05000313/FIN-2009002-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Procedure for Reactor Protection System Maintenance |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, for an inadequate maintenance procedure governing reactor protection system Channel A flux/delta flux/flow trip circuit. Specifically, the instructions did not provide sufficient details concerning the tightening of screws on a circuit card during a surveillance. This resulted in improper maintenance which rendered the channel inoperable after it was returned to service. The licensee had previously identified problems with the adjustment of these screws. In addition, the inspectors identified a significant contributor to the event. The lead qualified technician on the job failed to follow a maintenance procedure and provide continuous supervision to a non-qualified technician that was performing the sensitive maintenance. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Reports ANO-1-2009-0066 and ANO-1-2009-0464. The performance deficiencies were more than minor because, if left uncorrected, they could result in more significant concerns. Specifically, during future surveillance and maintenance work, a reactor protection system circuit could again be rendered inoperable by inadequate maintenance and go undetected for a longer time period. In addition, unqualified individuals performing unsupervised maintenance could render various pieces of mitigating equipment inoperable or cause initiating events. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding had very low safety significance because the finding: (1) resulted in a loss of operability of reactor protection system Channel A; (2) did not lead to an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) did not result in the loss of one or more trains of nontechnical specification equipment; and (4) did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program component P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed the causes i.e., failure to properly supervise the trainee |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2009002 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Clayton A Sanchez J Josey J Clark S Rotton |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2009002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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