A self-revealing
NCV of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to follow a
foreign material exclusion procedure and precluded foreign material from entering the safetyrelated Essential Raw Cooling Water (
ERCW) system. This resulted in wood debris within the
ERCW that ultimately migrated to the 2B2 emergency diesel heat exchanger. Immediate corrective actions included removal of the foreign material and the performance of an engineering analysis to ensure the wood debris did not affect the system operability. The licensee placed this issue into their corrective action program as CR 1033792. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the
mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the performance deficiency allowed a piece of wood to enter into the 2B2 emergency diesel heat exchanger blocking 11 tubes. Because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design of a mitigating structure, systems, or components (
SSCs) that was confirmed not to have resulted in the loss of operability, it was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that no cross-cutting aspect will be assigned to this performance deficiency since it occurred in 2008 and is therefore not indicative of current licensee performance.
