05000445/FIN-2015001-03
From kanterella
Revision as of 07:57, 25 September 2017 by StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by Mark Hawes)
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Work Planning Procedure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure STI-606.03, Work Planning, when developing work instructions for replacing concrete expansion anchors. Specifically, when developing Work Order 4851077 to replace Hilti Kwik-Bolt II expansion anchors with Hilti Kwik-Bolt 3 anchors on Manhole MH-E2B, planners failed to follow the requirements of Procedure STI-606.03. This failure resulted in the wrong anchors being installed in the facility. The licensee performed an operability determination for the affected anchors that established a reasonable expectation for operability. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2015-001579. The licensees failure to follow the requirements of Procedure STI-606.03, Work Planning, when developing work instructions was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to follow procedure resulted in incorrect material being installed in the plant which resulted in a condition where a structure necessary to mitigate the effects of a tornado may not have functioned as required. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated June 19, 2012, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design and qualification of a mitigating structure, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality. The finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with work management because the licensee failed to implement a process of planning activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority [H.5]. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000445/2015001 Section 1R18 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.18 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey J Kramer J O 'Donnell L Carson R Kumana W Walke |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
| ' | |
Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000445/2015001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||