05000413/FIN-2017007-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Translate Design Requirements into Operating Procedures for NW System |
| Description | Green: The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensees failure to translate the limiting high pressure design requirement of the containment valve injection water (NW) system surge chamber into station proc edures. Specifically, the licensee failed to translate the NW surge chamber high pressure design limit of 85 psig from calculation CNC-1223.19-00-0004, NW system setpoint ca lculation, Rev. 7, into procedure OP/1/A/6200/019, Containment Valve Injection Water System, Rev. 36, to ensure the NW system could perform its intended safety function during a design basis accident. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as action request 02096392, reviewed the issue for current and past operability, and issued an operations guide to limit the NW surge chamber pressures to 80 psig. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it adversely affected the design control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to translate the 85 psig NW surge chamber pressure limit into procedures resulted in exceeding the NW surge chamber high pressure limit, which could result in an inability of the safety re lated nuclear service water system to provide makeup water to the NW surge chamber and result in entrainment of nitrogen gas in the surge chamber outlet. The team determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containmen t, containment isolation system, and heat removal components, and the finding did not involve an actual reduction in function of hydrogen igniters in the reactor containment. This finding was assigned a cross-cutting aspect of Evaluation in the Problem Identification and Resolution Area because the finding was indicative of present licensee performance, and the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the issue identified in ARs 01912139 and 01912453 after the revision to the calculation was completed to ensure that the correct high pressure NW surge chamber design requirement would have been translated into procedures [P.2] |
| Site: | Catawba  |
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| Report | IR 05000413/2017007 Section 1R17 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.17 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Terry-Ward G Crespo J Bartley J Bozga M Riley |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2017007 | |||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Catawba) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Catawba)
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