05000220/FIN-2013003-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Containment Leakage Exceeds Technical Specification 3.3.3 Limits |
| Description | A self-revealing NCV of TS 3.3.3, Leakage Rate, was identified for CENGs failure from December 3 to December 13, 2012, to maintain containment leakage less than 1.5 percent by weight of the containment air per day and less than 0.6 percent by weight of the containment air per day for all penetrations and all primary containment isolation valves subject to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Types B and C tests, when pressurized to 35 pound per square inch gauge when reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature is above 215F and primary containment integrity is required. CENG entered this issue into their CAP as CR-2012-011247. Corrective actions included cleaning iron oxide from the primary containment vent and purge valve and replacing the resilient seals. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the structure, system, component (SSC), and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, containment leakage exceeded the leakage limits outlined in the Unit 1 TS 3.3.3 from December 3 to December 13, 2012. This finding was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance-Type B Findings at Full Power, of IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, issued May 6, 2004. The inspectors determined this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the leakage was less than 100 percent of containment volume per day for the duration of the leak. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, CAP, because CENG failed to take appropriate corrective action to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance. Specifically, following identification of the adverse trend regarding the frequency of nitrogen addition to the drywell, CENG did not assess in a timely manner the significance of the leakage and the impact on primary plant containment. |
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000220/2013003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2013 (2013Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Lilliendahl P Kaufman D Schroeder K Kolaczyk B Haagensen A Rosebrook J Krafty J Laughlin B Dionne E Miller B Scrabeck |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Technical Specification |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Nine Mile Point - IR 05000220/2013003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Nine Mile Point) @ 2013Q2
Self-Identified List (Nine Mile Point)
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