05000482/FIN-2015001-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification Section 5.4.1.a requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, February 1978. Section 1.c of Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires procedures for equipment control (e.g. locking and tagging). Station Procedure AP 21E-001, Clearance Orders, Revision 37, requires that the shift manager, ensure that plant conditions can support establishing the clearance order boundaries, including activities such as removing equipment from service. Contrary to the above, on January 28, 2015, the licensee failed to ensure that plant conditions could support the clearance order boundaries during preparation and implementation of clearance orders. Specifically, the preparation and implementation of clearance order EJ-A-005 unintentionally rendered both trains of the residual heat removal system inoperable and necessitated an unplanned entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 for 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the associated objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating event to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Finding At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, inspectors determined a detail risk evaluation was required because this finding represented a loss of system and/or function. Therefore, a senior reactor analyst performed a bounding detailed risk evaluation. The analyst noted that the isolation of valve EJ HV8716A would only affect the reliability of hot leg injection for train B. Hot leg injection is a necessary function to ensure that there will not be unacceptably high concentrations of boric acid in the core region (resulting in precipitation of a solid phase) during the long-term cooling phase following a postulated large-break loss of coolant accident. Consequently, valve alignments affecting hot leg injection are only of concern during large-break loss of coolant accidents. Using the simplified plant analysis risk model, the analyst noted that the frequency of a large-break loss of coolant accident (LLOCA) was 2.5 x 10-6 /year. As stated above, the exposure period was two hours or 2.28 x 10-4 years. The analyst then calculated the upper bound risk impact of the performance deficiency to be 5.7 x 10-10. Therefore, this finding is of very low safety significance (Green). |
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000482/2015001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2015 (2015Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook C Henderson D Dodson F Thomas G Guerra J Drake J O 'Donnell L Carson R Strobl |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Wolf Creek - IR 05000482/2015001 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Wolf Creek) @ 2015Q1
Self-Identified List (Wolf Creek)
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