05000327/FIN-2015003-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Implement Work Risk Activity and Oversight of Supplemental Personnel Procedures |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of TS 6.8.1.a, Administrative Controls of Procedures and Programs, was identified for the licensees failure to implement procedures related to quality during the surveillance capsule relocation activity. Specifically, procedures NPG-SPP-07.3, Work Activity Risk Management, and NPG-SPP.07.7, NPG TCM Role and Oversight of Supplemental Personnel, were not appropriately implemented. The deficiency was entered into the licensees CAP as Problem Evaluation Report (PER) 1016839. This finding was determined to be greater than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the performance deficiency resulted in the failure to properly secure reactor vessel surveillance capsules and the subsequent damage to the reactor vessel pressure boundary, reactor internals and fuel filter screens. The proper higher risk categorization would have led to enhanced contractor oversight, and the ability to detect when the contractors were performing actions outside the approved procedure. These additional oversights would reasonably be expected to prevent the events that led to the surveillance capsule ejections, and eliminate any potential to cause damage to the reactor vessel pressure boundary, reactor internals, and fuel filter screens. The inspectors identified a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance Consistent Process cross-cutting area. Specifically, the licensee failed to consistently incorporate risk insights, as required by procedure NPG-SPP-07.3, which resulted in less than conservative classification for an infrequently performed activity inside the reactor vessel performed by contract personnel. |
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000327/2015003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2015 (2015Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Blamey G Smith J Rivera -Ortiz M Coursey W Deschain |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Sequoyah - IR 05000327/2015003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Sequoyah) @ 2015Q3
Self-Identified List (Sequoyah)
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