ML15065A037

Final Report for the Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Report Conducted on December 4, 2014

ML15065A037
Person / Time
Site:	Vermont Yankee
Issue date:	02/23/2015
From:	Colman S US Executive Office of the President, Office of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC Region 1
References
Download: ML15065A037 (22)

Text

U.S. Department of Homeland Security FEMA Region I 99 High St., 5"h Floor ART FEMA Boston, MA 02110-2320 February 23, 2015 NRC Headquarters Document Control Desk US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sir/Madam:

Enclosed find a copy of the Final Report for the Bellows Falls Union High School, Westminster Vermont, Host Community Reception Center Exercise that was conducted on December 4, 2014.

The State of Vermont and Local Emergency Response Organizations successfully demonstrated their capabilities to implement their off-site radiological emergency response plans and procedures based on the evaluation of this exercise by a team of federal evaluators with final determinations made by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chairperson. As a result of this exercise, there were no deficiencies and one Area Requiring Corrective Actions that was re-demonstrated during the exercise and closed.

State and local preparedness remains adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station and provides reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off-site in the event of a radiological emergency.

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me at 617-832-4731, or Ryan Jones, of my staff, at (617) 832-4718 Sincerely, Steve Colman Regional Assistance Committee Chairperson Enclosure CC: Nancy McNamara, NRC Region I Vanessa Quinn, REPP Branch Chief, FEMA HQ Bridget AhIgrim, Project Officer, REPP Branch, FEMA HQ www.fema.gov

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Report Exercise Date: December 4, 2014 Report Date: February 23, 2015 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program FEMA Region I

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SFEMA Exercise Report Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Licensee: Entergy Vermont Yankee Exercise Date: December 4, 2014 Report Date: February 23, 2015 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REGION I 99 HIGH STREET BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02110 iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE I. Executive Summary .............................................................................. 1 II. Exercise Design ............................................................................................................. 2 III. Analysis of Capabilities ........................................................................... 4 List of Appendices Appendix A - Exercise Evaluators Appendix B - Extent of Play Appendix C - Exercise Scenario i.

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I. EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

On December 4, 2014 an evaluated exercise was conducted in Westminster, Vermont (VT) at the Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the capability of the Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center staff and volunteers to respond to a radiological incident involving the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station. The exercise was held in accordance with FEMA's policies and guidance concerning the exercise of State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Plans (RERP) and procedures.

Protecting the public health and safety is the full time job of some of the exercise participants and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities. Cooperation and teamwork of all the participants was evident during this exercise.

FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated in this exercise.

Particularly notable were the sheer numbers of local volunteers that Westminster has recently enlisted to staff the Reception Center. The area's residents show a commendable sense of community and willingness to help their fellow Vermonters in the event of an emergency.

This report contains the final evaluation of the Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Exercise.

The Westminster Emergency Management Response Organizations and Volunteers successfully demonstrated their knowledge to implement their emergency response plans and procedures. There were no deficiencies and one Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCAs) identified and corrected on the spot during this drill.

II. EXERCISE DESIGN Exercise Purpose and Design On December 7, 1979, the President directed FEMA to take responsibility for offsite nuclear planning and response. FEMA's activities are conducted pursuant to 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 350, 351, and 352. These regulations are a key element in the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) Program that was established following the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station accident in March 1979.

44 CFR 350 establishes the policies and procedures for FEMA's initial and continued approval of state and local governments' radiological emergency planning and preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants. This approval is contingent, in part, on state and local government participation in joint exercises with licensees.

FEMA's responsibilities in radiological emergency planning for fixed nuclear facilities include the following:

• Taking the lead in the review and evaluation of RERPs and procedures developed by state and local governments;

• Determining whether such plans and procedures can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises of the plans and procedures conducted by state and local governments;

• Responding to requests by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding between the NRC and FEMA dated June 17, 1993 (Federal Register, Vol. 58, No. 176, September 14, 1993);

and

" Coordinating the activities of federal agencies with responsibilities in the radiological emergency planning process:

U.S. Department of Commerce U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Environmental Protection Agency U.S. Department of Energy U.S. Department of Health and Human Services U.S. Center for Disease Control U.S. Department of Transportation U.S. Department of Agriculture U.S. Department of the Interior U.S. Food and Drug Administration

Representatives of these agencies serve on the FEMA Region I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC), which is chaired by FEMA.

Initial formal submission of the RERPs for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (NPS) to FEMA Region I by the State of Vermont and involved local jurisdictions occurred in April 1980, by the State of New Hampshire in October 1981, and by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in December 1979 and include recent revisions to plans and procedures.

Formal approval of the RERP was granted by FEMA in October 1981, under 44 CFR 350.

The findings presented in this report are based on the evaluations of the federal evaluator team, with final determinations made by the FEMA Region I RAC Chairperson.

The criteria utilized in the FEMA evaluation process are contained in

• NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," November 1980;

" FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual, April 2013.

Exercise Objectives, Capabilities and Activities A Host Community Reception Center Evaluated Exercise was conducted in Westminster, VT, on December 4, 2014, and was evaluated by FEMA Region I, REP staff to assess the capabilities of the Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center staff to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees of a Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station incident. The purpose of this report is to present the exercise results and findings on the performance of the offsite response organizations (ORO) during a simulated radiological emergency.

Scenario Summary The exercise scenario was developed to evaluate the response of the exercise participants to a radiological emergency. The scenario is listed in Appendix C.

III. ANALYSIS OF CAPABILITIES Participating Agencies Vermont Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security Town of Westminster Officials Westminster Volunteer Fire and Rescue BFUHS Staff Saxtons River Fire Department Grafton Fire and Rescue Windham County Sheriff Department Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES)

American Red Cross of Vermont and New Hampshire Vermont Department of Health Vermont Agency of Human Services Health Care & Rehabilitation Services (HRCS) of Vermont Individual Volunteers from surrounding communities Golden Cross Ambulance Service Vermont Yankee Emergency Preparedness Staff Contained in this section are the results and findings of the evaluation of the Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Exercise that was conducted on December 4, 2014. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the capabilities of the Emergency Management Personnel of Bellows Falls Union High School to demonstrate the adequacy of procedures, facilities, equipment, and personnel for the radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees of a Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station incident.

Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Reception Center staff demonstrated excellent communication and teamwork throughout the exercise. The Reception Center was ably led by the Westminster, VT town administrator and supported by staff made up of various emergency response and volunteer organizations from the community. This diverse group of reception center staff members worked exceptionally well together demonstrating excellent teamwork throughout the exercise from reception center set up and activation, to receiving and processing simulated dirty and clean evacuees in a thorough and timely manner. Emergency workers were knowledgeable and engaged at the job at hand. They maintained adequate contamination control throughout the exercise and demonstrated proficiency in their use of equipment and monitoring techniques. Staff successfully demonstrated knowledge of their plans and procedures.

a. MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1, L.e.1, 3.a.1, 3.b.1, 3.d.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1

b. DEFICIENCY: NONE

c. AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION: 6.a.1

Condition: The Emergency Workers in the Female Decontamination Area at the Bellows Falls Reception Center did not adequately demonstrate proper contamination control measures while monitoring a "simulated" contaminated evacuee.

Possible Cause: Emergency Workers may need additional training in this area.

Reference:

NUREG-0654, J.10.h;K.5.a, REP Program Manual, June 2013, and Vermont RERP, Reception Center Plan, Rev.3, October 2014 Effect: If the Female Decontamination Supervisor had not been present, contamination could have spread to emergency workers, other evacuees, and potentially the entire facility.

Corrective Action: The Female Decontamination Supervisor intervened and redirected staff. A re-demonstration of this criterion was successfully conducted via an "On the Spot Correction" per the Exercise Plan.

d. NOT DEMONSTRATED: NONE

e. PRIOR ARCAs RESOLVED: NONE

f. PRIOR ARCAs UNRESOLVED: NONE

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Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Evaluator Matrix December 4, 2014 EVALUATION SITE EVALUATOR TASK CRITERIA Bellows Falls Union R. Jones Mobilization, Direction & 1.a.1, 1.c.1, 1.d.1 High School Control, Communications Reception Center Reception Center R. Jones Facilities 1.b.l Reception Center H. LaForge Evacuee Registration 6.a.1 Reception Center B. Kennedy Dosimetry Issue & Briefing 3.a.l Reception Center T. Hollins (F) Female Decontamination 6.a.1 B. Kennedy (M) Male Decontamination Reception Center I. Pierce Portal Monitoring 6.a.1, 6.b.1 Reception Center B. Swartz Traffic Control Around 3.d.1, 6.a.1, 6.b.1 Reception Area Vehicle Monitoring &

Decontamination

APPENDIX B Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Exercise EXTENT OF PLAY RCX14 is a drill with the purpose of rehearsing and demonstrating the capability of the Bellows Falls Union High School (BFUHS) Reception Center (RC) management and staff to respond to a radiological incident involving the Vermont Yankee nuclear power station.

The RC staff will mobilize, open the RC, and process a limited number of vehicles and evacuees in response to a Hostile Action Based (HAB) incident resulting a limited release from the Vermont Yankee Spent Fuel Pool (SFP).

All activities will be based upon current plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency (unless otherwise indicated). Each facility functional area will be setup per procedure.

Immediate correction of issues, where remediationis possible, is allowed. All criteria except 1.a. 1 and 1.b. I are eligible for re-demonstration.

Evaluation Area I - Emergency Operations Management Sub-element 1.a.1 Mobilization.

Criterion 1.a.1: Off-site Response Organizations use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner. (NUREG-0654, A.4; D.3; 4, E.1,2; H.4)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654 which provides that OROs should have the capability to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and to activate and staff emergency facilities.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to receive notification of an emergency situation from the licensee, verify the notification, and contact, alert, and mobilize key emergency personnel in a timely manner. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the activation of facilities for immediate use by mobilized personnel when they arrive to begin emergency operations. Activation of facilities should be completed in accordance with the plan and/or procedures. Pre-positioning of emergency personnel is appropriate, in accordance with the extent of play agreement, at those facilities located beyond a normal commuting distance from the individual's duty location or residence. Further, pre-positioning of staff for out-of-sequence demonstrations is appropriate in accordance with the extent of play agreement.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Controllers will notify the Westminster host community pager carriers through the state paging system and simulate a phone call from the State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) to the Westminster EMD.

2. The RC staff will provide notification trees for review but the staff will be prepositioned at the school before the beginning of the evaluation.

3. Core activation, which is the processing of precautionary transfers and undirected evacuees, will not be demonstrated. Players will demonstrate full activation, which includes the monitoring and decontamination of the general public.

4. The RC will not demonstrate a shift change.

Sub-element 1.b.1 Facilities.

Criterion 1.b.1: Facilities are sufficient to support the emergency response. (NUREG-0654, H)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have facilities to support emergency response.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL Facilities will only be specifically evaluated for this criterion if they are new or have substantial changes in structure or mission. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the availability of facilities that support the accomplishment of emergency operations. Some of the areas to be considered are: adequate space, furnishings, lighting, restrooms, ventilation, backup power and/or alternate facility (if required to support operations).

Facilities must be set up based on the ORO's plans and procedures and demonstrated, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC There have been no significant changes. Evaluators will verify the suitability of the facility.

Sub-element 1.c.1 Direction and Control.

Criterion 1.c. 1: Key personnel with leadership roles for the Off-Site Response Organization provide direction and control to that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible. NUREG-0654, A.1.d, 2.a,b)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that the ORO have the capability to control their overall response to an emergency.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL Leadership personnel should demonstrate the ability to carry out essential functions of the response effort, for example: keeping the staff informed through periodic briefings and/or other means, coordinating with other appropriate OROs, and ensuring completion of requirements and requests.

All activities associated with direction and control must be performed based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC Reception Center leadership will follow plans to direct and control the response effort.

Sub-element 1.d.1 Communications and Equipment.

Criterion 1.d.1: At least two communication systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations.

Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, F.1,2)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should establish reliable primary and backup communication systems to ensure communications with key emergency personnel at locations such as the following: appropriate contiguous governments within the emergency planning zone (EPZ), Federal emergency response organizations, the licensee and its facilities, emergency operations centers (EOC), and field teams.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL OROs will demonstrate that a primary and at least one backup system are fully functional at the beginning of an exercise. If a communications system or systems are not functional, but exercise performance is not affected, no exercise issue will be assessed. Communications equipment and procedures for facilities and field units should be used as needed for the transmission and receipt of exercise messages. All facilities and field teams should have the capability to access at least one communication system that is independent of the commercial telephone system. Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to manage the communication systems and ensure that all message traffic is handled without delays that might disrupt the conduct of emergency operations.

OROs should ensure that a coordinated communication link for fixed and mobile medical support facilities exists. The specific communications capabilities of OROs should be commensurate with that specified in the response plan and/or procedures. Exercise scenarios could require the failure of a communications system and the use of an alternate system, as negotiated in the extent of play agreement.

All activities associated with the management of communications capabilities must be demonstrated based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an in an actual emergency, unless otherwise noted above or in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. Players will demonstrate primary (radio) and backup (telephone) external communications once with the State EOC. Players will simulate contact with locations that are not playing.

2. Players will demonstrate internal communications throughout the Reception Center. The primary internal system is radio with public address system; backup systems include mobile phones and messengers.

Sub-element 1.e.1 Equipment and Supplies to Support Operations.

Criterion 1.e.1: Equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, potassium iodide (KI), and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations. (NUREG-0654, H; J.10.a,b,e,f,j,k,11; K.3.a)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have emergency equipment and supplies adequate to support the emergency response.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL Equipment within the facility (facilities) should be sufficient and consistent with the role assigned to that facility in the ORO's plans and/or procedures in support of emergency operations. Use of maps and displays is encouraged.

All instruments, including air sampling flow meters (field teams only), should be inspected, inventoried, and operationally checked before each use. They should be calibrated in accordance with the manufacturer's recommendations (or at least annually for the unmodified CDV-700 series or if there are no manufacturer's recommendations for a specific instrument; modified CDV-700 instruments should be calibrated in accordance with the recommendation of

the modification manufacturer). A label indicating such calibration should be on each instrument or verifiable by other means.

Sufficient quantities of appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry and dosimeter chargers should be available for issuance to all categories of emergency workers that could be deployed from that facility. Appropriate direct-reading dosimetry should allow individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits and maximum exposure limits contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Dosimetry should be inspected for electrical leakage at least annually and replaced, if necessary. CDV-1 38s, due to their documented history of electrical leakage problems, should be inspected for electrical leakage at least quarterly and replaced if necessary. This leakage testing will be verified during the exercise, through documentation submitted in the Annual Letter of Certification, and/or through a staff assistance visit.

Responsible OROs should demonstrate the capability to maintain inventories of KI sufficient for use by emergency workers, as indicated on rosters; institutionalized individuals, as indicated in capacity lists for facilities; and, where stipulated by the plan and/or procedures, members of the general public (including transients) within the plume pathway EPZ. Quantities of dosimetry and KI available and storage locations(s) will be confirmed by physical inspection at storage location(s) or through documentation of current inventory submitted during the exercise, provided in the Annual Letter of Certification submission, and/or verified during a Staff Assistance Visit. Available supplies of KI should be within the expiration date indicated on KI bottles or blister packs. As an alternative, the ORO may produce a letter from FEMA indicating that the KI supply remains potent, in accordance with Food and Drug Administration (FDA) guidance.

At locations where traffic and access control personnel are deployed, appropriate equipment (e.g., vehicles, barriers, traffic cones and signs, etc.) should be available or their availability described.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The RC will demonstrate that equipment, maps, displays, dosimetry, KI and other supplies are adequate and sufficient to support the emergency response. (The Reception Center does not distribute KI to evacuees or the general public.)

2. Evaluators will verify survey meter calibration dates and KI expiration dates.

3. Quarterly inventory and operational checks are part of the Annual Letter of Certification and will not be evaluated.

Evaluation Area 3 - Protective Action Implementation Sub-element 3.a.1 Implementation of Emergency Worker Exposure Control.

Criterion 3.a.1: The OROs issue appropriate dosimetry and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to emergency workers in accordance with the plans and procedures.

Emergency workers periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. (NUREG-0654, K.3.a,b)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs should have the capability to provide for the following: distribution, use, collection, and processing of direct-reading dosimeters and permanent record dosimeters; provide for direct-reading dosimeters to be read at appropriate frequencies by emergency workers; maintain a radiation dose record for

each emergency worker; and provide for establishing a decision chain or authorization procedure for emergency workers to incur radiation exposures in excess of protective action guides, always applying the ALARA (As Low As is Reasonably Achievable) principle as appropriate.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide appropriate direct-reading and permanent record dosimetry, dosimeter chargers, and instructions on the use of dosimetry to emergency workers. For evaluation purposes, appropriate direct-reading dosimetry is defined as dosimetry that allows individual(s) to read the administrative reporting limits (that are pre-established at a level low enough to consider subsequent calculation of Total Effective Dose Equivalent) and maximum exposure limits (for those emergency workers involved in life saving activities) contained in the ORO's plans and procedures.

Each emergency worker should have the basic knowledge of radiation exposure limits as specified in the ORO's plan and/or procedures. Procedures to monitor and record dosimeter readings and to manage radiological exposure control should be demonstrated.

During a plume phase exercise, emergency workers should demonstrate the procedures to be followed when administrative exposure limits and turn-back values are reached. The emergency worker should report accumulated exposures during the exercise as indicated in the plans and procedures. OROs should demonstrate the actions described in the plan and/or procedures by determining whether to replace the worker, to authorize the worker to incur additional exposures or to take other actions. If scenario events do not require emergency workers to seek authorizations for additional exposure, evaluators should interview at least two emergency workers, to determine their knowledge of whom to contact in the event authorization is needed and at what exposure levels. Emergency workers may use any available resources (e.g., written procedures and/or co-workers) in providing responses.

Although it is desirable for all emergency workers to each have a direct-reading dosimeter, there may be situations where team members will be in close proximity to each other during the entire mission and adequate control of exposure can be affected for all members of the team by one dosimeter worn by the team leader. Emergency workers who are assigned to low exposure rate areas, e.g., at reception centers, counting laboratories, emergency operations centers, and communications centers, may have individual direct-reading dosimeters or they may be monitored by dosimeters strategically placed in the work area. It should be noted that, even in these situations, each team member must still have their own permanent record dosimetry.

Individuals without specific radiological response missions, such as farmers for animal care, essential utility service personnel, or other members of the public who must re-enter an evacuated area following or during the plume passage, should be limited to the lowest radiological exposure commensurate with completing their missions.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The Reception Center will provide a radiological briefing and issue dosimetry packets to at least four radiological emergency workers. (Non-radiological emergency workers such as registration and reunification staff do not receive dosimetry.) Four radiological emergency workers will demonstrate knowledge through evaluator interviews.

2. Most Reception Center staff will not wear protective clothing. However, at least four radiological emergency workers, including at least one male and one female, will wear full

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and demonstrate donning and doffing of protective clothing for the evaluators.

Sub-element 3.d.1 Implementation of Traffic and Access Control -TCP/ACP are established.

Criterion 3.d.1: Appropriate traffic and access control is established.

Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel. (NUREG-0654, J.10.gj,k)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement protective action plans, including relocation and restriction of access to evacuated areas. This sub-element focuses on selecting, establishing, and staffing of traffic and access control points and removal of impediments to the flow of evacuation traffic.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL OROs should demonstrate the capability to select, establish, and staff appropriate traffic and access control points consistent with evacuation/sheltering decisions (for example evacuating, sheltering and relocation), in a timely manner. OROs should demonstrate the capability to provide instructions to traffic and access control staff on actions to take when modifications in protective action strategies necessitate changes in evacuation patterns or in the area(s) where access is controlled.

Traffic and access control staff should demonstrate accurate knowledge of their roles and responsibilities. This capability may be demonstrated by actual deployment or by interview in accordance with the extent of play agreement.

In instances where OROs lack authority necessary to control access by certain types of traffic (rail, water, and air traffic), they should demonstrate the capability to contact the State or Federal agencies with authority to control access.

All activities must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed, as they would be in an actual emergency, unless specified above or indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The Reception Center will demonstrate traffic control within the BFUHS property. Police will not post Traffic Control Points that are external to BFUHS.

2. Evaluators will discuss traffic control in a brief tour and interview with a Windham County Sheriff Department official about the portion of the traffic and access control plan applicable to the RC but external to BFUHS.

Evaluation Area 6 - Support OperationslFacilities Sub-element 6.a.1 Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Workers and Registration of Evacuees.

Criterion 6.a.1: The reception center/emergency worker facility has appropriate space, adequate resources, and trained personnel to provide monitoring, decontamination, and registration of evacuees and/or emergency workers. (NUREG-0654, J. 1O.h; K.5.a)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees and emergency workers, while minimizing contamination of the facility, and registration of evacuees at reception centers.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL Radiological monitoring, decontamination, and registration facilities for evacuees/ emergency workers should be set up and demonstrated as they would be in an actual emergency or as indicated in the extent of play agreement. This would include adequate space for evacuees'

vehicles. Expected demonstration should include 1/3 of the monitoring teams/portal monitors required to monitor 20% of the population allocated to the facility within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Prior to using monitoring instrument(s), the monitor(s) should demonstrate the process of checking the instrument(s) for proper operation.

Staff responsible for the radiological monitoring of evacuees should demonstrate the capability to attain and sustain a monitoring productivity rate per hour needed to monitor the 20%

emergency planning zone (EPZ) population planning base within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This monitoring productivity rate per hour is the number of evacuees that can be monitored per hour by the total complement of monitors using an appropriate monitoring procedure. A minimum of six individuals per monitoring station should be monitored, using equipment and procedures specified in the plan and/or procedures, to allow demonstration of monitoring, decontamination, and registration capabilities. The monitoring sequences for the first six simulated evacuees per monitoring team will be timed by the evaluators in order to determine whether the twelve-hour requirement can be meet. Monitoring of emergency workers does not have to meet the twelve-hour requirement. However, appropriate monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of two emergency workers.

Decontamination of evacuees/emergency workers may be simulated and conducted by interview. The availability of provisions for separately showering should be demonstrated or explained. The staff should demonstrate provisions for limiting the spread of contamination.

Provisions could include floor coverings, signs and appropriate means (e.g., partitions, roped-off areas) to separate clean from potentially contaminated areas. Provisions should also exist to separate contaminated and uncontaminated individuals, provide changes of clothing for individuals whose clothing is contaminated, and store contaminated clothing and personal belongings to prevent further contamination of evacuees or facilities. In addition, for any individual found to be contaminated, procedures should be discussed concerning the handling of potential contamination of vehicles and personal belongings.

Monitoring personnel should explain the use of action levels for determining the need for decontamination. They should also explain the procedures for referring evacuees who cannot be adequately decontaminated for assessment and follow up in accordance with the ORO's plans and procedures. Contamination of the individual will be determined by controller inject and not simulated with any low-level radiation source.

The capability to register individuals upon completion of the monitoring and decontamination activities should be demonstrated. The registration activities demonstrated should include the establishment of a registration record for each individual, consisting of the individual's name, address, results of monitoring, and time of decontamination, if any, or as otherwise designated in the plan. Audio recorders, camcorders, or written records are all acceptable means for registration.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC

1. The staff will demonstrate vehicle monitoring per procedure by checking at least three vehicles; one should be contaminated. The staff will discuss decontamination procedures with the FEMA Evaluator.

2. There will be a discussion, but no demonstration, of processing of evacuee pets.

3. The Reception Center staff will set up two portal monitors to test their operability and demonstrate processing of 20% of the area population at the facility. Six evacuees will go through the portals in one minute to demonstrate the capability to monitor 4,009 people within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> (goal is at least 5.6 people/minute).

4. At least six evacuees will proceed through the portal monitors (separate from the time trial, can be the same six evacuees) to demonstrate the monitoring process. The controllers will inform the operator of the individual's contamination, if any. At least one male and one female will be contaminated. Secondary personnel monitoring staff will use a Ludlum Model 26 Frisker for general monitoring.

5. The staff will walk at least one male and one female through decontamination in the male and female decontamination areas and review procedures with the FEMA Evaluator.

6. The staff will process at least six evacuee registrations. The evacuees will provide (fictitious) information; the staff will simulate further congregate care by identifying and referring them for appropriate assistance.

7. Staff will demonstrate radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures for emergency workers through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator. Emergency workers have priority, but are monitored along with the general evacuating public.

Sub-element 6.b.1 Monitoring and Decontamination of Evacuees and Emergency Worker equipment.

Criterion 6.b. 1: The facility/ORO has adequate procedures and resources for the accomplishment of monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment including vehicles. (NUREG-0654, K.5.b)

Intent: This sub-element is derived from NUREG-0654, which provides that OROs have the capability to implement radiological monitoring and decontamination of emergency worker equipment, including vehicles.

EXTENT OF PLAY - GENERAL The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to monitor equipment, including vehicles, for contamination in accordance with the Offsite Response Organizations (ORO) plans and procedures. Specific attention should be given to equipment, including vehicles, that was in contact with individuals found to be contaminated. The monitoring staff should demonstrate the capability to make decisions on the need for decontamination of equipment, including vehicles, based on guidance levels and procedures stated in the plan and/or procedures.

The area to be used for monitoring and decontamination should be set up as it would be in an actual emergency, with all route markings, instrumentation, record keeping and contamination control measures in place. Monitoring procedures should be demonstrated for a minimum of one vehicle. It is generally not necessary to monitor the entire surface of vehicles. However, the capability to monitor areas such as air intake systems, radiator grills, bumpers, wheel wells, tires, and door handles should be demonstrated.

Interior surfaces of vehicles that were in contact with individuals found to be contaminated should also be checked.

Decontamination capabilities, and provisions for vehicles and equipment that cannot be decontaminated, may be simulated and conducted by interview.

All activities associated with this criterion must be based on the ORO's plans and procedures and completed as they would be in an actual emergency, unless noted above or otherwise indicated in the extent of play agreement.

EXTENT OF PLAY - SPECIFIC RC staff will demonstrate radiological monitoring and decontamination procedures for emergency worker vehicles through an interview with the FEMA Evaluator.

APPENDIX C Bellows Falls Union High School Reception Center Exercise Scenario

• The Reception Center (RC) staff will mobilize, open the RC, and process a limited number of vehicles and evacuees in response to a Hostile Action Based (HAB) incident (which has been resolved) that may have resulted in a limited radioactive release from the Vermont Yankee Spent Fuel Pool (SFP).

• Terrorists attacked the Vermont Yankee nuclear plant at approximately 1400 on December 4 with a small mobile force and several suicide bombs. Law enforcement confirmed defeat of all the terrorists by 1630.

• The attack damaged the reactor building and spent fuel pool and there has been a small radiological release. Vermont Yankee declared a General Emergency; radiological surveys are under way.

• The Vermont State Emergency Operations Center (SEOC) recommended, and at 1730 the Incident Commander directed, an evacuation of the towns of Vernon and Guilford.

Other Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) towns were under shelter-in-place orders during the initial response, but that has now been lifted.

" The SEOC has decided to open the RC to process evacuees. The SEOC ordered a core activation at 1600 and full activation at 1730. Given the situation, the SEOC anticipates that the RC will need to be open for a maximum of 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> (until noon the following day).

I