05000251/FIN-2015004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to correctly follow procedure 3-PMI-072.6, Steam Dump to Atmosphere Control Loop Calibration |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures and Programs, was identified when the licensee failed to properly implement procedure 3-PMI-072.6, Steam Dump to Atmosphere Control Loop Calibration. Specifically, the licensee incorrectly installed a temporary electrical jumper in reactor operator console 3C02 instead of 3C04, in contrast to Step 6.3.2 of 3-PMI-072.6. This action resulted in actuation of a 3B 4160 volt (V) vital bus lockout circuit causing loss of power to the B train of Unit 3 (U3) spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling. Immediate corrective actions were taken to remove the jumper and restore the B train of SFP cooling. The licensee entered the condition in its corrective action program (CAP) as action request (AR) 02088911 and 02088914. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system (RCS), and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases. In addition, the performance deficiency, if left uncorrected, had the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. The finding was screened using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, Tables 2 and 3, dated July 1, 2012, and Appendix G Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Exhibit 4 for Barrier Integrity, dated May 9, 2014. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not associated with low temperature over pressurization, freeze seals, steam generator nozzle dams, criticality, drain down or leakage paths, or the containment barrier. Furthermore, one train of SFP cooling remained in operation, the rate of SFP temperature rise was low (~ 2 F/hour), and additional methods remained available to limit SFP temperature rise. This finding was assigned a cross cutting aspect associated with the procedure adherence element of the human performance area because the licensee failed to correctly execute step 6.3.2 of procedure 3-PMI-072.6. |
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000251/2015004 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2015 (2015Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Dykes J Panfel L Suggs M Bates M Endress P Capehart R Kellner R Pursley R Williams T Hoeg |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Turkey Point - IR 05000251/2015004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Turkey Point) @ 2015Q4
Self-Identified List (Turkey Point)
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