from engaging in nuclear safety-related business for 5 years. The Satin American vice president/manager was sentenced to 3 years of imprisonment, also suspended with 3 years probation, 200 hours0.00231 days 0.0556 hours 3.306878e-4 weeks 7.61e-5 months of community service each year of probation, a $5,000 fine, and he was barred from nuclear safety-related business for 3 years. Information on the associated equipment problems can be found in IN 89-45 "Low-Voltage Metalclad 9309100054.
IN 93-73 September 15, 1993 Page 2 of 3 Power Circuit Breakers Refurbished with Substandard Parts," and its Supplements 1 and 2.
Case 2: On November 6, 1992, the president of J and S Machine and Valve and former partner in Coffeyville Valve, Incorporated, was indicted by a grand jury in Tulsa, Oklahoma, for 11 counts citing violations of 18 U.S.C. 371, 2:320, 1341, and 1343. Tliese counts included conspiracy, copyright infringement, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The defendant was alleged to have
'refurbished used valves and affixed counterfeit Crane Company labels in an
...__effort to mislead customers, including NRC licensees, to believe they were receiving unused valves manufactured by Crane. On March 16, 1993, the defendant pled guilty to charges of conspiracy to traffic in counterfeit goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3~1. On May 18, 1993, in United States District Court (Northern District of Oklahoma}, the defendant was found guilty. ~
Imposition of sentence was suspended, but the defendant was laced on /~
pro ation or years and fined $15,000. Information can be found in "IN 92-56, "counterfeit Valves in the Commercial Grade Supply System."
Discussion All per,sonnel involved in NRC-regulated activities, including licensees, suppliers, and their employees, have a responsibility to comply with applicable NRC regulatory requirements and other Federal laws. The NRC demands compliance and will seek criminal prosecution of wrongdoing in cases of willful violations of these requirements. As evidenced by the cases cited herein, criminal sanctions may include imprisonment, fines, restitution of monies, and rendering of community services.
In addition, the "Deliberate Misconduct" provisions, in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 30.10, 40.10, 50.5, 61.9(b), 70.10, and 72.121 allow the NRC to take direct enforcement action against suppliers and/or their responsible officers and/or their employees for deliberately causing a licensee to be in violation of Commission regulations or for providing false information to licensees or the Commission concerning licensed activities.
Furthermore, as indicated in numerous NRC generic communications, in addition to bearing counterfeit markings, much of the equipment in cases such as the ones cited above has been found to have been sold in unsatisfactory condition, or to contain substandard parts, manufacturing processes or workmanship. Some of this equipment has failed in service or testing. Inasmuch as some of this equipment is sold as basic components as defined in 10 CFR Part 21, "Reporting of Def~cts and Noncompliance," and some of it is represented as new and deviations in the equipment are deliberately not disclosed to the purchasers, directors or responsible officers of suppliers of such equipment could also be http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/2en-conun/info-notices/1991/in91071 html 'i/Q/')()1.1
NRC: Information Notice No. 93-73: Criminal Prosecution of Nuclear Suppliers for Wron ... Page 3 of 3 subject to civil penalties as described in 10 CFR 21.61. In addition, as provided in Section 21.62 of the revision of 10 CFR Part 21, published November 24, 1992, criminal sanctions could be imposed in accordance with Section 223 of the Atomic Energy 'Act of 1954, as amended. Although not.
IN 93-73 September 15, 1993 Page 3 of 3 required by this notice, addressees may wish to distribute copies of this information notice to their employees and suppliers.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the technical contacts listed below, the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation project manager, or the appropriate regional office.
/S/'D BY BKGRIMES Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Technical contacts: Stephen D. Alexander, NRR (301) 504-2995 Ronald K. Frahm, Jr., NRR (301) 504-2986 Joseph J. Petrosino, NRR (301) 504-2979 Kevin M. Ramsey, NMSS (301) 504-2534 Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday, November 12, 2013 htto://www .nrcJmv/readiml-rm/doc-col lectiom:/,n~n-~nmm/1 nfn-nnt1 f'P<dl QQ'.l Ii n0'.l()7'.l J..+...... 1
Page 1 of7 Sul:dect St.eve - Nice Hearing from You - This Must be the CT Company to which You were Referring From: B11rKtey, Richar~ (Ri(;hard.EJarkley@nrc.gov)
To: csc9i11leysr@yahoo.com; Date: Thuraday, May 8, 2014 4:21 PM IB*(~:ttm~ation Notice No .. 89-45, Supplement 2:
M6\~fll~lad, Low-Voltag.e Power Circuit Breakers Befurhished with Substan.dard Parts
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 December 15, 1989 I
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. \,S~~t~~~t,iO'n ~o.tice No. 89-45, SUPPLEMENT 2: METALCLAD, LOW-VOLTAGE
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POWER CIRCUIT BREAKERS *1
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.*. ~~i\Hs:q~?:(l>perating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power C/O/"'lf\t A
Page 2 of7 1.'
I This information notice supplement is being provided to alert addressees to Ii I
. the problem of potentially defective General &lectric (GE) and Westinghouse (W}~!llect{ilclad; low-voltage power circuit breakers and associated equipment supplied to nuclear power plants by the Satin American Corporation (SA) and its affiliate, Circuit Breaker Systems, Incorporated, both of Shelton, Conn~cti(:ut, or tiy any of SA's representatives. Of particular concern are GEEC-type, electromechanical, overcurrent trip devices, in safety-related applications, or available for use in such applications, supplied by these organizations.
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'~ *.~~1t~1~~~¥iXiy that recipients will re'l7iew this information for t.o. their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to lI I
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of Circumstances:
low-voltage power circuit breaker (field discharge been built or refurbished with nonstandard and substandard
rn fJ9-45 discussed the NRC' s findings on GE EC-type trip
follow-up inspections at utilities that had procured circuit
. mqt Page 3 ot 7 breakers and related electrical equipment such as trip devices from SA. As discussed in detail in the supplement, the NRC found .EC-type trip devices supp~ied by SA that were refurbished with nonstandard and possibly substa~dard parts, or old, used parts, in nonstandard combinations using questionable fabrication methods. Some of these devices had failed in service Ot' test,i.ng .
.Ad<:iJ..ti,ond tests were conducted by utility personnel and were observed by
r;~presentj:l.tives of the original manufacturer and the NRC. In these tests,
t'he-.
d:e:vices
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,II IN 89-45, Supplement 2 .I i
December 15, 1989 ,I I j i
Page 2 of 3 , II
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* * -.* * ~;~b~*1!.!.d ip;corn~istent performance including some test failures.
ly-F th113 NRC obtained more of these SA-supplied trip units and had
~:.::~*~mined at the GE Apparatus Service Facility in Atlanta,
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is currently the sole original equipment
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.EC-type trip devices. The .results of this testing were also I with virtually all the devices tested exhibiting I l I
operation of one or more of their functions in some (j~sign operating ranges. The devices were not adjustable operate within tolerance at all points within their
.t'age 4 OI I nam'eplate-i.dentified characteristic curves, and some of them failed to perform one or more of their trip functions entirely. Post-testing e~~min:q.ti<;>tt of, these devices confirmed that they were rebuilt with used par.ts~ .in: incorrect combinations. Some of the parts were so degraded with age that they were no longer suitable for use, and some of the unsatisfactory test results were directly attributable to the discrepancies in.the i:;:onditions found. Some of the fabrication methods used could
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trti.bute* to erratic operation and failure.
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Such latent defects would not i:;~*.. tepdily detectable during routine inspection and testing and could render tli,~. at:fected circuit breakers unreliable during normal operation due to
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tripp~ng and lack of overcurrent protection.
~***.~!'!.$l\.. £*c:,;J..ity in ~b4')lton, Connecticut, suffered major damage in a fire in
~esultant destruction of records may make it difficult or J)
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,~~ !I cus.1:;oJQ*rs to audit the colllpany and obtain the ~j 11
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alilsure that previously purchased equipment was in I j
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~:i'l(~& with the applicable specifications and purchase ord~r l
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'i';~.~i.3~f.~~ss the scope 0£ the problem with regard to GE EC-type trip !
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'.*;f~~#~~ar: utilities WE!re contacted by the Nuclear Managelllent and
~~~~l,f. C.NQMARC) at the request of the NRC to determine which i
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the types in question in the last 5 or 6 years, it) co1nlllercial grade equipment and was used in or i
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aV'a'i~abi'e fol:' use in nonsafety-related applications only. Of the NUMA.RC respOndonts, several utilities initially reported that they had GE AK-type ~
circuit breakers containing EC-type over-current trip devices supplied by SA
.which war~ possibly used in safety-related applications. These utilities subsequently contacted the NRC.
All licensees thus far identified that have GE EC-type trip devices ins~allefl in safety-related circuit breakers have committed to acceptable t/J courses of action to replace the suspect trip devices or to consult with G.E in :reviewing and determining the suitability of the trip devices for ll,,
i cf:>n~inued*. *Use. II 11
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As a.result of the NRC's continuing inspections of the*types of equipment in i~~*~:~;1:on at licensed facilities, the NRC has identified additional
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equipment that may be defective.
NRC inspections of SA-supplied c .:*~;~:~94"'voltage switchgear at several plants, including type DB-25 t1f;;:~i~,¢uit breakers a.t the Cooper Nuclear Station and the Zion I
$'u.~lear Power Station respectively, have identified apparent irregularities ;I 11
~ I wh~J:;lcompared to the original equipment. Specifically, apparent differences ,I I
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I IN 89-45, Supplement 2 December 15, 1989 Page 3 of 3
., Prin.t Page 6 of7 not be suitable for service without additional operability reviews in consult.~tion with the original equipment manufacturer.
The NRC is interested in obtaining information on circuit breakers and rel.ated pieces of equipment that have been found with deficiencies such as those described in IN 89-45, Su~plement 1 thereto, and this supplement.
Documentation, in as much detail as practicable, of any such deficiencies l
11 noted, especially in recent pr.ocurements and in cases of possible improper
!\
S,l;l,I"\ti¢ing or refurbishment, is impo.rtant. Licensees may conununicate
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frifd~mation' of th.is type by telephone to the technical contacts listed
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r:6i$:~nformation notice requires no specific action or written response. I{ 'I
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' .Yo~;;,hq,:Y.e> aqy questions about the information in this notice, please contact l ii
~.~c;;hoical contacts listed below or the appropriate NRR project
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Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational Events Assessment Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation S. D. Alexander, NRR
Page 7 of7 j
(301} 492-0995 !
U. Potapovs, NRR (301) 492-0984 1\;tta,§:hm~nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
~ Page Last Reviewed/Updated Tuesday,* November 12, 2013 ~
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f RPP-27195 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Manual ESHQ COUNTERFEIT ITEMS Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 1of51 '
Issue Date April 23, 2014 Ownership matrix Click for copy of Word (native) file TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE ................................................................................................................ 2 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION ..................................................................................................................... 2 3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES ...................................................................................................................... 2 3.1 Procurement Personnel ....................................................................................................... 2 3.2 Inspection Personnel ........................................................................................................... 2 3 .3 Quality Assurance Engineer ............................................................................................... 2 3 .4 S/CI Coordinator ................................................................................................................. 3 3 .5 Assigned Engineering Personnel ........................................................................................ 3 3.6 Responsible Managers and Supervisors .............................................................................. 3 4.0 PROCEDURE ................................................................................................................................. 3 4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3 4.2 Procurement ........................................................................................................................ 3 4.3 Inspection for Potential S/CI ............................................................................................... 4 4.4 Control of Material Identified as S/CI ................................................................................ 4 4.5 Reporting of S/CI ................................................................................................................. 5 4.6 Acceptance, Removal, and Disposition of S/CI... ............................................................... 5
4. 7 Surplus/Excess Material ..................................................................................................... 7 4.8 Assessments ........................................................................................................................ 7 4.9 Training ................................................................................................................................ 7 4.10 Trend Analysis .................................................................................................................... 9 5.0 DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................. 9 6.0 RECORDS .......................... ,. ......................................................................................................... 10 7.0 SOURCES ..................................................................................................................................... 10 7 .1 Requirements ..................................................................................................................... 10 7.2 References ......................................................................................................................... 10 TABLE OF ATTACHMENTS J°l?e p
ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST ........................................................................... 12..:;:,.. 'J-6 ATTACHMENT B - CLASSIFICATION OF POTENTIALLY SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS .... 30 ATTACHMENT C- SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS INFORMATION SOURCE LIST ................. 33 ATTACHMENT D - CHARACTERISTICS THAT MAY MAKE PRODUCTS VULNERABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION, FRAUDULENT PRACTICES, AND COUNTERFEITING ......... 35 ATTACHMENT E- WHERE TO LOOK FOR SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS .............................. 36 ATTACHMENT F- SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS DETECTION ................................................ 37 ATTACHMENT G- FASTENERS ........................................................................................................... 42 ATTACHMENT H - DOE HEADMARK LIST ........................................................................................ 46 ATTACHMENT I - REFURBISHED MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS .................................... 48
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ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 2 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS 1.0 PURPOSE AND SCOPE (7.1.1)
This procedure describes the process for the identification, prevention, evaluation, notification, and disposition of suspect/counterfeit items (S/Cls) at WRPS. This procedure applies to items that are:
In the procurement cycle
In receiving inspection
In inventory at warehouses and staging areas
Installed
In operation.
This procedure applies to:
Company ordered material
Material supplied by subcontractors
Material and test equipment supplied by test sponsors
Construction
Fabrication shops
Laboratory work and experiments
Surplus/excess property
Government property
Material obtained from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sources.
2.0 IMPLEMENTATION This procedure is effective on the date shown in the header.
3.0 RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 Procurement Personnel Maintain awareness of S/CI and support S/CI program implementation.
3.2 Inspection Personnel Perform inspections for conformance or acceptance of material including verifications that the item(s) being inspected do not exhibit indications attributed to potential suspect/counterfeit items.
3.3 Quality Assurance Engineer
1. Ensures appropriate procurement controls are implemented to preclude entry of S/CI to the site through review of procurement documents.
2. Notifies the S/CI coordinator of nonconformance reports (NCRs) associated with S/CI.
3. Controls potential S/CI in a secure location.
' 1 ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 3 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS 3.4 S/CI Coordinator I. Apprises company, and DOES/CI Point of Contact (POC) of S/CI status and final NCR disposition.
2. Reviews potential sources of S/CI information for applicability and distribution.
3.5 Assigned Engineering Personnel
1. Evaluate S/CI information for applicability to design and procurement specifications, system configuration, and operating conditions.
2. Provide technical specifications, critical characteristics, and acceptance methods in support of procurement and inspection activities to prevent introduction of S/CI.
3.6 Responsible Managers and Supervisors
1. Maintain awareness of S/CI.
2. Determine personnel S/CI training needs.
4.0 PROCEDURE 4.1 Introduction The two most common S/Cls found at DOE facilities have been threaded fasteners fraudulently marked as high-strength bolts, and refurbished electrical circuit breakers sold and distributed under false certifications. Purchasers have also been misled into accepting S/Cls that do not conform to specified requirements by falsified documentation.
Questions pertaining to S/CI should be referred to the S/CI coordinator. Attachment A provides a historical listing of suspect components. Equipment/material types or classes have been established to identify those specific items which are classified as potentially misrepresented or S/CI. Attachment B provides a listing of those classifications and items subject to S/CI control at tank farm facilities.
4.2 Procurement WRPS Personnel 1. Ensure material requirements are specified in subcontracts to preclude the purchase or introduction of S/CI. Use the information in Attachments A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I to identify specific components, characteristics, precautions, and other considerations that are to be addressed during the procurement process to prevent introduction of S/CI.
2. Ensure material requests for quality level 1, 2, and 3 items and services include appropriate technical specifications, procurement quality clauses, documentation, and inspection requirements to prevent introduction of S/CI.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 4 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS
3. In maintenance and construction/fabrication subcontracts, specify appropriate requirements to preclude the purchase or introduction of S/CI.
Quality Assurance 4. Review procurement documents to ensure they contain the appropriate Engineer procurement controls to preclude entry of S/CI to the site.
Procurement 5. Ensure vendor selection complies with qualification requirements for Personnel the quality level of the items and services and is based on the vendor's ability to demonstrate the capability of delivering acceptable items.
4.3 Inspection for Potential S/CI Bill of Material I. For quality level 0 and P-Card items listed in Attachment B, designate Preparers an S/CI inspection in the special instruction of the Bill of Material in accordance with the requirements ofTFC-BSM-CP CPR-C-06.
2. Ensure quality level 0 and P-Card items are inspected prior to material issuance.
First Line Manager 3. Obtain on-site S/CI inspection for quality level 0 and P-Card items prior to material issue and use.
Engineering 4. Provide technical specifications, critical characteristics, and acceptance Personnel methods to facilitate inspection planning for S/CI prevention and detection.
Quality Assurance 5. Ensure S/CI detection criteria are incorporated into QA inspection Engineer planning activities.
Assigned Inspection 6. Use Attachments G, H, and I as resources for detecting S/Cis during Personnel walk downs and inspections. Specific items are subject to inspection.
7. Verify and document that the items being inspected do not exhibit indications attributed to potential S/Cis as described in Attachments G through I.
8. If an S/CI is detected during inspection activities, document and control the S/CI in accordance with TFC-ESH0-0 ADM-C-02.
9. Contact the Shift Office to determine notification requirements in accordance with TFC-OPS-OPER-C-24.
4.4 Control of Material Identified as S/CI Responsible Manager I. Ensure items identified as potential S/CI are documented as or Delegate nonconforming and controlled in accordance with TFC-ESHQ-0 ADM-C-02.
2. Transfer tagged S/Cis to 2101-HV for storage.
..I ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 5 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS Cognizant Quality 3. Notify the S/CI coordinator of all NCRs associated with the S/CI.
Engineer 4.5 Reporting of S/CI S/CI Coordinator 1. Report S/Cls regardless of safety class, location (receiving inspection, inventory/storage areas, fabrication and maintenance areas, installed, etc.), or their operating status. Ensure the Shift Office has been contacted for notification determinations.
2. Ensure items identified as potential S/CI are documented as nonconforming and controlled in accordance with TFC-ESHQ-0 ADM-C-02. For S/Cls discovered during a formal "receipt inspection, (and still considered within the supply chain process) the S/CI NCR shall be written, reviewed and processed within four working days to determine whether or not the items are S/CI.
3. On receipt of an S/CI NCR from MSA/AVS, process in accordance with TFC-ESHQ-Q ADM-C-02 and notify the Shift Office (373-2689) if the possibility exists for similar items identified in operating systems.
4. Upon determination that an item is counterfeit, notify the DOE S/CI POC.
5. When notifying the DOES/CI POC include a copy of the occurrence report (if applicable). Also transmit a copy of the NCR and other applicable documentation/information, i.e.:
NCR number
Date NCR was written
Purchase order/job control number (if known)
End use of product
Name of manufacturer, distributor, supplier
Safety class (if known)
Occurrence report number, if available
Value ofitem(s), if known
Point(s) of contact
Description of item(s)
Quantity
Description of nonconformance.
Any other pertinent information that would help the DOE S/CI POC and the local Office of the Inspector General (OIG).
4.6 Acceptance, Removal, and Disposition of S/CI S/CI Coordinator 1. Notify responsible company personnel that S/CI may not be destroyed or disposed of without written release from the DOE local OIG.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 6 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS 2 Prior to destroying or disposing of S/Cls, consult the Inspector General to determine if there is a need to retain the items as evidence for potential litigation. Based on the OIG's decision, either:
a. Retain S/CI material as evidence for potential litigation, or
b. Release S/CI material for final disposition and/or disposal as directed by the S/CI coordinator, or
c. Release material for training use.
3. Provide a copy of the correspondence with DOE/OIG to the WRPS Internal Audit (IA) Department.
Engineering 4. Evaluate S/CI to determine if its use could create a safety hazard in its Personnel current/proposed application.
Assigned Company 5. If the engineering evaluation of the S/CI has determined that its use Personnel could not create a safety hazard in its current/proposed application:
a. Disposition the S/CI to remain in place. The disposition criteria are acceptance, removal, or replacement after an engineering evaluation. This should be based on the deficient characteristic of the particular item.
b. Identify the accepted S/CI by marking with orange paint (i.e.,
torque paint) or other appropriate methods and note its location in the Work Management System (i.e., Computerized History and Maintenance Planning Software [CHAMPS]).
c. In areas where operating temperatures are 500°F and above or are subject to cyclic loading where fatigue failure is likely to occur, replace all grades 8 and 8.2 S/CI fasteners prior to further use of the equipment.
d. Engineering must also identify a way to prevent its reuse in an application it may not be suitable for.
e. If removed, prepare the S/CI for disposal.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 7 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS
6. If the engineering evaluation of the S/CI has determined that its use could create a safety hazard in its current/proposed application:
a. Contact Base Operations Shift Operations to secure the equipment.
b. Remove the S/CI as soon as practical.
c. Tag, segregate, or otherwise control the S/CI to prevent inadvertent use.
d. Prepare the S/CI for disposal.
S/CI Coordinator 7. Upon receipt of notification from the DOE/OIG authorizing disposal, ensure that all S/CI material dispositioned for disposal is properly controlled and arranged for the material to be permanently and irrevocably altered so that it cannot be used. Examples of alterations include:
Melting
Shredding
Destroying the threads on fasteners.
8. Provide a copy of the correspondence with DOE/OIG to the WRPS IA department.
9. Burying S/Cls may be acceptable if they do not contain hazardous material or material prohibited by federal, state, or local regulations.
4.7 Surplus/Excess Material Responsible 1. Remove S/Cl from surplus/excess material before they are released for Personnel sale or transfer of accountability.
2. Ensure surplus items received from DOE or other facilities are inspected for S/CI prior to installation.
4.8 Assessments Quality Assurance 1. Ensure that assessment on the effectiveness of the S/CI program is Manager periodically conducted and reported. The assessment should be performance based and designed to determine if company activities are conducted in accordance with applicable requirements.
4.9 Training Responsible Manager 1. Ensure that applicable personnel, within your area (see below for list),
or Supervisor are assigned S/Cl training Course 350720, Suspect/Counterfeit Items, or approved equivalent so as to understand the basic concepts for awareness, prevention, detection, and reporting of S/CI items (e.g.,
Course 170720 is a preapproved equivalent).
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 8 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS Personnel within the following functional groups shall attend S/CI training:
Operations Person-in-Charge/Field Work Supervisor (PIC/FWS)
Maintenance (Craft and PIC/FWS)
Engineer (System & Project)
QA Engineer
Procurement Specialist
Material Coordinator
Truck Driver (Standard & Light Duty)
(Coordinate with your respective Training Coordinator to ensure S/CI training is on the employees training plan.)
2. For S/CI training classes taken outside of Hanford, ensure that requests for equivalency are approved by the Training Manager in accordance with TFC-BSM-TQ_MGT-C-01 prior to taking the class.
S/CI Coordinator 3. Monitor S/CI training to ensure it provides:
Actions and responsibility for notification and reporting of S/Cis are identified
Responsibility to control S/Cis when identified Responsible 4. Attend training class when scheduled and complete additional Personnel assignments when requested.
S/CI Coordinator 5. Collect, maintain, disseminate, and use the most accurate, up-to-date information on S/Cis and suppliers using all available sources, including:
Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (www.gidep.org)
Institute of Nuclear Operators (www.inpo.info)
DOE Occurrence Reporting and Processing System
DOE Suspect/Counterfeit web site (https://powerpedia.energy.gov/wiki/Suspect/Counterfeit_Items
_and_Defective_Items_(SCI/DI)).
6. Annually provide any applicable information on suspect/counterfeit items to the appropriate personnel using one of the following methods:
lessons learned, required reading, briefings, or training.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 9 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS 4.10 Trend Analysis Contractor Assurance 1. Perform trend analysis quarterly in accordance with TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-06.
2. Notify the S/CI Coordinator when a negative trend of S/CI issues is identified.
S/CI Coordinator 3. Review and process adverse trends through the PER process in accordance with TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-0 l.
5.0 DEFINITIONS Counterfeit part. A part made or altered so as to imitate or resemble an "approved part" without authority or right, and with the intent to mislead or defraud by passing the imitation as original or genuine.
Fastener (regardless of the safety classification).
A screw, nut, bolt, or stud with internal or external threads or a load-indicating washer with a nominal diameter of 5 millimeters or greater in the case of such items described in metric terms; or 1/4 inch or greater in the case of such items in terms of the English system of measurement which contains any quantity of metal and held out as meeting a standard or specification which requires through-hardening; or
A screw, nut, bolt, or stud having internal or external threads which bears a grade identification marking required by a standard or specification; or
A washer to the extent that it is subject to a standard or specification applicable to a screw, nut, bolt, or studs described above, except that such term does not include any screw, nut, bolt, or stud that is produced and marked as American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A 307 Grade A or produced in accordance with ASTM F432.
Grade identification. Any symbol appearing on a fastener purporting to indicate that the fastener's base material, strength properties, or performance capabilities conform to a specific standard of a consensus standards organization or government agency.
Graded classifications. System used to determine minimum requirements for structures, systems and components (e.g., design, operation, procurement, and maintenance requirements). The graded classifications in order of precedence are safety class, safety significant, and enhanced quality general services.
High strength graded fastener. Fasteners having a minimum tensile strength of75 ksi, including those produced and procured in accordance with the Society of Automotive Engineers Standard 1429, Grades 5, 5.2, 8, and 8.2; ASTM Standard A325, Types 1 and 3; ASTM A490, ASTM A354, ASTM A449 (Types 1 and 3), and some ASTM F468.
Item. An all-inclusive term used in place of any of the following: appurtenance, assembly, component, equipment, material, module, part, structure, subassembly, subsystem, system, or unit.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 10 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS Substantial safetv hazard. A loss of safety function to the extent that there is a major reduction in the degree of protection to the public or employee health and safety.
Suspect/counterfeit items. A suspect item is one in which there is an indication by visual inspection, testing, or other information that it may not conform to established Government or industry-accepted specifications or national consensus standards. A counterfeit item is a suspect item that is a copy or substitute without legal right or authority to do so or one whose material, performance, or characteristics are knowingly misrepresented by the vendor, supplier, distributor, or manufacturer. An item that does not conform to established requirements is not normally considered S/CI if the nonconformity results from one or more of the following conditions, which should be controlled by site procedures as nonconforming items:
Defects resulting from inadequate design or production quality control
Damage during shipping, handling, or storage
Improper installation
Deterioration during service
Degradation during removal
Failure resulting from aging or misapplication, or
Other controllable causes.
6.0 RECORDS The following records are generated during the performance of this procedure:
Training Records
Correspondence with DOE.
7.0 SOURCES 7.1 Requirements
1. TFC-PLN-02, "Quality Assurance Program Description."
7.2 References
1. DOE G 414.1-3, "Suspect/Counterfeit Items Guide for Use with 10 CFR 830 Subpart A, Quality Assurance Requirements, and DOE 0 414.1 B, Quality Assurance."
2. NRC Information Notice 89-70: "Possible Indications of Misrepresented Vendor Products."
3. NRC Information Notice 89-70, Supplement 1: "Possible Indications of Misrepresented Vendor Products."
4. TFC-BSM-CP_CPR-C-01, "Purchasing Card (P-Card)."
5. TFC-BSM-CP_CPR-C-05, "Procurement of Services."
6. TFC-BSM-CP_CPR-C-06, "Procurement ofltems (Materials)."
7. TFC-BSM-CP_CPR-C-09, "Supply Chain Process."
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 11 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS
8. TFC-BSM-CP_CPR-C-18, "Material Receipt, Storage, Issuance, Return, and Excess Control."
9. TFC-BSM-TQ_MGT-C-01, "Training Equivalencies and Extensions and Educational and Experience Equivalencies."
10. TFC-ESHQ-Q_ADM-C-02, "Nonconforming Item Reporting and Control."
11. TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-01, "Problem Evaluation Request."
12. TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-06, "Trending Analysis Process."
13. TFC-OPS-OPER-C-24, "Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information."
14. TFC-PLN-03, "Engineering Program Management Plan."
15. TFC-PLN-100, "Tank Operations Contractor Requirements Basis Document."
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 12 of 51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST This list was extracted from the U.S. Department of Energy Quarterly Reports on the "Analysis and Trending of Suspect/Counterfeit Items at Department of Energy Facilities," July 1997.
NOTE: It is not necessarily a negative reflection on a supplier or manufacturer if S/Cls are reported regarding its particular product. Reputable manufacturers and suppliers have a vital interest in preventing the manufacture or distribution of S/CI associated with themselves. It may be that the supplier or manufacturer was victimized and is pursuing S/CI associated with its products in an aggressive, prudent, and professional manner in order to get such items off the market. Therefore, each particular case regarding the manufacture or supply of S/CI must be examined on its own merit without making premature conclusions regarding fault or culpability of the manufacturer or supplier whose name is associated with the S/CI. In short, what follows is a "suspect components list" and not a "suspect manufacturer or supplier list." The manufacturer or supplier identified in the following table should not be considered to have engaged in any wrongdoing without additional information.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 13 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A-SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers General Electric Metal clad, low Satin America & Circuit NRC l.N. 89-45, (Component Examples) voltage, DC Breaker Systems Inc. Supplements and Attachments SENS
AKF-2-25 Report ID #6 5/23/89
EC Trip Types, E-C-1, E-C-2A
AK All Types Circuit Breakers General Electric 1, 2, & 3 pole, Bud Ferguson's Industrial NRC l.N. 88-46 (Component Examples) various amperages Control & Supply, Inc., Supplements and Attachments
AK-3A-25 General Circuit Breaker &
KHL-36 125 Electrical Supply
THEF 136050
AK-2-75-3 HLC Electric Supply
AK-2
AK-1-50 NSSS, Inc.
AK-1-75 California Breakers, Inc.
B
TDQ Rosen Electric Equipment
TCVVFS
TFJ PENCON International
TEB122015-WL (DBA) General Magnetics/
TEB 132090-WL Electric Wholesale
TEll 1015
TED134060-WL Lakeland Engineering
TEB124050-WL Equipment Co.
THED136100 WL
TED126050 ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. NRC l.N. 90-46
THED136060 WL (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers
THGB2120 and AC Circuit Breaker Electrical Supply
TEF134015
THEF136M1100 California Breakers
TED 134030-WL
AK2A25
THED-136100-WL
THED-136050-WL Voyter Electric Co. Office of Nuclear
THED-136045-WL Safety 93-5 (# 11)
THFK-236070-WL
TE-122070
THED-136150-WL
THED-13600-WL
TED-113020
TEC-360SO
THED-124015-WL
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 14 of 51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers Westinghouse (Component Examples)
TF136090
TF361050WL
TEDI 130020
Not Provided Commercial Grade Westinghouse NRC I.N. 91-48 Electric Supply Co.
(WESCO)
DB-25 & DS-416 Low Voltage Satin America & Circuit NRC I.N. 89-45 &
Breaker Systems, Inc. Supplement #2
FSN-5925-628-0641 Trip units; Navy General Circuit Breaker & NRC I.N. 88-46, Trip units; 1, 2, & 3 Electrical Supply Supplements and
DB-25 pole various amp. Attachments
DB-50 ratings
HKB3150T HLC Electrical Office Of
FB3020 Supply Nuclear Safety 93-9
FB3070
FB3050 California
EHB3025 Breakers, Inc.
LBB3125
HKA31250 PENCON International
JA3200 (DBA) General
EHB2100 Magnetics/Electric
225N Wholesale
EB 1020 ANTI THEFT Systems,
HDEA 2030 Inc. (DBA) ATS
MCP331100R Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit
MCP431550CR Breaker -
BAB3060H Electrical Supply
656Dl4 8G03
FA-2100 Molded Case
EH-2050 Circuit Breakers
HFB-3050
HFD(B)-3020 NSSS, Inc.
MA3600
F2020 Spectrum, Tech.
EH2100
EB3050
HMC3800F
EA2090 Rosen Electric
FA3125
HMCP 150 Luckow Circuit Breaker
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 15 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers Westinghouse (cont.)
(Component Examples)
HFD
EH2070
FA2050 Shunt Trips Aux. General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46
JA2225 Contacts 2 & 3 Breaker & Electrical Supply Supplements and
JL3Bl25 pole circuit Attachments
JL3B070 breakers of HLC Electrical Supply various amperages
JL3Bl50 PENCON International
JL3B200 (DBA) General Magnetics/
JL3B090 Electric Wholesale
JL3Bl00
HLM3800T ANTI THEFT Systems,
F3100N Inc. (DBA) ATS
MA3500 Circuit Breakers
EH2015 and AC Circuit
FA3035 Breaker -
FA2100 Electrical Supply
HLA21250TM
EH2070
JB3100 Molded Case
EB2030 Circuit Breakers
8MC800 Co. (MCCB)
CAH3200
EHB3040
JL3-Bl50
JL3-B200
JL3-B090
JL3-Bl000
HFA, HFB, FA
JL3-(B)8070
JL3-B125
EH-2020
FA-3035
EH-2050
FA-2100
FA-2050
HFB-3050
JA-2225
HLM3800T
F3100N
MA3500
EH2015
LA3200WL
HLA3200T
2602D58U9
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 16 of 51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers Westinghouse (cont.)
(Component Examples)
HLB3200T
262156G19 NRC 1.N. 88-46 Supp .
IA & IB & Attach.
HL300T
HLA2400TM 225 amp, 3 pole Not Provided
HMA3600T 3 pole, 20 amp 3 pole, 30 amp
HMA3700T 1 pole, 20 & 30 amp
HKA3225T 2 pole, 20 & 30 amp
HNB2700T 3 pole, 60 amp SENS ID#IO
MDL#KAF 3-17-89
QNB3020 SENS ID #11
QNB3030 3-3-89
BA 3 pole; 20 amp Not Provided
BA
BA
E3060 SENS Report ID # 12
F3020 10-19-88 NRC I.N. 88-46 Circuit Breakers ITE (Component Examples)
Model - E43B015 3-phase 480 volt Cal. Breakers/Elect. SENS Report ID #8, Wholesale Supply Co. 5-5-89
EQ-B l pole, 20 amp Not Provided SENS ID #10 3-17-89 3 pole, 30 amp
EE-3B030 SENS ID #11 3-3-89 2 & 3 pole various General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46,
EF3B070 amperages Breaker & Supplements and
EF3H050 Attachments
EF3Bl25 Electrical Supply
EF3B040
E42B020 HLC Electrical Supply
QJ2B200
JL3B400
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 17 of 51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers ITE (cont.)
(Component Examples)
HE9B040 California
EE3B050 Breakers, Inc.
BQ2B030
EE3B070 PEN CON
EE2Bl00 International (DBA)
EE2B050 General Magnetics/
Electric Wholesale
EE2B030
FJ3B225 ATS Circuit
ET Breakers, Inc.
KA
EH-313015 Panel Board
JL-3B070 Specialties
JL-3Bl50
E43B015 Rosen Electric
EF2-B030 Equipment
EH3BJOO
QPIB020
QJ3B200
EF3BJOO
1193 Circuit Breakers ITE, Gould & ITE Imperial Brown Boveri Elect.
(BBE)
ASEA Brown Boveri (Component Examples) Not Provided Brown Boveri NRC I.N. 89-86 ID-4KV ASEA Brown Boveri
Type HK Not Provided NRC I.N. 87-41
5 HK Not Provided
7.5 HK Not Provided Office of
15 HK Nuclear Safety,
38 HK 92-25
ITE 62-6 Circuit Breakers Square "D" Co. Molded Case General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46 Component Examples Breaker & Supp. & Attach.
Electrical Supply NRCB 88-10 HLC Electric Supply NRC I.N. 90-46
KHL 36125 California (Any Type) Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 18 of 51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers Square "D" Co. ANTI THEFT Systems Component Examples Inc. (DBA) ATS (cont.) Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply
QOB220 1 pole, 15 amp Not Provided SENS ID #10 3-17-89
Q0220 2 & 3 pole General Circuit NRC 1.N. 89-45 &
L0-3 20 & 50 amp Breaker & Supplement #2 breakers Electrical Supply
SBW-12
989316 HLC Electric Supply
FAL3650-16M 3 pole - 200 amp California or breaker Breakers, Inc.
30A/600V
FAL36050-16M
KA36200
999330 Not Provided PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale Manufacturer not Stokely Enterprises Not Provided DOE Letter 8-26-91 Provided Reprinted Molded Case NuVEP: Bulletin
EHB3025 Circuit Breakers 7-26-91 Circuit Breakers Fed. Pacific General Circuit (Component Examples) Breaker &
Electrical Supply
NEF431020R 3 pole, 20 amp
NEl 11020 1 pole, 20 amp HLC Electric Supply
NE 1 pole, 15 amp California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International SENS ID. #10 (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric 3-17-89 Wholesale
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 19 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers Fed. Pacific (Component Examples)
(cont.) ANTI THEFT Systems, SENS ID. #11 Inc. (DBA) ATS 3-3-89
NF63-1100 l, & 3 pole - Circuit Breakers
NE22-4060 30, 60 & 100 amp and AC Circuit
NE22-4100 breakers Breaker -
NEF-433030 Electrical Supply
2Pl25 General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46, Breaker & Supp. & Attach.
Electrical Supply HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
Jefferson (Component Not Provided PENCON International NRC I.N. 88-46, Examples) (DBA) General Supp. & Attach.
Magnetics/electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply Mid West Co.
Circuit Breakers Superior (Component Not Provided General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46 Examples) Breaker & Supp.& Attach.
Electrical Supply
246U-3 Rosen Electric HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Suooly
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 20 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Circuit Breakers Manufacturer Not General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46, Provided Breaker& Supp. & Attach.
(Component Examples) Electrical Supply 50DHP250 2 pole - 50 amp HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA)
ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply Circuit Breakers Cutler Hammer (Component Examples)
Heaters
10177Hl3 Not Provided AAKER NRC I.N. 88-46, Supp. & Attach.
General Circuit
10177H21 Breaker &
10177H32 Electrical Supply
10177H036
10177Hl049 HLC Electrical Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 21of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A-SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Switches (Component Examples)
Crouse Hinds Tumbler, ft. op Platt Electric SENS ID#l6
EDSC2129 Supply Co. 1-27-92 Sq. D Type G. Class Gen. Motors, 9012,9025,9016 Electro-Motive Office of Design Nuclear Safety 93-24 &
93-27 Transmitters Rosemount (Component Venetech E.L. Wilmot Examples) letter dated 8-1-91
Model 1151 GP
Model 1151 DP H. Richardson letter HR-81-91 dated 8-15-91 Motors Siemen & Allis General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46, (Component Examples) Breaker & Supplements and Electrical Supply Attachments INP 143 T lOH.P.
215 T HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply Rosen Electric Equipment
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 22 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Relays Potter & Brumfield Not-latching Stokely Enterprises NRC I.N. 90-57 &
(Component Examples) rotary Attach.
Spectronics, Inc.
MDR-138, 173-1 134-1, 142-1 Nutherm International The Martin Co.
Teledyne All qualified to Not Provided DOE-ID Wilmot MIL-R-28776 and letter, 7-16-91 MIL-R-39016 G.E. &Exide Overload & Aux. General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46, Supp.
(Component Examples) Breaker & & Attach.
Electrical Supply
12HGA-11 S52
NX400 HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI TIIEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply Manufacturer not Not Provided Stokely Enterprises DOE Letter 8-26-91 provided Reprinted NuVEP: Bulletin
FSC-5945 7-26-91 Amerace (or Agastat) Electro Amerace SENS ID #1 11-1-91 (Component Examples) Pneumatic Timing Relays Control Components NRC I.N. 92-24 Models: Supply E7024 E7022 A through L PRB Series Model 7032
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 23 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Fuses Bussman Co. 15A-250V & General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46, (Component Examples) 30A-600V Breaker & Supp. & Attach.
Electrical Supply REN 15 & NOS-30 HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply Class IE All Supplied by Preventive NRC I.N. 88-19 PMS Maintenance Systems (PMS)
Controllers Manufacturer Not Motor Stokely DOE letter 8-26-91 Listed Controllers Distributors & & NUVEP Bulletin (Component Examples) Stokely 7-26-91 Enterprises, Inc.
Starters Westinghouse Not Provided General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-45 (Component Examples) Breaker & Supp. & Attach.
Electrical Supply 626B187Gl7 HLC Electric Supply 626B187G13 California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Sunnly Resistors Unknown All Impala Electronics NRC I.N. 91-01
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 24 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Semiconductors Solid State Devices P-Channel MOSFET SSDI DOE Albuquerque Inc. (SSDI) Letter, 06-25-96 SFF 9140 to DOD Inspector General SPD 1511-1-11 Pin Diode (SA3059) 2A14/18 or 2A14/52 Ion Implanted Diode SSR4045CTTXV SCHOTTKY Diodes SFF9140TWX Power Transistors SPMF106ANH Special Pack MOSFET Switch SPD 5818 or Axial Leaded IN5858JTXV SCHOTTKY Diode Transistor 2N797 Diode (SA 3436)
Unknown Starter Controls Westinghouse Not Provided General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-48 (Component Examples) Breaker &
Electrical Supply
A200MICAC HLC Electric Supply
A201KICA California Breakers, Inc.
A201L2CA
AN13A PENCON International (DBA)
General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Suoolv
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 25 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Gauge Glasses Siemen & Allis Not Provided Rosen Electric Co. NRC I.N. 88-46 (Component Examples) Supp. & Attach.
00-737-637-118 215 T Mercury Lamps Spectro Inc. Not Provided General Circuit NRC I.N. 88-46 (Component Examples) Breaker & Electrical Supply V00014 HLC Electric Supply California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Supply Electrical Frames Westinghouse Not Provided General Circuit NRC 1.N. 88-46 (Component Examples) Breaker & Electrical Supply LA2600F HLC Electric Supply LA3600F MA2800F California Breakers, Inc.
PENCON International (DBA) General Magnetics/Electric Wholesale ANTI THEFT Systems, Inc. (DBA) ATS Circuit Breakers and AC Circuit Breaker -
Electrical Suoolv Push button Crouse Hinds Single gang, Platt Electric SENS Report ID # 16 station (Component Examples) pushbutton Supply Co. 1-27-92
00-737-637-118
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 26 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Overload Relay Square D (Component Not Provided Not Provided NRC I.N. 88-46 Thermal Unit Examples)
Bl9.5, B22 Piping, Fittings Tube-line Corp. Subassemblies, Tube-line NRC IEB 83-06 Flanges, and Ray Miller, Inc. fittings, flanges, & NRC I.N. 89-18 Components other components Ray Miller, Inc. NRC IEB 83-07 NRC I.N. 83-01 (Carbon and Stainless Steel components)
Piping, Fittings, Piping Supplies, Inc. Carbon and Piping Supplies, NRC Bulletin 88-05 Flanges, and & West Jersey Mfg. & Stainless Steel Inc. & West Jersey & Supplements Components Chews Landing Metal Fittings and Mfg. & Chews Mfa. Flanges Landing Metal Mfg.
Valves VOGT Full port design CMA International NRC I.N. 88-48 &
2-inch Model IMA Valve Supplements SW-13111 & 1023 Refurbisher Crane 4"-1500psi, Southern Cal. Valve NRC I.N. 91-09 pressure sealed Maintenance co.,
Amesse Welding Service & CMA Int.
ITT Grinnell Diaphragm valves ITT Grinnell Valve NRCComp.
Valve Co., Inc Co. Inc. Div. of Bulletin 87-02 Diaflo & ITT Engineered Valves Crane, Pacific, Powell, Gate Valves Coffeyville Valve NRC I.N. 92-56 Walworth& Inc.
Lunkenheimer Pacific 8" & 3" Globe CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48, Valve Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
Crane Chapman 24" Check Valve CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48, Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
Pacific Check Valve CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48, Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 27 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Valves Kero test 8" Valve CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48 Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
Pacific 4" Gate Valve CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48 Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
Lukenheimer 6" Model 1542 CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48 20" Model 3013 Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
Crane All CMA & IMA Valve NRC I.N. 88-48 Refurbisher Supp. & Attach.
Flanges China Ding Zinang Flanges, ASTM Billiongold Co. NRC I.N. 92-68 Nan Al05, ASME SA105 LTD. and Attachments Xi Li Flange Co. Tain Gong Co.
Shou Gang Mach. Eng. Sanxi Province Office of Co. Overseas Nuclear Safety Trading Corp 92-25, 93-23, and 92-35 National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) Bulletin:
Special Report, 1992, Volume 48, Number 2, The Chinese Flange Investigation Valve Masoneilian-Dresser Plug stem, stem to Cor-Val, Control NRC I.N. 88-97 Replacement Industries plug anti-rotation Valve Specialists, Supp. & Attach.
Parts pin, seat ring, valve H.H. Barnum & M.D.
plugs, bushings, Norwood, Sample Webtrol cages & packing box Controls, Inc.
components Pumps& Hayward Tyler Pump HTPCASME Hayward Tyler Pump Co. IEB 83-05 &
Replacement Co. Nuclear Code Attachments Parts Channel Unistrut Corporation Continuously slotted Unistrut Corporation NRC l.N. 91-25 Members channels, structural framing members, fasteners, nuts, fittings, pipe clamps Fire Barriers Thermal Science Inc. Thermo-Log 330 None Listed ES&Q Update #8 NRC l.N. 92-55 Valve Actuator Limitorque Eyebolts on housing None Listed Office ofNuclear cover Safety 93-25 NRC I.N. 93-37
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 28 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A- SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Steel Alloy & Carbon Steel Plate Meredith NRC I.N. 89-56, Co. Inc., Atlantic Steel Angle Corporation Attachments and Co., Levingston Steel Flat Bar Pressure Vessel Supplements Co., & Copperweld Bar Nuclear Alloy &
Steel co. Carbon Steel Co., Inc.
Fasteners (Bolts, (parentheses designated
Those with Note: Listed suppliers may Commercial Screws, Nuts, headmark) suppliers or also be manufacturers Carrier Journal and Washers) manufacturers Articles for:
Asahi (A) Lawrence Engineering & 6/88, 1/90, 2/90, 3190, Daiichi (D)
Those that are Supply Co. 4/90, 6190, 7/90, 12/90 Daiei (E) improperly Metal Building Bolts Fastener Co. of Japan marked Nichimin Corporation INEL Suspect (FM) UNI CO Headmark List Hinomoto Metal (H)
Those of foreign Ace Corporation Jin Her (J) manufacture that E. K. Fasteners, Inc. SENS Report #5 Kyowa(K) do not meet H. Y. Port Fasteners Co. 2/6/91 Kosaka Kogyo (KS) Public Law IOI- Kobayashi Metals, LTD.
Kyoei 592. Fastener Takai Screw Mfg. Co. LTD. SENS Report#13 Minamida Seiybo (M) Quality Act Yamaguchi Sesakusho Co. 2/6/91 Mnato Kogyo (MS) LTD.
Nippon (NF) Highland Bolt & Nut HR 3000, U.S. House Takai (RT) Porteous Fastener Co. of Representatives, Tsukimori (S) Northwest Fasteners July 1988 Unytte (UNY) Ziegler Bolts & Parts Co.
Yamadai (Y) Edgewater Fasteners, Inc. J. A. Jones, Ltr, lvaco, Infasco (hollow Reynolds Fasteners 9/23/92 triangled) A & G Engineering Memo from L.
Kubicek, 3/28/91 Memo from D. Sanow, 3/8/91 "Fastener Technology International," Feb.,
April, and June 1993 Rep. J. Dingell Ltrto Comm.
Dept. &NRC June 18, 1993 Office of Nuclear Safety 93-26, 93-22, 93-11 DOE Quality Alert, Bulletin, Issue No. 92-4, August 1992 FDH Hanford Suspect Headmark List
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 29 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT A-SUSPECT COMPONENTS LIST (cont.)
Component Manufacturer/Type Description Supplier References Fasteners (Bolts, NUCOR 1-114" x 2" Zinc Cordova Bolt, Inc. SENS ID #13 11-6/91 Screws, Nuts, Chromate plated and Washers) surface Hexhead cap screws Any Any Aircom NRC Compliance Barnett Bolt Works Bulletin 87-02 Bolts & Nuts, Inc. NRC I.N. 89-59 Glasser & Assoc.
Knoxville Bolt & Screw Metal Fastener Supply Phoell Mfg. Co.
Service Supply Co.
Southeastern Bolt & Screw Sure Loe Victory Bolt
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 30 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT B - CLASSIFICATION OF POTENTIALLY SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS Consider information on square D breakers from Square D Website and DOE Bulletins.
A. ELECTRICAL ITEMS
Molded Case Circuit Breakers
Motor Control Centers Complete Units Components Starters Starting coils Contactors Overload relays Starter control relays Overload heaters
Protective/control relays
DC power supplies/chargers
AC inverters
Current/potential transformers
Exciters/regulators
Bus transfers/auto bus transfers
Motor generator sets
Generators
Rewindable motors
Printed circuit boards
Bulk commodity items Fuses Splices Electrical connectors
Indicators/controllers
Panel lights/switches
Transmitters/instrument switches
Isolation devices .
The following items are excluded unless required by the applicable program/project: 600V or less: motors; outlets, switches, and plugs; boxes, conduit (i.e., bodies and covers, nipples, fittings, EMT, flex, liquid tight, rigid); wire; miscellaneous wire connections #10 and below; fixtures; lights.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 31of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT B - CLASSIFICATION OF POTENTIALLY SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS (cont.)
B. MECHANICAL ITEMS
Welding materials Rod Wire Flux
Structural members (pipe supports)
Channel members (UNISTRUT or B-Line)
Slotted Channels Structural framing members Fasteners Fittings Pipe clamps Spring nuts
Sheet
Plate
Bars
Round stock
Other raw material which requires an ASTM or national standard
All lifting/rigging gear (wire rope shall be made in the United States by a member of the Wire Rope Technical Board (WRTB) or the Associated Wire Rope Fabricators (A WRF) (except stainless steel, and unless recommended otherwise by a crane or hoist manufacturer); stainless steel wire rope shall be made in the United States and shall be 302 or 304 grade stainless steel unless otherwise recommended by a crane or hoist manufacturer)
Ratchet tie-downs/strapping devices and come-a-longs, with fasteners.
The following materials are excluded unless required by the applicable program/project:
ASTM-A36, brass, copper, sheet metal 7 GA or less, and aluminum.
C. PIPING - which requires an ASTM or ASME standard
Fittings
Flanges
Valves
Pipe
Components.
The following materials are excluded unless required by the applicable program/project:
ASTM-A-53, Swagelock; cast iron, galvanized, copper, bronze, and brass; PVC; and gaskets.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 32 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT B - CLASSIFICATION OF POTENTIALLY SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS (cont.)
D. FASTENERS - All fasteners 1/4" and above in diameter
Bolts
Studs
Cap screws
High-strength washers
Nuts
Anchors.
Attachment H identifies headmarkings for stainless steel and carbon steel high strength fasteners that are considered counterfeit. Fasteners exhibiting these headmarks are counterfeit and no further testing is required.
The following items are excluded, unless required by the applicable program/project:
sheetmetal screws, wood screws, stove bolts, pan heads, machine screws, lag bolts, threaded rod, rivets, and carriage bolts.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 33 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT C- SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS INFORMATION SOURCE LIST A wide variety of industry and Government sources publish information relative to suspect/counterfeit products. The following sources provide information which is available on a continuing basis:
Industrial Fasteners Institute (IFI)
The following information is available from IFI via subscription:
"Fastener Application Advisory" (Published Monthly)
"North American Manufacturers Identification Markings for Fasteners"
Fastener-related video cassettes.
The National Board of Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI)
The NBBI publishes "National Board Bulletins" to alert manufacturers and users of misrepresented products as they are discovered.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
The NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation issued a "Suspect Bolt List" in late 1990 identifying numerous fasteners, which they determined to be misrepresented.
Trade Journals and Magazines There are numerous trade-oriented magazines which have carried articles identifying incidents of failure of substandard parts in industry applications which have caused personal injury and death, as well as serious property damage.
Newspaper and Television Reports Another good source of information is news reports, which provide current accounts of problems encountered as a result of misrepresented products.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
The NRC issues bulletins, notices, and regulatory guidance on a continuing basis to alert nuclear power utilities of potential intrusion of misrepresented products into the operations environment of operating nuclear power plants.
U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and U.S. Department of Commerce publications are also monitored by the DOE to assure that the deficiencies identified do not contaminate DOE facilities.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 34 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT C- SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS INFORMATION SOURCE LIST (cont.)
Government Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
The mission of this program, established by the Office of Management and Budget, is to support government systems readiness, logistics effectiveness, productivity, and cost reduction through timely retrieval, storage, and distribution of data among government and industry organizations.
U.S. Department of Energy The following documents are issued by the DOE to provide information and guidance relative to the suspect/counterfeit parts issue:
DOE Orders
Letters of Direction
Bulletins and Quality Alerts (In addition, the DOE periodically sponsors seminars/workshops relative to the detection and control of suspect/counterfeit parts).
U.S. Customs Service The U.S. Customs Service has published the Suspect Headmark List (Attachment H) identifying graded fasteners determined to be of indeterminate quality, which has been adopted by DOE and, ultimately, Project Hanford, as a formal guide for use when evaluating currently installed and newly procured graded fasteners to assure their fitness for use on the Hanford Site.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 35 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT D - CHARACTERISTICS THAT MAY MAKE PRODUCTS VULNERABLE TO MISREPRESENTATION, FRAUDULENT PRACTICES, AND COUNTERFEITING The following information has been extracted from the NRC Information Notice 89-70, Supplement l, :
High-turnover usage rate.
No easy or practical way to uniquely mark the component itself.
Critical characteristics, including environmental qualification not easily discernible in external visual inspection, or characteristics that are difficult to verify through receipt testing.
May be widely used in non-critical and critical applications.
Use may not result in used appearance.
Often marketed through a supplier and dropped shipped from locations other than that of the original supplier.
Special processes for ASME materials may be subcontracted (heat treating, testing, and inspections).
Easily copied by secondary market suppliers.
Viable salvage market.
Reduced number of original equipment manufacturers.
Obsolete or hard-to-get components.
Components manufactured by a company that is no longer in business.
Items with documentation from a plant where construction has been suspended, canceled, or deferred.
Moderate or low cost.
High potential for profit (rejected heats of material are purchased and decertified).
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 36 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT E - WHERE TO LOOK FOR SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT ITEMS The following areas should receive increased scrutiny to assure that suspect/counterfeit items are not evident:
Items in Supply
Company supply stock
Wagon stock
Other sources of supply contamination.
Items in Use
Plant facilities, components, and systems
Equipment
Operations and maintenance.
Items Being Procured
"Known" critical items
Critical equipment and assemblies
Non-critical "known" purchases.
Operations Decisions
Major disaster risks
Personnel safety risks
Program/mission risks (cost and schedule).
Cost of Implementation
Potential consequential costs
Management risk assessment
Cost of focusing established controls
Impact on schedule and program mission.
Cost of Focus on Known Suspect/Counterfeit Parts
Uses existing procurement program
Focuses on "known parts first"
Reduction in major disaster potential
Program costs low/benefits high.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 37 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT F - SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS DETECTION It is very important to remember that just because an item is identified as being "suspect/counterfeit" it may not be appropriate to simply reject it. A review should be performed prior to formal disposition of the item to assure that it is indeed unfit for the intended application.
DETECTION METHODS Visual Inspection Items may be substandard or fraudulent when:
Nameplates, labels, or tags have been altered, photocopied, painted over, are not secured well, show incomplete data, or are missing (e.g., preprinted labels normally show typed entries).
Obvious attempts at beautification have been made, e.g., excess painting or wire brushing, evidence of hand painting (touch-up), or stainless steel is painted.
Handmade parts are evident, gaskets are rough cut, shims and thin metal part edges show evidence of cutting or dressing by hand tools (filing, hacksaw marking, use of tin snips or nippers).
Hand tool marks on fasteners or other assembly parts (upset metal exists on screw or bolt heads) or dissimilar parts are evident (e.g., seven or eight bolts are of the same material and one is a different material).
Poor fit between assembled items.
Configuration is not consistent with other items from the same supplier or varies from that indicated in supplier literature or drawings.
Unusual box or packing of component or item.
The supplier is not a factory-authorized distributor.
Dimensions of the item are inconsistent with the specifications requested on the purchase order and/or those provided by the supplier at the time of shipment.
The item or component matches the description of one that is on a suspect items list (e.g., U.S.
Customs Service "Suspect Headmark List," National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors (NBBI) "Special Bulletin," etc.).
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 38 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT F - SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS DETECTION (cont.)
Documentation Documents may be suspect/counterfeit when:
The use of correction fluid or correction tape is evident. Type or pitch change is evident.
The document is not signed or initialed when required, is excessively faded or unclear (indicating multiple, sequential copying), or data are missing.
The name or title of the document approved cannot be determined.
Technical data is inconsistent (e.g., chemical analysis indicates one material and physical tests indicate another).
Certification or test results are identical between items when normal variations should be expected.
Document traceability is not clear. The document should be traceable to the item(s).
Technical data are not consistent with code or standard requirements (e.g., no impact test results provided when impact testing is required or CMTRS physical test data indicate no heat treatment and heat treatment is required).
Documentation is not delivered as required on the purchase order or is in an unusual format.
Lines on forms are bent, broken, or interrupted indicating data has been deleted or exchanged (cut and paste).
Handwritten entries of data are on the same document where typed or preprinted data exists.
Data on a single line located at different heights indicate the possibility of retyping.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 39 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT F-SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS DETECTION (cont.)
Fasteners
Headmarkings are marred, missing, or appear to have been altered.
Threads show evidence of dressing or wear (threads should be of uniform color and finish).
Headmarkings are inconsistent with a heat lot.
Headmarkings matching one of those identified on the U.S. Customs Service, "Suspect Headmark List" (Attachment H).
Headmarkings which depict both raised and hand-stamped markings, such as those described in WHC Quality Assurance Bulletin# 94-01, "Discrepant Dual Head Stamped Stainless Steel Bolts." This bulletin documents the results of internal inspections and independent testing of stainless steel bolts purchased to ASTM A 193, Grade BS, which were found to be substandard.
Only manufacturers listed on the "Suspect Fastener Headmark List" (Attachment H) are known to produce substandard graded fasteners. If graded fasteners are discovered which exhibit headmarks matching those on the Suspect/Fastener Headmark List, they shall be considered to be defective without further testing, unless traceable manufacturer's certifications are received which provide documented evidence that the fasteners were not produced by the manufacturer listed on the Suspect Fastener Headmark List.
Interpretation ofheadmark/manufacturers listed on the "Suspect Fastener Headmark List," including newly discovered variations thereto, shall only be provided by the designated S/CI coordinator based on guidance received from the DOE.
Electrical Devices
Connections show evidence of previous attachment (metal upset or marring).
Connections show arcing or discoloration.
Fasteners are loose, missing, or show metal upset.
Molded case circuit breakers are consistent with manufacturer-provided checklists for detecting substandard/fraudulent breakers.
Missing or photocopied Underwriters Laboratories (UL) labels on products requiring such.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 40 ofSl CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT F - SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS DETECTION (cont.)
Rotating Machinery and Valve Internal Parts
Shows marring, tool impressions, wear marks, traces of Prussian blue or lapping compound, or other evidence of previous attempts at fit up or assembly.
Heat discoloration is evident.
Evidence of erosion, corrosion, wire-drawing or "dimples" (inverted cone-shaped impressions) on valve discs, seats, or pump impellers.
Valves
Paint Valve appears to be freshly painted and valve stem has paint on it Wear marks on any painted surface Valve stem is protected, but protection has paint on it Paint does not match standard Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) color.
Valve Tags Tags attached with screws instead of rivets Tags attached in a different location than normal Tags appear to be worn or old Tags with paint on them Tags that look newer than the valve Tags with no part numbers Tags with irregular stamping.
Hand Wheels Old looking hand wheels on new looking valves Hand wheels that look sand blasted or newer than the valve Different types of hand wheels on valves of the same manufacturer.
Bolts and Nuts Bolts and nuts have a used appearance (excessive wrench marks on flats)
Improper bolt/nut material (e.g., a bronze nut on a stainless stem).
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 41 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT F - SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PARTS DETECTION (cont.)
Valve Body Ground off casting marks with other markings stamped in the area (OEM markings are nearly always raised, not stamped)
Signs of weld repairs Incorrect dimensions Freshly sand-blasted appearance, including eye bolts, grease fittings, stem, etc.
Evidence of previous bolt head scoring on backsides of flanges, or evidence that this area has been ground to remove such marks On a stainless valve, a finish that is unusually shiny indicates bead-blasting. A finish that is unusually dull indicates sand-blasting. The finish on a new valve is in-between.
Manufacturer's Logo
Missing.
Logo plate looks newer than the valve.
Logo plate shows signs of discoloration from previous use.
Other
Foreign material inside the valve (e.g., metal shavings).
Valve stem packing that shows all the adjustments have been run out.
In gate valves, a gate that is off-center when checked through the open end of the valve.
Obvious differences between valves in the same shipment.
Price
Price is significantly less than that of the competition.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 42 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT G- FASTENERS 1.0 Counterfeit/Substandard High-Strength Bolts 1.1 General Background Counterfeit bolts have been found in military and commercial aircraft, surface ships, submarines, nuclear weapon production facilities, bridges, buildings, and the space shuttle. These bolts often do not possess the capabilities of the genuine bolts they counterfeit and can threaten the reliability of industrial and consumer products, National Security, or lives. At Congressional hearings in 1987, the Army testified that they had purchased bolts that bore the headmarks of Grade 8 high-strength bolts, but that were actually inferior Grade 8.2 bolts.
The International Fasteners Institute (IFI) reported finding substandard, mis-marked, and/or counterfeit high-strength Grade 8 bolts in the United States commercial marketplace. In 1988, IFI reported that counterfeit medium- strength Grade 5 bolts had also been found.
Foreign bolts dominate the American marketplace due to their price advantage, and the majority of suspect/counterfeit bolts are imported. Identifying, testing, and replacing these bolts has proven expensive and difficult, both mechanically and technically. Not finding and replacing these bolts, however, has proven fatal in some instances.
1.2 Headmarks Attachment I may be removed and photocopied, as needed, for use as a poster and reference to known suspect fastener headmarks. Bolts with the headmarkings shown have a significant likelihood of being found to be inferior to standards. Generally, the cost of replacement of these bolts is less than the cost of chemical, hardness, and tensile strength testing. Note also that counterfeit bolts can be delivered with counterfeit certificates. Documentation alone is insufficient to demonstrate compliance with standards.
1.3 Consensus Standards There are several consensus organizations that have published standards for the properties of fasteners. One of these is the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE).
The SAE grade (or alleged grade on a suspect item) of a bolt is indicated by raised or indented radial lines on the bolt's head, as shown in Attachment I. These markings are called headmarks. DOE is currently concerned with two different grades of fasteners:
one has three equally spaced radial lines on the head of a bolt which indicate that it should meet the specifications for a Grade 5 bolt; the other has six equally spaced radial lines which indicate a Grade 8 bolt. Letters or symbols on the head of a bolt indicate the manufacturer.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 43 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT G-FASTENERS (cont.)
Attachment I is a Suspect/Counterfeit Headmark List that was prepared by the United States Customs Service after extensive testing of many samples of bolts from around the nation. Any bolts anywhere in the DOE community that are currently in stock, in bins, or installed that are on the Customs Headmark List should be considered suspect/
counterfeit. The headmarks on this list are those of manufacturers that have often been found to have sold bolts that did not meet the indicated consensus standards. Sufficient testing has been done on the bolts on this list to presume them defective without further testing.
1.4 Precautions
Selective Testing Some facilities (manufacturers, distributors, etc.) perform selective testing of sample bolts rather than have an independent testing laboratory run all the tests required by consensus standards. In many cases, a new counterfeit bolt has roughly the same physical strength as the graded bolt it mimics, but does not have either the chemical composition or the heat treatment specified by the consensus standards. As a result, it will stretch, exhibit metal fatigue, or corrode under less harsh service than the genuine bolt. Simple tensile strength tests cannot be used to identify substandard high-strength fasteners and should not be solely relied upon in performing acceptance test.
1.5 Using Suspect/Counterfeit Grade 5 Bolts in Grade 2 Applications Some sites use suspect/counterfeit Grade 5 bolts in applications that only call for Grade 2 bolts. Eventually, the suspect/counterfeit Grade 5 bolts may find its way into an application that requires a genuine Grade 5 bolt and that application may fail. In some cases, cheap imported graded bolts have been purchased in place of upgraded bolts because the small price differential made the extra quality seem to be a bargain. Given the expense of removing suspect bolts from DOE facilities, the practice of using suspect bolts for any application should be discontinued.
1.6 Keep Bolts in Original Packages All bolts purchased should be kept in the original packages, not emptied into bins. The packages should have labels or other markings that would permit them to be associated with a particular procurement action and a specific vendor. Approved supplier lists should be checked to assure that fastener suppliers on that list have been recently qualified/audited for adequacy of their quality programs.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 44 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT G- FASTENERS (cont.)
2.0 Stainless Steel fasteners 2.1 Purpose To provide follow-up information to the previous notification sent to the DOE field and contractor organizations in late 1996.
2.2 Background In November 1993, the Industrial Fastener Institute (IFI) issued a Fastener Advisory regarding 1S-S stainless steel bolts. The advisory warned about a "bait and switch" tactic in which a distributor takes an l S-S bolt (indicated by two radial lines 90 degrees apart), but no manufacturer's marking, and sells them as ASTM A320 Grade BS bolts after hand-stamping BS on to the heads.
As a result of this IFI Advisory, DOE sites conducted a search of facility stores for stainless steel fasteners with hand-stamped BS grade marks. Hundreds of stainless steel bolts with hand-stamped BS grade markings, along with a variety of other raised and depressed head and manufacturer's markings were identified in facility stores throughout the DOE complex.
For example, an inspection of shop stock at a Hanford Site facility revealed bolts with three different raised grade markings, 1S-S, 304, and F593C, along with raised manufacturer's identifications of CK, H, HP, C, SO, CS, PMC, TH, THE, and a STAR.
The majority of the remaining samples found at Hanford exhibited raised grade markings of l S-S and 304, with a BS grade marking and manufacturer's identification hand-stamped into the head of the bolt.
Finally, a few samples did not display any manufacturer's markings. Most of the bolts discovered were purchased with the specification to meet a national consensus standard, American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) A 193, BS Class 1 rather than the ASTM A320 standard discussed in the IFI warning.
The Savannah River Site also conducted a site-wide search of facility stores with similar results. A total of 159 stainless steel fasteners with hand-stamped BS grade marks and raised or hand-stamped manufacturer's symbols were found. Fifteen stainless steel fasteners that had no manufacturer's symbol were also found.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 45 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT G- FASTENERS (cont.)
2.3 Issue The requirements of the ASTM A 193 standard regarding fastener marking and certification are very similar to those required by the ASTM A320 standard discussed in the IFI advisory. The ASTM Al93 standard requires that grade and manufacturer's identification symbols be applied to the heads of bolts that are larger than 114" in diameter. The standard, however, does not specifically differentiate between raised and depressed headmarkings, but by reference to ASTM A962 states only that "for the purposes of identification marking, the manufacturer is considered the organization that certifies the fastener was manufactured, sampled, tested, and inspected in accordance with this specification." In other words, the standard allows for some of the required markings to be formed into the head of the bolt (either raised or lowered) during manufacturing, and the rest to be applied later on via hand-stamping.
Since ASTM A 193 does not differentiate between raised and depressed markings, these fasteners can be counterfeited in the same way as the ASTM A320 fasteners discussed in the November 1993 IFI warning. For example, distributors can procure 18-8 stainless steel bolts that were manufactured by an anonymous party, and without conducting the necessary upgrading process or certification testing, a second party could hand-stamp B8 and a manufacturer's marking into the heads to indicate that the fasteners exhibit the mechanical and chemical properties required of ASTM Al 93Grade B8 Class 1.
Unless the certification documentation is specifically requested, and in most cases it is not, there is no way to determine by visual inspection whether these fasteners were properly certified and tested to meet the requirements of the ASTM standard.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 46 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT H - DOE HEADMARK LIST
~&t.11r<~~;1j};~~;,1?w.~viBe.lp,.Stamp Out Suspects/Counterfeits Examples of stainless ateel faatanara that have bean upgraded from 1&-8 to ASTM A320 or ASTM A 193 Grade 88 after hand stamping. The lut lhraa exampl*
h- aamplaa Of fasteners to indicate conformance to two non-compatible standards, ASTM A193 and ASTM F 693C.
Any bolt on lhi* Hat ahould be treated a* defective without further testing and proceaa in accordance with HNF-PR0-301. Note: Thia list was origlnally Publlahed by DOE IEH-0196, laaue No. 9NI If any of theae fasteners are localed, contact your faclllty SICI Point of Contact (POC) for lnatructiona. The POC Hat I* on the Hanford Intranet el: http://doca.rl.gov/han.lnfol hlanacl/hlanecl.doc. Scroll to the end of the document for the Hal.
A
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ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 47 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT H - DOE HEADMARK LIST (cont.)
SUSPECT/COUNTERFEIT PART HEADMARK UST:
A Resource Aid for Identifying Legacy Fasteners ALL GRADE 5.1\ND GRADE B FASTENERS WHICH 00 NOT BEAR ANY MANUFACTURERS HEADMARKS 0 Gradec5 0 GradeB GRADE 5 FASTENERS WITH THE FOLLOWING MANUFACTURERS' HEAOMARKS:
0 ~K G M4~K GRADE 8 FASTENERS WITH THE FOLLOWING MANUFACTURERS' HEAOMAAKS:
e MA.RI< M6.RK 0 A KS e NF e RT 0 H e FM e M e KY e MS 0 J 0 Hollow Trlang!E (CA TW JP YU) (Greater tharr1/2 inch dia}
0 E e UNY GRADE 8.2 FASTENERS WITH THE FOLLOWING HEADMARKS:
MARK KS GRADE A325 FASTENERS Wffii THE FOLLOWING HEADMARKS:
Type1 Type2 Type3@
Headmarkings are ~ raised - S001elimes indl!l!lted.
Reference:
Th.is tool was derived from the U.S. Cus!Dms Service. Daled: 1992
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 48 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT I - REFURBISHED MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS Investigations thus far of electrical components at DOE facilities uncovered over 700 suspect/
counterfeit molded-case circuit breakers that were previously used, refurbished and sold to DOE contractors.
1. Recognition Factors The following factors should be recognized regarding suspect or refurbished circuit breakers:
A. The quality and safety of refurbished molded-case circuit breakers is questionable since they are not designed to be taken apart and serviced or refurbished. There are no electrical standards established by Underwriters Laboratory (UL) for the refurbishing of molded-case electrical circuit breakers, nor are there any "authorized" refurbishes of molded case circuit breakers. Therefore, "refurbished" molded-case circuit breakers should not be accepted for use in any DOE facility.
B. One source of refurbished molded-case circuit breakers is from the demolition of old buildings. Some refurbishes are junk dealers who may change the amperage labels on the circuit breakers to conform to the amperage ordered and then merely clean and shine the breakers.
This situation was brought to DOE's attention by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which, in turn, had been informed of the practice by the company that manufactures circuit breakers. In early 1988, a sales representative identified "refurbished" circuit breakers at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. A subsequent investigation confirmed that circuit breakers sold to the power plant as new equipment were actually refurbished. The managers of the two firms that refurbished and sold these breakers have been convicted of fraud and have paid a substantial fine.
C. NRC published information Notice No. 88-46 dated July 8, 1988, on the investigation findings and circulated it to all applicable government agencies, including DOE. On July 20, 1988, DOE notified all field offices that refurbished circuit breakers may have been installed in critical systems. Shortly thereafter, DOE established the Suspect Equipment Notification System (SENS), a sub-module of ES&H Events and News on the Safety Performance Measurement System (SPMS). SENS has since been replaced by the Supplier Evaluation and Suspect Equipment (SESE) sub-module which includes Suspect Equipment Reports.
D. Some of DOE's older sites have circuit breakers in use that are no longer manufactured.
According to the Nuclear Management and Resources Council (NUMARC), examples of such breakers are Westinghouse breakers with frames E, EA, F, and FA. If a DOE contractor has an electrical box that requires a breaker with one of these frame sizes, that contractor would not have been able to purchase it from Westinghouse for several years. If the contractor were to order a replacement breaker from an authorized Westinghouse dealer, the dealer could not get a new replacement breaker from the manufacturer. To fill the order, the dealer had to turn to the secondary or refurbished market.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 49 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT I- REFURBISHED MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (cont.)
Dealing with an authorized distributor does not preclude ending up with refurbished circuit breakers. Westinghouse has announced that it is considering satisfying this market by manufacturing circuit breakers that will fit in these applications.
The solution, as recommended by NUMARC, is not to focus on the credentials of the distributor but on the traceability of the circuit breaker itself. A purchaser can be assured of having a new circuit breaker only if the breaker can be traced back to the original manufacturer.
2. Indicators of Refurbished Breakers Typically, refurbished circuit breakers sold as new equipment have one or more of the following characteristics:
The style of breaker is no longer manufactured.
The breakers may have come in cheap, generic-type packaging instead of in the manufacturer's original boxes.
Refurbished circuit breakers are often bulk-packaged in plastic bags, brown paper bags, or cardboard boxes with handwritten labels. New circuit breakers are packed individually in boxes that are labeled with the manufacturer's name, which is usually in two or more colors, and are often date stamped.
The original manufacturer's labels and/or the Underwriter's Laboratory (UL) or Factory Mutual (FM) labels may have been counterfeited or removed from the breaker. Refurbishing operations have been known to use copying machines to produce poor quality copies of the original manufacturer's and the certifying body's labels.
Breakers may be labeled with the refurbisher's name rather than the label of a known manufacturer.
The manufacturer's seal (often multicolored) across the two halves of the case of the breaker is broken or missing.
Wire lugs (connectors) show evidence of tampering.
The surface of the circuit breaker may be nicked or scratched yet have a high gloss.
Refurbishers often coat breakers with clear plastic to produce a high gloss that gives the casual observer the impression that the breaker is new. The plastic cases of new circuit breakers often have a dull appearance.
Some rivets may have been removed and the case may be held together by wood screws, metal screws, or nuts and bolts.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 50 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT I - REFURBISHED MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (cont.)
Contradictory amperage ratings may appear on different parts of the same refurbished breaker.
On a new breaker, the amperage rating is stamped into, raised from, or machine-painted on the handle of the circuit breaker. In order to supply a breaker with a hard-to-find rating, refurbishers have been known to file down the surface of the handle to remove the original rating and hand-paint the desired amperage rating.
3. Testing In a news release dated February 6, 1989, the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) announced the cancellation of its Publication AB-2-1984 entitled, "Procedures for Field Inspection and Performance Verification of Molded-Case Circuit Breakers used in Commercial and Industrial Applications," and stated the following:
"These procedures were intended for use with breakers that had been originally tested and calibrated in accordance with NEMA Standards Publication AB 1 or Underwriters Laboratories Standard UL 489, and not subsequently opened, cleaned or modified ... Therefore, the Standards Publication contained none of the destructive test procedures ... necessary to verify the product's ability to withstand such conditions as full voltage overload or short circuit. Without such tests, even if a rebuilt breaker had passed the tests specified in AB-2, there would be no assurance that it would not fail under overload or short circuit conditions. It is NEMA's position that regardless of the results of electrical testing, refurbished electrical circuit breakers are not reliable and should not be used."
4. Precautions Follow these precautions regarding suspect or refurbished circuit breakers.
A. Require that molded-case breakers be new and unaltered. Proof that they are new and unaltered requires the vendor to show traceability back to the original manufacturer.
B. Do not rely completely on dealing with authorized dealers for protection from purchasing refurbished molded-case circuit breakers.
C. Approve formal procedures for inspecting circuit breakers that are received and installed according to the indicators of refurbished breakers listed above.
D. Contact the original manufacturer if any indication of misrepresentation is encountered.
There are many original manufacturers of molded-case circuit breakers whose products are being refurbished and sold as new. These manufacturers have the most specific information about how to ensure that their products have not been refurbished.
ESHQ Document TFC-ESHQ-Q_C-C-03, REV C-11 Page 51 of51 CONTROL OF SUSPECT/ Issue Date April 23, 2014 COUNTERFEIT ITEMS ATTACHMENT I- REFURBISHED MOLDED CASE CIRCUIT BREAKERS (cont.)
5. Disposition A. Segregate and retain all circuit breakers found with indications that they may be refurbished. These will be retained as potential evidence until specifically released by the Office oflnspector General and the Office of Nuclear Safety for Price Anderson Enforcement. Circuit breakers that may be refurbished may only be disposed of when the above organizations no longer need them as evidence.
B. Report suspect electrical components to Occurrence Reporting and Processing System (ORPS). The ORPS categorization group should be identified as "Cross-Category items, Potential Concerns or issues." The description of cause section in the ORPS report should include the text "suspect counterfeit parts."
C. Witness and document the destruction of all suspect/counterfeit circuit breakers when approval is given for disposal.
Petition to President Obama, Vice President Biden. Speaker Boehner and Members of Congress to Create an Independent Commission to Investigate the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
WHEREAS we the people of the United States and beyond have an obligation to ourselves and to future generations to uphold the democratic process and to challenge federal policies when they endanger us and our fellow citizens; and WHEREAS current NRC plans call for the construction of at least fifty more nuclear plants in order to reduce our nation's dependency on foreign oil: and WHEREAS the NRC and the Government Accounting Office have found that more than 70 existing US nuclear plants con-tain counterfeit and substandard defective parts: and WHEREAS recent NRC rules streamline the nuclear plant licensing and re-licensing process by limiting public participation, lowering safety inspection and quality assurance standards applicable to nuclear components in existing and new facilities to reduce constmction costs: and WHEREAS nuclear power plants and their surrounding communities do not have adequate emergency evacuation plans to protect people who would be at risk when a nuclear accident occurs.
WHEREAS recent experience has shown our governments' inability to respond to short and long term needs of our citizens whose lives arc disrupted by unforeseen disasters: and WHEREAS current emergency plans propose that senior citizens and other special needs persons who cannot immediately evacu-ate be lcn behind in the event of a nuclear accident be given potassium iodide which only protects the thyroid against radioactive iodine, leaving them susceptible to contamination by other dangerous radioactive products released during an accident or act of sabotage: and such plans assume these valuable members of our communities are expendable. a discriminatory policy which vio-lates their civil rights: and WHEREAS building more nuclear power plants will result in increased amounts of hazardous radioactive nuclear wastes for which there is no SAFE storage available for the foreseeable future and if not properly transported, stored or disposed of will be potentially dangerous to many future generations: and WHEREAS the NRC is the federal agency primarily responsible for regulating the nuclear power industry consistent with public safety. health and welfare: and WHEREAS the NRC Office of the Inspector General has released a report titled "NRC Failure to Adequately Regulate" confirming the agency falls short in its efforts to regulate the nuclear industry in a manner that assures public safety ; and WHEREAS the NRC has previously mterfered with efforts of its employees and other _unu.:;rned persons who have disclosed serious problems with the nuclear power industry.
YOUR GROUP OR TOWN NAME HERE THEREFORE we the people of:
hereby petition to establish an independent and bi-partisan Commission I similar to the 911 Commission) comprised of elected officials and other qua Ii fied experts to folly inve--tigate the Nuclear Regulatnry Commission's regulation pf the nuclear power industry including the manner in which it has acted and adequacy of current safeguards to assure that it con-tinues to protect the American public from dangers posed from the design. construction and operation of existing and future nuclear power plants.
The commission shall have at least fifteen ( 15) members. be staffed and funded by Congress and shall hold extensive public hearings. No later than two (2) years after its first meeting. the commission shall issue a report that contains specific find-ings and recommendations regarding the manner in which the NRC has acted to protect the public from dangers associated with the nuclear power indust1y including. but limited to. the following topics:
l. Plant location, design and construction:
2. Evacuation plans and other proposed public responses to short and long-term effects of nuclear accidents;
3. Safety Inspections and Quality Assurance including. but not limited to. the use of substandard and counterfeit parts exist-ing and future nuclear power facilities and effectiveness of recent NRC rules relaxing standards frlr safety inspections of plant components and inspection documentation requirements.
4. Integrity and independence of NRC staff and management including whether NRC decisions are improperly influenced by the nuclear industry or other interest groups. opportunities for employees to express concerns about public safety issues and effectiveness of the NRC Office oflnspector General's Office.
By signing below. J assert and affirm my belief that it is in the best interests of the United States to conduct an investigation to assure that our government is doing everything possible to protect America against the dangerous perils caused by nuclear accidents on the devastating scale of Chernobyl and Japan Castastrophes.
PRINT YOUR NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE AND E-MAIL ADDRESS AND THEN SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW (additional signatures add to back)
Sponsored by We The People STEPHEN B. COMLEY SR.
Please return all petitions to: WE THE PEOPLE 45 MANSION DRIVE BOX#7 904-206-3114 ROWLEY MA 01969 OVER
Petition to President Obama, Vice President Biden, Speaker Boehner and Members of Congress to Create an Independent Commission to *nvestigate the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Ni.. C)
WHEREAS we the people of the United States and beyond have an obligation to ourselves and to IUture generations to uphold the democratic process and to challenge federal policies when they endanger us and our fellow citizens; and THEREFORE we the undersigned people of:
hereby petition to establish an independent and bi-partisan Commission (similar to the 911 Commission) com-prised of elected officials and other qualified experts to fully investigate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulation of the nuclear power industry including the manner in which it has acted and adequacy of current safeguards to assure that it continues to protect the American public from dangers posed from the design, con-struction and operation of existing and future nuclear power plants.
By signing below, I assert and affom my belief that it is in the best interests of the United States to conduct an investigation to assure that our government is doing everything possible to protect America against the dangerous perils caused by nuclear accidents on the devastating scale of Chernobyl and Japan Castastrophes.
PRINT YOUR NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE AND E-MAIL ADDRESS AND THEN SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW (Signatures continued from front)
Sponsored by We The People STEPHEN B. COMLEY SR.
Please return all petitions to: WE THE PEOPLE 45 MANSION DRIVE 904-206-3114 BOX#7 ROWLEY MA 01969
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BEARER _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PETITION NO. _ _ _ _ __
OVER
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tt/G NRC meeting 12/18/13 held of public testimony to whether to extend Seabrook's Nuclear Power operating license from 2030 to 2050.
Stephen B. Comley Sr.'s opening remarks:
I want it known I have brought my best friend with me today. The Holy Spirit and without HIM I do not know where I would be today ..
l have come here tonight because J need everyone's help to prove democracy still works in America. This includes everyone on the NRC panel. My relationship with NRC former & present NRC staff members still is continuing who reveal concerns to me.
I am hopeful other NRC staff including some on this very NRC Panel may decide to get in touch with me about concerns they believe is wrongdoing at the NRC. I think most people know they can trust me since I spent 6 years in MA Federal Court protecting the identities of courageous NRC informants who came to me about unsafe condition at US Nuclear Plants.
I also have had threats to my life & there arc also records of occurrences which were done to intimidate members of my family. I certainly hope those kind of incidents will never happen again.
My own description of the NRC comes as a resul l of WTP proving the vcy statements informants from the NRC and the Nuclear Industry have stated to me including this one,
" If the mafia say they arc going to do something you can count on it. When the NRC say they will protect the safety of the American people instead they protect the profits of the Nuclear Industry. The rest of these quotes I will present with my testimony. Sec Page 6 C of large Packet with letter to Michelle Obama on the front page.
r certainly hope the NRC panel will have some questions for me after my testimony. (I got NONE.)
Opening Statement:
You should not even being having this hearing and it is a waste of tax payers hard earn money because the NRC never should have licensed the Seabrook Nuclear Plant because it was sited in a area which anyone familiar with the Reach areas in MA and NH surrounding this plant knows you cannot be able to evacuate citizens safely in lhe event of a Seabrook nuclear disaster. Proof of this is when I attended the Ted Nugent Concert Aug 11, 2013 (see ticket stuh) this past summer at the Hampton Beach Casino when I noticed during the time before the concert I was having trouble crossing the street because of all the people at I Jarnpton Beach that day. Due to this congestion I decided to individually ask 15 NH State Troopers this question, "Jf tht: Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant blew up right now what would you do?" Time and time again r received this answer, "there is nothing we can do, we would all be a goner bl.!cause we cannot safely
Page 2 of opening remarks of Stephen H. Comley Sr. at NRC Hearing 12/18/13.
Evacuate these people." Since August I I. 201.1 I have talked to many State Troopers in NH anJ MA as wdl as othcr poli1.:e onict::rs in surrounding towns within the 10 miles radius of the Seabrook plant and gel this same answer. I am requesting of this NRC Panel to ammge a hearing to ask the State Trooper of Ml\, NH and the officers of the surrounding towns or within the I 0 mile radius of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant whether it is in their opinion people can be evacuated safely in the event of nuclear disaster at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant. Jfin fact these traffic experts determine they are not able to safely evacuate citizens in a safe matter then it is obvious to me the NRC, President Obama, the Governors of NH and MA arc in violation of US Laws. U.S. Nuclear Power Plants must conform to safe evacuation procedures when approving the location of a Nuclear Plant. Please let m know when the NRC will conduct this hearing?
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SUN AUG 11 2013 8: 00 PM :1 2G w From here I presented pans of my written testimony. I was given only 10 minutes when other groups were given over 15 minutes.
41;-fl;'i A!} ~~121 Stephen B. Comley Sr. {/'
Founder of We The People a National Whistlcblower Non Profit Organization For further comment or clarification contact me at 904-206-3114 or E-mail me scomleysr@yahoo.com
NUCLEAR REGULATORY (NRC) COMMISSION HEARING 12/18/13 STEPHEN COMLEY SR PRESENTATION - Objecting to hearing not being recorded for the public record. The NRC is allowing me 5 minutes. What must one do to earn minutes, be President? I have represented 80% of Rowley Citizens and have been investigating Cover-ups & unsafe conditions at U.S Nuclear Plants for over 25 years.
Pass out packets: Letters from individuals & my letters to our First Lady Michelle Obama because President Obama ignored WTP's 3 letters which the White House signed for. See reasons on page 14 article in New York (NYT) Times. WTP's Background
& experience of investigating cover-ups within the NRC & revealing unsafe conditions at Civilian Nuclear & Weapons Plants See Enclosure A, Enclosure B- KI stockpiling and enclosure C Law regulating KI and enclosure D substandard Cconcrete/Grout.
Read Quotes from NRC informants Page 6 C of first packet.
Read NRC IN notices on page 18 concerning suspect Bogus Parts. Don't ask don't tell.
Page 24 Former Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta sends letter in behalf of WTP to Dept of Justice. This request was never responded to by the DOJ.
Page 26 Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich orders removal of gag from Seabrook's former Level III Welding Inspector, Joseph Wampler. James Padovano Case was Plea Bargained & only went to Jail for 6 months for being found guilty of falsifying Welds at the Seabrook Plant. I have information he did not act alone. Congress never invited me to testify at the Congressional hearings on the Wampler Case.
Page 27 - David Williams, Former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC IG) Inspector General who White House contacted to respond to WTP concerns. List 5 IG reports.
Page 28 - Letter from NRC IG office to FBI. This request was never honored.
Page 43 - NRC violated The First Amendment Rights of Comley Sr.
What is really upsetting to me during these past 25 years is when WTP bring evidence forward WTP does not always get to credit for it by the Media or by Politicians who hold congressional hearing on the very evidence WTP brought to light. The reason is not for us to feed anyone's ego or get publicity but so potential whistleblowers know who they can trust in order to get their safety concerns public without the threat of revealing their identities. 60 minutes I can prove has a reputation of giving up informants names when they refuse to go on Camera. NYT tried to keep informants from coming to me.
I have found out WTP cannot trust the Depts. Justice or the FBI to address our concerns so I am taking WTP letter cause to Michelle Obama who hopefully will encourage our President to meet with me. In the meantime I am reaching out to Americans citizens especially youth to help awaken the sleeping giant in this country and beyond.
Page 2. Testimony of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC hearing 12/18113.
I am currently receiving letters of interest requests from Churches, Colleges from within the US & internationally from South Korea, Japan & Russia. I fully intend on honoring these invitations for me to go to these countries and speak on my experiences with cover-ups at the NRC & my knowledge of unsafe conditions within the Civilian Nuclear and Weapon industries. Einstein Said after he cracked the Atom, "To the villege square we must take the facts of Atomic energy form there must come the people's voice."
I would like everyone here including NRC employees to consider signing WTP's petition to President Obama & Congress. Luke 18:1-8 Parable of the Persistent Widow. There some things in my life I have found I am not able to walk away from which is my faith, family & my pursuit of Justice. Nuclear Power has no room for fence sitters either you are for Nuclear Power or you are not. American People cannot make a responsible decision if the facts are covered-up & suppressed by the very agency that is supposed to protect them. "A sin by silence when we should protest makes cowards of men." Wilcox.
Questions: regarding Violations of the LAW
1. Am I correct in stating the NRC evacuation requirements are supposed to be set up in the likely not the unlikely event of a Nuclear Disaster at Seabrook? If this is indeed true then President Obama, Governor Deval Patrick, Governor Maggie Hassan, the NRC and Seabrook owners, Florida Power & Light (FPL) are violation of Laws on 3 fronts.
1. These 5 have & are committing discrimination and making the special needs segment of America's population expendable ... There must be an acceptable humane evacuation for these citizens. Leaving paralyzed individuals behind to be administered the controversial drug KI to drink is not an acceptable evacuation for anyone. According to the Center for Disease Control & (CDC) Prevention there are serious side effects &
radiation fears has (see enclosure B) sparked Substandard KI Pills." That rings a bell.
Is there anyone on the NRC Panel or in the audience today who believes leaving special needs citizens behind to be given KI is acceptable or humane?
2. Even if this unacceptable drug was effective which it is not, the 5 names and agencies mentioned above are in violation of a law for not making sure enough of KI is available within a 20 mile radius. "The public Health (see enclosure C) Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & & Response Act of 2002 expanded the Potassium Iodide distribution radius to 20 miles from 10 miles. President George W. Bush signed the measure into law following the Terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, amid concerns that enemies were planning attacks on American nuclear facilities. Here's the problem, though: Neither Bush nor his successor, President Barack Obama, actually implemented the law mandating broader distribution of the so-call "emergency Pills" containing potassium iodide, which reduce the risk of thyroid cancer in people at risk for inhalation or ingestion of radioiodines,"
Page 3. Testimony of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC Hearing of 12/18/13 For years & currently President Obama, the NRC, Governors Maggie Hassan & Deval Patrick, Seabrook Owners, FPL & all U.S. Nuclear Plants operating today are in violation of these U.S Laws outlined above ..
I have more violations and questions for President Obama to address when I meet with him about the NRC and Seabrook Nuclear Plant involvement in Cover-ups & penciling away of safety concerns.
WTP first brought to light the presence of Counterfeit Substandard Parts October 26, 1987 to then President Reagan (outlined in my recent letter to Michelle Obama which the White House signed for May 1, 2013. After I personally gave this troubling information to President Reagan which at that time was present in most U.S. Nuclear Plants including Seabrook, I questioned Seabrook owners about this then and they said, "Seabrook has no such parts." Well they lied about that issue then & others I am familiar with. Two years after WTP brought this to light the U.S. General Accounting (GAO) Office Investigative Report entitled Counterfeit Substandard Parts are a Government- Wide Concern listed Seabrook as built with Counterfeit Substandard Fosterers, Pipe fittings/Flanges & Fuses.
Initially the NRC under Victor Stello watch ordered all the plants listed in this GAO report to find & replace all of these bogus parts. But because of pressure from the Nuclear Industry & their Lobbyists who routinely fill a lot of our Politician's War Chests the NRC lower the standards so these parts so the Industry would not have to be replace these components at a cost of a million plus dollars a day to replace one Substandard Bolt. I debated the Vice President of the Nuclear Institute in Wash on NPR in Jacksonville, Fl. During this debate I brought up the fact a Vendor in Conn who was supplying these bogus parts to U.S. Nuclear Plants and the building which housed these records mysteriously burned to the ground the day before the owners was tipped off US Marshals were to seize their records. When I asked the Nuclear Institute representative how those parts could be located now in US Plants he hung up his phone! l I have further requests of this NRC Panel tonight. Due to the fact this hearing is in connection to the Seabrook Nuclear Plants owners' desire to extend their license from 2030 to 2050, 20 years longer than they were scheduled to operate I believe WTP's information above and below is germane to these proceedings.
Request: # 1: As Executive Director of WTP I had in the past requested the NRC to list all the Counterfeit Substandard Parts that built and I understand later replaced in the Seabrook Nuclear Plant and what parts were not replaced and why not. Unfortunately I never got a response. I am officially asking someone on this NRC Panel to take the responsibility of contacting the NRC official who would be able to send me this information. I
Page 4. Testimony of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC Hearing of 12/18/13.
Requests 2. I would like to know who was in charge of the tracking Counterfeit Substandard Parts while under the Watch of Victor Stello. I am specifically interested in the time frame from 1987 to January 1990 when Mr. Stello was stripped of his desire to become President Bush Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Energy under Mr. Watkins.
Request 3: As I understand it is the Law that the Seabrook owners must put away decommissioning costs so there is adequate_money to dismantle Seabrook Nuclear Plant when it is ultimately shut down. How much money at the present time is set aside for the decommissioning of Seabrook's Plant?
If no one on this NRC panel has this information available please direct the appropriate official to send this information to me as soon as possible.
Request 4: Why hasn't the NRC required the Nuclear Industry to expand the 10 radius as a result of the disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima in Japan? Sununu was for a reduction to a 1 mile after the Russian Explosion.
Request 5: I want to encourage any former or present employees of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant or any former or present NRC staff members to know they can trust me to bring me any safety concerns they feel the American People should be made aware of with the understanding their identities would never be revealed.
Request 6: That the NRC approved the DVD of CNN's year and half investigation aired on EARTH MATTERS entitled, INSIDE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: INTIMIDATION OR REGULATION to be included in the NRC reference library. In addition the 5 NRC IG Investigative (See enclosure A press articles) Reports brought about by truly Brave Americans who came to We The People with their safety concerns.
I look forward to these requests being addressed as soon as possible.
Thanking you in advance of you prompt attention and understanding in addressing these important concerns requests which is affecting every American Citizen of the United States.
Sincerely, _p 91:-/.JW'/,6 b~,M d~
~,,..-<::.J/~~~n B. Comley Sr /
Founder of We The People, a National Whistleblower Non Profit Organization.
Enclosures
MN No.13-026 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING Licensee: NextEra Energy, Seabrook, LLC Facilities: Seabrook Station Docket Nos: 50-443 Date/Time: December 18, 2013 Open House 5:00 p.m. to 5:45 p.m.
Public Meeting 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
Location: Best Western Plus, The Inn at Hampton 815 Lafayette Road Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 (603) 926-6771
Purpose:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will host an open house and public meeting with NextEra. The NRC plans to discuss NextEra's testing program and their schedule regarding concrete degradation caused by Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) at Seabrook Station.
Participants:
David Lew, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region I (RI)
James Trapp, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RI Mel Gray, Chief, Engineering Branch I, DRS, RI William Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst (Team Leader), RI Michael Marshall, Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NextEra Kevin Walsh, Vice President, Seabrook Station Rick Noble, ASR Project Manager, Seabrook Station Dr. Oguzhan Bayrak, Director, Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory, University of Texas at Austin Public Participation: This is a Category 1 Meeting. During the open house, NRC staff will be available to answer questions from the public and discuss issues or concerns related to the Seabrook Station.
Following the open house, the NRC will hold a meeting with NextEra.
The public is invited to observe this meeting and will have the opportunity to communicate with the NRC during a question and answer period directly following the business portion of the meeting, but before the meeting is adjourned.
Meeting Contact Mel Gray, Region I 610-337 -5209 E-mail: Mel.Gray@nrc.gov
2 AGENDA:
5:00 - 5:45 p.m. Poster Session (NRG staff, NextEra staff, Other Organizations) 6:00 - 6:15 p.m. Opening Remarks by NRG staff 6:15- 7:15 p.m. Presentation by NextEra on Testing Program and Schedule 7:15- 9:00 p.m. Question and Answer Period Additional information relative to the NRG's oversight of the ASR conditions at Seabrook Station can be found on the NRG's website at:
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/seabrook/concrete-deg radation. htm I The NRG's Policy Statement, "Enhancing Public Participation in NRC Meetings," effective May 28, 2002, applies to this meeting. The policy statement may be found on the NRC's website, http://www.nrc.gov/read ing-rm/doc-collections/commission/policy/67fr36920. html, and contains information regarding visitors and security.
The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities where appropriate.
If you need a reasonable accommodation to participate in this meeting, or need the meeting notice or other information from the meeting in another format (e.g., Braille, large print}, please notify the NRC's meeting contact. Determinations on requests for reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis. Persons requiring assistance to attend the meeting shall make their requests known to the NRC meeting contact no later than two business days prior to the meeting.
Meetings are sometimes canceled or rescheduled as a result of unforeseen circumstances.
Please confirm the meeting schedule on the NRC website under public meetings.
Approved by: ___/..._R-..Al....__ _ _ _ __
Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety cc: via ListServ
ML13330A584 0 Non-Sensitive 0 Publicly Available 0 SUNSI Review D Sensitive D Non-Publicly Available OFFICE RI/DRS Rl/DRP RI/DRS NAME WCook/NPF for GDentel/GD MGrav/MG DATE 11/25/2013 11/25/2013 11 /25/2013 Enc.
Michal Hana Freedhoff, Ph.D. February 18, 2014 Director of Oversight & Investigations Office of Senator Edward J. Markey 218 Russell Senate Office Building Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mrs. Michal Hana Freedhoff,
As I stated in our conversation on Friday, February 14, 2014 the laws I have referred to are in my oral and written testimony I presented at the NRC hearing December 18, 2013.
The laws specifically I believe President Obama, Governor Deval Patrick, Governor Maggie Hassan, the NRC and Seabrook owners, Florida Power and Light are in violation of are the following:
1. Discrimination: Federal Law prohibits discrimination against disabled persons.
According to 29 U.S.C. 794, no person, solely by reason of their handicap, may be subjected to discrimination by any program or activity which receives federal funds. Since most of the entities involved in evacuating a population receive federal funds, it would be a contravention of federal law MA and NH to effectuate a plan that wholly ignores persons solely by reason of their handicapped status.
According to the emergency evacuation plan created by the owners of the Seabrook nuclear power plant in NH, the young, the old, and the physically and mentally disabled are left to fend for themselves in some bizarre Darwinian version of Survival of the fittest.
People who are frail, ill, helpless, and people with special needs will be a larger part of any group which ends up being sheltered indefinitely rather than evacuated with the general population.
I raised this issue in 1986 to James K. Asselstine, NRC Commissioner and to Lando Zech, NRC's Chair when (I believe your Boston office sent you copies of these issues.) I asked the question, "Do you feel that some means should be provided for people who cannot be moved, other than merely being sheltered?"
On August 19, 1986, Mr. Asselstine replied, "I do not believe the commission has faced the situation in which evacuation is impossible for some individuals within the EPZ and the only alternative is sheltering within unprotected facilities."
Victor Stello, former Executive Director for operations, answering the same question to me for then Chairman Zech who wrote on October 1, 1986, "For the few individual patients where in the judgment of medical experts prompt evacuation is not advisable, we believe that shelter is an appropriate protective measure until they can be safely relocated. In some cases ... it may be appropriate to administer potassium iodide (KI)."
In considering the KI option, the NRC should examine the issue of discrimination.
Many people not immediately evacuated will be left behind because they are ill,
Page 2 Letter of February 18, 2014 to Michal Ilana Freedhoff, PH.D.
frail and senior citizens or people with special needs. Using KI could endanger some of them. They deserve to have more protection against a radioactive plume than KI and their bedclothes.
The Nuclear Industry is licensed by the Federal Government to generate electricity (and profits) with this potentially lethal technology. To prevent a situation which discriminates against those left behind, the federal government should make a criteria for licensing that the licensee provide comparable protection for those left behind. One possible means of preventing discrimination should be to build shelters similar to the bomb shelters built during the early years of the Cold War to protect against nuclear bomb attacks.
We The (WTP) People is bringing awareness to these concerns and others by circulating our National Petition which states (in part here) to President Obama, Vice President Biden, Speaker Bochner and Members of Congress, "WHERE AS current emergency plans propose that senior citizens and other special needs persons who cannot immediately evacuate be left behind in the event of a nuclear accident be given potassium iodide which only protects the thyroid against radioactive iodine, leaving them susceptible to contamination by other dangerous radioactive products released during an accident or act of sabotage; and such plans assume these valuable members of our communities are expendable, a discriminatory policy which violates their civil rights."
Our hope is U. S Senator Edward Markey will be one first of many elected leaders who will endorse WTP's petition that is being circulated throughout the Town of Rowley MA.
2. Law Violation: Partially taken from News and issues US Government Info: The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 expanded the Potassium (KI) Iodide distribution radius to 20 miles from 10 miles. President George W. bush signed the measure into law following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, amid concerns that enemies were planning attacks on American nuclear facilities. Neither former President George W. Bush nor his successor, President Obama, actually implemented the law mandating broader distribution of the so-call "emergency Pills" containing potassium iodide, which reduce the risk of thyroid cancer in people at risk for inhalation or ingestion of radioiodines."
Even when this law and in some cases this unacceptable drug KI is put into effect the area where KI is made an option must be more extensive than the 20-mile evacuation zone delineated by law as the area for which licensees must provide a detailed plan. A radioactive plume form a damaged nuclear power plant can extend a great distance, as was learned during the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters when radiation fell heavily within those countries, and elevated radiation
Page 3 Letter of February 18, 2014 to Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.
levels were even measured in the U.S. from both accidents including affecting the air in MA.
The use of KI can have serious side effects, a matter to address when making KI an emergency option. Some manufacturers and pharmacies state KI should not be administered without a physician's prescription. A manufacturer's caution about Potassium Iodide solution include: giving the preparation with a full glass of water to assure against gastrointestinal injury: to notify a physician if skin rash, fever, swelling of throat or signs of iodism (brassy taste, burning of mouth and throat, chronic sore gums and teeth, symptoms of head cold) occur; and the note that KI is contraindicated in cases of Addison's disease, acute or chronic renal disease, dehydration, tuberculosis, and in patients with sensitivity to iodides. The manufacturer cites several reports on nonspecific bowel lesions where surgery was required and deaths occurred, and says KI should be discontinued immediately if abdominal pain, distention, nausea, vomiting, or gastrointestinal bleeding occurs. In cases of over dosage, lethal levels can be reached in a few hours.
All emergency personnel in a position to administer KI, including hospital and nursing home employees, police and fire departments must receive in-depth training in administering KI, its side effects, and antidotal measures.
When stockpiling, it is necessary the stockpile not exceed its shelf life. For example, some of the liquid solutions have a shelf life of six months. The tablet form may be longer lived, but some special needs people are unable to consume tablets and would have to have the liquid form available.
A great deal of preparation and ongoing attention is involved in making KI one of the options in protecting the public, but none of these cautions should exclude KI as an option.
The entire population at risk of exposure to a radioactive plume should be educated about the benefits and side effects of KI so they are informed of their options. The Nuclear Management and resources Council (NUMARC), and organization of nuclear utility owners, recommend the NRC discourage use or stockpiling of KI because "Stockpiling or predistribution and the associated public education would result in a potentially significant negative public perception." In CNN's year and half investigation of WTP's work which aired on EARTH MATTERS entitled, INSIDE THE NRC: INTIMIDATION OR REGULATION touched on the NUMARC position. I believe you have this DVD. WTP has recommended to the NRC they disregard the NUMARC position which has influenced the NRC's stand on KI for the last several years.
Page 4 Letter of February 18, 2014 to Michal Ilana Freedhoff,Ph.D.
NUMARC's short term "potentially significant negative" image problems pale in the face of the public's right to be protected against life-threatening radiation in the event of a nuclear power plant accident. Negative publicity does not last long; thyroid cancer has a much deeper, long-lasting, and more devastating consequence.
Just before the NRC hearing I found out in NH and MA the availability of KI is very limited or nonexistent. In evidence I presented at the NRC hearing 12/18/13 I included statements (attached Marked Enclosure E) made by managers of two CVS Pharmacies in Salisbury MA and Seabrook NH directly in front of the Seabrook Nuclear plant who stated, "We do not carry potassium Iodide for the past year or so. We cannot get it or normally carry potassium iodide."
3. Violation of Law and standards of NRC licensing U.S. Nuclear Plants.
As I stated in my oral (oral attached) and written statements, "This NRC panel should not even be having this hearing. It is a waste of tax payer's hard earned money because the NRC never should have licensed the Seabrook Nuclear Plant in the first place. Anyone familiar with the Beach areas in MA and NN surrounding this plant knows you cannot possibly evacuate citizens safely in the event of a Seabrook Nuclear disaster.
Proof of this is when I attended the Ted Nugent concert August 11, 2013 this past summer at the Hampton Beach casino when I noticed during the time before the concert I was having trouble crossing the street because of all the people at the Hampton beach that day. Due to this congestion I decided to individually ask 15 NH State troopers this question, "If the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant blew up right now what would you do?"
Time and time again I received this answer, "There is noting we can do, we would all be a goner because we cannot safely evacuate these people."
Since August 11, 2013 I have talked with other State Troopers in NH and MA as well as other police officers in surrounding towns within the 10 miles radius of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant and get the same answer.
Due to these troubling concerns at the hearing I requested the NRC Panel "To arrange a hearing to ask the State Troopers of MA, HH and the Police officers of the surrounding towns of within the 10 mile Fadius of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant whether it is in their opinion people can be evacuated safely in the event of nuclear disaster at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant."
If in fact these traffic experts testify they are not able to safely evacuate citizens in a safely and I believe they will it is obvious to me the NRC, President Obama, FEMA, The governors of NH and MA are in violation of US Law ..
Page 5 Letter of February 18, 2014 to Michal Ilana Freedhoff, Ph.D.
U.S. Nuclear Power Plants must conform to safe evacuation procedures when approving the location of a Nuclear Plant. Please let me know when the NRC will conduct this hearing?"
It is pretty obvious to me and many others I know the NRC and the FEMA in the event of a Nuclear disaster at hr Seabrook Nuclear Plant never held legitimate tests on Routes 1 or US Federal Highway 95 in MA or NH to establish whether citizens can be evacuated safety during crowed beach days or people traveling to Maine or Canada from MA and NH.
Those of us who watched the licensing of Seabrook knows what a mockery of our democratic process was made by former Governor Sununu and Victor Stello in making sure evacuation plans would indeed be passed and established in the unlikely event of a nuclear accident at Seabrook instead of the likely occurrence of one happening. I always wondered how John Sununu then and now can ride around with a NH license plate saying "Live Free or Die."
The NRC and some our top elected officials in our government continue to establish a double standard for the Nuclear Civilian and Weapons Industries. My family certainly knows our Son's family owned and run Health Care Extended Community Center would have his license to operate revoked immediately ifhe had inadequate evacuations plans or installed Counterfeit Substandard fire doors in his facility.
In over the 27 years WTP investigating and revealing the NRC 's penciling away of inadequate evacuation plans and bringing to light the NRC covering up unsafe conditions at US Nuclear Plants, the agency's same philosophy of playing Russian Roulette in America's neighborhoods still continues to exist this day.
Mrs. Michal Hana Freedhoff, if you need further calcification or comment please do not hesitate to call me. I look forward to continue working together with U.S Senator Edward Markey, you and the rest of the Staff in the Senator's offices.
Sincerely, _ J!,,,1...£>,
Ste hen B. Cof:ey~ - ~
Founder of We The People a National Whistleblower Non Profit Organization Attachments
NRC meeting 12/18/13 held of public testimony to whether to extend Seabrook's Nuclear Power operating license from 2030 to 2050.
Stephen B. Comley Sr. 's opening remarks:
I want it known I have brought my best friend with me today. The Holy Spirit and without HIM I do not know where I would be today ..
I have come here tonight because I need everyone's help to prove democracy still works in America. This includes everyone on the NRC panel. My relationship with NRC former & present NRC staff members still is continuing who reveal concerns to me.
I am hopeful other NRC staff including some on this very NRC Panel may decide to get in touch with me about concerns they believe is wrongdoing at the NRC. I think most people know they can trust me since I spent 6 years in MA Federal Court protecting the identities of courageous NRC informants who came to me about unsafe condition at US Nuclear Plants.
I also have had threats to my life & there are also records of occurrences which were done to intimidate members of my family. I certainly hope those kind of incidents will never happen again.
My own description of the NRC comes as a result of WTP proving the vey statements informants from the NRC and the Nuclear Industry have stated to me including this one, "If the mafia say they are going to do something you can count on it. When the NRC say they will protect the safety of the American people instead they protect the profits of the Nuclear Industry. The rest of these quotes I will present with my testimony. See Page 6 C of large Packet with letter to Michelle Obama on the front page.
I certainly hope the NRC panel will have some questions for me after my testimony. (I got NONE.)
Opening Statement:
You should not even being having this hearing and it is a waste of tax payers hard earn money because the NRC never should have licensed the Seabrook Nuclear Plant because it was sited in a area which anyone familiar with the Beach areas in MA and NH sunounding this plant knows you cannot be able to evacuate citizens safely in the event of a Seabrook nuclear disaster. Proof of this is when I attended the Ted Nugent Concert Aug 11, 2013 (see ticket stub) this past summer at the Hampton Beach Casino when I noticed during the time before the concert I was having trouble crossing the street because of all the people at Hampton Beach that day. Due to this congestion I decided to individually ask 15 NH State Troopers this question, "If the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant blew up right now what would you do?" Time and time again I received this answer, "there is nothing we can do, we would all be a goner because we cannot safely Ct1
Page 2 of opening rema-rks of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC Hearing 12/18/13.
Evacuate these people." Since August 11, 2013 I have talked to many State Troopers in NH and MA as well as other police officers in surrounding towns within the 10 miles radius of the Seabrook plant and get this same answer. I am requesting of this NRC Panel to arrange a hearing to ask the State Trooper of MA, NH and the officers of the surrounding towns of within the 10 mile radius of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant whether it is in their opinion people can be evacuated safely in the event of nuclear disaster at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant. If in fact these traffic experts determine they are not able to safely evacuate citizens in a safe matter then it is obvious to me the NRC, President Obama, the Governors of NH and MA are in violation of US Laws. U.S. Nuclear Power Plants must conform to safe evacuation procedures when approving the location of a Nuclear Plant. Please let m know when the NRC will conduct this hearing?
From here I presented parts of my written testimony. I was given only 10 minutes when other groups were given over 15 minutes.
~l~r~~/
Founder of We The People a National Whistleblower Non Profit Organization For further comment or clarification contact me at 904-206-3114 or E-mail me scomleysr@yahoo.com GJ
NUCLEAR REGULATORY CNRC) COMMISSION HEARING 12/18/13 STEPHEN COMLEY SR PRESENTATION-Objecting to hearing not being recorded for the public record. The NRC is allowing me 5 minutes. What must one do to earn minutes, be President? I have represented 80% of Rowley Citizens and have been investigating Cover-ups & unsafe conditions at U.S Nuclear Plants for over 25 years.
Pass out packets: Letters from individuals & my letters to our First Lady Michelle Obama because President Obama ignored WTP's 3 letters which the White House signed for. See reasons on page 14 article in New York (NYT) Times. WTP's Background
& experience of investigating cover-ups within the NRC & revealing unsafe conditions at Civilian Nuclear & Weapons Plants See Enclosure A, Enclosure B- KI stockpiling and enclosure C Law regulating KI and enclosure D substandard Cconcrete/Grout.
Read Quotes from NRC informants Page 6 C of first packet.
Read NRC IN notices on page 18 concerning suspect Bogus Parts. Don't ask don't tell.
Page 24 Former Chief of Staff, Leon Panetta sends letter in behalf of WTP to Dept of Justice. This request was never responded to by the DOJ.
Page 26 Secretary of Labor Robert B. Reich orders removal of gag from Seabrook's former Level III Welding Inspector, Joseph Wampler. James Padovano Case was Plea Bargained & only went to Jail for 6 months for being found guilty of falsifying Welds at the Seabrook Plant. I have information he did not act alone. Congress never invited me to testify at the Congressional hearings on the Wampler Case.
Page 27 - David Williams, Former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC IG) Inspector General who White House contacted to respond to WTP concerns. List 5 IG reports.
Page 28 - Letter from NRC IG office to FBI. This request was never honored.
Page 43 - NRC violated The First Amendment Rights of Comley Sr.
What is really upsetting to me during these past 25 years is when WTP bring evidence forward WTP does not always get to credit for it by the Media or by Politicians who hold congressional hearing on the very evidence WTP brought to light. The reason is not for us to feed anyone's ego or get publicity but so potential whistleblowers know who they can trust in order to get their safety concerns public without the threat of revealing their identities. 60 minutes I can prove has a reputation of giving up informants names when they refuse to go on Camera. NYT tried to keep informants from coming to me.
I have found out WTP cannot trust the Depts. Justice or the FBI to address our concerns so I am taking WTP letter cause to Michelle Obama who hopefully will encourage our President to meet with me. In the meantime I am reaching out to Americans citizens especially youth to help awaken the sleeping giant in this country and beyond.
(J)
Page 2. Testimony of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC hearing 12/18/13.
I am currently receiving letters of interest requests from Churches, Colleges from within the US & internationally from South Korea, Japan & Russia. I fully intend on honoring these invitations for me to go to these countries and speak on my experiences with cover-ups at the NRC & my knowledge of unsafe conditions within the Civilian Nuclear and Weapon industries. Einstein Said after he cracked the Atom, "To the villege square we must take the facts of Atomic energy form there must come the people's voice."
I would like everyone here including NRC employees to consider signing WTP's petition to President Obama & Congress. Luke 18:1-8 Parable of the Persistent Widow. There some things in my life I have found I am not able to walk away from which is my faith, family & my pursuit of Justice. Nuclear Power has no room for fence sitters either you are for Nuclear Power or you are not. American People cannot make a responsible decision if the facts are covered-up & suppressed by the very agency that is supposed to protect them. "A sin by silence when we should protest makes cowards of men." Wilcox.
Questions: regarding Violations of the LAW
1. Am I correct in stating the NRC evacuation requirements are supposed to be set up in the likely not the unlikely event of a Nuclear Disaster at Seabrook? If this is indeed true then President Obama, Governor Deval Patrick, Governor Maggie Hassan, the NRC and Seabrook owners, Florida Power & Light (FPL) are violation of Laws on 3 fronts.
1. These 5 have & are committing discrimination and making the special needs segment of America's population expendable... There must be an acceptable humane evacuation for these citizens. Leaving paralyzed individuals behind to be administered the controversial drug KI to drink is not an acceptable evacuation for anyone. According to the Center for Disease Control & (CDC) Prevention there are serious side effects &
radiation fears has (see enclosure B) sparked Substandard KI Pills." That rings a bell.
Is there anyone on the NRC Panel or in the audience today who believes leaving special needs citizens behind to be given KI is acceptable or humane?
2. Even if this unacceptable drug was effective which it is not, the 5 names and agencies mentioned above are in violation of a law for not making sure enough of KI is available within a 20 mile radius. "The public Health (see enclosure C) Security & Bioterrorism Preparedness & & Response Act of2002 expanded the Potassium Iodide distribution radius to 20 miles from 10 miles. President George W. Bush signed the measure into law following the Terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 200 l, amid concerns that enemies were planning attacks on American nuclear facilities. Here's the problem, though: Neither Bush nor his successor, President Barack Obama, actually implemented the law mandating broader distribution of the so-call "emergency Pills" containing potassium iodide, which reduce the risk of thyroid cancer in people at risk for inhalation or ingestion of radioiodines,"
( 'f)
Page 3. Testimony of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC Hearing of 12/18/13 For years & currently President Obama, the NRC, Governors Maggie Hassan & Deval Patrick, Seabrook Owners, FPL & all U.S. Nuclear Plants operating today are in violation of these U.S Laws outlined above ..
I have more violations and questions for President Obama to address when I meet with him about the NRC and Seabrook Nuclear Plant involvement in Cover-ups & penciling away of safety concerns.
WTP first brought to light the presence of Counterfeit Substandard Parts October 26, 1987 to then President Reagan (outlined in my recent letter to Michelle Obama which the White House signed for May 1, 2013. After I personally gave this troubling information to President Reagan which at that time was present in most U.S. Nuclear Plants including Seabrook, I questioned Seabrook owners about this then and they said, "Seabrook has no such parts." Well they lied about that issue then & others I am familiar with. Two years after WTP brought this to light the U.S. General Accounting (GAO) Office Investigative Report entitled Counterfeit Substandard Parts are a Government- Wide Concern listed Seabrook as built with Counterfeit Substandard Fosterers, Pipe fittings/Flanges & Fuses.
Initially the NRC under Victor Stello watch ordered all the plants listed in this GAO report to find & replace all of these bogus parts. But because of pressure from the Nuclear Industry & their Lobbyists who routinely fill a lot of our Politician's War Chests the NRC lower the standards so these parts so the Industry would not have to be replace these components at a cost of a million plus dollars a day to replace one Substandard Bolt. I debated the Vice President of the Nuclear Institute in Wash on NPR in Jacksonville, Fl. During this debate I brought up the fact a Vendor in Conn who was supplying these bogus parts to U.S. Nuclear Plants and the building which housed these records mysteriously burned to the ground the day before the owners was tipped off US Marshals were to seize their records. When I asked the Nuclear Institute representative how those parts could be located now in US Plants he hung up his phone!!
I have further requests of this NRC Panel tonight. Due to the fact this hearing is in connection to the Seabrook Nuclear Plants owners' desire to extend their license from 2030 to 2050, 20 years longer than they were scheduled to operate I believe WTP's information above and below is germane to these proceedings.
Request: #1: As Executive Director of WTP I had in the past requested the NRC to list all the Counterfeit Substandard Parts that built and I understand later replaced in the Seabrook Nuclear Plant and what parts were not replaced and why not. Unfortunately I never got a response. I am officially asking someone on this NRC Panel to take the responsibility of contacting the NRC official who would be able to send me this information. I
Page 4. Testimony of Stephen B. Comley Sr. at NRC Hearing of 12/18/13.
Requests 2. I would like to know who was in charge of the tracking Counterfeit Substandard Parts while under the Watch of Victor Stello. I am specifically interested in the time frame from 1987 to January 1990 when Mr. Stello was stripped of his desire to become President Bush Nominee to be Assistant Secretary of Energy under Mr. Watkins.
Request 3: As I understand it is the Law that the Seabrook owners must put away decommissioning costs so there is adequate_money to dismantle Seabrook Nuclear Plant when it is ultimately shut down. How much money at the present time is set aside for the decommissioning of Seabrook's Plant?
If no one on this NRC panel has this information available please direct the appropriate official to send this information to me as soon as possible.
Request 4: Why hasn't the NRC required the Nuclear Industry to expand the 10 radius as a result of the disasters in Chernobyl and Fukushima in Japan? Sununu was for a reduction to a 1 mile after the Russian Explosion.
Request 5: I want to encourage any former or present employees of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant or any former or present NRC staff members to know they can trust me to bring me any safety concerns they feel the American People should be made aware of with the understanding their identities would never be revealed.
Request 6: That the NRC approved the DVD of CNN's year and half investigation aired on EARTH MATTERS entitled, INSIDE THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION: INTIMIDATION OR REGULATION to be included in the NRC reference library. In addition the 5 NRC IG Investigative (See enclosure A press articles) Reports brought about by truly Brave Americans who came to We The People with their safety concerns.
I look forward to these requests being addressed as soon as possible.
Thanking you in advance of you prompt attention and understanding in addressing these important concerns requests which is affecting every American Citizen of the United States.
Sincerely, ~ / /l 91:-/d_A/} &~ U~
~~~LB. Comley Sr Y Founder of We The People, a National Wbistleblower Non Profit Organization.
Enclosures
MN No.13-026 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I NOTICE OF PUBLIC MEETING Licensee: NextEra Energy, Seabrook, LLC Facilities: Seabrook Station Docket Nos: 50-443 Date/Time: December 18, 2013 Open House 5:00 p.m. to 5:45 p.m.
Public Meeting 6:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
Location: Best Western Plus, The Inn at Hampton 815 Lafayette Road Hampton, New Hampshire 03842 (603) 926-6771
Purpose:
The U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) will host an open house and public meeting with NextEra. The NRC plans to discuss NextEra's testing program and their schedule regarding concrete degradation caused by Alkali-Silica Reaction (ASR) at Seabrook Station.
Participants:
David Lew, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region l (RI)
James Trapp, Deputy Director. Division of Reactor Safety (ORS), RI Mel Gray, Chief, Engineering Branch I, DRS, RI William Cook, Senior Reactor Analyst (Team Leader), RI Michael Marshall, Division of License Renewal, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NextEra Kevin Walsh, Vice President, Seabrook Station Rick Noble, ASR Project Manager, Seabrook Station Dr. Oguzhan Bayrak, Director, Ferguson Structural Engineering Laboratory, University of Texas at Austin Public Participation: This is a Category 1 Meeting. During the open house, NRC staff will be available to answer questions from the public and discuss issues or concerns related to the Seabrook Station.
Following the open house, the NRG will hold a meeting with NextEra.
The public is invited to observe this meeting and will have the opportunity to communicate with the NRC during a question and answer period directly following the business portion of the meeting, but before the meeting is adjourned.
Meeting
Contact:
Mel Gray, Region I 610-337-5209 E-mail: Mel. Gray@nrc.gov
2 AGENDA:
5:00 - 5:45 p.m. Poster Session (NRC staff, NextEra staff, Other Organizations) 6:00- 6:15 p.m. Opening Remarks by NRC staff 6:15 - 7:15 p.m. Presentation by NextEra on Testing Program and Schedule 7:15 - 9:00 p.m. Question and Answer Period Additional information relative to the NRC's oversight of the ASR conditions at Seabrook Station can be found on the NRC's website at:
http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/reactor/seabrook/concrete-degradation.html The NRC's Policy Statement, "Enhancing Public Participation in NRC Meetings," effective May 28, 2002. applies to this meeting. The policy statement may be found on the NRC's website, http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/commission/policy/67fr36920.html, and contains information regarding visitors and security.
The NRC provides reasonable accommodation to individuals with disabilities where appropriate.
If you need a reasonable accommodation to participate in this meeting, or need the meeting notice or other information from the meeting in another format (e.g., Braille. large print). please notify the NRC's meeting contact. Determinations on requests for reasonable accommodation will be made on a case-by-case basis. Persons requiring assistance to attend the meeting shall make their requests known to the NRC meeting contact no later than two business days prior to the meeting ..
Meetings are sometimes canceled or rescheduled as a result of unforeseen circumstances.
Please confirm the meeting schedule on the NRC website under public meetings.
Approved by: _ _.l.....R....AJ.....__ _ _ _ __
Mel Gray, Chief Engineering Branch 1 Division of Reactor Safety cc: via ListServ (3-)
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hereby petition to establish an independent and hi-partisan Commission I similar to the 911 Commission) comprised of elected officials and other qualified experts to folly inve<>tigate the Ni1c!ear Regulatory Commission's regu!;:itfrm of the nuclear power industry including the manner in which it has acted and adequacy of current safeguards to assure that it con-tinues to protect the American public from dangers posed from the design, construction and operation of existmg and future nuclear po\l.*er plants.
The commission shall have at least fifteen ( 15) members, be staffed and funded by Congress and shall hold extensive public .
hearings. No later than two (2) years after its first meeting, the commission shall issue a report that contains specific find~
ings and recommendations regarding the manner in which the NRC' has acted to protect the public from dangers associated with the nuclear power industry including, but limited to. the fi11lowing topics:
I. Plant location. design and construction:
2. Evacuation plans and other proposed public responses to short and long-term effects of nuclear accidents;
3. Safety Tnspcctions and Quality Assurance including. but not limited to. !he use of substandard and countcrli.:it parts exist-ing and future nuclear power foci Ii ties and effectiveness of recent NRC rules relaxing standards for safety inspections of plant components and inspection documentation requirements.
4. Integrity and independence of NRC staff and management including \vhcther NRC decisions are improperly 1nlluenced hy the nuclear industry or other interest groups, opportunities for employees to express concerns ahoul public safety issues and effectiveness of the NRC Office oflnspector General" s Office.
By signing belo\V, I assert and affirm my belief that it is in the best interests of lhe United States lO conduct an investigation to assure that our government is doing everything possible to protect America against the dangerous perils caused by nuclear accidents on the devastating scale of Chernobyl and Japan Castastrophes.
PRINT YOUR NAME, ADDRESS, PHONE AND E-MAIL ADDRESS AND THEN SIGN YOUR NA.MF: BELOW
!.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~-
2.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~
3.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~*~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
4. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
5.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
(additional signatures add to back)
Sponsored by We The People STEPHEN B. COMLEY SR.
Please return all petitions to: WE THE PEOPLE 45 MANSION DRIVE BOX#7 904-206-3114 ROWLEY MA 01969
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ BEARER PETITION NO. _ _ _ _ __
Petition to President Obama~ Vice President Biden. Speaker Boehner and Members of Con~ress to Create an Independent Commission to Investigate the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
WHF:RF.AS we the people of the United States and beyond have an obligation to ourselves and to fotun: generations to uphold the democratic process and to challenge federal policies when they en<ianger us and our fellow rillzens: and WH Elt EAS cum:nt NRC plans call for the constmc11on of al least fifty more nuclear plants in order w reduce our nation* s dependency on foreign oil: and WHEREAS the NRC and the Uovemment Accounting Oflke have found that more than 70 existing US nuclear plants con-tain counterfeit and substandard defective parts, and WfffREAS recent NRC rules streamline the nuclear plant licensing and re-licensing process hy limiting puhlic participation.
lowering sa!Cty inspcdinn and quality assurance standards applicahlc In nuclear c..:omponcnts in existing and new focilitics lo reduce constnict1on ..-o~ts: and WHEREAS nudear power plants and their summnding communities do not have adequate emergency evacuation plans to protect people who would he at risk when a nuclear accident occurs.
WHERE,\S recent experience has shown our governments* mabiltty 10 resrond to short and long tcm1 needs of our citizens who!>c ltn'!> arc disrupted hy unforeseen dis:.t'\lcrs. and WHERF:AS cun-cnt emergency plans propose that senwr citizens and other special needs persons who cannot 1mmed1ately evacu-ate be lelt behind m the event of a nuclear accident be given potassium 1od1dc which only protects the th)'roid against radioactive iodim*. lea\'tng. them susceptible to contamination by other dangerous radiuactive products released during an accident or act of sabotage: and such plans a<:sume these valuahle members of our communities are expendahle. a discrimina1ory policy which vio-lates their civil rights: and WHF.RE \S huildmg more nudear power plants will result in mcrcased amounts of hazardous radioactive nuclear wastes for which there is no SAfF storage availahlc for the forcsccahlc fumrc and if not properly transponcd. stored or disposed of will he polcnlially dangerous to many future generations: and WHEREAS rhc NRC ts the federal agency pnmarily responsible for regulating the nuclear power industry consistent with public safety. health and welfare: and WHF.JU:A~ the NRC Otlicc of the lnspccior General has released a report titled "NRC Failure to Adequately Regulate" confinning tht: agency falls shon in its effons to regulate the nuclear industry in a manner that assures public safety : and WH ERE.\S the NRC has prcvmusly interfered with efforts of its employees and other concerned persons who have d1sdose<l serious problems with the nm.:lcar power industry.
TJU:REFOIU: we the people of:
YOUR GROUP OR TOWN NAME HERE
The following information concerns a decision made on November 9, 1989 by NRC Law Judge, Ivan Smith of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board regarding New Hampshire Seabrook Nuclear Plant's Emergency Evacuation Plan.
This is just another example of the Quotes 1-5 (enclosed page 2) We The People received from Brave NRC whistleblowers who stated, "Whenever safety allegations come into the NRC, which may pose a threat to the further operation or licensing of a nuclear plant, those allegations are penciled away." These NRC quotes were also given into evidence during my oral and written testimony I presented at the NRC Hearing December 18, 2013 which included a large packet of information and letters sent to Michelle Obama which the White House signed for but not replied too by the First Lady.
On November 9, 1989, Judge Ivan Smith's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board reached a decision on New Hampshire's Seabrook Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. The decision spoke directly to the Appeals Board's, (established in 1972) order to reconsider Radiological Emergency Response Plan ability to evacuate handicapped, schoolchildren, and transients at local beaches. The appeal came two days before Judge Smith's decision. Judge Smith order implied the appeal Board's decision did "not preclude the immediate issuance of a license for Seabrook station" because changes in New Hampshire's emergency plan could "be readily and promptly taken."
Despite the fact MA Attorney General, James Shannon promised another appeal, the NRC decided on November 20, 1989 they would settle all future licensing disputes over Seabrook Nuclear Station. Case closed. In the words of Edward M. Kennedy "the rogue agency that lives by its own set of pro-industry rules would decide the safety of the American people." Representative Peter Kostmayer called it an "extraordinary action and a further example of "the steady erosion of safety standards enacted by Congress/"
During this time I gave Peter Kostmayer Legal aid, John A. O'Donnell evidence of Counterfeit Substandard Parts built in most U.S. Nuclear Plants including Seabrook. At this time Rep. Kostmayer's staff was investigating allegations of cover-ups of safety concerns at the Nile Mile Plant in NY by then former NRC Executive Director, Victor Stello. These findings were proven and Rep. Kostmayer publicly went against President Bush's nomination of Victor Stello to become Assistant Secretary of Energy under Watkins. Due to Mr. Kostmayer attempts to expose corruption inside the NRC, he was not reelected. Mr. Kostmayer top legal aid John A. O'Donnell chose not to investigate the bogus parts Scandal and instead went on to have a successful career as a Nuclear Lobbyist. See NRC quotes# 4.
Like NRC employees, Politicians while in office have their political war chests filled by Nuclear lobbyists go on and work in the Nuclear Industry or become Lobbyists.
For further clarification or comments please contact me at scomleysr@yahoo.com
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_,...........-"'Sfe~~Comley ~~~f We The People, a Whistleblower Organization.
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We The People, Inc.
- - - - - - - - - - o f the United S t a t e s - - - - - - - - -........
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1. "Seabrook is in the wrong location."
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2. I f the people 1 et Seabrook open, it is their own fault."
But the NRC has not been playing a fair game. 0
3. I said "What do yu mean? 11 "Whenever safety allegations come into the NRC, which may pose a threat to the further operation or licensing of a nuclear plant, those allegations are pencilled away."
4. "Members of the NRC are mostly engineers so they do not rock the boat because the only place to go after working for the NRC is to work in the industry."
5. "Over the years I have looked at how rotten our agency is in my view. How pro-industry it is. Hey look, if they play it straight and you get stuck with your plant, so be it. Does that make sense? You may not like it but that is the American way, the majority rules. But when I see a system that is designed to thwart the majority or keep the majority ignorant and then one day it happens and you wonder how it happened .. That is not fair .. That is what turned me off. It is a shame to make you think you are getting a*voice ... "
6. When a member of the NRC staff was demoted he went to the present chairman and asked "Why?". He was told "What do you expect when you talk about your boss."
7. "The NRC protects the industry more than they protect the people."
8. "We will have a nuclear disaster in the U.S. worse than Chernobyl. It can happen any day because of the way our plants have been constructed and the way they are run." Confirmed by NRC Bulletin 88-05.
(NRC Bulletin 88-05 confirmed existance of counterfeit substandard parts in U.S. nuclear plants across the country.)
Main Office: Box 277, Rowley, MA 01969, (508) 948-7959 SO Court St., Plymouth, MA 02361, (508) 746-9300 National Press Bldg., 14 & F. Sts., N.W., Washington D.C. 20045, (202) 628-6611 Offices S & 6, 3 Pleasant St., Concord, NH 03301, (603) 228-9484 Bayberry Village, Route 9, Kennebunk, ME 04043, (207) %7-5111
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By Steve Haberman tially reported no problems and Nu-
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Hampton Bureau Chief c:!ear Regulatory
Commission in-spectors at first closed the matter, the HAMPTON - A congressional Seabrooknuclearplanthashadton:-
~pon has confirmed that nearly place two safety-related pipe flanges
~
two-thirds ofnuclearpower plants in that did noc meet federal standards, this country arc operating with. or officials said yesterday." .
have received, parts not meeting fed- In an Oct. 4, 1988 Jetter to anti-
~.._,
eral safe:y standards. . Se:ibrook aaivist Stephen B. Com*
According to The Associated ley of the whistleblowers* group We
Press, in a recently released r:eport The People, Thomas Murley, then the General Accounting Office dir~tor of the office of Nuclear
.f9un_d pg~-:"Comp!ying,f~~n~rs in at .E.eaaor Rirg~~tion wro~ ".I ~
'**** ,,.,. 'fi.i?tJ2*ot 1'1~ liccnsi:id, plants. The "*yotircon'!-£rfF.CbOufthe*1otential use~..
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office defined fasteners as any type of substandard piping :fixtur= ~nu-**
~f.u~ ~rew or bolt. It found some clear power facilities: .1'hctdore, of lhese substandard fasteners in- NRC : issued NRC B'ulletin* No.
$tilled in systems needed co* shut 88-05 and Supplemenu I and 2
_*~ down the reactor in the case of an ac- thereto ro inform applicaurs a:
-~ * . .' cidenL No specific nuclear facili?cs licensees *oc this ~tial problem.* . f'
. were named in the repon.. The Seabn:iok Station liCensee re.-
~
Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich.* had called on the the office tO identify in-viewed the Seabrook SWioo ~ .
struction records in accordance wiih.
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- ~* . .. SWJCeS in which the Nuclear R.egu- ~requirements of the~ Uld *
'1::~~i. Wery* Comrtdssioo foun~ pfsm sup-
suppler.nf:%1ts, a:.od. ~-:rm.*;
~-...~,... pliers .provided ~on...eonforming" *: ~69 sllspect ~ were-~.*
:* pans. .. . m the Seal:rook Umt 1 plw. A re- .
The rcpon stated the Nuclear port of the llcensee* s rovkw. *wu Reaulatory Commission was "defer- submitted t0 NRC on Aug. 25, 1~
ring its regulatory. responsibility." and is cwrently being reviewed by by not acting aggressively enough to the NRC staff, ~ appllcm must
=
oversee the paru. .
dcmonstratetothesati.Sfacdo11oft&e
.Regulatory .commission* spoke$- NRC staff that all of tbCSC! suspei:t '.
man *Joseph Foucha.rd mponded . fixture! provide an acceptable level
. ~t, ..We h~IVe applied enormous of quality and safety. . ..
~
rnan:lgement attention to this issne. ..You also expres.~ a concern re.
We have issued any number of advi- gardi.ng the thoroughness* of tbe soricstotbeutiHties.Atthispointwc licensee's iospcction to dct=mine haven't found anything that we that *counterfeit' bolts were not built would consider a serious safetY into Seabrook Station." rbc Mwiey problem." . letter continued. 1bc licensee's ini* 1 Besides fasteners. the office re- tiaJ inspection ... determined that the port fisted pipe fittings, pumps, fastcne1' used in Seabrook Station
"1
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fuses. valves and circuit-breakers as we(e acceptable.
some ofthe noncomplying pan$cur- "The NRC reviewed the inform.a.
rcmly in use in operating U.S. nu- tion submitted by the Seabrook Sta:;
cleat plantS. tion licensee ... and concluded that Seabrook Stntion officials hiJvc the :ictions r~en by the Ji~nsee consistently <lcnfou Lhc existence o( were both' complete and adequate.
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~
n)' substandnrd parts in 1heir nu- and that the fasteners installed in cleufi:icility. A Dec. I0, 1989 article Scal>rook Srntion arc accept.able for published in ;i nu~ltlll paper, how- their intended use," the lelter ever, reported 1h;1t. "Thuui;h ir ini- ..:ununucd.
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DeUvered The Region's Largest New~paper .,.
11;: Toil~y
aster & Co., Inc., Publishers DOVER, N.1-1., SATURDAY MORNING, November 12, 1.994 ESTABLISHED 1 Comley* group slams NRC for issUing waivers
{"p) -: Th~ Nuclear
, . CONCOllD *w The report also said lhe NllC did Hegulalory Conm11ss1on du\ not en* not routinely follow up to make sure force its safety rec1 uirement~ ro~* nu- The 340 waivers include tour at* the :,:1 the. problem that prompted the clear reactors more than 340 tunes * * * :J waiver was corrected or that a plant since 1!l!l0, consumer a1\vocacy Vermont Yankee plant In Vernon, Vt.; . was penali:r.ed, if 11ee1led. It also 6-o.,o groups allege.
"The agency is more interested in
~eeping the indus_Lry ~!ive_ h;: lgnu1*-
th
. ree a tS b k*
ea fOO ' all WO a Yankee in Wiscasset Maine.
dt t Matne*
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found shortcomings in how \he paperwork lracltetl lhe waivers.
lls reco111me111lalions fur improve-
_.:.....-< 111g safely reg11lal1ons, s:iul Stephen Cumley, head of We The People, Inc., which was organjzed uul uf op-
.. 1 111e11l were inclurled iu lhe N It C's lask force report, which suggested sume immediate changes of its own "OI'~ position lu New Hampshire's Seabrook nuclear plant.
denl oul there wailing lo happen and lhey are waiting lo react, not lo pre-aml an NllC task force reviewed how lhe policy was implemented: from as l9ng-range improvements are drafted.
Al issue are Notices of lt:uforce- vent," Comley said of the NRC. March of lost year, when the :policy. It said the NHC staff overstepped me.nl Discr.elion, essentially NRC The Nader group's rej)Orl ;ug11e1l was revised lo .June uf this year. ils discretion in allowing some plants waivers cles1gned to allow a plant to Uie NllC was too solicitous of the nu- The Inspector General followed the lo start reactors under waivers.
wail lo fix something 1hal doesn't clear indusll'y. adm inislrnlive channels; w,1elher "While lhe staff's determina.1 ions meet regulations IC lhe situation will "The NllC's .actual motivation is lhe agency followed ils pap~rwork in such cases did not delracl from nol cause any danger. based on allempling lu maintain the guidelines in granting 49 o( 1the 04 safely, the higher standard required Public Citizen, a Washington, D.C.- financial viability of the industry il is waivers granted in the three monlhs for plants in startup was not based non-profit group founded by supposed to regulate," the report it reviewed. lls review was prompted achieved," an NllC memo su11111H1*
Ralph Nader in 1971, released a re- said. "It appears Lhal complying hy concerns raised by Comley's ri7.ing the report said.
port lhis week accusing lhe NRC of wilh safely regul<1lions is too costly gruup.
The task force found lwo instances abusing ils discretion. Also, lwo NH.C ) for the nuclea 1* industry."
The N llC tm;k force
ioo~ed al in which NllC staH a_ppeared lo al\pw studies released by Com_ley's ~roup An NH.C spokesma1~ disputed lhe whether there w~1*e sound technical plants to op~rale w1t~1 p!*oble111s ~or reasons for grantm~ lhe 84 waivers.
K suggest lhe agency was 111cons1slent in implementing lhe policy.
The :1411 waivers include four at the Vermonl Yankee* plaut in Vernon, Nader group's conclus1on.
"The prime directive of the NllC is lo make sure plnnls
opernle safely and protect lhe publii;. and lhe work-The IG said lhe NRC generally cum plied with its admlnlstrni\ve pro-
.cedures, with some shorlcon1lngs. ll 1.oo long while a wa1ve1 was be1,ng considered. ll found lhe pracl1ce "inappropriale" and "unaccepl-ahle." . . . . .
Vl.; lhree at Seabrook; and two at ers froru excessive radiation duses. said I.he NllC dill nol specl,ly how Comley sa11~ rev1ew111g a lrncl1on Maine Yankee in Wiscasset, Maine. So we would never allow a plant lo long waivers that affect amei\ding a u[ the 3411 waivers was nol enough.
K The lhree reai:tors al Millstone, continue lo operate In an unsafe con- plant's operating license coulfl be in lle'd like lo see all .of lhem reviewed.
Conn., led the list, Wllh 15 inciclenls. dilion," said Breck Henderson, an effect and did not address condlliuns "We're not lalkmg about General "Whal it ;ill adds up lo is lhere is NRC public arrairs officer. that would allow a plant lo~.i;~arl up Motors here, we are talking ab<!ul p**obably, wilhoul a doubl, an acd- Tho U.S.""""'" Gonornl'* ollke while a""'"' W*; in offeet:*l \ nudm poweo* pl*nlo."
FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT WE THE PEOPLE Call 508-948-7959
... 35 cents*-**--
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50 cents outside 30-mllil tone Thursday """';;:;:;~:;~::=;::*6;;~~;:;~;;;";:g;7i ii.
1' I)'. I ':* ... i 1 ' .. _,, ,*. .' *:: 'II 18 THE BOSTON HERALD, HIURSlJAY, AUGUST 10, 1994
. . -,. f ) ,' PUblic safety said to*:~e'f'. t risk with new nuke inspeCtio~ policy x
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CONCORD, N.H. - A new 111speClo1* General D1Lvli.F:* "'l'ho la duslry le l11ldng 11 govcrnmenl policy on nucleur Wllllume said tho ch1111ge has *
wall nnd
cc ntlllude on these plnnl lnepecllons nllows plnnln "slg11Ulcn11l en(oly. lmpllc11~-
counlerfo~t pnrls: 'H eomethlng lo 1mlloo lho11111olvo1, ornullng n ll111111." . * '- l1ronl111, ~ 'II lh< ll,'" Comloy lhroul lo public sa(oly, en.ye n l11nle1ul o( 11 progrn111
l1i. j HtLld. "'l'hr o Miio lnlrmd nml
' ,, Jongllmo crlllo o( nuoloa1* eufo* llllllll? 11ut*o 11u.clpur plru1l11 huv.o :lUhon1ubyt lmvu cunflrmmJ lhnl
, ly. .. . . procedures lo cheolt lho qunlll;){-
hlndslght 1 cgulnllon lo nol nc-
"IL - confirms what we've o{ commerclul pO.rls, lho NH.C (!eplable *r*' American nelghbor-x known for a long* time," said now .lnnpecle onfoly-relaled ?*!hoods, ,.'*
Blophon Comley, founder o( Wo 1mrl11 IC they full 01* ll lhoro IR iu1_*;j_ Al So: broolt, epoltosmnn Tho People lno. "We've boon allognllon lhoy
11ro eulmlai** * . Dil v Id B* r onld pnrle bought*
trying lo got tills lnfor11rnllo11 dnnJ, Wllll1u11e snl!). * * :-*i:ommoro.l lly, as opposed lo oul for sevou yonrs." llo cnlled lhc policy change,.;. those ape~ llcnlly approved (or Tho policy o1111ngo,
high* unj1111lHlcd, dung NRC roporl~ :: 111!cloar~ ,an.Coty. uso,. nro llghlod ~n n orlllo~l g~vo~nmonl l thnl ohowod 11 rilmllnr lovol .o( :_:_; choolrn,d orouKhly IJoCoro bo-rop<>rl~ 1!1sl. monlh,. l',o~nxoe pro- llllrln,11roblomo In 101H and 10112'** Ing U1Jod.1i1*~
grnme *aimed opeclllcally 11.l 1111 In 1086*8U, when they wore)* ~*wo pu thom through very provcmllng aubslnndnrd 111u*l11 doo111od lo hnvo "slg11lf!c1uit* * .-l1{ornu11 l~ oln lo documonl, thoy from being uood *at pla~1le. nnfoly l111pl1_11all911e." NltC m. rm-: ." mr.el \ho .i~lnudnnle,"* ho .a11ld.
'rhe Nudloat':*nogulalo1*y ngere 1llld elnrf no.Id lho 111111*112 * .. "Wo lmoW* ho nllmdnrdn rmd we Comml1111lon'e lnepeolor.gouornl Umllnff" woro not "nu.Coty elgnl.-* 11.ro m.oellllg thom."
(ound .lho ngonoy did nol JunlUy l(,l1111t."... :
In 19901.tho Oovurnmonl J\u*
I '* lho ohnugo In 1990 and. llml Urn~ ~;'WJl-llnme' -rovlow w1rn-. counllng_{)mco looltcd Into lho ngo11cy did
not tell
Congrcsn ~rompfml lJy colnplalnts (rum pnrln pro~lem *1111d reported nl about It, breaking a promloo lo Comley und hlo group, bnacd ln- hmsl '.12 ';rluclcnr phmlo either conduct rogular* lnspocllono t Rowley, Mnne., In lho nl111dow*or 1*1 .hnd rocel~cd or wol'c euspoctod uncover
countorColl and sub* New H1l1npshlro'8 Benbroolt nu-._ : o( having ~ocolvcd aubetnndnrd standard parls. clonr plnnl. ..... amrlo. ::
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FRIDAY, JULY 29, 1994 75¢ (S 1.00 CANADIAN{.
THE CHRISTIAN s*crENCE MONITO\
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I PILGRIM NUCl.EAA PLANT: Sajety adiiocates say the lVRC's failure to protect whistle-bl.oWm a.t 71':4 will add to concerns oj wor'reer; ai ]Yrivate utiiiiies, such as the Pil.grim Nuclear Plant i'n Plymouth, Mass. (above):
l I Jn a j\1 onitor exclusive, the NRG admits I _it told TV:4 utility the names of employees I .* who warned of problems at atomic plants 1
Whistle-Blowers II Betrayed by Nuclear Agency on Saf etv Risks
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1 II By John Dillin thority (TVA). The NRC regulators' actions vio-lated federal policy protecting whistle-blowers, who are a major source of vital information about Stcff\:....t;;er of The Christion Science Monitor safety risks at nuclear power Stations across the
=======wASHINGToN======= United States.
The inspector general's revelation could seri-HE Nuclear Regulatory Commission ously erode public confidence in the NRC, which T (NRC) - watchdog of America's nuclear power industry - has routinely blown the cover of wh.is-Je-blowers who revealed safetV is frequently charged by safecy advocates with being too cozy with the multibillion-dollar nuclear industry.
problems at nuclear planr.s.
David Williams, the NRC inspector general.
An investigation by the NRC's inspector gen- says the regulatory agency failed to abi~e by a*
eral has discovered that NRC officials were rurn- fozmal memorandum of understanding between' ing over whistle-blowers' identities to one of the NRC and TVA's Office of Inspector GeneralJTVA-nation *s largest utilities. the Termessee Valley Au- See WHISn.E-ELOWER page 4
1\
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WHISTLE-BLQWERfrqm personally waiv~ tbeir conndentiality.
page 1 job or a woman lose her home ... you wonder,
'How much did I contribute to it?' I feel very OIG), The tr1em,0 randum requires that whistle- guilty that I helped contribute, possibly, to these blower names be con.ceal.ed unless individuals people's misery."
How did this happen? In the 1970s, TVA In a teport ;marked * "Official Use Only" launched the largest nuclear-power building pro-
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dt\tain~d b,y,Jl\~ MOnit()r,. lvfr.~ Williams wrote that gram in the nation, with 17 plants \lllder con-
~~... N.?.<3; t?ffi:~eo.or**rnv.~~oriS di5cl£?sed t<> struction .. Even after later scaling back its plans, TVA-OIG' ~. ~out the individuals' consent or TVA maintained one of the r1.at.ion~s principal knowledge. ..,: Jd~r#ties of al:legers. who believed nuclear ccinSti:uC:tion prog:riins. *..;* * .* . . .
their identities woilld'be held* confidentiar. . ~ As work accelerated, so did. complhlntS about AftertumihgnarnesovertoTVA-OIG, the NRC the quality of"construction, and about pOsSible also failecLtofollow through.to make slire safety safety problems. Constructing a nuclear plant problems cited: by whistle-blowers were properly requires highly-trained. cra.(t5:m.en;: and insiders investigated and correctec4. W.tlJiams found. say it was difficult. to find. enough people with the Stephen. Comley;" founcier of We the People right skills. . * .**.*.* . > .*
Inc., a nuclear whlStl~lower protection or-
NRC, which has only .:five. investigators in "ani.zation im'Rowiev; Mass** TVA's regicingftheeountzy, Wa5
ays he Wa5 riotr;

suzi>~edbS **unable to hanclle a:lLthe accusa-the inspector~generars report~ . 'r° ha. d . ke..n..*,'th_.. e. se.... Pe. o. pfe tions
..*.'.t.. a of safety problems.
He sayS'::r~l~*iSJ;:jtist;;a Meanwhile, in 1985 TVA set small. tmderneny' 'of:.* wnat~~f to {the*:Nudear up its own inspector-general of-been going *on. inside the Regulatory C:ommission] fice to probe allegations about agency for: years. Now . we safety and other matters ..
have, in * '* *
wh at all o f ; us in goodfcith, an. d .t. hey
wiati.ng, Anxious to get on top of the have s~ed'for so* fong~.. [NRCJ were conspiring problems, NRC signed a memo-
"The ~_Q~,.is more; inter;.* wtth TVA to shut us up 1 randiirn of understanding with ested ini'..premotmg: nuclear. * * * * ' TVA*s inspector general on..Jan.
power thAft,gukdingthe-safefy. * * ,,.~-inn Harris, 11, 1991. The purpose was to of the Arn'ericiil,public:>
TY:A whistle-blower share responsibility when.NRC's What interests- Mr. Comley
s-...aff was overwhelmed with and others outside the agency cases. Williams says four things is not only that NRG would reveal the names of went wrong.
whistle-blowers, but also that there was a private First, despite a provision that requires NRC to NRC-TVA pact to share information involving first obtain permission to name a whistle-blower safety allegations. to TVA, at least 11 whistle-blowers were revealed:*
Although the pact includes provisions protect~ The NRC official responsible for contacts with ing the na,m,es,ofw.histle-blowers, it has been rou- TVA told WJ.lliams that,. until one year ago, he did I. :
tineW i.griore<l:t- ..., *... ..c i:t~.H~~~B--:t!A'!~e-blower who has now not realize that the names had to be con:fidential.
Second, NRC failed to regularly review matters I gone:pubJiC-~.sayS:sl:le<~ trying to* work within turned over to TVA., and fu:forrnation developed thej'~~'tW:h~~~she "took safety complaints by TVA iiwestigawrs was not routinely used for abo **. * *1\;'t{i:th&NRC~..:A.t the time Mrs. Harris enforcement-
. . ~~~¥atts:Bar.:nuclear;plau~.m:~,.;-c.,: Thif~;-NRC sometimes nill.l~~q*w.histle-blowers esseiFas.c'~Uhlt'supei:ViSor of electrtdti engi~., byrailing to eiPiain tne:aiffererice* between "i~=- -
ne"...ringfa constructiom,;. tity protection" and "confidentiality." The latter "I did ask NRC to keep my name confidential; offers more protection for those worried about and'l thought I had that. promise. I guess I'm the retribution.
origilla.l duntmy," she says;. Eventually, Harris Fourth, NRC failed in some early instances to rea.Ched an out,of-cQurt..settlement with TVA. protect whistle-blowers' identity when faced with
_ Wb#:.~~:Pe/#a.Ily:3.I1.ge~* Harris is that she led Freedom of Information Act requests, contrary to other TVAemployee5:With.safety concerns into general NRC practice.
the arnl.S:o[the NRC"Offke of Investigations. Despite his criticism of NRG; Mr: Comley "Ifutdtakeij,'.thesepepple to NRC fu good faith,. praises Williams: "I'm glad to see that there's and they [NRC} were COI1$piring with TVAto shut somebody in Washington listening to the people us up," she charges. "I felt just devastated that I of this councry and listening to these courageous could have unwttt:ingly contributed to these [whistle-blowers]. I have to commend Mr. Wtl-people 's further abuse by TVA." Iiams and his s--...aff on challenging the agency and She continues: "When you see a man lose his holding them accountable."
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1994 n<!L5lo e
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fSmling US removes a gag from Seabrook critic I emovesgag ,aSEABROOK Continued from. Page29 the welds could not be determined.
But in January 1984, when
. National Aeronautics and Space ministration's space shuttle, found Ad-1 I
romcritic '
. li.
'F. The heanng could c.y and u~enforceable.
0
?en the way Wampler raised questions about the welds with .man.ageme_nt, he was fired. Technical mspections by the
'Other neople . . .
will .a.
c.ome orwar f, d that his business was drying up. "As soon as a client found out w.?o i am, I alt of a sudden, no contract,
he said i f Seabrook Jor :Wampler to be paid da~ages, but it also could reveal new evidence 3:.bout whether nuclear safety q~es-NRC and congressional investiga-tions followed.
With Safety concerns now that yesterday. "I've lost two houses, and !
a wife. hecause of this,, ..
In an effort to preseive his pnva- i
. I By John Milne _tions had. ~een covered up. Antinu- Records deemed faulty We knOW they Cfill cy until the hearing, Wampier yes- l GLOBE STAFF ;fiear actlVlsts h~ve cont_ended t~1at In 1991 the NRC found that sev-. be protected.' terday de~lined to identify t:he mid- !
. puclear plants v.1thheld mformabon era! welds did not have the proper western city where he now lives. I CONCORD, N.H. - Ten years Irom the US Nuclear Regulatory X-ray documentation and the agen- STEPHEN COMLEY But in 1990, backed by Stephen
r Joseph D. Wampler was fired C?mmission and ~hat t~e NR~ itself cy fined Seabrook's ~revious opera- Nuclear safety activist Comley, a Rowley, l\.fas;. nuclear raising* safety concerns at the misled congressiona~ investigators tor, New Hampshire Yankee, safety activist, Wampler and his iaw-brook nuclear power plant, the about nuclear ~af~ty issues. $100,000 for failing to keep properly yer* filed a motion with the. Labor Labor Department has ruled Pullman-Higgins Co., the Sea- documented X-rays. Backus, a longtime opponent of the Department, see~fog lo reopen the ;
he ca.n tell his side of the *story brook subcontractor that was Seabrook spokesman Rob Wil- plant. settlement. ~eic.h considered the i 1ublic. . I Wa~pler's ~mploy~r, filed a Fe~. 28 Iiams said that North Atlantic Ener- But Wampler could not openly case early this year _and concluded The Feb. 14 decision by Secre- j mo~on _asking i

-e1ch to recon_sider, gy Corp., the plant's current opera- provide information to opponents. that the settl~me~t violated the En-
, of Labor Robert B. Reich, ob-
saying it nev~r mtended !-° pi event tor, "wants to emphasize that there On March 20, 1984, shmtly after his ~gy Reorgamzat10n _Act of 1974, de-ed by the Globe
yest.erd ay, as- Wampler,
' a licensed
. .. quality control was never an. issue of plant safety, fimng,
wamp1er and puII man- H.1g- signed .. to protect wh1stleblowers.
ied Administrative Law Judge ~nspector, from rrusmg safety co~- and the quality of the wel?,s th~m- gins reached a settlement 'in which To the extent that this pro~1s~on id W. Di Nardi in Boston to hold . cerns. The comp;my's lawyer, Mruk selves has been confirmed. -*Dunng the company aid his lawyers' fees could ?e construed as re~trictmg lie hearings expected to b *
T. B~th, wouldn t return phone calls the plant's 1991 refueling, the ques- d d p t to b. kb h. complamant from voluntanly corn-
e m eking ,,,....... . t . an agree no 1ac a11 un . . d 'd' . "
~mouth Uris summer :se
iw ui_er commen
tioned welds were reexammed and .thi th . d t.
h mumcatmg an provi mg iniorma-Reich in h'15 .- * * . "It'
. s bee n a .ong me,"wll!TIP1e1.
1 ti. . .
new X-rays made, W1lhams srud. . WI n
. .. . e m . us cy. 0 ne
. . paragrap . " d al .
t10n to any ie er or sr,ate govern-
.a March decision~ reveal~ '* s_rud m a tel?phone interview. "I ~eel ~e. investigation led to an in- srud, nei~eI party will_ dis~lose the ment agenci~s, it is void a.<; contrary out-of court_ ~t 1984 like the weight of a 40-foot trailer speotioirat the Watts Bar nuclear facts of this case :xcept tf 01 dered to to public policy and unenforceable,"
.

~~ed W~~ler from dis~ has been lifted fr?m my shoulders." power pla.r1t in Spring City, Tenn., do so by co~~ ~b~n~ or agency of Reich wrote. . ..
iru0 r~ case ~u~~d~, or even vol ' ; . _Wampler's firing ~uched off one where substandard welds were con:~tent Jtms?iction.
1 Comley hailed the dec1s10n, say-
. Y P es~ritlng*-sf et! concerns .; of the most contentious regulatory found, and the Tennessee Valley Au- Wampler ~rud afterw:ird he had ing: "\Ve have other people who will 00
~. ~e~.~~rs. ei~h label~d !\disputes. ~uring R. t.he construction of thority spent $50 million on repairs. been.coerced 1~to- accepting .the set- come forward '.vith safety concerns, P OViS ~n ,. ~o_ntrary 'to: J?µblic ~he $6 billion reactor. Wampler con- Wampler became a hero to the tlemenl He sru.d it barred hun from now that we know they can be pro-
. SEAB1WOK, Page 33 tended that 20 percent of the 2,669 activists who maintained nuclear voluntarily raising nuclear safety tected." .
!safety-related welds at Seabrook power was inherently unsafe and concerns even with the NRC. Asked whether he would do the were either defective or improperly that the Seabrook reactor was sub- Wampler, who had worked as a same thing if he had the chance,
documented - X-rays used* for standard. "He's our original Sea- quality-control inspector for such Wampler said, "Yeah, I'm probably oackup were flawed and the safetv of brook whistleblower." Raid Rnhflrt. A. othP.r hiirh-nrnft)p nrniPC't~ ll~ t.hP c:hmirl onnmrh tn rln ;t ~i! "'~-'**"
In October, th~ NRC's office of Inspect~r General - an in-
~

** dependent investigating arm of the NRC - decided to look into what happened. Late last month, the inspector general
~------------------:*m Wednesday, January 17, 1996 issued his report. Here's an excerpt from it:
~eene. ' ~entinet "The investigation determined that the NRC headquarte~s staff had p*1:NION PAGE several opportunities to review the Millstone Unit 1 refueling practices and the heat removal capability of the spent fuel pool cooling system; however, the staff did not conduct an adequate evaluation relate:! to dited by Guy MacMillin the capabilities of the spent fuel pool cooling system.
"The OIG (Office of Inspector General) investigation developed evi-eene, New Hampshire Established in 1799 dence that NU operated Miijstone Unit 1 outside of its design basis.
OIG found that the NU practice of offioading the entire core at 150 hours0.00174 days 0.0417 hours 2.480159e-4 weeks 5.7075e-5 months or less during normal refueling outages ... had not been ona-lvzed. *
"The OIG investigation also determined that the licensee may have
ditorial violated the operating license for Millstone Unit 1 because of a failure to operate in accordance with its technical specifications. One proce-dure required by the technical specifications is for the operation of the Is it safe now? spent fuel cooling system. OIG uncovered information which indicates that for approximately 10 years, in order to handle the heat load from a full core offioad, reactor operators at Millstone Unit 1 operated the The dispute over* refueling practices at Northeast Utilities' soent fuel pool cooling system in a configuration that was not covered uclear-power plants came to a head recently, t~a~ks. to. a* by a plant operating procedure."
tinging report by the Nuclear Regulatory Com.m1sswu 5 m- Embarrassed by that report, NRC Chairwoman Shirley P~.ctor general and _an NRC policy review. Both. are wel- Ann Jackson has now ordered NRC staff members to re-ex-
. come, but hardly reassunng*. They amine all their monitoring practices at nuclear-power plants.
Once again, a may. however, lead to improved Arid yesterday, NU announced an overhaul of the company'E nuclear safety at the NU nuclear pfants. nuclear organization, including the establishment of an Of-As, is too often the case with fice of Nuclear Safety and Oversight.
whistleblower nuclear-safety matters, the NU That's the good news. The bad news - incredible in light has been problem was discovered by an of the good news - is that in December the NRC changec.
proven correct. outside whistleblower, not by the Millstone's operating license to allow the plant to do what il nuclear industry o: by the NR~,
he agency that's supposed to protect public safety. ~s
\Vasn't supposed to have been doing for the past 10 years: un-load all the radioactive fuel at once. The order does contain r thistle was blown last summer by We the People, an ~rgaru- few additional safety precautions that NU must now take.
ati9n in Rowley, Massachusetts. It charged that, ~unng re- *So, is it now perfectly safe to unload full nuclear fuel coreE ll¢ling operations at the Millstone 1 nuclear plant m Wate.r- at one time? Unfortunately, there's nothing in the NRC's be-
ird. Connecticut, NU routinely placed more hot fue.l rods 1? havior in this and other similar cases to reassure the publi(
he plant's cooling pool than were authorized by Millstones on that score. Thank goodness for whistle blowers.
perating license. Later, similar allegatio~s were made about ther NU plants, including Seabrook Station.
A nuclear engineer at Millstone 1, defying his bosses, went
,ublic with his opinion that these cooling pools are not ~e igned to absorb that much heat that quickl~. So,. he said, here was the potential for a truly catastrophic accident ev-ry time the fuel unloading took place. .
As we reported in this space at the tune, NU ev'.mtually
.dmitted it was indeed putting entire fuel cores. into the 1ools. But the company said the procedure - which saves n.illions of dollars every time a plant is shut down - had 1een permitted by NRC inspectors at the plants.
FOR MORE INFORMATION ABOUT WE THE PEOPLE
. ,tone violation
.-...._gs NRC review JI ii ment," spokeswoman Deborah Beau-By John Milne GLOBE STAFF champ said.
The concern arises when a nucle-The top US nuclear power regu- ar power plant is refueled. For the lator has ordered a nationwide re- last 13 refuelings - including the one viei,v of nude~ safety regulation currently under way - Millstone has after learning that a Connecticut re- removed all the radioactive fuel in actor openly violated its license for the reactor to permit repairs. 1"ne al:!* Jo.ng as* a decade without objec- highly radioactive fuel rods, which tions fJ:or.n inspectors. are also hot in temperature. are
' In am~rno obtained yesterday by stored under water in a spent fuel th~ Globe, NRC chairwoman Shirley pool on the site .
.*Ann Ja.ckson ordered the Nuclear Critics have said if too many fuel R~gula,tocy Commission staff to "re- rods are put into storage, the cooling examirte its oversig-ht and monitor- water could boil away and restart a
., . ing.'; Her Novembe'!- memo cited the chain reaction, which could lead to a failtire to note safety violations at catastrophic meltdo-w-n. Beauchamp Millstone Unit 1 in Waterford, insisted that during all 13 refuelings, Conn.. operated by ~ ortheast Utili- the temperature in that pooi has ti~~: never risen above 125 degTees. *'well Jackson acted at the same time below boiling."
that the agency's inspector general, Last month the NRC re\\TOte an independent investigator estab- Millstone's license to pennit a fuil-lished by federal law, concluded that core unloading during refueling.
.the. Millstone 1 power- plant had been But until then, since the plant be-unloading nuclear fuel from its reac- gan operating in the 1970s. its oper-tor all at once, though its license ating license had demanded a partial called for partial unloading. His re- unloading - no more than a third *JI port said NRC officials knew about the core at one time. In his reoort: '
the practice for a decade but never Robert A. \Vatk:ins. acting as:3i.Stani:
checked documents to see whether it inspector general for investigations.
was approved. concluded that ~U "may have 1-ioiat-Jackson's instruction gave ce- ed the operating license for :Ylill-dence to critics' assertions that the stone Unit 1 because of a failure w NRC, the federal agency assigned to operate in accordance with the tec!'i-ensure reactor safety, has tended to nicaJ speciiications."
favor utilities. Equa!Jy significantly, Watkins At another New England power concluded, the NRC inspectors who plant, Maine Yankee in Wiscasset, were supposed to ensure safety nev-Maine, an anonymous whistleblower er checked the licensing doc'.lmenrs.
has charged that the NRC failed to "Resident inspectors typically ob-enforce safety regulations. served one or two refueling outages Jackson's order is seen as a \icto- and they did not question the Licens-ry for nuclear safety activists. par- ee's practice of ofr1oading the entire ticylarly We The People Inc., a Row- core," he said.
ley, Mass., group which has publi- Higher-ups at NRC headquar-
-.""" wh,stleblowe,.,* crmmm " ters. Watkins said. had severai op- '
~stone operabons that created po1tunities to review the refueling sigrubcant nuclear safety concern m* but "the staff did not conduct a fullv Connecticut over the past year. adequate evaluation related rn the Hartford-based ~ ortheast Utili- capabilities of the spent fue~ pool ties. Millstone's .ope:rator, declined to cooling system."
discuss the findings until the full The NRC has beefed up its in-NRC reacts to the inspector gener- spection staff at Millstone and told al's report. the plant that before its return to "We'll be communicating with service, expected next month, it the NRC on this issue, and until then must provide updated safety infor-it would be inappropriate to com- mation.
>anelSees Anim~sify BehiXJ/ni,Jl~~niyuJieViifBi/-J;?fr~ *. *C***
By MATTHEW L WAlO
, ~£'natc coinmiuce said yesterday The committee 1 jn m1crn.t1 imestighliun aJ UJc Nu-
r ~~f:ulalory C'"ommlssiob of lf!Z"' 1.f mii;,*onduct by a higb-rank-said the 11Hic 1;1~ appcan*d mollv;ued as
.* h toy .. personal and prorcssional .investjga~on 111 .. ~11y** .as.by :my li'gitirnatcn<'cd.
lw 11n:l*i;ti;~:ulun lnvulvt'd a pay- wasted money.
111 of S(i,llfJ(J in c:ash to.° infO"rtnct, JpRutleafpJgntsground the C9YJ1.lrl n*p111111u:;ty r~*rordc:tl 1apes cir tcle- . ccording to l e Senate report.if1~
.n,* <111w<<'rsauuns and com~tssion .safely problems, had not adeq~ately , Information that Mr. Fortuna mlghl
nah lying to c*arh othc~, said a re- handled safely complaints ~r. Ellisoll hove disclosed lfllproperly to Mr. C<<>m-1 1,:;;u1-J by the. Senate Government badCJCpi"eS"Sed. , . Icy was that the former technlclan had
rauuns Comm1Ure. Among th~ panel s llndmgs Is that ln pleaded guilly to attempted sexual hl* imwsti~alinn has aroused inter-: seeking Information. derogatory lo Mr. abuse or a 13-year-old girl. It Js qot lit*r ause at was ap1lrovt.'11 by the Fortuna. Mrs. Connelly asked lbe-agen- clear what lnform1ttloq Mr. Comley
1missi11n's top Slaff official, Victor cy*s top lawyer U she could hire a11 (n- might have given Mr. Fottuna. .,
111, J 1
whom President Bush re:- formant as a consultant" and pay him' In the disputed lnvesllgatlon Mr. El*
1ty numlna1cd to be head of produc* for t!}formatfon and,lapcs of telcphon:e .
1 :11 1hc nation's troubled nuclear conversaUons. The lawyer told hcrtf.llit Uson, the Informant, was paid $6,000 .
and put up in a hotel near Washlngtonf' 1\tlS HUSf HA'Jt 1pnn.; romjlll'x. Mr. Slcllo has not she probabt.y could nol unless_ public n nmhrmed by the sm,.,te, but he heallh!ttnd safetywas*lnvolved. .
for two weeks whUe Mrs. Connelly and
two other staff members met w.llh him. . "5E.EtJ ~ ITE f rtl*J tht" job on an acting ba:sts last
k. lnforma~t's Allegadons Umlted ., . .
Mrs. Connelly gave him a code name and arranged her Vaca~lon for the Um.e UJEEK.
1 Senate Investigators.later ques~ 111eNarYn TiwM he was lJiere, the report sat,d. *
'Lack of Good Judgment: I the la~r...Wl\llam *Parler, tJJ~ com* Victor S.tello Jr. u ~ top-~nk- The commission has asserted thaC -
~nator John Glenn, an Ohio Dem~ mls.sloats &pr&I c:Ounsel, ahd he said ini:.stalt dffacial at the Nuolcar
Mrs. Connelly wanted to pay. him I who is chairman of the commiuee. that ln*hlnd1dghl he should have urged 1 the invesl igation showed **an un- the commission to subpoena the tapes R-~.ul toru* Commiiaion
. ~ a .o1
ap- rather. than subpoena the tapes be-causls Mr Elllson bi.d threatened to d&o mly lack .of good judgment'.' by rather lhan ~ay* for Uiem; the report provech $6.QOO-~ p&Y.m~t for stroy*the 'tapes. But* the senate report*
i-Jcvel staff members at t~e cona- 'Said. * ~Informer.In an intern.al c9m- sal'dthattherewun0evldencetorthal siun. which overse.!5 cjvlhan nu- The :report dot:!S not c:enter on Mr. mialon invesdption. *
and that "to the tonlrary, he was
,, planlS.
Steno. but lt'iays that~ ruled that &he . lhreatenln to*gopubUc.' ..
he mvestigatlon under scrutiny was informant might havellnforrnatlon OD & . .
~ucd by Sharon R. Connelly. then reactor sale,.y. The safety allegatlollS "-*UoM d by The Senate committee concluded dot the rommtssion's Office ot In:. the informant proVtdect were so.Jim- vesUgauon of the*~:.~ e lhatthe "1vesUgaUonwaaunfalrloMr,
1or and Auditor. against Roger lled. the Senate report satd. lhat "the 1una, then deputy director oflhe Of- case could equally ba made that this oflnvesligaUon. safety ratlorul.le moreprovldeda*con-wo yc.-ars ago, Mr. Fortuna testified venienl cover to do somelhlng lhal the ins1 Mrs. Connelly when she was N.R.C. general counsel had Otherwise used of trying to shiet4 her deputy lndlcaled couJd not b\! done - pulling n charges of seXUlll harassment. someone. on 'lhe payroll lo provide loo
=
w .
8 1
th;~c~!':ri: lllll lnvesUgattn&
. beiher M~:ifortuna Improperly dis*
r. lnfomiatlon about
~J't~°'ln anti-nuclear advo-orrecelved Information from the ca~ that he should have passed on NucJea R lato Fortuna, violated established prlncl-pies or Internal tnvestl,adons and shouldnothavesoheavllylnvolvedtop management. ~e tnvestlgaUon. lhe comllU~lee said, repJ!,SeDled a wastt of gov8n~t funds; the tnvestlga-tlon was iqcompelently . conducted,**
a-..
ate last year Mrs. Connelly, wtiose formation pertaining to an lni.mai af. to ~ ~ the r egu ry punctualed bt maoage".1ent lnlerven-re handles llte commission's lnle..., fairs Investigation." .m lion and olher problems.'
hw1*s1igations received a com** A spokesman for the commission. Jo- acUvlst. Stephen B* .COmley, bas **1n sum. we round very llllle reason nl about Mr. Fortuna from a (or- &epb:f°aµc"-rd. .said lhal his agency been subpoenaechnd ordered lo turn forthecourseofconductofthlsJnvestl*
,'"""'cl** .....
ctor. near Oswtgo. N.Y.
Nine - -~ Ila.I.-""' ... - -

1 w~studytrig it.
ml&hl .... .,__.........................Id.
~ween~mseJrandMr. Fortwia. Mr. Fouchard saJcl that the commls- .. r .
he former technicilm. Douglas Elli* A Jud&odtoseo b)'.Qle c:ommisslon41l .* ,~! Of RoWley, Mau., who slon could not comment furlher be-said Mr'. Fortuna. whoSe office ls lnvestlgile bas conduded.U.t Mr.~*
a groop,* We the People, hal cause lhe matter ls still under h'ltemal iionsible ior loo,king into reactor tunabilct41d!d app.roprlateJy In hJl.fn- nfe!!d.to CCIUfJor provld"e lapel~ lnveat1gat1o4
-f.~'
-:... *--~ .... -....
e.
The Chajrman and Executh'e CommUtee of the NaUonal Repubhcan SenatorjaJ CommUtee do on this second clay of August. in the year of our Lord, one thousand-nine hundred and ninetJl-one, hereby confer with all due circumstance and respect THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF l\!fERJT upon Mr. Stephen 'B. Comfey from the City of!J(ow{ey in the Commonweaftfi. of!Mas.sacfi.usett.s The said. in ivofthy qnd honest pursuit. has unequivocally earned this good and J7ig;~ tribute in recognition of their undying commitment. patriotic
IOJ'alty and dedication or service to the Prt>sident.
the Republican Party anct the United States ol'America.
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f A\
ti.0 Court says 1*
The NRC's rules against display
.NRC critic I of "visually disruptive posters or signs at its public meetings are a reasonable restriction, but it failed to
wronged
show that the actions against Com-ley wer.e "viewpoint neutral," Pratt wrote.
The court said NRC officials sin-gled Comley out, assigned security By James L. Franklin guards to monitor him at commis-GLOBE STAFF sion meetings, and at one point .
A federal judge has ruled that barred him from a meeting because
, the N ucleal' Regulatory Commi.ssion he was carrying a small. bag, al-
*violated the First Amendment rights ~hough other members of the public .
'of Steve Comley, a Rowley business- *were allowed into the room Carrying
man and longtime NRC critic, on briefeJlSeS, purses and similar items; sel"eral occasion8 when it barred or ** "It api;)ears tfu!,t NRC officials ejeeted him fto_m NRC m~tings.
treated Comiey dif!erentlffroin oth-The co~mission "prevented. fn' meeting attendees, and that :tbiS C91nley ~m e~ in proteeted differenee in treatment was ba8ed on
~ becaUSe they did not like hjj *** Comiets.views, whichnoaoiibtwe?e m~~ge,'* Jupge John H. Pratt of irritatmg and annoying," the cOUJ:t said. .
. the US Pistzict Comt for 'the Dis-
'.. ~.Of ColliJnbia wrote bl a *decision : ~t Hadley,. COinley'a att.o?-
n :oblierYe.d:* "nJe. 'IN.- .l-:..,;...i.
'~ Sept.- 19.' ' ' . ' '. '<('.:~*:, ,_.!!Tt./J ....... , , , . £'o\ID\' ...,AU-K:;UU
'* ~*tiThe co~ 'held that Comley's_ ~
ment _ii. not baaed on what govern* *
.. Pit of posters and btmlper stickers* ment ofticiala.find .distreeidng, Mr.
. ~g tHe mesS1ge, "Stop Ohen)q.. 9<>m1e)"s conduct was not diaruptive,
byl Here," at NRC hearings on the, and no one complained."
~ ~k ~d Pilgrim nuclear power ..* HadJey'said the d~on bolsters
plant.a "is~ protected speech under the First _Amepdment."
ilrgumenta that the NRO tmts. its critics JJlOl'e harshly than industry representatives.
I Robert A. Backu.a, a Manchester, * ;
N.H., attorney who has represented l
'It appears that Seabrook opRQ!lents for m~ than a \
'+ dozen years, said the deeisiop t *.
i '.
NRC* omclals showed the NRC has been less than treated Comley evenhanded~
"I don't think anybody other differently. from than NRC staff or license applicants other meeting ever thought tl!ey got a fidr. hear*
ing," he aaid; complaining of what he attendees, and that I,
this difference In descn'bed as the agency's "barely-disguised contempt for intervenors."
treatment was Joseph J. Fouchard, the NRC*s director of public attain!, eaid the based on Comley's agency is reviewi!'lg _.the decision.
views** **' 'I'
W.e dbn't permit sigriftoi baimers in NRC meetings, but we do rtot single JUDGE JOHN H. PRA'IT ! out individuals," he said.
US Diatrict Cout't
~ ..*. *
, I r
PRESIDENT OBAMA
CONGRESS* PRESIDENT PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY OBAMA PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRAC'Y
~CONGRESS§§§* PRESIDENT PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY OBAMA PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACl
~* . .-
/
Rowley, MA
flS!B-Wide Ca11_1pai~ .
apilllt US-Japanete donunatioa and aggres.Jron ofkia c/o ALUl-Office. 113F. Peort Daiichi Btdg..
99- l 4. Nishivto. Hirono-cho. Ujk:ity. Kyoto. Jo pan. 6 1i -0031 Otlkial Invitation Dear Mr. Stephen B. Cumley Sr..
We arc \'Ct)' glad to invill! you as a representative from the \Ve lbc Peopk. inc. of the Lniti:d States to 0\.11' August Peace Activitil!s both in South K<'n.:a on. August :2-5. 2014 and in Japan on August 5.9. 201..i..
We believe that the commiuncnt for building of peace is a very import.ant and urgent mattt"r for people who live in the Asia Pacific n...-gion.(\\'e arc witnessing. the ri~ing of military t~nsion and rapid military building*up in th~ rcgi~n n{l\\. ln foct. t11c $0-celh..'1.i 'CS pi,ot h>
Asia.Pacific' have brought aboul seriQ~ iinpacb to <liJTcr~nl ~untrics in lh~ region.
Rcprdi:na both of l.M ~\'emment.s of Soutli'-Korcn and Japan. l~"'Y try to pmmotc their llUHt.arizadon as allied counlries of the l:nited States.
Al the same time. coming August 20\4 is the 69th annfrt:"rs.ar} of th~ ntomic l'iombing l'l1 Hiroshima and Nagasaki on t 945. Man) yc~rJ had ulread~ pas.-.e<J but it is nol ju~t pu~t
~ Survivors an<l their anct!Slo(') an.: livin~ in com.:cms aboul their health con<lition even ~. Tbey have sought for the \\orld without nukes. however. huge numbc..T of nuclear
~ and nuclear )'Xl\Wt" station in the world. In addition to the tragedies on Hiroshima and N~. people i.n Japan have faced &l<)tl\e~ nudcar disaster by the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nm:lc-Jr Po\\ er Station sincr.: March 2011 tn this situation. the 1\WC Kon.-a Lommittcc and th~ ;\WC-Ju.pan \\itl hold a coorJiOlll~"ci peace activities on coming. August 20 t 4. lb~ aim' of the August Pcac~ Activities both in S0tuh Korea and in Japan is to expand peopk's mice *ag.ai~t nukes~ wnr and militari1.a1ion and for peace in the region.
The commitment of you as a nuclear saf~ty ij<lvocat~ of rhc Lnilcd Stalc:s \\iii surdy eneoorqe participants bolh in South Korea and Ju.pun. We also- hdicvc th.ill \\C cm1 sh.:m: unJ learn respective exp...'"licncc- dc~ply <luring )OU s.iaring in both <.:oumric:1.
Junt: 30. 201-t y( c S t._t-
/* c ,<JI t '--"n ~ c'.{ ~<v\fo.
Yoshio Natamur.1 lntcmationnl Secrcusriat A~iu-\\'idc C:Jmpaign
Page 2 of 4 Yoshio Nakamura
. AWC International Secretariat
Dear Yoshio Nakamura,
Your letter to me just reinforces my, belief of divine spiritual influence of a i higher power in our world. Please mail it to me as soon as possible.
I
, It will be a honor and a privilege to be invited to participate in your goal of
making our world a safer one by imploring diplomacy and forgiveness instead
of implementing intimidation and weapons in order to prevent a war.
1 Unfortunately the biggest business in this world is war.
i i Together we can and will change the currert thinking of some high officials in
the United States and other countries of exercising violence to achieve peace in our world.
' I am looking forward to hugging more of my brothers and sisters in the
' countries of Japan and South Korea. '
Really looking forward to meeting and continuing work with you, Professor
~ Barbara Wa1dern and the rest of all your colleagues in solidarity i Sincerely, Steve
\ Stephen B. Comley Sr Founder of We The People a National Whistleblower Non Profit Organization From: AWC Secretariat <awc.sec.21@gmail.com>
To: scomleysr@yahoo.com; Red Ma~es <tea_kor@yahoo.com>
Sent: Tuesday, July 1, 2014 3:28 AM
Subject:
draft of the invitation letter
Dear Stephen Comley,
, check the attachment file. I0 ti)
I made the draft of the invitation letter for your trip to South Korea and Japan. Please
~
https://us-mg6.mail.yahoo.com/neo~µnch?.rand=2mb73fvmvs3i9 7/3/2014
Subr
I 63~ Archive Genealogy
'";\:e*.t~,,.*,t; :*' .,, :>:n:;::o.t ';, .. -12,1::'1 Multlplo databa'ses, bit!.ons of rocords Just 1 qt..1cll search RATH YOUNG PIGNATELLI Natiaul knfact. Uniqatly New ~n.
Home >>News >>Politics>> State House Dome Garry Rayno's State House Dome: Buffer zone ruling by U.S. Supreme Court fuels abortion feud ShareTh:s The U.S. Supreme Oiurt l'llk<l last week that stah*~ cnnnot u11il<1terall:> t< ~ 1' II ~ 0 ti r; (:
P!G'it..TELL!
~>tablish buffer wne_~ around ab<Jrtion clinic.> in order to hlnclz pDtcntial clashes het\\CCtl pro~choicl! and auti**ahnrtinn 0:1dYncate'\ :11H.l lft~t\\t.'L"ll patit*nt-' and sdf-describctl "cmms"1ors."
Nt*w Han1pshire's Ul'W law crl!atiu~ a 2;:>-foi,t huff1.*r c1..*rL1i11ly \"\ill be dff:..'l'tL'd lis tbc <lcdsilm~ but ltt!W nmch and in 1\'hat way hill take sonw t11llc to clc\e1111ine. almust certninly throni?;b a court d1,1liPnge.
Opponents of the Ne"- I lamp:-;hire l..Iw \unnL'lltatdy ded.1n*ti \idory, Sd)iH~ tiw law ...;hnnl1l nPt be cnf1lfl'l.'tl onct* it hcrotnt>.s effi.."('tiv<.* .July :10, but :-;upput1er:-: ...:a~d ;i h*v.11 n~Y~l'\\ t1l't'tb to he di'rn_* tn tktcnnint' whc'tlwr theff is .my imp,wt.
\\11ik th<' nilw C.S. Supre11w Conrt ..lnstkes '1)\rt'cd tlw .\las<;whu,ett;.; l.1" and it' :i:;-foot buikr zo>ue is unconstitntional, the.'* split ,'i-4 on the quesliLin of the constitutinuality t."f hnffcr 1.0nes.
Chief .lusticc John Roberts, writing for the maju1ity, wliicli indud1<<! the court's fnur libcrah. sai,l the
~s-fnot zonr. was mwonstlt11tion;.tl bcntusf* it o\*c~rread1Pd.
The opiniuu said tlasht*s at one llos\Oll clinic do not justify rcstnrti11v fr,*~ speech at all :mch fadlities, and th1: ~tJte h:is othi..:r uptil1ns t1.1 en~ure prutcstl.'N do not iutin1idc\k or inkrfi,.*rc ith patient~.
RATH YOUNG
'l1K* four cr.it,ervati,*cs sJid the buffer 1.011<' is uncou;;titutioual - perioLl.
PIGNATELLI L:t::t*:::l'.:':J'~
l lo><c,*er, the mlin~ left staks ancl their lawmak<'r:i some* wiggle room to cr.ift nan*o,,* bnffor wm"; \o prn\ect patknt;; and staff while nol rcstrktiug free spt'ech and :\S't'Illhly rights.
\\11ile supporters of New Ha1np~hin,,*:; .statntc ma: arµ.tw tha1 the law '""*a:-: narrowly drti\'1i - as <lid the bill's prim<' spotJ>or. Sen. Donna Suncy, D-Mand1cslt*r - olht*rs do 1101 bdic\'l' it is n<uww cw>ul\h to pass mlL';kr c,~rr, Rayna's Slat<.* HOllSC L:.ome: Dcrno1;rats and The ,\me1ic;1n Civil Liberties l'nion bas ar;;ned in q1ppurt nf <Jho11io11 ri£,ltts bcfort' th~ l'..S. Snpre1n~ Rcpublic,ms parties rou:id out Court and clwwher<', but has al~n heeu a staunch defender of free speech 011 public streets anti ti<e:ir n0xt tichots in NM sitkwalks, arguin;; that principle in both stati: anti hkr..11 cumt.,.Gillcs Bis,;onncttc. thr slaff attumcy READER COMMENlS;'
for the ::\ew Hamp;;hire Ci'1l l.ibe1tic> l'uion, said Sc1h1k Bill ;i19 is likt>ly twt tai\owd 11mTuwh*
G;i..RPY AATNVS STATE HOUSE DOME.. NH enough.
LEG1$1J. TIVE. SE~SlON \l"JiJ-40ING TO A GLOSE The C.S. Supreme Court's ruling came in the ca.<c :VkCullcu '" Coakiey. . '
(;,')<FRY ~~-iNO'S STATE ~Ol)SE OOME:
"As in McCullen. to th<? extent SB *319'; 2;;-foot buffer zone dcpri,t's indhidna\s ofthi: abitit) to SATiNGGO-~C£YE
O engage in personal aud t'ons.:nsual conversations ith women ab1;11t variou;. alternath*c, to aburticm, G,,tR.Rv RAY NO'S STAi"E HOVSE OOMe 50 MANY NH LEGISLA'T!VE BILLS GfTLE.F7 AT SB 319 likcly is constitutionally problcmatk." Bissonnette ,;aid.
http://'\.\IWW. Ul1ionleadeLCOm/article/20140629/NE\VS0604/140629016 6/2912014
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Sponsored From Around the Web 1\,..,n~~v~\ .unionlcadcr.com '~1nick :o 1406.291)..T \\.S0<104*140629016 6'29'2014
Commonwealth of Massachusetts June 13, 2014 Governor Deval L. Patrick State House, Room 105 Boston, MA 02133
Dear Governor Patrick,
First I want you to know how much it meant to me for you to have first recognized me at your press conference on Friday June 6, 2014. This is the second time you and I have personally met on these important issues of serious safety concerns within the Nuclear Civilian and Weapons industries which effects all of the citizens of MA and NH and beyond. Over the 27 years I have been trying to get this issue before the American people through our elected officials has been a very challenging one to say the least. I never took political science in college but I have had 27 years of it since and has given me quite an education in politics and it has not been pretty but very educational.
At your press conference Friday afternoon I could not help but notice all of the young people waiting to hear you speak and how they have been so misinformed about the dangers of Nuclear Power. They deserve to know the truth and that was all I could think of at that moment waiting for you to start your speech before them and the media.
American's young people should have a voice and decide the future of Nuclear Power not the Nuclear Regulatory (NRC) Commission or the Nuclear Lobbyists who routinely fill many of our politicians' war chests. The American People cannot make a responsible decision about the future of Nuclear power until all of the information about cover-ups within the NRC the unsafe condition at U.S. Nuclear plants have been fully investigated.
As you know now I have been contacting your office in all means possible either by showing up in your office, writing letters, leaving messages or meeting with many of your staff over several years dating back to 2007. This has included Mr. Ryan, your Chief of Staff, Michelle Mansilla, your Executive Assistant, present and former Constituent Directors, Bianca K. Hoffman and Mark Lilienthal as well as many other employees of your administration. The issues and concerns I have endeavored to inform you through them has in all due respect appears to have fallen on deaf ears until you took charge during your press conference I attended and spoke at on June 6, 2014.
I want you to know I appreciate the fact you gave me an opportunity to ask you some questions like you gave the rest of the journalists attending your press conference. This gave me a suitable occasion to inform you personally of the some of the Nuclear Safety concerns I have gathered during my 27 years as founder of We The (WTP) People a National Whistleblower Non-Profit Organization. This includes WTP's many investigations of Cover-ups within the NRC and unsafe conditions still preseni at .
American's Nuclear Civilian and Weapons Plants. During this time you gave at your
formal meeting with the media, I mentioned I had given oral and written (attached) testimony at the NRC hearing December 18, 2013 concerning whether Seabrook Nuclear Plant's operating license should be extended from 2030 to 2050. A week before this NRC hearing I notified your staff and suggested that you attend this important NRC
Page 2 Letter of June 13, 2014 to Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts.
Hearing on Seabrook Station. I also notified the Boston Globe reporters but was told, "The Boston Globe would not be covering this NRC hearing because it is out of our area." I guess they forgot the Japan disaster effected our air in MA.
I will say to your credit as soon as you realized the importance of my concerns you stated, "Mr. Comley I want to speak with you further on this subject right after the press conference." You and I talked again out outside your office in the hall. During this conversation between you and I, while your Deputy Chief of Staff, Rosemary J. Powers was present you stated, "Mr. Comley I would like you to draft a letter to me explaining what you would like me to address in a letter to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA. I must tell you I was very impressed and taken back by the quick decision you made in asking me to draft a letter with the language you will need in writing a letter to the NRC and FEMA in endorsing my call for investigation into Seabrook Station evacuation preparedness in the event of Nuclear Explosion at the Plant. You made this statement in front of many people including many of the Boston media. I certainly was not surprised when none of the media who attended your press conference did not take the time to contact me about this important safety issue. As a Journalist myself, I believe it is important for all of us in the media to occasionally review and reread our Journalist Creed which states in part, "I believe that a journalist should write only what he holds in his heart to be true. I believe that suppression of the news, for any consideration other than the welfare of society, is indefensible."
Your decision to personally meet with me on this issue of Nuclear Power certainly has not been my usual experience with elected officials. Most political officials I have approached with this issue of the Nuclear Civilian and Weapons Industries have in most cases chosen to ignore my concerns. This has included WTP being ignored by U.S.
Presidents of the United States. This consists of Presidents Carter, Reagan, both Senior George Bush and Son. George Bush and our present President of the United States, Barack Obama, who I have written to including the First Lady. All of these letters were signed for by the White House. Instead of looking straight ahead and doing what is right for the safety of the American people many of our politicians look sideways and wonder how this issue will affect my political career and war chest which is filled routinely by Nuclear Lobbyists.
I have found few exceptions in getting elected officials to step up and be willing to take on the corruption within the NRC and the Nuclear Industries. First is former Representative of Miami Florida, Julio Robania, who is the first elected leader in the United States who has signed We The People's National "Petition to President Obama, Vice President Biden, Speaker Bochner and Members of Congress to Create an Independent Commission to Investigate the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission."
State Senator Bruce E. Tarr, Minority Leader, Representative Bradford R. Hill, House Minority Whip and U.S. Senator Edward Markey have also expressed interest in signing We The People/s National Petition. My hope is all our elected officials will sign it too.
Page 3 Letter of June 13, 2014 to Governor Deval L. Patrick of Massachusetts.
It would be remise of me to not mention the commitment, dedication time and the hard work State Senator Bruce Tarr's Chief of Staff, Attilio J. Paglia expended in preparing e his MEMO {attached} to the Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General's Public Integrity Division. I was glad to hear from your Deputy Chief of staff on Friday that she already has contacted Mr. Paglia so she would fully understand his reasons and Senator Tarr's in justifying this MEMO to the Attorney General Office. I am sure you agree Governor Patrick this certainly is an issue that all officials must cross party lines in order to protect the safety of American citizens and our brothers and sisters in other countries from another nuclear disaster from occurring on this earth?
The language I would like you to consider in your letter as Governor of Massachusetts to the NRC and FEMA should include the following: "As Governor of Massachusetts, I Deval L. Patrick am endorsing Stephen B. Comley Sr's call as Founder of We The People a National Whistleblower Non-Profit Organization to request the Nuclear Regulatory (NRC) Commission & The Federal Emergency Management (FEMA)
Agency to hold a investigated hearing with the New (NH) Hampshire &
Massachusetts (MA) State Police, Civil Defense & Fire Departments together with the Police Chiefs & Police Officers within & outside the 10 mile radius of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant to determine in the judgment of these traffic experts if the citizens of MA & NH can be safely evacuated during all seasons including Holidays and high beach days in the event of a nuclear explosion at Seabrook Station. "
I would suggest July 3, 4 and 5th, would be appropriate days to test the Seabrook Station's Evacuation Preparedness in the likely not the unlikely event of Fukushima or Chernobyl like disaster at this Nuclear Plant. The last test I understand was held in the dead of winter without the thousands of bathing suits on the beaches at Hampton and Salisbury but only snow & ice were present and no one was around!
If you need further clarification or comment please do not hesitate to contact me.
I look forward to continuing to work with you and your staff concerning these important safety issues involving the Nuclear Civilian and Weapon Industries.
In closing, I know you Governor Patrick of Massachusetts and Governor Maggie Hassan of New Hampshire who I look forward to meeting with soon, would much rather do everything possible in preventing a nuclear disaster from occurring in America and beyond, than reacting to one? I look forward to your replies.
l\
GootrJ..e 'ii/I.Si
~Te.lie We must work together t©>
c. 011 t.ei prevent disaster at N-pkmt . . '1:*.: *:;
f/1J~Je~1' Viewpoint yo1:1 come to NRC hear-Since the heiirfo_,g the
~e trvl~T1>ll'/
ings you usually bring a NRC has informed me Stephen R Comley Sr. lot of signs With sticks they will in "the n~ar 00 on them and the counsel future" address'. the;_.
CDMl'ald/OIJ. is concerned you could questions, requ~ls )md The Nuclear Regul.atory injure people attending the violations,. oqJi,')'s _I Commission (NRC) held the hearing. I said, "Now ref~rred ~o ~n ni!t~~~ ~nd
- a very important meet-* the NRC has insulted me. wr1~ten testm;tony. <*: , .
ing Dec. 18 to consider I advise in the futur-e the More r~~entl~_-fpaye
~
extending Seabrook's
co1insel get all t.he facts contacted. the ~Qffj~es*~of nuclear license from 2030 before she makes allega- Govs. Maggie Hass'~zi .and to 2050, 20 years beyond tions about anyone." Deval Patrick; attorney the time it was to be 1informed the official generals of M:assacbu-
. *.*._* .-*~*..*.* decommissioned. On Dec. that .Judge Pratt acquitted setts and New Hai:npshire; 12 I sent out my letter to me in a summary judg- state Sen. Bruce Tarr and
.* the *editor to all the media. ment. Jucige Pratt :f-0tifid,
u.s~ Sen. Edward Markey
. Five days before the "Exeeutive Director of the regarding thMe inlPoftant
. . ... -.$ "?'":* .:.....:::.
hearing in Hampton, NRC, Victor Stello, Lando matters which liffect every 7 ll*-
N.H., an NRC official Zech, chairman of tlie NRC citizen of these states.
called me and said, "We coinlilissioners and Ivan Uo'V. Hassan office noticed your letter in the Sniith, an NRC administra- stated to ine, "Policies of media and that you want tive law judge guilty of the U.S. NRC are a fed-to testify." I said, yes I violating We The People eral matter and are best
.*----~
.. *.*~
do. He replie<t-d. said, .. gftl!e Un\t.g<! ~tii.te11~~d, ... .ad4r~~~ed:a.Uli~*federal "The NRC has ifedded Stephen 13. *coln1ey's First level through the agency
. . *~
this meeting will not be Amendment right to free *. itself." It appears Gov.
recorded for the public expression by l;>anning Hassan is not aware of the record." I said, well, so their display Qf political letter former Gov. John much for the value of
po$ters and bu:r;nper stick- H. Lynch wrote to the public input. I wefi.t on to ers at public NRC meet- NRC stating, "The state state the NRC's irrespon- ings." I have requested a of New Hampshire, under sible decision did not sur- . formal apology from the the authority ofJhe gov-prise me at all and that I general counsel, but have ernor, has an obligation to would officially object. not received one as of this engage in the safety of its Ten minutes later the date. citizens where radiation man from the NRC called When I arrived at hazards exist."
back. NRC's general coun- the meeting, an official A lot of people lµ'e sel had notice~my letter informed me the J-JRC*had complaining'ab011t the stated I would'-pfesent decided to not only record way our government is evidence the NRC i>Fesi- the public meeting for the run tQese days. Unless 1
dent Obama and the plant public record but the NRC we take the time to owners w.ere in violation had hired someone to vid- get involved and make
... of the federal laws. I was eotape the NR.b hearing! demo~racy work -in our told the counsel wanted to I requ*ested the NRC
own backjards there isn't know what laws i referred create an investigative any chance change will to so she.could prepare committee to hold a hear- take place. Let's work a response before I testi- ing with Massachusetts together so we can pre-fied. I stated I would give and New Hampshire state vent a :inieiea:r di$aster at them to the NRCin writ- tro,cipers and the police Seabrook tilstead of react-ing at the same time I officei:s withjn the lO*mile ing to one,
present them to everyone radius of the plant to
1J1
else during my testimony state whether reside~ts Stephen B. C<rin,ley Sr.
at the hearing ..
can be evacuated safety is ~Rowley resident and Shortly afterward I was in the event of a nuclear foun.de.r of W~ The.People, contacted again by* the explosion at the Seabrook a national whisiieblower NRC official saymg when nuclear plant. nonprofit organization.
... -*-*-------- ------ -- --- ... . j -
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ommon THE-.RSiife-,,S- tA*RGES-i
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a*mber 1*8 - 24, 2013 Vol. 10, No. 7
* * ** ... c * * * *" * . urwur.'U-e't"otirntto*mmon.com. December 18
24, 2013
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_* We the People : Because ot an !!fl~ mctili attm~on~ 1b_cl~JJ:g_~iing WTP;s-w.O,r~ -
Letter to Editor, c.
, 1cature d oil thc eover
of'TIME * ' &.'* C'-~
l'"lt~:l*:~lH l'.*'J.n*
MAU~\* *~~~
informants from the NR:C and th~* il~w. l~d~ay. co11~~d ~
The Nuclear RegUlatoryr cNRC) Com.mission is holding* a very and continue tq ..~o so. In th,~ ,_~l. ,J.f-C'¢.tv-#.-eY:i!icrt~ _co~~i:r .or impo.ruit meetiiig tcf eonsic:lei eXt-!:Jl.~g the .&~brook Nuclear Plant substandarif(i..:t£f$ bu.Ut*'ift:m0~t:l;J_~'*. ~cl~. p:tu.iu .inclµding Scahr-opk'J license, from 2030 to 2050, just bcfOte'thc hoiid2ys; on Dccc1J1ber 18, Plmt. Victet *Steilo dicn*1~-if. ~.*:r.~?.cral ~cna wfticli te~a; ~'Mr.
2013. This meeting is .planed-fo be hdd at Best Westem Plus, Tue.Inn Stephen ~~Sr. & I't<>-gct*V@ifud~ D'Pnty.Dir~'i.Of th~ NRC's at Ham.pro~, 815 Lafayette Road, Hampton, NH- NRC Open House J* Office of~~~gation.-uc c;:Gnspilt#g_ifi,~0pplc~N.JlC*and ifSicp,h~
5:0p to 5:45 pm, Public Mceti11g 6:00 - to 9}-00 pm. *I h~vc; been told 1
- Comley Sr. deci jlOt gty~ up-~ *t*.pe- r~c0t$.~p . hi:.' ~ Diadc of -high by a N~C official this meeting will not be rc;c.o!'~ed:~i*tlte public record 1 l~c} o°(fid.~ i~ Wasiiingt~n h~-OOU:ld 'be jeopar~ng-!;he safety of the which is no surprise to me. So much for the ~\le .of public input. ~
Am'.et~¢ail:~p1e*amf~..S~6-Qrlty ofU.S~ ruid~ p1tnts from ~ound I will be presenting evidC_ncc the NRC, President Obama, ~ the !; .the e8t1Atiy.11' * ~-q-Gificµl Thol'Jlb.urgh* p.'1f5ued- me in the same Seabr<<:'ok Plant owners arc in violati~~pf w~_law. I aho will p~nt *
cou:tt:~~dy Whi~ ~\ilgcr:'~pic4 for a*~h~n-.tlmc, but 1 was c:onrent of conversations I have*af vetf:{jr~v.-;~~~ts from inside the th'Ci'e f~t.0~*'-.6,,_~~;:~~~ng*mc Wltli*Jail if rw.a,sn~t.wil.ling -~o NRC and from whistleblowcrs from the nuclear industty who come to o* u1T*:m. naia vive .. rr . .. .... _. ~d*'""' ...~ *these* bow"
.. '.F~;o~*..... . . indMduals'
.. .
h ~e
. w._o * ~--WI
.. n*mg*
me and trust that I will not rcve~ their identities. *
to. p~a.ct)tb.cit . ~n-aintmc"firianaaf.sc*:
. .. . ... , ... . .. .,.. ". .. "l'V*of. ..1:.*e:ir c..-~n*.
..c;:u.rl-J -1.11 "".11µ *cs on *- thc I am the founder of 'We The *~coplc';**~~-al Wbistlcblower Non- li~e :~~ ~:e:~~~:.P~p1~: calk~bJPW th~ ti~tbs abo.ut.Cl,'>ver~ups at the Profit Organization established in 1987 :to invesliPt~- mc.i U:ps at NRC NRC - *and mtrilc , . .... i::linliitflJiil
. . ..... at-nti:afear *Pbnts.
md unsafe conditions at ~udear civilian and"Wiapons plantS'. This Tue 1o* mile *Evacuitfon*t.o-he i$ aj~ ~d- itr~p.<>"ttsiblc; Chernobyl
-amc about as a result of the fonncr L.e~ti~ D~tc?r of die NltC,. affected the cow's* niilk*in Vermont and the fillout from the Fukushima.
V'tttor Stdio, who informed me in writing-.t-c;lta~ a:paralr.zcd resident _platlts .\P Japan ~4- oin_~J' in*~* ~~* J~s tim.~ (or us as lt our family owned and run nursing home behind. ancl ~er AriierR:ans:a:o*..flSC up m*thc int~rcst*Qf our gr-anddilldicn and dieir funile
he conuovers~ drug Potassium lodldc by. volunt-ccr~ who- would be generations t~ demand the shutdown of.Seabrook's rabid dog living in willing to stay behind in the event the* St.atlrook Nuclear* Plant blew -our heighbor~oods. * * . .
lp. *Bcc.ause my son's nursing home and the* citiiens of the Town of A lot of people arc complaining about the way our government is
towlcy lived outside" the 10 mi_le radius ofd'l~ so*~ Safe Zone, the being run these day.s, and with plenty of reasons, but unl~s w~ take the .
~RC said we were not allowed to* ha\'e a $ay* die c\racuation* of our in time to get involved ~d mm 'democracy work in our *own- bat:kyards
esidents at the nursing home, or for that ma¢er our children, even rhcrc isn't any chance change will take place. Let work iogcthet so we
hough they attended. Triton Regional Smool. l1;>catcd inside the 10 can prevent a nuclcar-d.isastet at Seabrook instead* of reaqing t-o .one.
niie radius. The whole town was ouq~ and 80%. of Rowley signed Hope to sec you at the Dec: 18th -rnectjng with ~a.Jhc
least-some of L petition to then-President Ri;agan:. B~gwe I was a. life member of the media ar this meeting. I can assure you it will be"~ int-cr~ng.
he Repuhlicm Inner Circle and still am (Wl'latcve-r that rnems) I felt ny _president would m=t with me but instead.-of proving ~ocracy is Stephen B. Comley St
n"'ff *alf'Ve and well in America, disgracc(Uily Mr. Reagan chose to ignore Founder of 'We llic People'
l-owJty's -petitions requesting an investigating ef the NRC. Likewise .:.
~~ahoo.Comr~*)
low President Obama and, our First Lady are still ignoring the 5 letters sent chem. This includes the lut letter to Michcffc Obama signed f~r
~ay 1, 2013.
State of New Hampshire June 6, 2014 Office of the Governor Robert E. Ditman Director of Citizen Services 107 North Main Street State House Rm. 208 Concord, New Hampshire 03301
Dear Mr. Ditman,
I sent you a letter (attached) February 12, 2014 but I have not received a response to my requests as the date of this letter. Due to the demands of being Director of Citizens Services I am hoping this is just an oversight. Please respond to the following requests.
In your e-mail to me (attached) of January 17, 2014 you state, "Our office is in receipt of the additional documentation that you have provided and I have forwarded this along as I have with the initial documentation you presented at our meeting." Please inform me what Department or agency and who is the individual or individuals are looking into these important safety matters?
You also state in this e-mail, "Policies of the United States Nuclear (NRC) Regulatory Commission are a federal matter and are best addressed at the federal level through the agency itself or your congressional delegation."
During our meeting I believe I made it quite evident President Obama, Governor Hassan, Governor Patrick, the NRC and the owners of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant (Florida Power and Light) are currently in violation of several Federal and States laws.
From our conversation and the documentation I provide you with I hope has made clear to you and Governor Maggie Hassan the NRC had become a non-option for me to contact with any concerns about safety matters due to the NRC always putting the safety of the American people second to bowing to the wishes of the Nuclear Industry. Five reports from the NRC own Inspector General which We The People brought about confinns again and again the NRC pencils away safety concerns in favor of protecting the Nuclear Industries profits. All five NRC IG reports (you already have in media accounts marked in Enclosure A with my written testimony ofNRC hearing 12/18/13) were developed from information our organization WTP brought to the NRC IG. In addition WTP brave informants brought about the biggest investigations of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant concerning the falsifications of welds. WTP was able to involve (attached article US removes a gag from Seabrook critic) former Department of Labor Secretary Robert B. ,
Reich. To this day Counterfeit Substandard welds at Seabrook Station have never been thoroughly investigated by NRC or Congress. I reported more of this information to NRC IG but they never fully investigated WTP's charges. Unfortunately WTP and I do not have the same productive relationship with the current NRC IG, Mr. Bell which we had with former NRC IG. David Williams. (attached letter to me from Mr. David Williams)
(D)
( .
Page 2 Letter of 6/6/2014 to Robert E. Ditman, Director of Citizens Services.
The State of New (NH) Hampshire and Governor Maggie Hassan have a responsibility to protect the safety of their citizens, especially since the NRC has a long record wanting to keep investigations of the Nuclear Industry a "Public Secret .so the public are kept in the dark about the real dangers of Nuclear Power."
I understand you also were in a position of Deputy Director of Citizens Services for former Governor Lynch. Governor Lynch wrote a letter to then NRC Chairman, Dale E.
Klein, Ph.D., (attached) April 12, 2007 which stated in part, "The purpose of this letter is to comply with the provisions of section 651(e) of the Energy Policy Act of2005, regarding the licensing of certain naturally occurring and accelerator produced radioactive materials now defined as byproduct material in sections 1 le (3) and 11 e (4) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended."
"WHEREAS, The Governor of the State of New Hampshire certified on January 13, 1966, that the State of New Hampshire (hereinafter referred to as the State) has a program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect the public health and safety with respect to the materials within the State covered by this agreement, and that the State desires to assume regulatory responsibility for such materials."
"Pursuant to this rule, the State of New Hampshire, under the authority of the governor, has an obligation to engage in the safety of its citizens where radiation hazards exist."
As I stated to you during our meeting along with my written and oral testimony I gave at the NRC hearing on December 18, 2013 15 NH and MA State Police Troopers and the Police Chiefs and officers within the 10 mile radius of the Seabrook admitted to me they would not be able to evacuate citizens of NH or MA safely in the event of a radioactive emergency as a result of a nuclear explosion at the Seabrook Nuclear Plant. Due to these concerns and other guidelines mentioned in this Act, the Governor of NH is responsible for the safety of New Hampshire Citizens.
As you know on January 9, 2014 I met with Richard C. Tracy, Criminal Investigator, from the Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General of NH. I also informed you I have been in contact with Representatives from MA including State Senator Bruce Tarr, U.S. Senator Edward Markey and Governor Patrick who i met with him today ..
I also had direct contact with John Beling, Assistant Attorney General and Chief of Brownfields Unit, Environmental Protection Division, Office of the Attorney General, Boston, MA. This contact came about as a result of a MEMO (attached) sent to the MA Attorney General Office from Chief of Staff Attilio J. Paglia of State Senator Bruce E.
Tarr's Office. I am still waiting for official replies to WTP's and my requests from Governor Patrick and U.S. Senator Edward Markey. Attached is copy of the requested
(!)
Page 3 Letter of 6/6/2014 to Robert E. Ditman, director of Citizens Services.
letter I wrote to Michal Hana Freedhoff, Ph.D., Director of Oversight and Investigations, Office of U.S. Senator Edward J. Markey.
In my last letter to you February 12, 2014 I asked and am still requesting that the Governor's office list and specifically acknowledge the information and documents I have given to your office.
Lastly I also requested a meeting with Governor Maggie Hassan but in your e-mail to me you did not address my request to meet with her. I am hoping this meeting with Governor Hassan will ultimately convince her to endorse my call that the NRC and FEMA hold a investigated hearing with the NH and MA State Police together with all the Chiefs of Police of the Towns within the 10 mile radius of the Seabrook Nuclear Plant to determine in the judgment of these traffic experts if the citizens of MA and NH can be safely evacuated during all seasons including Holidays in the event of a nuclear explosion at Seabrook Station.
In closing I know Governor Maggie Hassan and you would much rather do everything possible in preventing a Chernobyl or Fukushima like disaster from occurring in America and beyond than having to react to one.
I am anxiously awaiting your replies to these very important safety concerns.
Sincerely, Stephen B. Comley Sr.
Founder of We The People a National Whistleblower Organization (f)
PRESIDENT OBAMA
CONGREss* PRESIDENT PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY OBAMA PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY
~coNGREss~* PRESIDENT PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY OBAMA PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY r/ r;./
._____....,_/~* Rowley, MA ~/fRowley, MA
Nuclear Leaks and Response Tested Obama in Senate - New York Times Page 1of5 FR 0 .M O!RECTOK TERRENCE MALICK February 3, 2008 Nuclear Leaks and Response Tested Obama in Senate By MIKE McINTIRE When residents in Illinois voiced outrage two years ago upon learning that the Exelon Corporation had not disclosed radioactive leaks at one of its nuclear plants, the state's freshman senator, Barack Obama, took up their cause.
Mr .. Obama scolded Exelon and federal regulators for inaction and introduced a bill to ~
require all plant owners to notify state and local authorities immediately of even small leaks.
He has boasted of it on the campaign trail, telling a crowd in Iowa in December that it was
"}he only nuclear legislation that I've passed/ 'Y;i /J H(r/ jJ,,{.).S- q "I just did that last year," he said, to murmurs of approval.
<A close lo.ok at the path his legislation took tells a very different story. While he initia.Jly fought to advance his bill, even holding up a presidential nomination to try to force a hearing on it, Mr. Obama eventually rewrote it to reflect changes sought by Senate.
Republicans, Exelon and nuclear regulators. The new bill removed language mandatin~
prompt reporting ~d simply offered guidance to regulators, whom it charged ' with. ,'
addressing the issue of unreported leaks.
I'.+*
Those revisions propelled the bill through a crucial committee. But, contrary to Mr. Ob.am(~
comments in Iowa, it ultimately died amid parliamentary wrangling in the full Senate. ~
"Senator Obama's staff was sending us copies of the bill to review, and we could see it weakening with each successive draft," said Joe Cosgrove, a park district clirecto~in Will . ,
County, Ill., where low-level radioactive runoff had turned up in groundwater." e teeth
were iU.st taken out of it."
The history of the bill shows Mr. Obama navigating a home-state controversy that pitted two important constituencies against each other and tested his skills as a legislative infighter. On one side were neighbors of several nuclear plants upset that low-level radioactive leaks had
Nuclear Leaks and Response Tested Obama in Senate - New York Times Page 2of5 g,_one unreported for years; on the other was Exelon, the country's largest nuclear plaift operator and one of Mr. Obama's largestsourees of campaign money.
Since 2003, executives and employees of Exelon, which is based in Illinois, have contributed at least $227,000 to Mr. Obama's campaigns for the United States Senate and for presidel,lt.
Two top Exelon officials,_ Frank M. Clark, executive vice president, and John W. Rogers Jr., a
<;lirector, are among his largest fund-raisers.
Another Obama donor, .Tobu W. Rowe, c:;hairman of Exelon, is also chairman of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear power industry's lobbying group, based in Washington.
Exelon's support for Mr. Obama far exceeds its support for any other presidential candidate..
In addition, Mr. Obama's chief political strate~st, David Axelrod, has worked as a consultant to Exelon. A spokeswoman for Exelon said Mr. Axelrod's company had helped an Exelon subsidiary, Commonwealth Edison, with communications strategy periodically since 2002, but had no involveme~t in the leak controversy or other nuclear issues.
The Obama campaign said in written responses to questions that Mr. Obama "never discussed this issue or this bill" with Mr. Axelrod. The campaign acknowledged that Exelon executives had met with Mr. Obama's staff about the bill, as had concerned residents, environmentalists and regulators. It said the revisions resulted not from any influence by Exelon, but as a necessary response to a legislative roadblock put up by Republicans, who controlled the Senate at the time.
"If Senator Obama had listened to industry demands, he wouldn't have repeatedly criticized Exelon in the press, introduced the bill and then fought for months to get action on it," the campaign said. "Since he has over a decade oflegislative experience, Senator Obama knows that it's very-difficult to pass a perfect bill."
Asked why Mr. Obama had cited it as an accomplishment while campaigning for presiden~
the campai~ noted that after the senator introduced his bill, nuclear plants started making such reports on a voluntary basi§. The campaign did not directly address the question of why Mr. Obama had told Iowa voters that the legislation had passed.
Nuclear safety advocates are divided on whether Mr. Obama's efforts yielded any lasting benefits. David A Lochbaum of the Union of Concerned Scientists agreed that "it took the introduction of the bill in the first place to get a reaction from the industry."
"But of co1irse because it is all voluntary," Mr. Lochbaum said, "who's to say where things will be a few years from now?"
Nuclear Leaks and Response Tested Obama in Senate - New York Times Page 3of5 Others say that turning the whole matter over to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, as Mr. Obama's revised bill would have done, played into the hands of the nuclear power.
indUBtry, which they say has little to fear from the regulators. Mr. Obama seemed to shalk those concerns when he told a New Hampshire newspaper last year that the commission ~'.is a moribund agency that needs to be revamped and has become a captive of the industry. it regulates,"
Paul Gunter, an activist based in Maryland who assisted neighbors of the Exelon plants, said he was "disappointed in Senator Obama's lack of follow-through," which he said weakened the original bill. "The new legislation falls short" by failing to provide for mandatory reporting, said Mr. Gunter, whose group, Beyond Nuclear, opposes nuclear energy.
The episode that prompted Mr. Obama's legislation began on Dec. 1, 2005, when Exelon issued a news release saying it had discovered tritium, a radioactive byProduct of nuclear power, in monitoring wells at its Braidwood plant, about 60 miles southwest of Cl;iicago.A few days later, tritium was detected in a drinking water well at a home near the pl*tt, although the levels did not exceed federal safety standards_.
At least as disturbing for local residents was the revelation that Exelon believed the tritium came from millions of gallons of water that had leaked from the plant years earlier but we11t unreported at the time. Under nuclear commission rules, plants are required to tell state and local authorities only about radioactive discharges that rise to the level of an emergency.
On March 1, Mr. Obama introduced a bill known as the Nuclear Release Notice Act of 2006.
It stated flatly that nuclear plants "shall immediately" notify federal, state and local officials of any accidental release of radioactive material that exceeded. "allowable limits for normal operation."
To flag systematic problems, it would also have required reporting of repeated accidental leaks that fell below those limits. Illinois' senior senator, Richard J. Durbin, a fellow Democrat, was a co-sponsor, and three other senators, including Hillary Rodham Clinton, Democrat of New York, later signed on. But Mr. Obama remained its primary champion.
In public statements, Mr. Obama dismissed the nuclear lobby's arguments that the tritium leaks posed no health threat.
"This legislation is not about whether tritium is safe, or at what concentration or level it poses a threat," he said. "This legislation is about ensuring that nearby residents know whether they may have been exposed to any level of radiation generated at a nuclear power plant as a result of an unplanned, accidental or unintentional incident."
Nuclear Leaks and Response Tested Obama in Senate - New York Times Page 4of5 Almost immediately, the nuclear power industry and federal regulators raised objections to the bill.
The Nuclear Energy Institute jumped out in front by announcing its voluntary initiative for plant operators to report even small leaks. An Exelon representative told an industry newsletter, Inside N.R.C., that Exelon was "working with Senator Obama's office to address some technical issues that will allow us to support the legislation."
Last week, an Exelon spokesman, Craig Nesbit, said the company sought, among other things, new language to specify what types of leaks should be reported, and assurance that enforcement authority remained with the nuclear commission and not state or local governments.
"We were looking for technical clarity," Mr. Nesbit said.
Meanwhile;the nuclear commission told Mr. Obama's staff that the bill would have forced the unnecessary disclosure of leaks that were not serious. "Unplanned releases below tl(e level of an emergency present a substantially smaller risk to the public," the agency said in a memorandum to senators, which ticked off about a half-dozen specific concerns about the hllh Senate correspondence shows that the environment committee chairman at the time, Senator James M. Inhofe, Republican of Oklahoma who is a strong supporter ofindustiy in battles over energy and environmental legislation, agreed with many of those points and held up the bill. Mr. Obama pushed back, at one point temporarily blocking approval of President Bush's nominee to the nuclear commission, Dale E. Klein, who met with Mr.
0 bama to discuss the leaks.
But eventually, Mr. Obama agreed to rewrite the bill, and when the environment committee approved it in September 2006, he and bis co-sponsors hailed it as a victory.
In interviews over the past two weeks, Obama aides insisted that the revisions did n_gt substantively alter the bill. In fact, it was left drastically differeEt.
In place of the straightforward reporting requirements was new language giving the nuclear commission two years to come up with its own regulations. The bill said that the commission "shall consider" - not require - immediate public notification, and also t~
into account the findings of a task force it set up to study the tritium leaks.
By then, the task force had already concluded that "existing reporting requirements for abnormal spills and leaks are at a level that is risk-jnformed and appropriate"
Nuclear Leaks and Response Tested Obama in Senate - New York Times Page 5 of 5 The rewritten bill .also contained the new wording sought by Exelon making it clear t~at state and local authorities would have no regulatory oversight of nuclear power plants.
In interviews last week, representatives of Exelon and the nuclear commission said they were satisfied with the revised bill. The Nuclear Energy Institute said it no longer opposed it but wanted additional changes.
The revised bill was never taken up in the full Senate, where partisan parliamentary maneuvering resulted in a number of bills being shelved before the 2006 session ended.
Still, the legislation has come in handy on the campaign trail. Last May, in response tcz questions about his ties to Exelon., Mr. Obama wrote a letter to a Nevada newspaper citing e bill as evidence that he stands up to owerful interests.
When I learned that radioactive tritium had leaked out of an Exelon nuclear plant in Illinois," he wrote, "I led an effort in the Senate to require utilities to notify the public of any unplanned release of radioactive substances."
Last October, Mr. Obama reintroduced the bill, in its rewritten form.
Copyright 2008 The New York Times Company
-~~~~- Se~~h I Corrections I ~ I First Look I l::::!.§!R I Contact Us I Work for Us I ~ I
. BY.fiel~
n P.O. Box 335 Parish Chu*rch The Honorable Michelle Obama
)
July 15, 2013 Georgetown, MA 01833 Phone:.978-352-2022 First Lady of the United States Certified Mail Receipt Fax: 978-352-2863 The White House.
www.bYfieldparish.org Washington, D.C. 20500 Senior Pastor Dr. William E. Boylan
Dear Mrs. Obama,
Pastor of Administration and Church Ministries My name is William Boylan. Reverend Wright and I were two* of Rev. Daniel R. Ledwith the longest seniing pastors in the United Church of Christ. The Director of Youth Ministries Byfield Parish Church tj:l~t I have served for.more than forty-four
-James MacDonald years, is the first independent Congregational Chi.irch in America.
Director of Music Ministries Robert Lathrop
we are barely beyond the ten mile radius that marks the mandatory evacuation zone for the nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire-. After the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986, Mr.
Stephen Comley Sr., one-of our members and the previous owner of the Seaview Nursing Home at the time, oontacted the director of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission regarding the evacuation plan for special needs residents: He was- advised to administer potassium iodide by any staff willing to remain behind in event of an accident. This alarmed *Comley since it would make certain residents expendable. At that time, whistleblowers began contacting Mr. Comley, informing him that the Seabrook Plant contained counterfeit substandard parts. Reportedly, this is true of most of the nation's nuclear power plants. As a result Comley formed We The People" (WTP) a national non-profit whistleblower organization.
Knowing that Pres.ident Obama want~ whistleblowers to be heard, .We The People" seeks a hearing with those like the president who are dedicated to protecting the public. In thepast, President Clinton's Cnief of Staff Leori]:>anetta requested that tlie rtepartment of Justice contact Mr. Comley. Justice refused his request. Likewise the F.B.I. failed to reply to a request by former and first NRC IG, David Williams that the information Mr.
Comley handed directly to President Ronald Reagan be investigated. Instead, the Office of the NR.C IG threatened to jail Mr. Comley for refusing to betray the whistleblowers.
Tue.March 11, 2011 melt-down at the Fukushima #1 plant confirmed the danger posed by unsafe installations. Although signed for, Mr. Comley's letter to you (enclosed) that was received at the White House on May T; 2013, has yet to be answered. Like the Trinity Church in Chicago, the Byfield Parish Church seeks the nation's good. We dare not remain silent when mill1ol1S of our fellow Americans are potentially at rislc because a watch is not being kept on the nuclear power industry. A text that is central to our self-
understanding as a congregation was spoken to the prophet Ezekiel six centuries before Christ was born. Ezekiel announced, " ... The word of the Lord came to me, 'Son of man, I have made you a watchman for the house of Israel; so hear the word I speak and give them warning from me." (3:16, 17)
The Comley family has been in the nursing* home profession for eighty-five years.
Seaview has a sterling reputation in our area. Secretary of State Kerry is well aware of WTP 's reputation as an organization and of the high quality of nursing care offered by the owner, Stephen Comley II. Please consider meeting both yourself and the President with Mr. Comley. WTP seeks to assuage the public's fear that we might experience an American Chernobyl or Fukushima. It is important to know that dangers posed by the nuclear industry are either unfounded or wm be corrected.
Your brother in Christ, fl - I ,,1,.1 - < ~ /
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1 Dr. William Boylan cc. Mr. Stephen Comley
Mrs.Michelle Obama p. 2 Julyj5, 2013
The Honorable M*kheUe Obama December 5, 2013 flrst Lady of the Untt~d States Certified Mall Receipt t, '* '*
\ /\'\A~,~ 'r; D~ ~o \3 The White HO'USe Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mrs*. Obama,
Recently I had the pleasure of having lunch with Mr. Stephen Comley
, The founder of "We the People", and l Hstened intently while this man described his concerns about the use of sub-standard counterfeit parts currently in use at numerous Nuclear Plants in our country.
At the time of our lunch, this issue, and the dangers posed by the by-products of nuclear energy, had not been a serious concern of mine. This all changed on Monday when a truck hauling nuclear waste was stolen in Mexico whUe enrou.te to a radioactive waste storage facility. I am now convinced that the issues which were raised in Mr.. Comley's letter to you
( dated April 18th of this year) a:re very genuine and deserve the attention of our leaders at the highest tevel in our Government.
Accordingly, I sincerely request that this concern be brought to the President's attention and that a meet*ing be scheduled with you, President Obama, and Mr. Comley.
I cannot fathom the workload each of you must experience daily, but I am convinced that such a-meeting would be to the benefit of the people of our Country.
In deep respect, James-W. Shepherd, P.O ..Box 316, Georgetown, Ma 01833 cc. Mr. Stephen Comley 1
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Why isn't the options about more violence and Karen E. Andreas for President Obama to take in the cri1;is in Syria
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The Honorable Michelle Obama April 18, 2013 First Lady of the United States Certified Mail Receipt The White House Washington, D. C. 20500 (Signed for by the White House 5/1/13 @ 4:28am)
Dear Mrs. President,
I was hoping to give this letter to you or to a member of your entourage during the Interfaith Service at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross I attended, so I am once again sending it to the White House. My name is Stephen B. Comley Sr. founder of We The (WTP) People a national Whistleblower non profit organization. Enclosed is a copy of the registered letter signed by the White House at 3 P.M I mailed to you on March 17, 2011 which as of this date remains unanswered. The only reasons I can think ofis
---~ither.your staff or you dec~ded not to addr..ess my con_c~ms. This letter was ac~_,ompanied by information & evidence provided to you of corruption at the highest levels of the Nuclear Regulatory (NRC) Commission & former U.S. Presidents.
This information included letters, emails & direct calls placed to your Husband's former Deputy. Press Secretary, Mr. Bill Burton, President Obama's on April 26, 2010 & June 20, 2008.
These letters were signed for, yet no reply was offered. I also spoke with Bill Burton's assistant who signed for information also on June 20, 2008 at the Prime Osborn Convention Center in Jacksonville, Florida. Since none of these letters
& conversations produced a response I am asking average Americans around the country to write to you Mrs. President in hopes you will heed their voices.
The information signed for by the White House at 3 PM on April 4, 2011 alse included documents proving I first brought to light the presence of Counterfeit Substandard parts built in most U.S. Nuclear Plants, This evidence ultimately led to a GAO report entitled, "Counterfeit Substandard Parts are a Government-Wide Concern." Your Husband's administration is now the fifth during two decades to ignore my letters concerning this most pressing concern outlined in my letter to you & three letters to President Obama More information confirms in January of this year the presence of 500 Counterfeit Substand~rd Parts (enclosed) w.ere discovered at the construction site of Watts Bar Unit 2 in Tennessee. In addition, a former TVA vice president, Masoud Bajestani--
(enclosed) was charged & arrested for illegally trying to ship money to his native Iran after he lied to TVA about why he needed the 1.2 million from his retirement account.
Mr. Bajestani was in charge of TVA's $2.5 Billion completion project for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 until he was fired.
I would like to not believe the reason my letters have not been addressed is what I &
others read in the New York Times article of2/3/08 (see Pages lOA-E of3/17/ll letter). President Obama ChiefPolitical Strategist, David Axelrod worked as a consultant to Exelon, the country's largest nuclear plant operator which is based in Illinois. Exelon also contributed at least $227,000.00 to President Obama's
Page 2 of April 18, 2013 letter to the First Lady.
Campaigns for the U.S. Senate & for President. Another Obama donor, John W.
Rowe, chairman of Exelon, is also chairman of the Nuclear Energy Institute, the nuclear power industry's lobbying group, based in Washington."
Officials in your administration have replied to my letters & concerns while working for past presidents. Former CIA Director, Leon Panetta, sent two letters while Chief of Staff for President Clinton (see Page 13 of letter of 3/17/11) requesting the Department of Justice to get in touch with me but they did not honor his reguest.
The F.B.I. likewise did not reply to the request made by Former & f"J.rstNRC JG, David William's office (see P. 14 of letter of (see P. 14 of Letter of 3/17/11) to investigate evidence I personally handed to President Ronald Reagan about substandard Parts at a Gala event held for the former President by the Republican Inner Circle of whicid a.m*a member but still remain a Registered Independent. The-American People have a right to know why these requests of Leon Panetta & David Williams office were never honored or investigated.
After three years of the NRC IG office of threatening me with jail in order to force me to
give up the names of braves individuals from the NRC & the Nuclear Industry who came to WTP so their safety concerns could be made public the NRC IG office decided to work with us. WTP was given credit in the four NRC IG investigated reports proving cover-ups within the NRC.
WTP's efforts to reveal the dangers of nuclear power & the NRC have been featured on the Cover of TIME entitled, " Special Investigation: Blowing the Whistle on Nuclear safety: How a Showdown at a Power Plant Exposed the Federal government failure to enforce its own Rules." By the way Vice President Biden was mention in the Time Cover story so he knows of WTP' s work. After a year & half fuvestigation of-WTP's accomplishments CNN aired on Earth Matters: INSIDE THE NRC: INTIMIDATION OR REGULATION. (# 2 DVDs enclosed) 2nd one is Control Room Ol>erators."
Jay Camey, President Obama's press Secretary is no stranger to WTP's work. I contacted Mr. Camey April 17, 2006-(see Page 11 & 12 of 3/17111 letter) & spoke with
- him iiliOOf'°wheri. he was Time's Washington Bureau Chlef.- ltopefuliy Mr. Carney & or Mr. Burton can be asked to locate the information I gave them including the 4 NRC IG investigations brought about by WTP. Former Secretary of State, lii:narv Clinton m
during her Presidential run at a Campai@-*stop Virginia took the tb:ne to taJk with me & promised to look over the same information I had 81ready ~ven -tQ Bill :eurton
& Jay Camey. Mrs. Clinton did reply back to WTP.
Secretary of State John (also see Pages 11 & 12 of your 3/17/11) Kerry is quite familiar with-wTP's work. Our government & the NRC'nave decided-which citizens have value & which are dispensable. Currently, evacuation strategies designed for a nuclear meltdown exclude our grandparents & the mentally handicapped & many of our school aged children. Instead of created a just & fair exit strategy if tragedy struck, the
Page 3 of April 18, 2013 Letter to the First Lady.
Government has supplied bottles of Potassium Iodide for our grandparents & children to swallow & wait as radiation eviscerates our national treasures & the future of our country. These bottles of Potassium Iodide are what inspired me to begin my investigation in what safety measures were taken at our country's nuclear power plants.
My family owns & runs Sea View Nursing Home in Rowley, Massachusetts which lies 12 miles from the Seabrook Nuclear Plant in NH. Victor Stello, then Executive of Director of the NRC in replying to my questions suggested Potassium Iodide be given to special needs citizens administrated by caregivers who would be willing to stay behind in the event of a nuclear accident at Seabrook. This inhumane treatment lead to my persistent inquires into the Nuclear Industry & the United States Government; I could not stand by & let this go on any longer.
In-the w8.ke-oftragedies like Fukushima, after decades ofbeingignored by our elected--
leadership, it becomes incumbent upon the American People, especially our young people to speak out against the failed oversight of the Nuclear Regulatory (NRC)
Commission & the nuclear industry that puts our country at risk. I am circulating petitions including at our educational institutions & churches asking for an investigation by a bipartisan commission, not unlike the 9/11 commission, to evaluate the effectiveness of the NRC before a nuclear catastrophe happens on American soil.
I understand the high demands of your position as First Lady. You have taken it as your cause the health of American's children. No matter how well balanced our children's diet a meltdown on the scale of Chernobyl would eradicate all our children equally whether diabetic, obese or fit.
I ask agam for you to respond to my request to meet with you & President Obama. As citizens of this country we have a right to know that every measure has been tll.ken to insure our safety. The Citizens of Rowley MA were the only town in the United States who took the time to sign a petition to former Presidents Reagan & Bush instead they chose to ignore the concerns mothers & fathers had in the evacuation of their children.
First Lady, Michelle Obama, you see the issues of Nuclear Power are secondary to me the real issue is- whether together we can-prove that Democracy is still alive &
well in American. You & President Obama have an opportunity & a responsibility to help me prove especially to our young people that citizens outside the Washington Beltway can make a difference. I look forward to meeting with you both as soon as possible. I can be reached at my E-mail scomleysr@yahoo.com or mail me your response to Stephen B. Comley Sr. 45 Mansion Drive, Rowley, MA 01969. Cell# 904-206-3114
Date: May 9, 2013 Stephen Comley:
The following is in response to your May 9, 2013 request for delivery information on your Certified Mail' item number 70123050000129665050. The delivery record shows that this item was delivered on May 1.2013 at 4:28 am in WASHINGTON, DC 20500. The
~anned image of the reci_Pien~information is provided below.
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co'11d fliel tensions with fr.an Since 200~n.PtesidetttQl:)~a. took of- and Chin.!l,_i!-nd make it easier initiative," Kerry remarked iI for potentilll. adversaries to gain May as he met Oman's defens*
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amt8dlitlit ** ptirtf f'orneariYa.t *,: . jh* access to sensitiv(! us military roughly $.3Cl n fn weapqjhrat'lsfers corii. technologies.
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enough consideration is being the review process said the ir given to the possibility that crease in arm sales to the Mic' c.Of;Jmg to ~$ taiuecl
!<i some allies who are buying re-cord amounts of high-tech clle East and Asia is a reflectio of the government's new aI arms, especially in the unstable proach.
Middle East, could end up us- "In the-past, there wasn't ing American weapons to stifle very coherent strategy to do ac dissent or commit other hu- vocac'y," said the official, wll man-rights abuses. They cite was litlt a_utborized to spe2 Egypt as a recent example. publicly. "Slciwly over the yea "The floodgates are going to there's oeen a recognition th open anq it is going to be a hap- there ha.S to be a greater go
~ new year for the defense in- emmentwide thought proces
. ~pstry, Wlii:tcltiSil~**.::',.~to,tii-a.ke a. This administration has f lOt of money/;*sai
ichard ~ cusedcin it."
GriJtitnett, ~Jw ~.en 'y retired I . One of the biggest beneficia- The official explained th aftet ll1di':e'than 30 years.as t~
leading international security analyst for the Congressional nes has been Waltham-based Raythe~n Co., the largest ployer m, Massachusetts and em-x US defe0$e company proposi are now a.con8ideration in v tually all diplomatic dealin Research Service, a nonparti- the worlds fifth*largest defense with foreign officials. For exa.i san legislative branch agency. co~tractor. It reported earlier ple, top government offici; "But you didn't have oversight this month. that as much as 30 traveling to partieular countr hearings explaining, 'Here is PC:rcent of its annual business are now regularly prepared why it is a good idea, here is Wlll c:ome ~om f.oreign sales - advocate for US firms who ~
ingto export~... . . . wny it is a bad idea.'" the highest it has reported. The seeking to sell anns there.
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n DECEMBER 22, 2013 COl{f' 1 TOP 5 ARMS EXPORTER'S, 2008*2012 spare parts," he sa;id. "That, of "'fh:ere are downside ri~'Ut United States ~~a .. * .. ~ef)ll~?Y . Ffi!nce China Others course, will' be gt)ne!'
said Michele flournoy, who
i. . The Obama administration served as undersecretary ofde-also is. shifting approval pow~r fense for policy in the presi-WHAT THE USIXPORfiED, 2008*2012 for the sale of some miiitary dent's first tenn. "You can*b:a.ve Air defense systems Aircra.ft Armored vehicles Missiles Ships Others components from the State De- governments change, or gov-partment to the Comri.terce De- ernments misuse US weapon-NOTE: llecauseof rot11.!4ing, numbers do not add up to 1-00. partment, which requires less ry." .
SOURCE: Stockholm*International Peace Research Institute GLOBE STAFF ov.el'Sight.
She also said that by tr!l-DS*
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how te get the biggest:*bang for .Pe1'~agon's buying power is saµdS of components that offi- melit's export licensing process, the buck." shrinking substantially with chils. say would not *provide a there will.be less tracking of.
US defense companies have j)u.Ciget cuts. significant military e.d~, such where those parts go and how two primary avemi.es to seil "'The* most important thing as aircraft parts .and satellite they are ultimately used.
weapons internationally. There is the US down trend, said technologies that are available "There is certainly less re-are foreign military sales, Richard Aboulafia, vice presi- on the corim.iercial market. The porting after the fact,n l'lournoy which are government-to-gov- dent for analysis at the Teal list also will include "military said, though she maintains the ernment deals and managed by Group, a defense and aerospace vehicles, vessels, submarines, benefits outweigh the risks for the Pentagon, and direct com- consulting firm in Fairfa.X, Va. and auxiliary military equip- US foreign policy.
mercial sales to foreign govern- "Tu keep production lines alive, ment," the White House an- A few members of Congress ments. Those are overseen by you have to focus on the foter- nounced this fall. are calling for restoration of the Department of State, which national market." Leading industry advocates stronger export controls.
grants export licenses, For instance, he nqted that a say the Obama administration Representative Ileana Ros-Administratjon officials in- number of key weapons sys- could go even further to coordi- Lehtinen, a l'lorida Republican K sist that security, not econom- tems that are being purchased nate overseas sales.
ics, is what drives the push to sell more US arms. Providing key aUies with American hard-ware, they say, will ensure the
'It is going.to be and member of the House For-
"We just want to start a pro- eign Affairs Committee, said cess where it is done eV'en* more, she believes more oversight is and make it as much of a ma- needed "to ensure that our mili-chine as poss'.jble," Remy Na- tary equipment and technology United States bas partners in a happy new year than,'vice president for interna- are not transferred to a third containing Iran and North Ko- for the defense tional affairs at the .AerO$pace party without our knowledge, rea, as well as deterring China Industries Association, a de- and that they cannot be used to:
from taking a more aggressive industry, which is fense trade group, said of in- threaten our interests."
posture toward US allies Japan dustry-government coordina- Longtime observers ~id and South Korea. .
going to make tion. they are surprised. by how 1'-le
( "We don't make these deci, a lot of money.' Among the critics of this attention has been paid to.:the sions as a jobs program, said trend is the American Bar Asso- arms sales bonanza. ..
the State Department's Kaus- RICHARD GRIMMETT .ciatio~'s Center for Human "There have been ii1'\es ner. Retired government analyst Rights,* which has raised con- when there has been a surte, in In a sign of the growing eerns that the United States will US arms sales and the issu&'llas global competition, China's vol- be introducing a flood of small been debated," said wm!im ume of anns exports climbed a in fewer numbers by the US arms and ammunition into ar- Hartung, a researcher at:ihe whopping 162 percent in 2008 military are now major offer- eas ripe for conflict. Center for International Policy, to 2012, compared with 2003 to ings overseas:, including F-15 "I.have not seen any mean- a Washington think tank. 'ibis 2007, according to the Stock- and F/A-18 fighter jets and C-17 ingful analysis of the l}u~an time it doesn't seem to be:ihe holm Peace Research Institute militaryttanSP<>rt planes. rights compbnent:' said :aritta- case!' ~-
tally. For the first time China Another fact:Or is that the US ny BenoWitz, the* center's chief Grimmett, who has watched placed in the top five of global military presence in both Iraq counsel, who noted.worries . the process for nearly fou;.Jle-arms providers, behind the and Afghanistan is drawing to a about "people who obtain arms cades, said few seem to eare United States, Russia, Germa- close, said Siemon Wezernan, a from the US and then go out about the potential risks. *'.~
ny, and France, and displacing senior researcher at the Stock- and do horrible things with "There is no opposition ~y-the United Kingdom. holm Institute. them!'
more," he said.
But numerous experts see fi- "Business was up durtng the Even some of the architects nancial considerations - not wars, which gave US c;ompan:ies of the Obama administration's Bryan Bender can btf reachl4. at security strategy - as the key quite a lot of possibilities to sell approach acknowledge there bender@gl.obe.com. Follow i.tt1n factor in the surging US arms equipment and services and* are potenti,µ consequences. on Twitter @Gl.obeBender. "
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Mr. Stepnen B. Comley B'Xee\ltive Director we ~he ~opie, Inc. of the united States Post Ot~ice Box 2?7
~ovley,. Massacl:?.us&tts OJ.969 oear Mr. Cotnley:
'.... --~ y~ for your *f~ *o:t Q~t~~~- 1oi' 1~'95. ' r ain sorry t:o.:*
he~r that yO'Q. ha.ve not. yet: ret:eJ;:ved A l.ei:ter .from th~ De;;;artmen:=
ot Just~cS' regarding* Yot.?-l'. concerns. wittf the* Nuc:1ear Regulatory . , . ,.
cozmds*sioa CN:RC) * * ' .. *. *. *. * **.. **
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. . Once again, X:: ~vt:;t forw~l;'ded your *fµ .co th~.)~epartment of~~:** =:
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is t:ha aPl'Jropr$ate ag~ncy co assis.c you. i~ dea-ling** :with your \-.-'.* . :* .*. *"
complaint~. with the 'NRC.. ** . * * * . * -*
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISS-1-0N WASHINGTON. O.C 20555 May 31, *19.91 FICE OF .THE 5PECTOR GENERAL Mr. Stephen B. Comley Mansion Drive Rowley, MA 01960 D.ear Mr. Comley:
This correspondence is provided in respo:r::se to your request of Special Agent Kent E~ Walker con~erning the *status of an allegation you forwarded to the Inspector General*concerning former President Ronald Reagan. You alleged ~hat in October 1987 you provided President Reagan with information regarding the use of counterfeit and substandard parts throughout the nuclear industry and that the former President subsequently refused to acknowledge receipt of that information. Your concerns were p~rovided to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Silver Spring, MD, on December 13, 1990.
Sincerely,
/Yttlf tfL ~/~~
/fl Ife Ki r,.-11-t c 0 Leo J. Norton, Assistant Ins~ector General for Investigations-1 GOT W \LL BE*
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16; 1994' 1
rs rtding US removes a gag frOm Seabrook critil. .
einovesgag .SEABROOK
.the welds could not be det.ermined. National Aeronautics and Spaci romen .ti*C ,Continued Crom Page 29
~
.* polk!y and unenforceable."
But in January 1984, when Wampler raised questions about the welds with management, he was
'Other people *..
ministration's space shuttle, i that his business was drying u1 ~
soon as a client found out who [
j
! The hearing could open the way rared. Technical inspections by the will come forward all of a sudden, no contract," hi rs.brook for Wampler t.o be* paid damages,
but it also could reveal new evidence about whether nuclear safety ques-NRC and congressional investiga-tions followed.
with coneems, now that smeiy yesterday. "I've lost two house I a wife, hecause of this."
In an effort lo p1*ese1ve his l
By*Jt)hn Milne
\
lions had ~een covered up. Antinu-
ar activists ha~e contended- that Reeonls deemed faulty we-lmow they can cy until the hearing, Wample11 f!,~8£ STAFF ** !)uclear plants withheld information In 1991 the NRC found that sev-. be protected.' terday declined to identify the eral welds did not have the proper western city where he nuw livE .
" * * :rrom the US Nuclear Regulatory X-ray documentation, and the agen- STEfPHEN COMLEY But in 1990, backed by St11 CONCORD, N.H. - Ten years Commission and that the NRC itself
!I" ~~eph 0. Wampler was fared JJJisled congressioHal investigators cy fined Seabrook's previous opera- NuilMJ.r ~afety activist Comley, a Rowley, Mass., nil rmmg* s~ety* concerns at the about nuclear safety issues. tor, New Hampshire Yankee, safety activist, Wampler and hi~
brook nuc~ear power ptant, *the
Pullman-Higgins Co., the Sea- $100,000 ror falling to keep properly yer- filed a motion with the. If LalJor ~!!partme11t has niled documented X-rays. Backus, a longtime opponent. of the Department, see-!rlng lo reopel b'rook subcontractor that. was
he can tel- his Side of the**story Wampler's employer, filed a Feb. 28 Seab1*ook spokesman Rob Wil- planl I settlement. Reid-a cons-idererf liams said that North Atlantic Ener- But Wamples* could not openly case early this year_ and cone(
1ubli4?. . motion asking Reich to reconsider, gy Corp., the plant's current opera- that the settler:nent violated thi The *FeJi>. J.4 decision by. Beere- ' saying it never intended to prevent provide information to opponents.
tor, "wants to empl1asize that there ergy Reorganization AcL of 1971
' or ~r 1,ll.obert B. ReJ~. ob- On Ma11:hjZO, 1984, shortly after his ed -l '-~e~.~be y;J.!Sterqay, as-1ed l);clP.nlStrative _1,;aw. Judge
Wampler, a licensed quality control Inspector, from 1-aising safety con-een.. The company's *lawyer, Mark was never an issue of plant safety, and the quality of the welds them-firing, Witmpler and.' Pullman-Hig-gins .reached a settlement 'in which signed to pa*otect \VhisUeblowe1i
ro tJ1e extent that this prol selves has been confinned."...During could be const111ed as restri
d W>D.l ~i in Bos~n t.o ho!d .T. BJQth, wouldn't return phone calls the plant's 1991 refueling, the ques-the company .pald his lawyers' re"es complainant from voluntarily I lie h~, 'expec~ to be m *. seeking*furth.er commenL tioned welds were reexamined ;uJd and agreed no\ tq blackball him municating and providing inf.~
tsmouti:~ *11~mer. . * * ; "It's been a long time," Wapipler new X-rays made, Williams said.
within the industry. One paragraph lion to any federal or i;tate gde*ion, rev~;aled , said in a telephone-interview. *1 Ceel said, "neithei* party will disclose the "ti.,. 'n)e. investigaUon led to an in- anent agencies, it is void a.c; cor!
. a I(~ ~~- ~u~r~co!ft_:~t- * : .,JPgs the weight* of a 40-toot trail~~ speotiotr'l..t the W~tts Bar nuclear facts* of this c:ase except if ordered to to public policy and unenforcej W~pler fnmi dis-* has beeh lifted from my shoulders. do so by court. bibunal or -.gency of aerit.
Jing~.... pi.blcl~, or; ev.en vol-,
lnly *~~~'1 *n~er.QS .. of the most. contA!ntious reglilatory Wampler's firi°' ~uched off one power plant. in Spring City, Tenn.,
where subst.andard*welds were found, and the TeMeasee V~ley Au-compet.ent jurisdiction."
Wampler said afterward he had Reich \vJ-ote.
Comley hailed the clecisionj ing: "We have 0U1er people wt?
.l edeRO ~-Jn. 'Bei4h l*l?.d*d Clispu~ during the consti:uct.ion o[. thority spent $50 million on repairs. been, coerced into accepting the set- come fo1ward with safety con*I
pmudon ,}/,~n~ \bl. P,Pblic fji)e $6 biWon reactor. Wampler -con- Wampler became a hero to the tlement He aaid it barred him fl*om now that we know they can bt~

r- $!fPltOOK, P*gl! 38 tended that 20 percent* or the 2,669 activiets who maintained nuclear voluntarily raising nuclear safety tected." *

Asked whetlier he would d
w-.
s"*fety-a:-elated welds at Seabrook power was inherently unsafe and concerns even with the NRC.
~
l:** . * ... either defect.ive or. bnproperly that the Seabrook reactor was sub- Wampler, wl:io had worked as a same thing if he had the ell Q,,veb).
J' .
y
J'Oc-umented - *X-rays used for
. lJackup-~ flawed and the safetv of standard. "He's our original Sea-brook whiRtJP.hlnwAr." AAiil 'Rnl-..+ A quality-control inspector for such
,..bor .,-;,.J.,_,....._._r..1,_ n......,;,.,. *., .... ..i.,.. ~~~~1~~~~~~* .:~e:~: ::,~.*
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~~
PRESIDENT OBAMA
CONGRESS*~ PRESIDENT PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY OBAMA PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY I'?"
____...,_./ Rowley, MA -~-,r*Rowley, MA
~coNGREss*~ PRESIDENT PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY OBAMA PROTECT U.S. DEMOCRACY
~.,,~
~-~.,I'?*
Rowlev, MA
~~_,,
i'?.R*
~ ---------....::::~-~~~=~=le~~M=A~
Petition to President Obama, Vice President Riden, Speaker Boehner and Members of Congress to Create an Independent Commission to Investigate the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
WHEREAS we the people of the United States and beyond have an obligation to ourselves and to future generations to uphold the democratic process and to challenge federal policies when they endanger us and our fellow citizens; and WHEREAS current NRC plans call for the construction of at least fiftY more nuclear plants in order to reduce our nation's dependency on foreign oi I: and WHEREAS the NRC and the Government Accounting Office have found that more than 70 existing US nuclear plants con-tain counterfeit and substandard defective parts; and WHEREAS recent NRC rules streamline the nuclear plant licensing and re-licensing process by limiting public participation, lowering safety inspection and quality assurance standards applicable to nuclear components in existing and new facilities to reduce construction costs: and
\VHEREAS nuclear power plants and their surrounding communities do not have adequate emergency evacuation plans to protect people who would be at risk when a nuclear accident occurs.
WHEREAS recent experience has shown our governments* inability to respond to short and long term needs of our citizens whose lives arc disrupted by unforeseen disasters; and WHEREAS current emergency plans propose that senior citizens and otl1er special needs persons who cannot immediately evacu-ate be left behind in the event of a nuclear accident be given potassium iodide which only protects the thyroid against radioactive iodine, leaving them susceptible to contamination by other dangerous radioactive products released during an accident or act of sabotage; and such plans assume these valuable members of our communities are expendable. a discriminatory policy which vio-lates their civil rights: and WHEREAS building more nuclear power plants will result in increased amounts of hazardous radioactive nuclear wastes for which there is no SAFE storage available for the foreseeable future and if not properly transported, stored or disposed or will be potentially dangerous to many future generations; and WHEREAS the NRC is the federal agency primarily responsible for regulating the nuclear power industry consistent with public safety, health and welfare; and WHEREAS the NRC Office of the Inspector General has released a report titled "NRC Failure to Adequately Regulate" confinning the agency falls short in its efforts to regulate the nuclear industry in a manner that assures public safety ; and WHEREAS the NRC has previously interfered with efforts of its employees and other~cerned persons who have disclosed serious problems with the nuclear power industry. - - - - - *-
hereby petition to establish an independent and bi-partisan Commission (similar to the 911 Commission) comprised of elected officials and other qualified experts to fully investigate th.e Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulation of the nuclear power industry including the manner in which it has acted and adequacy of current safeguards to assure that it con-tinues to protect the American public from dangers posed from the design. construction and operation of existing and future nuclear power plants.
The commission shall have at least fifteen ( 15) members, be staffed and funded by Congress and shall hold extensive public hearings. No later than two (2) years after its first meeting, the commission shall issue a report that contains specific find-ings and recommendations regarding the manner in which the NRC has acted to protect the public from dangers associated with the nuclear power industty including, but limited to. the following topics:
1. Plant location, design and construction;
2. Evacuation plans and other proposed public responses to short and long-term effects of nuclear accidents;
3. Safety Inspections and Quality Assurance including, but not limited to, the use of substandard and counterfeit parts exist-ing and future nuclear power facilities and effectiveness of recent NRC rnles relaxing standards for safety inspections of plant components and inspection documentation requirements.
4. Integrity and independence of NRC staff and management including whether NRC decisions are improperly influenced by the nuclear industry or other interest groups, opportunities for employees to express concerns about public safety issues and effectiveness of th.e NRC Office of Inspector General's Office.
By signing below, l assert and affirm my belief that it is in the best interests of the United States to conduct an investigation to assure that our government is doing everything possible to protect America against the dangerous perils caused by nuclear accidents on the devastating scale of Chernobyl and Japan Castastrophes.
PRINT YOUR NAME. ADDRESS. PHONE AND E-MAIL ADDRESS AND THEN SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW (additional signatures add to back)
Sponsored by We The People STEPHEN B. COMLEY SR.
Please return all petitions to: WE THE PEOPLE 45 MANSION DRIVE BOX#7 904-206-3ll4 ROWLEY MA 01969
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ BEARER _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ PETITION NO. _ _ _ _ __
OVER
_Newburyport, Massachusetts .;~-:->*::~ - *'*ti~*
40Pages Wednesday, November 5, ~ 35 cents* $1.50 weekly home delivered Taking Seabrook all the way to Washington To the editor: -
I am a resident of Rowley, Massachusetts, which go back to.check over Mr. Padovano's work. More lies two miles outside the Seabrook Nuclear. Plant's ~rtantly, some of the inspections that be was 10-mile radius. I am. also the administrator of the Sea required to be performing could never be re-inspect-View Nursing home in Rowley. ed as they were already covered in cemenl I became concerned in the Seabrook issue when 1 Recently, the NRC granted 11 pages of inspection found out that there is _not an acceptable evacuation relief pertaining to current welds, even though the plan for people who cannot be moved. This includes NRC's own regulations require 100% examination.
children hospitalized for surgery who must be shel- I contacted Governor Sununu's office by regis-tered in place. tered mail . on October 15, 1986, requesting him to Rowley could not be included in the evacuation make public some of the things I had found in planning even though our young people attend school Washington as well as making public the James within the 10-mile radius because they go to a region- Padovano case. His office informed me that they did al school in Newbury. . not know of the case and that they didn't think there I concluded that it was not only the industry that wouldbeenoughtimetodothisbeforeelection.
was at fault but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Mr. Sununu does not have the right to decide for i which led me to believe that the real stench was the people of today and, more importantly, the people*
coming from Washington. of tomorrow whether Seabrook opens or not This 1 During my weeks in Washington, D.C. this was rigbtbelongstoallofus.
1 confirmed. I uncovered some very disturbing infor- Ei~ty per cent of our town has officially asked t mation regat.ding the safety and viability of nuclear President Reagan to investigate the NRC to see if power p~ts in the United States, including our they are acting responsibly, to request a moratorium neighbor Seabrook. . on the start-up of any new ~uclear plants awaiting For instance, James K. *Asselstine, an NRC Com- licenses and that be remind the NRC that this is missioner, has told me in a formal meeting that he America not Russia and that they are accountable to
has information which supports bis assertion that the people. In addition, I have asked Congressman there will be a serious nuclear accident in the United John D. DingeH from Michigan to set up a hearing to States within the riext 20 years and could result in off- subpoena 18 present and former employees of the site releases of radiation larger than what occurred NRC. Some of the employees of the NRC want to at Chernobyl, unless something is done now to inves- testify because they are committed to the safety of tigate-and regulate the nuclear power industry. the people of America.
I have also learned of the case of James V. ; I appeal to present and former employees of the Padovano, whose sole position was to inspect welds Seabrook Nuclear Plant. It is your responSibility to at the Seabrook plant. He was charged with 11 counts make known any wrong-doings at Seabrook whether
of federal violations and pleaded guilty and was they be regarding equipment, design, or personnel.
sentenced on Sept. 30, 19855. He was sent to jail for six Anyone knowing of any more problems in the months and then placed on three years probation. plant's construction which may make it tmsafe is These charges w.ere for not performing inspection of advised to conta<;t the Employees Legal Project in welds and falsifying the records to show that he did Amesbury at*388-9620 or feel free to contact me at 948-2002: Your identity will be protected and your infor- i perform the inspections.
I think the *least the Department of .Tustice could
, bave done was to fully investigate tbe*case and let all mation will be used effectively. * . -* * '
Please* help t.o remind some of our government
. l Witnesses be questioned. I have asked for this case to officials and the nuclear industry that we nm~*
be: re-opened .in Washington thtough the Justice country, theydo~t. .
.J:tepartment. Seabrook officials admit that due to Mr. . *. ** * '* * *:., .-*.,, . STEPHEN B. COMLEY
,*Padmuµio'~;~~~.~~~~~-onemilliondollai:&~ 1r_~;;;-? ~-*~ -i"¥:;a:;*1;.tl;...~ --~::!J, ~~-~.; *.;,;~~Rowley Awe. o-:r:.om1:s
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ML15236A273

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