05000446/FIN-2014005-01
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure for Boundary Valve Leakage Testing |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow instructions when performing surveillance testing of the reactor coolant loop cold leg injection boundary valves. The test procedure had a prerequisite for the plant to be in mode 4 or 5. The licensee performed the test in mode 3 which isolated the residual heat removal system flow to loops 3 and 4 and aligned the loop 3 safety injection accumulator to the test line. As a result, both trains of residual heat removal and one safety injection accumulator were inoperable. The licensee revised the procedure for the plant conditions and re-performed the test. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2014-005254. The licensees failure to follow procedure for performing surveillance testing of the reactor coolant loop cold leg injection boundary valves was a performance deficiency. Specifically, personnel failed to ensure prerequisites were met in accordance with the procedure. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The performance deficiency resulted in both trains of the residual heat removal system and one safety injection accumulator being inoperable. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the finding wa
determined to require a detailed risk evaluation because the finding represented a loss o function for the residual heat removal system. A senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with challenging the unknown because the licensee failed to stop when faced with uncertain conditions and evaluate risks before proceeding [H.11]. |
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000446/2014005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2014 (2014Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Tindell B Travis C Alldredge J Kramer L Carson N Greene N Hernandez P Hernandez R Kumana R Williams W Walker |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| CCA | H.11, Challenge the Unknown |
| INPO aspect | QA.2 |
| ' | |
Finding - Comanche Peak - IR 05000446/2014005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Comanche Peak) @ 2014Q4
Self-Identified List (Comanche Peak)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||