05000321/FIN-2013004-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Take Required Actions for Inoperable Equipment in Accordance with Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B |
| Description | The NRC identified a non-cited violation of Unit 1 License Condition 2.C.(3), Fire Protection, and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C.(3)(a), Fire Protection, which occurred on September 3, 2013, when the licensee failed to establish fire watches and compensatory measures required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, after a fire header pipe rupture rendered sprinklers and hose stations inoperable. The licensee returned the fire header to operable status September 4, 2013, to restore compliance. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as condition report (CR) 700402. Failure to establish fire watches and compensatory actions as required by Hatchs Fire Hazards Analysis, Appendix B, when sprinkler systems and hose stations became inoperable on September 3, 2013, was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more-than-minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone protection against external factors (fire) attribute and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to establish fire watches and alternate compensatory measures resulted in the loss of fixed fire suppression capabilities within each fire area on the plant site for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The inspectors screened this finding using IMC 0609, Appendix F, Attachment 1, dated February 28, 2005. Using Part 1, Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding screened as requiring a Phase 2 analysis, because the duration factor was determined to be 0.01 (< 3 Days), the summation of estimated fire frequency for the fire areas was calculated to be 3.78E-01, and the delta core damage frequency (CDF) calculation of 3.78E-03 was greater than a high degradation value of 1E-6 in Table A1.1. The inspectors submitted this finding to the Region II senior reactor analyst for further processing. A detailed SDP risk evaluation was performed by a regional senior reactor analyst. A bounding SDP risk evaluation was completed using a hand calculation and guidance from NRC IMC 0609 Appendix F. The significant analysis assumptions included a five hour exposure time, plant wide ignition frequency of approximately 3E-1/year, severity factor of 1E-1 (only large fires li (PNS) of 5E-1 (10 minute fire growth scenario for base case and PNS of 1.0 no suppression due to the PD for the non-conforming case), and a conditional core damage probability of 1E-1 (assumed that large unsuppressed fire would lead to alternate shutdown scenario). The low exposure period mitigated the risk of the performance deficiency. The result of the bounding SDP evaluation was a core damage frequency increase (ACDF) of < 1E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. The inspectors determined this performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area decision-making attribute because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making when applying actions for inoperable fire hose stations, yard fire hydrants, and sprinklers. |
| Site: | Hatch  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000321/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ehrhardt E Morris D Hardage |
| Violation of: | License Condition - Fire Protection License Condition |
| CCA | H.14, Conservative Bias |
| INPO aspect | DM.2 |
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Finding - Hatch - IR 05000321/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hatch) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Hatch)
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