05000483/FIN-2015003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the licensees failure to follow their operability determination procedure. Specifically, when an auxiliary feedwater control valve failed to operate from the main control room, the licensee failed to evaluate the operability of the component in accordance with Procedure ODP-ZZ-00001, Addendum 15, Operability and Functionality Determinations. The immediate corrective action taken by the licensee was to evaluate the operability of the flow control valve. After determining that the equipment was inoperable, the licensee entered the required technical specification condition and performed the required technical specification actions. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201502708. This performance deficiency is more than minor and, therefore, a finding, because, if left uncorrected, it has the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern if safety-related systems are not properly evaluated for operability. The finding affects the Mitigating System Cornerstone because the performance deficiency is related to the auxiliary feedwater systems ability to conduct short-term decay heat removal. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not affect system design, did not result in a loss of system function, did not represent a loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specifications allowed outage time, and did not cause the loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of challenge the unknown in the human performance cross-cutting area because the licensee did not stop when faced with uncertain conditions. Specifically, rather than declaring the system inoperable and allowing the process to evaluate the condition, the licensee declared the system operable without fully understanding the failure mechanism [H.11]. |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2015003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Cowdrey J O 'Donnell L Carson M Kennard M Langelier M Phalen N Greene N Taylor P Hernandez S Hedger T Hartman J Tic |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2015003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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