05000334/FIN-2013002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Manage Elevated Risk during Preventive Maintenance |
| Description | The inspectors identified a Green, NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, because FENOC did not implement risk management actions to manage the risk associated with the performance of preventive maintenance on the Unit 2 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Specifically, FENOC did not post the 23B motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps as protected equipment in the field as required by NOP-OP-1007, Risk Management and BVBPOPS- 0012, Guidance for Protected Equipment during Normal Operations. The stations immediate corrective actions including posting the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump as protected equipment, and entering this issue into their corrective action program as condition report CR-2013-03412. The inspectors determined that the finding is more-than-minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, removing the 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump without protecting the 23B motor-driven and turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps reduced the reliability and capability of the auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors, in conjunction with the regional senior reactor analysts, evaluated this finding using IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Flowchart 2, Assessment of Risk Management Actions of IMC 0609, Appendix K, Maintenance Risk Assessment and Risk Management Significance Determination Process. Using the Birnbaum value for the 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump from the plant risk information book, the inspectors estimated the incremental core damage probability to be approximately 1.46E-7 during the preventive maintenance period. Additionally, FENOC calculated the incremental core damage probability to be approximately 1.76E-7 using the On-Line Risk Safety Monitor. Since the finding is a 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) performance issue associated with risk management actions only and the incremental core damage probability is not greater than 1E-6, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Area, Work Practices because FENOC not did follow their risk management procedures during preventive maintenance on the 23A motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. Specifically, FENOC did not post opposite train equipment as protected as required by NOP-OP-1007 and BVBP-OPS-0012. |
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
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| Report | IR 05000334/2013002 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2013 (2013Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Silk D Spindler E Burket G Hunegs T Moslak T Ziev |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) 10 CFR 50.65 |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Beaver Valley - IR 05000334/2013002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Beaver Valley) @ 2013Q1
Self-Identified List (Beaver Valley)
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