05000321/FIN-2013005-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Scaffolding Installed in Safety Related Areas Failed to Meet Procedural Requirements |
| Description | The NRC inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to implement existing procedural guidance for the control of clearances between installed scaffolding and safety-related plant equipment. The licensee corrected each scaffold identified to restore compliance. This violation has been entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 721564. Failure to maintain the required clearance of two inches between scaffolding and safety related equipment in accordance with 50AC-MNT-003-0, Scaffold Control, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more-than minor because it adversely affected the protection against external factors attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, this issue is similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E, Section 4 Example (a) of a more-than-minor issue because the licensee routinely failed to perform engineering evaluations on scaffolding erected with clearances less than procedural requirements. The inspectors screened this finding utilizing IMC 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, dated June 19, 2012, and IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings at Power dated June 19, 2012. The finding screened as Green using Exhibit 2, Section A. Mitigating Structures, Systems, Components and Functionality screening question 1, because the finding was a qualification (seismic) deficiency of a mitigating structure, system, or component which maintained its operability or functionality. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance area because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2013005 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2013 (2013Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Caballero D Hardage E Morris F Ehrhardt J Laughlin P Niebaum |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2013005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2013Q4
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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