05000331/FIN-2015004-04
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Temporary Configuration Control Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance for the licensees failure to follow procedure EN-AA-205-1102, Temporary Configuration Changes, Revision 6. Specifically, the licensee constructed a shaft housing enclosure on the B condensate pump without applying the rigor provided by the temporary configuration change (TCC) process. This resulted in water intrusion into the B condensate pump lower motor bearing. This finding does not involve enforcement action because no violation of a regulatory requirement was identified. The licensee entered the inspectors concerns into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2100521. Corrective actions included the performance of an apparent cause evaluation and the creation of a form to document engineering positions with respect to TCC applicability. The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to follow procedure EN-AA-205-1102 to document the addition of the B condensate pump shaft housing shield and forced air blower as TCCs was a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, the addition of the shaft housing shield resulted in a very high humidity environment which resulted in water passing through the lower motor shaft seal and entering the lower motor bearing oil reservoir. This resulted in the need for repetitive feeding and bleeding of the lower motor bearing oil reservoir to prevent emulsification of the oil. The feeding and bleeding of the B condensate pump lower motor bearing oil reservoir was an evolution that could have resulted in bearing damage, pump trip, and reactor scram. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not result in exceeding the reactor coolant system leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident, cause a reactor trip, involve the complete or partial loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of or caused an initiating event, and did not affect mitigation equipment. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of operating experience in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee failed to implement relevant internal operating experience in a timely manner. |
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000331/2015004 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Norton C Phillips G Hansen J Steffes K Stoedter R Edwards R Walton V Myers |
| CCA | P.5, Operating Experience |
| INPO aspect | CL.1 |
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Finding - Duane Arnold - IR 05000331/2015004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Duane Arnold) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Duane Arnold)
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