ML17308A071

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Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Initiation & Flow Indication, (F-16,F-17),technical Evaluation Rept
ML17308A071
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 07/23/1982
From: VOSBURY F W
FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To: KENDALL R
NRC
Shared Package
ML17256B208 List:
References
CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118 TER-C5257-287, NUDOCS 8207270149
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~~~a~/*4~TECHN)CALEYALUATION REPORTAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMAUTOMATIC INITIATIO.N ANDFLOWINDICATION (F-j.6,F-l7)ROCHESTER GASAIIIDELECTRICCORPORATION ROBERTE.GINNANUCLEARPOHERPLANT-NRCDOCKETNO.50-244NRCTACNO.

11706NRCCONTRACTNO.NRC43-79-11S FRCPROJECTC5257HFRCASSIGNMENT 9FRCTASK287PreparedbyFranklinResearchCenter20thandRaceStreetPhiladelphia, PA19103Author:F.W.VosburyFRCGroupLeader:K.S.PertaerPreparedfoinuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555I'eadNRCEngineer:

R.KendallM.WigdorJuly23,1982Thisreportwaspreparedasanaccountofworksponsored byanagencyoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.

NeithertheUnitedStatesGovernment no'ranyagencythereof,oranyoftheiriemployees, makesanywarranty, expressed orImplied,orassumesanylegalllablllty orresponslblllty foranythirdparty'suse,ortheresultsofsuchuse,ofanyInformation, appa-ratus,productorprocessdisclosed lnthisreport,orrepresents thatItsusebysuchthird'arty wouldnotInfringeprivately ownedrights.Reviewedby:Approvedby:GroupLeaderPro'nagerDepartntDirctor'(~(~(yafoPR J,'ranklin ResearchCenterADivisionofTheFrankiininstitUte TheBenjaminFranklinParkway,Phila.,Pa.19103(215)448.1000 ll TERM5257-287 SectionTitleP'acaeINTRODUCTION

  • ~~~'~~~~~~~~11.1PurposeofReview1.2GenericIssueBackground 1.3.Plant-Specific

Background

l.1~2REVIEHCRITERIA~~'~~~'e~~~~3TECHNICAL EVALUATION

~3.1GeneralDescription ofAuxiliary Feedwater System3.2Automatic Initiation.

3.2.1Evaluation'.

,3.2.2Conclusion:

55668,3.3FlowIndication

.933.13-3:2Evaluation,'onclusion:.

3e4Description ofSteamGenerator ieCONCLUSIONS~~~'~~~~~~~~LevelIndication

.~~~9~1010~'125RFZEHNCES

~~~~,~~~~~~~~~~13~IÃFran}dinResearchCenterA~onQTheFnvklinIntoaac TERM5257-287 ThisTechnical Evaluation ReportwaspreparedbyPranklinResearchCenterunderacontractwiththeU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation, DivisionofOperating Reactors) fortechnical

.assistance insupportofNRCoperating reactorlicensing actions.Thetechnical evaluation wasconducted inaccordance withcriteriaestabljshed bytheNBC.'"'r.P.W.Vosburycontributed tothetechnical'preparation ofthisreport.throughasubcontract withHESTECServices, Inc.bJvFrankiinResearchCenterI(("I,

'1 TER~257-287 1oINTRODUCTION 11PURPOSEOPREVIEW:Thepurposeofthisreviewistoprovideatechnical evaluation oftheemergency feedwater systemdesigntoverifythatsafety~rade automatic initiation circuitry andflowindication areprovidedattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPower'PlantAlthoughnotinthescopeofthisreview,thesteamgenerator levelindication available attheGinnaplantisdescribed toassistsubsequent NRCstaff.review.12GENERICISSUEBACKGROUND Apost-accident designreviewbytheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NBC).aftertheMarch28<1979incidentatThreeMileIsland(TMI)Unit2estab-lishedthattheauxiliary feedwater (APH)systemshouldbetreatedasasafetysysteminapressurized waterreactor(PWR)plant.Thedesignsofsafetysystemsinanuclearpowerplantarerequiredtomeetgeneraldesign.criteria(GDC)specified inAppendixAof10CPR50[1].TherelevantdesigncriteriafortheAPWsystemdesignareGDC13,GDC20,andGDC34.GDC13setsforththerequirement forinstrumentation tomonitorvariables andsystems(overtheiranticipated rangesofoperation) thatcanaffectreactorsafetyGDC20requiresthataprotection systembedesignedtoinitiateautomatically inordertoassurethatacceptable fueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofanticipated operational 4occurrences.

GDC34requiresthatthesafetyfunctionofthedesignedsystem,thatis,theresidualheatremovalbytheAPW,system, beaccomplished eveninthecaseofasinglefailure.OnSeptember 13,1979,theNRCissuedaletter[2]toeachPWRlicenseethatdefinedasetofshort-term control~rade requirements forthe~system,.specified.

inNUREG-0578

[3].ZtrequiredthattheAMsystemhaveautomatic initiation andsinglefailure-proof designconsistent withthe,requirements ofGDC20andGDC34.Inaddition, itrequired~flow/indication inthecontrolroominaccordance.

withGDC13.'II!L!L~FrenkiinResearchCenter TER~257-287 DuringtheweekofSeptember 24,1979,seminarsvereheldinfourregionsof.thecountrytodiscusstheshort-term requirements.

OnOctober30,1979/,anotherlettervasissued-to eachPWRlicenseeproviding addit'ional clarifica-tionoftheNRCstaffshort-term requirements vithoutalteringtheirintent[4].IIPost-TMIanalysesofprimarysystemresponsetofeedwater transients aridreliability ofinstalled AFWsystemsalsoestablished that,inthelongterm,theAFWsystemshouldbeupgradedinaccordance vithsafety-grade requirements.

Theselong-term requirements wereclarified intheletterofSeptember 5,1980[5]andformalized intheletterofOctober31,1980[6].TheOctober-31='etter.

incorporated inonedocument, NUREG-0737 f7]<allTMI-related itemsapproved.

bythecommission forimplementation SectionII.E.1.2ofNUREG-0737 clarifies therequirements fortheAFWsystemautomatic initiation andflovindication.

l.3PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND TheLicenseeoftheRobertEGinnaNuclearPowerPlant<Rochester GasandElectricCorporation (RG6E)<provideditsresponsetoReference 3onOctober17,1979f8].InthisresponseRG&Eindicated thattheGinnaplantwasequippedwithasafety~rade<

automatically initiated 2QWsystem,andthattheexistingflowindication foreachgenerator compliedwiththerequirements foracontrol-grade system.RG&EagreedtoupgradetheAFWflowindication byJanuary1,1981.Additional correspondence

[9-13]wasexchanged betweenRGaEandtheNRCregarding theAFWsystem,theimplementation ofNUREG-0578, andthesubsequent clarification.

issuedbytheNRCOnDecember30,1980[14]<RG&EprovideditsresponsetoNUREG-0737 andincludedthedesigncriteriato'upgradetheAFWflovindication tosafety~rade.

OnAugust19,1981[15]<theNRCsentarequestforadditional information toaidinthecompletion ofthisreport.RGREresponded withtheadditional requested information onSeptember 22,1981[13]u~JFr'anklin.Research CenteriiIii TER~257-.28 7~2~REVZEHCRITERIAToimprovethereliability oftheAHfsystem,theNRCrequiredlicensees toupgrade.thesystem,wherenecessary<

toensuretimelyautomatic initiation whenrequired.

Thesystemupgradewastoproceedintwophases.Intheshortterm,asaminimum,control-grade signalsandcircuitsweretobeusedtoauto-matically initiatetheAPWsystem.Control~rade systemsweretomeetthefollowing requirements ofNUBEG&578<

Section2.1.7.a[3]:Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomatic initiation of"theauxiliary feedwater system.2~Theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliary feedwater systemfunction.

3~Testability oftheinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign..4.Theinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency buses.5.Manualcapability toinitiatetheauxiliary feedwater sys-temfromthecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplemented sothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnot'esult inthelossofsystemfunction.

6."Theacmotor-driven pumpsandvalvesintheauxiliary feed-vatersystemshallbeincludedintheautomatic actuation (simultaneous and/orsequential) oftheloadstotheemer-gencybuses.70Theautomatic initiating signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapability toinitiatetheAPHsystemfromthecontrolroom."Inthelongterm,thesesignalsandcircuitsweretobeupgradedinaccor>>dancewithsafety-grade requirements.

Specifically, inadditiontotheabove1requirements, theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsweretohaveindependent channels<

useenvironmentally qualified components, havesystembypassed/inoperable statusfeatures, andconformtocontrolsysteminteraction

criteria, asstipulated inIEEEStd279-1971[17].'I4llllllFranklinResearchCenter TER~257<<287 Thecapability toascertain theAPWsystemperformance fromthecontrolroommustalsobeprovided.

Intheshortterm<steamgenerator level,indication andflowmeasurement weretobeusedtoassistthebperatorinmaintaining therequiredsteamgenerator levelduringAB/systemoperation.

Thissystemwastomeetthefollowing requirements fromNUREG-0578, Section.2.1.7.b[3),asclarified byNUREG-0737, SectionII.E.1.2[7]:"1.Safety~rade indication ofauxiliary feedwater flowtoeachsteamgenerator shallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.Theauxiliary feedwater flowinstrument channelsshall-bepoweredfrom.theemergency busesconsistent withsatisfying theemergency powerdiversity requirements oftheauxiliary feedwater systemsetcnorthinAuxiliary SystemsBranchTechnical Position10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9[18}.":TheNRCstaffhasdetermined that<inthelongterm,theoverallflowrateindication systemforCombustion Engineering andWestinghouse, plantsshouldincludeatleastoneAFHflowrateindicator andonevide-range steamgenerator

'.level.indicator foreach"steamgenerator ortwoflowrateindicators.

Theseflowindication systemsshouldbeenvironmentally qualified; poweredfromahighlyreliable, batterybacked<non~lasslEpowersource;periodically Itestableg partoftheplant'squalityassurance program;andcapableofdisplayondemand.Theoperatorreliesonsteamgenerator levelinstrumentation, inadditionto.APHflowindicatiori<

todetermine APHsystemperformance.

Therequirements forthissteamgenerator levelinstrumentation arespecified inRegulatory

~Guide1.97,Revision2,"Instrumentation forLightWater-Cooled NuclearPower1lPlants.toAssessPlantandEnvironsConditions DuringandFollowing anAccident"

[19].~JIIIIJFranklinResearchCenter'is TER~257-28 73~TECHNICAL EVALUATION 3.1GENERALDESCRIPTION OFAUXILIARY PEEDWATER SYSTEMTheGinnaplantisaWestinghouse&esigned, two-3.oop nuclearpowerplant.TheAPWsystemconsistsofamainAPWsystemandastandbyAPWsystem.ThemainAFWsystemconsists.

oftwomotorMriven pumps(200gpmeach)andoneturbineMziven pump(400gpm).Normally<

eachmotor-driven pumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator<

butthealignment canbealteredtoalloweithermotor-driven pumptosupplybothsteam'generators.

Theturbine&riven pumpnormallysuppliesfeedwatez tobothsteamgenerators.

Eachpumpsupplies'the steamgenerators throughanormallyclosed,motor-operated, discharge valve.OnlytheflowfromonemotorMriven pump(200gpm)isnecessary topreventthereactorcoolantsystemfromreachingthepressurerequiredtoactuateareliefbivalve.ThethreemainAPWpumpsarelocatedinthesameroomandcouldberenderedinoperable asaresultofahighenergylinebreak.ThestandbyAPWsystemwasinstalled toprovideindependent APWsystemcapability following suchaneventThestandbyAPWsystemconsistsoftwomotor-driven pumps(200gpmeach)locatedinaplantareaseparatefrom'themainAPWsystem.ThestandbyAPWsystemismanuallyactuatedandalignedsothateachpuinpsuppliesonesteamgenerator.

ThewatersourcesforthemainAPWsystemaretwo30,000-gallon condensate storagetanks(non-seismic),

a100<000~allon condensate storagetank(non-seismic)

>andtheservicewatersystem(seismicCategoryI)~Thewater..source forthestandbyABCsystemistheservicewatersystem,whichdraws,its waterfromLakeOntario.Steamgenerator leveliscontrolled manuallyfromthecontrolroombyadjusting thepositionofthemainAPWpumpmotormperated discharge valves.k(I!ldFranklinResearchCenter TERM5257-287 32AUTOMATIC INITIATION 3.2.1Evaluation

'ThemainAPHsystemattheGinnaplantisdesignedasanengineered safe-guardssystemtoseismicCategoryI(withtheexception ofthecondensate storagetanks),Class1E,andtheautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsaredesignedtocomplywiththerequirements ofZEEEStd279-1971[17].'heGinnaplantmainAPHautomatic initiation systemconsistsoftwoindependent actuation trains.Theactuation circuitsarepoweredfromemergency dcbuses.,Theredundant channelsarephysically separated and'Eelectrically independent.

Areviewoftheautomatic initiation

'circuitry revealednocrediblesinglefailurethatwouldinhibittheautomatic

.'nit'iation systemfromproviding APWflowtoatleastonegoodsteamgenerator.

Thescopeofthesingle-failure analysisinthisreportwaslimitedtotheredundancy ofpowersupplies<

diversity ofactuating signals<'

and'independence andredundancy ofautomatic initiation circuits.

BoththemainandstandbyAPWmotor-driven pumpsarepoweredbyindependent acemergency buses.TheloadingofthemainAPHmotorMriven

'pumpsontotheirrespective 480-Vacemergency busesispartofthepost-accident, au'tomatic loadsequencing.

ThestandbyAPWmotorMriven pumpsareinterlocked withthemainAPHmotor-driven pumpssothatbotharenotsimultaneously loaded'onto theemergency bustopreventoverloading duringlossof.offsitepower.Theturbine-driven pump'receives itssteamthroughamotor-operated steamadmiss'ion valveineachoftwolinesthattapoffupstreamofthesteamgenerator isolation valves.Thefollowing signalsareusedforautomatic iriitiation ofthemainAPWsystem:Motor-driven Pumsolow-lowsteamgenerator..level (2outof3channelsoneither@teamgenerator) otripofbothmainfeedwater pumpsosafetyinjection.

~I~"Frankiin'Research Center T~5257-287 TurbineMriven olow-lowsteamgenerator

'level(2outof3channelsonbothsteamgenerators) olossofvoltageonboth4>>kVbusesThemainAPWsystemmaybemanuallyinitiated fromthecontrolroombystartingthemotor-driven APWpumpsindividually; uponpumpstart,theassociated discharge valveopens.ThemainAPWmotor~iven pumpsdischarge valvesopenfullyonpumpstart.andthenthrottledowntolimitflowtoamaximumof230gpmtoeachsteamgenerator The'automatic throttling conserves auxiliary feedwater andhelps.Limitthecooldownrate%eturbine&riven pumpdischarge valveisnormallyopen;inaddition<

whentheturbinMriven pumpisautomatically initiated (steamadmission valvesopen)<thedischarge valvereceivesanautomatic actuation signaltoensurethatitisfullyopen.ThemainandstandbyAPWsystemandcomponents aretestedinaccordance wi.thtechnical specifications.

Operation oftheAPWpumpsandmotor-operated valvesischeckedmonthly.Evexy18monthseachmainAPWpumpandmainAPWmotor-operated valveisverifiedtooperatecorrectly onreceiptofeachoftheautomatic initiation signals.Meautomatic initiati'on logicistestedmonthly.Thesystemdesignallowsonechanneltobebypassedformaintenancef

~testing,andcalibration duringpoweroperation withoutinitiating aprotective action.Nhenachannelisbypassedfortesting,thebypassisaccompanied by'asinglechannelalertandchannelstatuslightactuation inthecontrolroom.Theautomatic startofthemainAPWmotorMriven pumpsresulting fromthertrippingofbothmainfeedwater pumpsmaybedefeatedduringstartuporshutdownwhentheturbinegenerator isofftheline.Thedefeatswitchisautomatically bypassedwhentheturbineislatched.Thisbypassisalarmedinthecontrolxoom.Theonlyinteraction betweenthemainAPHsystemautomatic initiation circuitsandnormalsystemcontrolfunctions occursinthenarrow-range steamgenerator levelinstrumentation.:

Theselevelinstruments areusedforboth-.I~,I$/s.~L~""Franklin ResearchCenter TERM5257-287 protection (reactortripandmainAFHinitiation) andnormalcontrolfunctions (narrow-range channelIonly)inthemainfeedwater system.Thecontrolsignalsareseparated fromtheprotection signalsbyisolation'ransformers sothat.amalfunction inthecontrolcircuitswillhavenoeffectonthe.protection signals.Thefollowing individual alarmsareprovidedonthemaincontrolboardtoalerttheoperatorthatthemainAFWequipment maynotoperateproperly:

olow-lowsteamgenerator level(3channelseach)o2outof3low-lowsteamgenerator levels(1channeleach)Io3outof3low-lowsteamgenerator'evels (1channeleach)oemergency shutdownequipment localcontrolosafeguards breakertriposafeguards equipment lockmffomainAPHbypassindefeatlockout.osinglechannelalertostandbyAPHpumpCorDtripostandbyAPWpumptransferswitchoffnormal(1channeleach)'ostandbyAFHpumphigh'discharge flow(1channeleach)ostandbyAPHpumphighdischarge pressure(1channeleach)ostandbyAFHHVACtrouble.Noalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamadmission valvesorAPHdischarge.

valves.Areviewof.theautomatic andmanualinitiation circuitry andsignalsrevealedthatnosinglefailureofeithercircuittrainwouldinhibitthecapability formanualinitiation fromthecontrolroomortheauxiliary shutdownpanel.Theenvironmental qualification of.safety-related electrical andmechanical components, including AFWsystemcircuitsandcomponents,'s beingreviewedseparately bytheHRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthis.review.3.2.2Conclusion Theinitiation signals,logic,andassociated circuitry oftheautomatic initiation featureofthemainAFHsystemoftheGinnaplantcomplywiththeIJ~JLL'renklin ResearchCenter

TERW5257-287

.long-term safety~rade requirements ofNORE~578, Section2.1.7.a,andthesubseeluent clarification issuedbytheNRstaff..Znaddition, thefollowing pointmayeffectthereliability oftheAPHsystem:oNoalarmsadmission areprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamvalvesorAPHdischarge valves.3.3PLOWZNDZCATZON

.3.3.1Evaluation Thecapability toevaluatetheperformance ofthemainandstandbyAPHsystemsattheGinnaplantisprovidedbythefollowing indications:

o,mainAPHmotorMriven pumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator (2channelseach)omainAPWturbineMriven pumpdischarge flow(2channels) omainAPHturbine-driven pumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator (2channelseach)ostandbyAPWmotor-driven pumpflow(1channeleach)omainAPWpumpdischarge pressureostandbyAPHpumpdischarge pressuret~to,narrow-range steamgenerator level(3channelseach)o"wide-range steamgenerator level(1channeleach)omainandstandbyAZW'umpstatusindication omainandstandbyAPH,valve positionindication ocondensate storagetanklevel(2channels).

TheLicenseehasstatedthatthemainAPHflowindication foreachsteamgenerator issafety-grade.

Theindividual steamgenerator APHflowcircuitry ispoweredfromseparatebattery-backed instrument buses.PoreachmainAPWpump,thereisaprimaryandsecondary flowinstrumentation channel.The.primarychannelindicates flowand,'forthemotor-driven pumps,controlstheindividual discharge valves.Thesecondary flowinstrumentation indicates flowonly.Theprimaryandsecondary channelsarepoweredfromoppositeinstrument buses.Theprimaryandsecondary flowindication isprovidedonthemaincontrolboardbyadual-movement vertical-scale indicator.

)I)FranklinRes'earch Center TERM5257-287 Sincethedischarge headerfromtheturbineMriven pump/ranchestosupplybothsteamgeneratois, anadditional channel'of safety~rade flowinstrumenta-tionisprovidedineachline.Safety~rade wide-range steamgenerator levelindication isprovidedasabackup.ThestandbyAPHsystemprovidesasingle..channelofsafety-guide flowinstrumentation foreachpump.Theflowindication channelsaretestedinaccordance withtechnical specificatiohs.

Theenvironmental qualification oftheAPHflowindicators willM.'Ireviewedseparately bytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3~3.2Conclusion Itisconcluded thattheAPHflowinstrumentation attheGinnaplantcomplieswiththelong-term safety~rade recyirements of.NUREG-0578<

Section2.1.7.b,andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.3~4DESCRIPTION OP~STEAMGENERATOR LEVELINDICATION Steamgenerator levelindication attheGinnapl'antconsistsofthreesafety-grade narrow-range levelchannelsandonesafety~rade wide-range level.~channelpersteamgenerator.

Theleveltransmitters andtheirpowersupplies*areasfollows:PSTEAMGENERATOR AChannelTransmitter VitalBusHideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIII=LT-460LT-461LT-462LT-463AACDSTEAMGENERATOR BChannelTransmitter VitalBusHideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIIILT-470LT-471LT-472LT-473BDABk'".'LlFranklinResearchCenter TERW5257-287 Thesteamgenerator levelchannelsarecheckedeachshift,testedmonthly,andcalibrated duringrefueling.

Thewide-range channelsforbothsteamgenerators areindicated individually ononestripchart recorder.

Narrow-range channelsforboth'steamgenerators areindicated onverticalgages.b3'ranMin ResearchCenter

~i/

~a~aw~~a~~~>v~.TERM5257-287 4~CONCLUSIONS Theinitiation signals,logic,andassociated circuitry oftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantauxiliary feedwater systemcomplywiththelong-term safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.a[3],andthesub-sequentclarification issuedbytheNRC.Inaddition, thefollowing pointsmayaffectthereliability of-theAPW"system:oNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravai3.able to=the=steam admission valvesorAPWdischarge valves.Theauxiliary feedwater flowinstrumentation complieswiththelong-term safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578'<

Section2.1.7.b[3]<andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.r't~JP~~FranklinResearchCenter

~~~TER~257-287 2~5~REFERENCES 1CodeofFederalRegulations, Title10,OfficeoftheFederalRegister, NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration, RevisedJanuary1<1980.NRC<Genericlettertoall'PHRlicensees regarding short-term requirements resulting fromThreeMileIslandAccidentSeptember 13,1979.304~5NUBEG-0578, "TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportand,.ShortMerm Recommendations NRC,July1979.NRC<Genericlettertoall'PWRlicensees clarifying lessonslearned'hort-term requirements, October30;1979.NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicensees regarding short-term requirement resulting fromThreeMileIslandAccident, September 5<1980.67~NRCGenericlettertoallPWRlicensees regarding post-TMIrequirements, October31,1980.INUREG-0737<

"Clarification:of TMIActionPlanRequirements;"

NRC,November1980.89.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD,.L.Ziemann(NRC)October17<1979L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NHC)'November 19,.197910.L.D.,White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November28<197911.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)December14,197912.13~D.M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoL.D.White(RG&E)July7,1980D;M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RG&E)Mayll,'1981.'I4L3[)FranMinResearchCenter

~~~~~':~~ITER~257-287 14J.E.Maier(RC'4E)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield (NBC)December30,198015.D.M.Crutchfield (NBC)'ettertoJ.E.Maier(RGS,E)August19'98116.J.E.Maier(RGRE)LettertoD.MCrutchfield (NBC)September 22,198117~,18'EEEStd279-1971, CriteriaforProtection SystemsforNuclear-,powerGenerating Stations<"

Institute ofElectrical andElectronics Engineers, Inc.,NewYork,NY.NUREG-75/087, StandardReviewPlangSection10..4.9tRev.1gUSNRC,nodate19Regulatory Guide1.97(TaskRS917-4)<'Instrumentation forLight-Water-Cooled NuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditions DuringandPollowing anAccident/

Rev2gNRCtDecember1980 hC'Il~VPA'I TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORTAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMAUTOMATIC INITIATION ANDFLOWINDICATION (F-16,F-17)ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION ROBERTE,GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANT.NRCDOCKETNO.50-244NRCTACNO.

11706NRCCONTRACTNO.NRG43-79-118 FRCPROJECTCS257FRCASSIGNMENT 9FRCTASK287PreparedbyFranklinResearchCenter20thandRaceStreetPhiladelphia, PA19103Auth01':F.W.VosburyFRCGroupLeader:

K.S.FertnerPreparedfoiNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555LeadNRCEngineer'.

KendallM.WigdorJuly23,'1982Thisreportwaspreparedasanaccountofworksponsored byanagencyoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.

NeithertheUnitedStatesGovernment noranyagencythereof,oranyoftheiremployees, makesanywarranty, expressed orImplied,orassumesanylegalliability orresponsibility foranythirdparty'suse,ortheresultsofsuchuse,ofanyInformation, appa-ratus,productorprocessdisclosed Inthisreport,orrepresents thatitsusebysuchthird'arty wouldnotInfringeprivately ownedrights.Reviewedby:Approvedby;GroupLeaderPro'nagerDepartntDlrctorDESIGNATED ORIGINALCertified.

By~~FId'ADivisionofTheFranklinInstitute TheBenjaminFrankiinParkwoy,Phila.,Pa.19103(215)4481000 TERM5257-287 SectionTitlePacae2INTRODUCTION 1.1PurposeofReview1.2GenericIssueBackground 1.3Plant-Specific

Background

REVIEWCRITERIA~~111e2~33.2Automatic Initiation.

~~TECHNZCAL EVALUATION 3.1GeneralDescription ofAuxiliary Peedwater System5563.2.1Evaluation 3.2.2Conclusion:

~i~~683.3PlowIndication

.933.13'-3.-2Evaluation,'onclusion'.

CONCLUSIONS3e4Description ofSteamGenerator LevelIndication

.9101012REFERENCES 13)llFranMinResearchCenterADivisiondTheFrsnrrtin Inserore TER~57-28.7 ThisTechnical Evaluation ReportwaspreparedbyFranklinResearchCenterunderacontractwiththeU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation, DivisionofOperating Reactors) fortechnical assistance insupportofNRCoperating reactorlicensing actions.The~technical evaluation wasconducted inaccordance withcriteriaestablished by~theNRC.Mr.F.W.Vosburycontributed tothetechnical'preparation ofthisreportthroughasubcontract withWESTECServices, Inc.FranklinResearchCenterADivisionot'sieFrenidinInsonrtev TER~257-287 1,INTRODUCTION 1.1PURPOSEOFREVIEWThepurposeofthisreviewistoprovideatechnical evaluation oftheemergency feedwater systemdesigntoverifythatsafety-grade automatic initiation circuitry andflowindication areprovidedattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Althoughnotinthescopeofthisreview,thesteamgenerator levelindication available attheGinnaplantisdescribed toassistsubsequent NRCstaffreview.lo2GENERICISSUEBACKGROUND Apost-accident designreviewbytheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC).aftertheMarch28,1979incidentatThreeMileIsland(TMI)Unit2estab-lishedthattheauxiliary feedwater (AW)systemshouldbetreatedasasafetysysteminapressurized waterreactor(PWR)plant.Thedesignsofsafetysystemsin'anuclearpowerplantarerequiredtomeetgeneraldesigncriteria(GDC)specified inAppendixAof10CFR50[1).TherelevantdesigncriteriafortheAFWsystemdesignareGDC13<GDC20'ndGDC34'DC13setsforththerequirement forinstrumentation tomonitorvariables andsystems(overtheiranticipated rangesofoperation) thatcanaffectreactorsafety.GDC20requiresthataprotection systembedesignedtoinitiateautomatically inordertoassurethatacceptable fueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofanticipated operational occurrences.

GDC34requiresthatthesafetyfunctionofthedesignedsystem,thatis,theresidualheatremovalbytheAFWsystem,beaccomplished eveninthecaseofasinglefailure.OnSeptember 13,1979,theNRCissuedaletter[2]toeachPWRlicenseethatdefinedasetofshort-term control-grade requirements fortheAFWsystem,specified inNUREG-0578

[33.ItrequiredthattheAMsystemhaveautomatic initiation andsinglefailure-proof designconsistent withtherequirements ofGDC20andGDC34.Inaddition, itrequiredA1Wflowindication inthecontrolroominaccordance withGDC13.IjljFranMinResearchCenterADiviision otTheFfsnklinInsutu<t TER~257287DuringtheweekofSeptember 24>1979,seminarswereheldinfourregionsofthecountrytodiscusstheshort-term requirements.

OnOctober30,1979,anotherletterwasissued-to eachPWRlicenseeproviding additional clarifica-tionoftheNRCstaffshort-term requirements withoutalteringtheirintent[4]~Post-TMIanalysesofprimarysystemresponsetofeedwater transients andreliability ofinstalled AFWsystemsalsoestablished that,inthelongterm,theAFWsystemshouldbeupgradedinaccordance withsafety-grade requirements.

Theselong-term requirements wereclarified intheletterofSeptember 5>1980[5]andformalized intheletterofOctober31<1980[6].The'ctober-.31r letterincorporated inonedocument, NUREG-0737

[7],allTHI-related itemsapprovedbythecommission forimplementation.

SectionII.E.1.2ofNUREG-0737 clarifies therequirements fortheAFWsystemautomatic initiation andflowindication.

lo3PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND TheLicenseeoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Rochester GasandElectricCorporation (RGhE),provideditsresponsetoReference 3onOctober17,1979[8]~InthisresponseRGSEindicated thattheGinnaplantwasequippedwithasafety-grade<

automatically initiated AFWsystem,andthattheexistingflowindication foreachgenerator compliedwiththerequirements foracontrol~rade system.RGREagreedtoupgradetheAFWflowindication byJanuary1,1981.Additional correspondence f9-13]wasexchanged betweenBG&EandtheNRCregarding theAFWsystem,theimplementation ofNUREG-0578, andthesubsequent clarification, issuedbytheNRC.OnDecember30,1980f14],RGaEprovideditsresponsetoNUREG-0737 andincludedthedesigncriteriatoupgradetheAFWflowindication tosafety-grade.

OnAugust19,1981[15],theNRCsentarequestforadditional information toaidinthecompletion ofthisreport.RGSEresponded withtheadditional requested information onSeptember 22'981f13][illFranklinResearchCenterADon@IonotTheFrlnkh'nlnsotute TER~257-.28 72REVIEWCRITERIAToimprovethereliability oftheABCsystem,theHRCrequiredlicensees to.upgrade thesystem,wherenecessary, toensuretimelyautomatic initiation whenrequired.

Thesystemupgradewastoproceedintwophases.Intheshortterm,asaminimum,control-grade signalsandcircuitsweretobeusedtoauto-matically initiatetheAPHsystem.Control~rade systemsweretomeetthefollowing requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.af3]:"1.Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomatic initiation oftheauxiliary feedwater system.2.Theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliary feedwater systemfunction.

3.Testability oftheinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.4.Theinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency buses.5.Manualcapability toinitiatetheauxiliary feedwater sys<<ternfromthecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplemented sothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnotresultintheloss'ofsystemfunction.

6.Theacmotor-driven pumpsandvalvesintheauxiliary feed-watersystemshallbeincludedintheautomatic actuation (simultaneous and/orsequential) oftheloadstotheemer-gencybuses.7.Theautomatic initiating signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapability toinitiatetheAPWsystemfromthecontrolroom."Inthelongterm,thesesignalsandcircuitsweretobeupgradedinaccor-dancewithsafety~rade requirements.

Specifically, inadditiontotheaboverequirements, theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsweretohaveindependent

channels, useenvironmentally qualified components, havesystembypassed/inoperable statusfeatures, andconformtocontrolsysteminteraction
criteria, asstipulated inIEEEStd279-1971f17].ll!)llFranMinResearchCenterADivisionofTheFnuk5nInsane TER~257-,287 Thecapability toascertain theAPWsystemperformance fromthecontrolroommustalsobeprovided.

Intheshorttean,steamgenerator level1indication andflowmeasurement weretobeusedtoassisttheoperatorin"maintaining therequiredsteamgenerator levelduringAFHsystemoperation.'his systemwastomeetthefollowing requirements fromNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7b[3],asclarified byNUREG-0737>

SectionII.E.1.2[7]:"3..Safety~rade indication ofauxiliary feedwater flowtoeachsteamgenerator shallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.Theauxiliary feedwater flowinstrument channelsshall.be=powered fromtheemergency busesconsistent withsatisfying theemergency powerdiversity requirements oftheauxiliary feedwater systemsetforthinAuxiliary SystemsBranchTechnical Position10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9[18]."TheNRCstaffhasdetermined that,inthelongterm<theoverallflowrateindication systemf'rCombustion Engineering andWestinghouse plantsshouldincludeatleastoneAPWflowrateindicator andonevide-range steamgenerator levelindicator foreachsteamgenerator or.twoflowrateindicators.

Theseflowindication systemsshouldbeenvironmentally qualified~

poweredfromahighlyreliable, batterybacked,nonmlass1Epowersource;periodically testable; partoftheplant'squalityassurance program;andcapableofdisplayondemand.Theoperatorreliesonsteamgenerator levelinstrumentation, inadditiontoAPWflowindication<

todetermine APWsystemperformance.

Therequirements forthissteamgenerator levelinstrumentation arespecified inRegulatory'uide 1.97,Revision2<"Instrumentation forLight-Water-Cooled NuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditions DuringandPollowing anAccident"

[19].FranklinResearchCenterADMsion4TheFnuA!inInsotutc TERM5257-287 3TECHNICAL EVALUATION 31GENERALDESCRIPTION OPAVXILIARY PEEDWATER SYSTEMTheGinnaplantisaWestinghouse-designed, two-loopnuclearpowerplant.TheAFWsystemconsistsofamainAFWsystemandastandbyAFWsystem.ThemainAPWsystemconsistsoftwomotorMriven pumps(200gpmeach)andoneturbine-driven pump(400gpm).Normally<

eachmotor-driven pumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator, butthealignment canbealteredtoalloweithermotor-driven pumptosupplybothsteamgenerators.

Theturbine-driven pumpnormallysuppliesfeedwater tobothsteamgenerators.

Eachpumpsuppliesthesteamgenerators throughanormallyclosed,motor-operated, discharge valve.OnlytheflowfromonemotorMriven pump(200gpm)isnecessary topreventthereactorcoolantsystemfromreachingthepres'sure requiredtoactuateareliefvalve.ThethreemainAPWpumpsarelocatedinthesameroomandcouldberenderedinoperable asaresultofahighenergylinebreak.ThestandbyAPWsystemwasinstalled toprovideindependent AIWsystemcapability following suchanevent..ThestandbyAPWsystemconsistsoftwomotor<<driven pumps(200gpmeach)locatedinaplantareaseparatefromthemainAFWsystem.ThestandbyAPWsystemismanuallyactuatedandalignedsothateachpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator.

ThewatersourcesforthemainAPWsystemaretwo30,000~allon condensate storagetanks(non-seismic),

a100,000~allon condensate storagetank(non-seismic),

andtheservicewatersystem(seismicCategoryI).Thewater.sourceforthestandbyAPWsystemistheservicewatersystem,whichdrawsitswaterfromLakeOntario.Steamgenerator leveliscontrolled manuallyfromthecontrolroombyadjusting thepositionofthemainAFWpumpmotor-operated discharge valves.IllFranMinResearchCenterACiMsionotTheFfsnkhnInstate TERM5257-287 3.2AUTOMATIC INITIATION 3.2.1Evaluation

-ThemainAFWsystemattheGinnaplantisdesignedasanenginee'red safe-guardssystemtoseismicCategoryI(withtheexception ofthecondensate storagetanks),Class1E,andtheautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsaredesignedtocomplywiththerequirements ofIEEEStd279-1971f17].'heGinnaplantmainAWautomatic initiation systemconsistsoftwoindependent actuation trains.Theactuation circuitsarepoweredfromemergency dcbuses.Theredundant channelsarephysically separated andelectrically independent.

Areviewoftheautomatic initiation circuitry revealednocrediblesinglefailurethatwouldinhibittheautomatic initiation systemfromproviding AFWflowtoatleastonegoodsteamgenerator.

Thescopeofthesingle-failure analysisinthisreportwaslimitedtotheredundancy ofpowersupplies, diversity ofactuating signals,'nd independence andredundancy ofautomatic initiation circuits.

BoththemainandstandbyAFWmotor-driven pumpsarepoweredbyindependent acemergency buses.TheloadingofthemainAFWmotorMriven pumpsontotheirrespective 480-Vacemergency busesispartofthepost-accident automatic loadsequencing.

ThestandbyAFWmotorMriven pumpsareinterlocked withthemainAFWmotor-driven pumpssothatbotharenotsimultaneously loadedontotheemergency bustopreventoverloading duringlossofoffsitepower.TheturbineMriven pumpreceivesitssteamthroughamotor-operated steamadmission valveineachoftwolinesthattapoffupstreamofthesteamgenerator isolation valves.Thefollowing signalsareusedforautomatic initiation ofthemainAFWsystem:Motor-driven PumsIolow-lowsteamgenerator level(2outof3channelsoneithersteamgenerator) otripofbothmainfeedwater pumpsosafetyinjection.

)L'L<l.renklin ResearchCenter T~5257-287 Turbine-driven olow-lowsteamgenerator,'level (2outof3channelsonbothsteamgenerators) olossofvoltageonboth4-kVbusesThemainAFWsystemmaybemanuallyinitiated fromthecontrol,roomby.startingthemotor-driven APWpumpsindividually; uponpumpstart,theassociated discharge valveopens.ThemainAPWmotor-driven pumpsdischarge valvesopenfullyonpumpstart.andthenthrottledowntolimit'flowtoamaximumof230gpmtoeachsteamgenerator.

Theautomatic throttling conserves auxiliary feedwater andhelpslimitthecooldownrate.Theturbine&riven pumpdischarge valveisnormallyopen;inaddition, whentheturbine-driven pumpisautomatically initiated (steamadmission valvesopen),thedischarge valvereceivesanautomatic actuation signaltoensurethatitisfullyopen.ThemainandstandbyAPWsystemandcomponents aretestedinaccordance withtechnical specifications.

,Operation oftheAB/pumpsandmotor-operated valvesischeckedmonthly.Every18monthseachmainAFWpumpandmainAPWmotor~perated valveisverifiedtooperatecorrectly on'receipt ofeachoftheautomatic initiation signals.Theautomatic initiation logicistestedmonthly.Thesystemdesignallowsonechanneltobebypassedformaintenance,

~testing,andcalibration duringpoweroperation withoutinitiating aprotective action.When'achannelisbypassedfortesting,thebypassisaccompanied byasinglechannelalertandchannelstatuslightactuation inthecontrolroom.~Theautomatic startofthemainAPWmotor&riven pumpsresulting fromthetrippingofbothmainfeedwater pumpsmaybedefeatedduringstartuporshutdownwhentheturbinegenerator isofftheline.Thedefeatswitchisautomatically bypassedwhentheturbineislatched.Thisbypassisalarmedinthecontrolroom.Theonlyinteraction betweenthemainAFWsystemautomatic initiation circuitsandnormalsystemcontrolfunctions occursinthenarrow-range steamgenerator levelinstrumentation.'hese levelinstruments areusedforbothjfffiflrjL'uJFranklinResearchCenterhDivisionofnreFran@inInsrrnrre TERM5257-287 protection (reactortripandmainAPHi.nitiation) andnormalcontrolfunctions.

(narrow-range channelIonly)inthemainfeedwater system.ThecontrolsignaLsareseparated fromtheprotection signalsbyisolation transformers sothat.amalfunction inthecontrolcircui.ts willhavenoeffecton-theprotection signals.Thefollowing individual alarmsareprovidedonthemaincontrolboard.toalerttheoperatorthatthemainAPWequipment maynotoperateproperly:

olow-lowsteamgenerator level(3channelseach)o2outof3low-lowsteamgenerator levels(1channeleach)o3outof3low-lowsteamgenerator levels(1channeleach)oemergency shutdownequipment localcontrolosafeguards breakertriposafeguards equipment lockmffomainAPHbypassindefeatlockout~osinglechannelalertostandbyAFWpumpCorDtripo-standbyAPWpumptransferswitchoffnormal(1channeleach)ostandbyAFHpumphighdischarge flow(1channeleach)ostanctbyAPWpumphighdischarge pressure(1channeleach)ostandbyAFNHVACtrouble..Noalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamadmission valvesorAPWdischarge valves.Areviewoftheautomatic andmanualinitiation circuitry andsignalsrevealedthatnosinglefailureofeithercircuittrainwouldinhibitthecapability formanualinitiation fromthecontrolroomortheauxiliary shutdownpanel.Theenvironmental qualification ofsafety-related electrical andmechanical components, including AFHsystemcircuitsandcomponents, isbeingreviewedseparately bytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.I3.2.2Conclusion Theinitiation signals,logic,andassociated circuitry oftheautomatic initiation featureofthemainAFHsystemoftheGinnaplantcomplywiththeIIl)FranklinResearchCenterADivisionafTheFronkttnInt TERM5257-287

,long-term safety-grade requirements ofNURE&4578, Section2;1.7.a,andthe\subsequent clarification issuedbytheNRCstaff.Inaddition, thefollowing pointmayeffectthereliability oftheAPHsystem:oNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamadmission valvesorAFWdischarge valves.3.3FLOWINDICATION 3.3.1Evaluation CThecapability toevaluatetheperformance ofthemainandstandbyAFHsystemsattheGinnaplantisprovidedbythefollowing indications:

omainAPWmotor-driven pumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator (2channelseach)omainAFWturbineMriven pumpdischarge flow(2channels)

.omainAPHturbine-driven pumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator (2channelseach)ostandbyAPHmotor-driven pumpflow(1channeleach)omainAFWpumpdischarge pressureostandbyAPWpumpdischarge pressureonarrow-range steamgenerator level(3channelseach)owide-range steamgenerator level(1channeleach)omainandstandbyAPW'pumpstatusindication omainandstandbyAPWvalvepositionindication ocondensate storagetanklevel(2channels).

TheLicenseehasstatedthatthemainAPWflowindication foreachsteamgenerator issafety~rade.

Theindividual steamgenerator AFHflowcircuitry ispoweredfromseparatebattery-backed instrument buses.PoreachmainAFWpump,thereisaprimaryandsecondary flowinstrumentation channel.Theprimarychannelindicates flowand,forthemotor-driven pumps,controlstheindividual discharge valves.Thesecondary flowinstrumentation indicates flowonly.Theprimaryandsecondary channelsarepoweredfromoppositeinstrument buses.Theprimaryandsecondary flowindication isprovidedonthemaincontrolboardbyadual-movement vertical-scale indicator.

)llFranklinResearchCenterADnnsionofTheFrsnkbnInsatiate TERM5257-287 Sincethedischarge headerfromtheturbine-driven pumpbranchestosupplybothsteamgenerators, anadditional channel'of safety~rade flowinstrumenta-tionisprovidedineachline.Safety~rade wide-range steamgenerator levelindication isprovidedasabackup.ThestandbyAPHsystemprovidesa.single-channelofsafety~uide flowinstrumentation foreachpump.Theflowindication channelsaretestedinaccordance withtechnical specifications.

Theenvironmental qualification oftheAPWflowindicators willhe-reviewedseparately bytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3.3.2Conclusion Itisconcluded thattheAPWflowinstrumentation attheGinnaplantcomplieswiththelong-term safety~rade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.b,andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.3.4DESCRIPTION OPSTEAMGENERATOR LEVELINDICATION Steamgenerator levelindication attheGinnaplantconsists'of threesafety-grade narrow-range levelchannelsandonesafety~rade wide-range level,channelpersteamgenerator.

areasfollows:Theleveltransmitters andtheirpowersuppliesSTEAMGENERATOR AChannelTransmitter VitalBusWideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIZNarrowRangeIIILT-460LT-461LT-462LT-463AACDSTEAMGENERATOR BChannel'ideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeZZNarrowRangeZZZTransmitterILT-470LT-471LT-472LT-473VitalBusBDABIjl)FranMlnResearchCenterh~ae TERM5257-287 Thesteamgenerator levelchannelsarecheckedeachshift<tested.monthly,andcalibrated duringrefueling.

Thewide-range channelsforbothsteamgenerators areindicated individually ononestripchart recorder.

Narrow-,range channelsforbothsteamgenerators areindicated onverticalgages.)llFranMinResearchCenterADresisnotTheFranklinInstitute TERM5257-287 4CONCLUSIONS Theinitiation signals,logic,andassociated circuitry oftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantauxiliary feedwater systemcomplywiththe'long-term safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.a[3],andthesub-sequentclarification issuedbytheNRC.IZnaddition, thefollowing pointsmayaffectthereliability of.theAPWsystem0o"Noalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable to=thesteamadmission valvesorAFHdischarge valves.Theauxiliary feedwater flowinstrumentation complieswiththelong-term

~safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.b[3],andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.l)llFranMinResearchCenterADivisionorTheFrontonInsutute TERW5257-287 REFERENCES 2~3~4~CodeofFederalRegulations, Title10,OfficeoftheFederalRegister, NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration, RevisedJanuary1,1980.NRC,Genericlettertoall'WRlicensees regarding short-term requirements resulting fromThreeMileIslandAccidentSeptember 13,1979.INUHEG-0578, "TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportandShortMerm Recommendations'<"

NRC,July1979.NRC,Genericlettertoall'WRlicensees clarifying lessonslearnedshort-term requirements, October30,1979.5~NRC,Genericlettertoall'PWRlicensees regarding short-term requirement resulting fromThreeMileIslandAccident, September 5,1980'.7~8.9.NRCGenericlettertoallPWRlicensees regarding post-TMIrequirements, October31,1980.INUREG-0737, "Clarificationiof TMIActionPlanRequirements;"

NRC,November1980.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)October17,1979L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NBC)November19,197910'1.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November28<1979L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)December14,197912.13.D.M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoL.D.White(RG&E)July7i1980ID.M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RG&E)Mayll,1981!FranklinResearchCenterADnbiondTheFranklinInsowte TER~257-287 14.J.E.Maier(RGSE)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield (NRC)December30,198015.D.M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RGaE)August19<198116.J.E.Maier(RG&E)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield (NRC)September 22,198117.IEEEStd279-1971,

'Criteria forProtection SystemsforNuclear--

PowerGenerating Stations,"

Institute ofElectrical andElectronics Engineers, Inc.,NewYork/NY.18.NUREG-75/087'Standard ReviewPlang'ection 10.4.9gRev.lgUSNRC,nodate.19.Regulatory Guide1.97(TaskRS917-4)<"Instrumentation forLight-Water-Cooled NuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditions DuringandPollowing anAccident,'ev.

2,NRC,December1980.III)FranklinResearchCenterI TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORTAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMAUTOMATIC INITIATION ANDFLOWINDICATION

<F-16.F-37)ROCHESTER GASANDELECTRICCORPORATION ROBERTE,GINNANUCLEARPONERPLANTNRCDOCKETNO.50-244NRCTACNO.11706NRCCONTRACTNO.NRC43-79-118 FRCPROJECTC5257FRCASSIGNMENT 9FRCTASK2S7PreparedbyFranklinResearchCenter20thandRaceStreetPhiladelphia, PA19103Author:F.W.VosburyFRCGroupLeader:K.S.FertnerPreparedforNuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.20555LeadNFICEngineer:

R.KendallM.WigdorJuly23,19S2Thisreportwaspreparedasanaccountofworksponsored byanagencyoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.

NeithertheUnitedStatesGovernment no'ranyagencythereof,oranyoftheiremployees, makesanywarranty, expressed orImplied,orassumesanylegalliability orresponsibility foranythirdparty'suse,ortheresultsofsuchuse,ofanyInformation, appa-ratus,productorprocessdisclosed Inthisreport,orrepresents thatitsusebysuchthird'arty wouldnotInfringeprivately ownedrights.Reviewedby:Approvedby:GroupLeaderPro'nagerDepartntDirctor".8207270149.

820723.DOCK05000244CF9IlFranklinResearchCenterADivisionofTheFranklininstitute 7heBenjaminFranklinParkway,Phila.,Pa.19103(215)448-1000 TERM5257-287 CONTENTSSectionTitle~PaeINTRODUCTION

~1.1PurposeofReview1.2GenericIssueBackground 1.3Plant-Specific

Background

1112REVIEWCRITERIA~3TECHNICAL EVALUATION

~3.1GeneralDescription ofAuxiliary Feedwater System3.2Automatic Initiation.

3.2;1Evaluation 3.2.2Conclusion 556683.3FlowIndication

.93.3.1Evaluation 3.3,.2Conclusion 3a4Description ofSteamGenerator LevelIndication CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES 910101213~llllFranklinResearchcenterrtkDMeiOnOlTbt:FranMtnInSututt:

TERM5257-28 7FOREWORDThisTechnical Evaluation ReportwaspreparedbyFranklinResearchCenterunderacontractwiththeU.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission (OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation, DivisionofOperating Reactors) fortechnical assistance insupportofNRCoperating reactorlicensing actions.Thetechnical evaluation wasconducted inaccordance withcriteriaestablished bytheNRC.Mr.F.W.Vosburycontributed tothetechnical preparation ofthisreportthroughasubcontract withWESTECServices, Inc.~llllFranklinResearchCenterADivlslonofTheFrenItlnInstitute J

aTER-C5257-287 l.INTRODUCTION 1.1PURPOSEOFREVIEWThepurposeofthisreviewistoprovideatechnical evaluation oftheemergency feedwater systemdesigntoverifythatsafety-grade automatic initiation circuitry andflowindication areprovidedattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Althoughnotinthescopeofthisreview,thesteamgenerator levelindication available attheGinnaplantisdescribed toassistsubsequent NRCstaffreview.1.2GENERICISSUEBACKGROUND Apost-accident designreviewbytheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)aftertheMarch28,,1979incidentatThreeMileIsland(TMI)Unit2estab-lishedthattheauxiliary feedwater (AFW)systemshouldbetreatedasasafetysysteminapressurized waterreactor(PWR)plant.Thedesignsofsafetysystemsinanuclearpowerplantarerequiredtomeetgeneraldesigncriteria(GDC)specified inAppendixAof10CFR50[1].TherelevantdesigncriteriafortheAFWsystemdesignareGDC13,GDC20,andGDC34.GDC13setsforththerequirement forinstrumentation tomonitorvariables andsystems(overtheiranticipated rangesofoperation) thatcanaffectreactorsafety.GDC20requiresthataprotection systembedesignedtoinitiateautomatically inordertoassurethatacceptable fueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofanticipated operational occurrences.

GDC34requiresthatthesafetyfunctionofthedesignedsystem,thatis,theresidualheatremovalbytheAFWsystem,beaccomplished eveninthecaseofasinglefailure.OnSeptember 13,1979,theNRCissuedaletter[2]toeachPWRlicenseethatdefinedasetofshort-term control-grade requirements fortheAFWsystem,specified inNUREG-0578

[3].ItrequiredthattheAFWsystemhaveautomatic initiation andsinglefailure-proof designconsistent withtherequirements ofGDC20andGDC34.Inaddition, itrequiredAFWflowindication inthecontrolroominaccordance withGDC13.~llllFranklinResearchcenterrstDltrlslon ofTheFranklnInstitttte TER-C5257-287 DuringtheweekofSeptember 24,1979,seminarswereheldinfourregionsofthecountrytodiscusstheshort-term requirements.

OnOctober30,1979,anotherletterwasissuedtoeachPWRlicenseeproviding additional clarifica-IItionoftheNRCstaffshort-term requirements withoutalteringtheirintent[4].Post-TMIanalysesofprimarysystemresponsetofeedwater transients andreliability ofinstalled AFWsystemsalsoestablished that,inthelongterm,theAFWsystemshouldbeupgradedinaccordance withsafety-grade requirements.

Theselong-term requirements wereclarified intheletterofSeptember 5,1980[5]andformalized intheletterofOctober31,1980[6].TheOctober31letterincorporated inonedocument, NUREG-0737

[7],allTMI-related itemsapprovedbythecommission forimplementation.

SectionII.E.1.2ofNUREG-0737 clarifies therequirements fortheAFWsystemautomatic initiation andflowindication.

13PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND TheLicenseeoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,Rochester GasandElectricCorporation (RGGE)rprovideditsresponsetoReference 3onOctober17,1979[8].InthisresponseRGt'Eindicated thattheGinnaplantwasequippedwithasafety-grade, automatically initiated AFWsystem,andthattheexistingflowindication foreachgenerator compliedwiththerequirements foracontrol-grade system.RG6EagreedtoupgradetheAFWflowindication byJanuary1,1981.Additional correspondence

[9-13]wasexchanged betweenRGGEandtheNRCregarding theAFWsystem,theimplementation ofNUREG-0578, andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.OnDecember30,1980[14],RGaEprovideditsresponsetoNUREG-0737 andincludedthedesigncriteriatoupgradetheAFWflowindication tosafety-grade.

OnAugust19,1981[15]rtheNRCsentarequestforadditional information toaidinthecompletion ofthisreport.RG&Eresponded withtheadditional requested information onSeptember 22,1981[13].(IllFranklinResearchCenterA(anionorTheFranMlnInaarure TER-C5257-287 2~REVIEWCRITERIAToimprovethereliability oftheAMsystem,theNRCrequiredlicensees toupgradethesystem,wherenecessary, toensuretimelyautomatic initiation whenrequired.

Thesystemupgradewastoproceedintwophases.Intheshortterm,asaminimum,control-grade signalsandcircuitsweretobeusedtoauto-matically initiatetheAFWsystem.Control-grade systemsweretomeetthefollowing requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.a[3]:"1.Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomatic initiation oftheauxiliary feedwater system.2.Theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliary feedwater systemfunction.

3.Testability oftheinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.4.Theinitiating signalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency buses.5.'Manualcapability toinitiatetheauxiliary feedwater sys-temfromthecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplemented sothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnotresultintheloss'ofsystemfunction.

6.Theacmotor-driven pumpsandvalvesintheauxiliary feed-watersystemshallbeincludedintheautomatic actuation (simultaneous and/or'equential) oftheloadstotheemer-gencybuses.7.Theautomatic initiating signalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapability toinitiatetheAkWsystemfromthecontrolroom."Inthelongterm,thesesignalsandcircuitsweretobeupgradedinaccor-dancewithsafety-grade requirements.

Specifically, inadditiontotheaboveYrequirements, theautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsweretohaveindependent

channels, useenvironmentally qualified components, havesystembypassed/inoperable statusfeatures, andconformtocontrolsysteminteraction
criteria, asstipulated inIEEEStd279-1971[17].()llFranklinResearchCenterAChilonofTheFranklinInstitute TER-C5257-287 Thecapability toascertain theAFWsystemperformance fromthecontrolroommustalsobeprovided.

Intheshortterm,steamgenerator levelindication andflowmeasurement weretobeusedtoassisttheoperatorinmaintaining therequiredsteamgenerator levelduringAFWsystemoperation.

Thissystemwastomeetthefollowing requirements fromNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.b[3],asclarified byNUREG-0737, SectionII.E.1.2[7]:"l.Safety-grade indication ofauxiliary feedwater flowtoeachsteamgenerator shallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.Theauxiliary feedwater flowinstrument channelsshallbepoweredfromtheemergency busesconsistent withsatisfying theemergency powerdiversity requirements oftheauxiliary feedwater systemsetforthinAuxiliary SystemsBranchTechnical Position10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9[18]."TheNRCstaffhasdetermined that,inthelongterm,theoverallflowrateindication systemforCombustion Engineering andWestinghouse plantsshouldincludeatleastoneAFWflowrateindicator andonewide-range steamgenerator levelindicator foreachsteamgenerator ortwoflowrateindicators.

Theseflowindication systemsshouldbeenvironmentally qualified; poweredfromahighlyreliable, batterybacked,non-class 1Epowersource;periodically testable; partoftheplant'squalityassurance program;andcapableofdisplayondemand.Theoperatorreliesonsteamgenerator levelinstrumentation, inadditiontoAFWflowindication, todetermine AFWsystemperformance.

Therequirements forthissteamgenerator levelinstrumentation arespecified inRegulatory Guide1.97,Revision2,Instrumentation forLight-Water-Cooled NuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditions DuringandFollowing anAccident"

[19].0PFranklinResearchCenterADMslonoITheFtenMinInstitute 4,

TERM5257-287 3~TECHNICAL EVALUATION 3.lGENERALDESCRIPTION OFAUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMTheGinnaplantisaWestinghouse-designed, two-loopnuclearpowerplant.TheAFWsystemconsistsofamainAFWsystemandastandbyAFWsystem.ThemainAFWsystemcon'sists oftwomotor-driven pumps(200gpmeach)andoneturbine-driven pump(400gpm).Normally, eachmotor-driven pumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator, butthealignment canbealteredtoalloweithermotor-driven pumptosupplybothsteamgenerators.

Theturbine-driven pumpnormallysuppliesfeedwater tobothsteamgenerators.

Eachpumpsuppliesthesteamgenerators throughanormallyclosed,motor-operated, discharge valve.Onlytheflowfromonemotor-driven pump(200gpm)isnecessary topreventthereactorcoolantsystemfromreachingthepressurerequiredtoactuateareliefvalve.ThethreemainAFWpumpsarelocatedinthesameroomandcouldbe-renderedinoperable asaresultofahighenergylinebreak.ThestandbyAFWsystemwasinstalled toprovideindependent AFWsystemcapability following suchanevent.ThestandbyAFWsystemconsistsoftwomotor-driven pumps(200gpmeach)locatedinaplantareaseparatefromthemainAFWsystem.ThestandbyAFWsystemismanuallyactuatedandalignedsothateachpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator.

ThewatersourcesforthemainAFWsystemaretwo30,000-gallon condensate storagetanks(non-seismic),

al00,000~allon condensate storagetank(non-seismic),

andtheservicewatersystem(seismicCategoryI).ThewatersourceforthestandbyAFWsystemistheservicewatersystem,whichdrawsitswaterfromLakeOntario.Steamgenerator leveliscontrolled manuallyfromthecontrolroombyadjusting thepositionofthemainAFWpumpmotor-operated discharge valves.~llllFranklinResearchCenterADMslonoiTheFranklinInariture 0

0TER-C5257-287 3.2AUTOMATIC INITIATION 3.2.1Evaluation ThemainAFWsystemattheGinnaplantisdesignedasanengineered safe-guardssystemtoseismicCategoryI(withtheexception ofthecondensate storagetanks),ClasslE,andtheautomatic initiation signalsandcircuitsaredesignedtocomplywiththerequirements ofIEEEStd279-1971[17].The'GinnaplantmainAFWautomatic initiation systemconsistsoftwoindependent actuation trains.Theactuation circuitsarepoweredfromemergency dcbuses.Theredundant channelsarephysically separated andelectrically independent.

Areviewoftheautomatic initiation circuitry revealednocrediblesinglefailurethatwouldinhibittheautomatic initiation systemfromproviding AFWflowtoatleastonegoodsteamgenerator.

Thescopeofthesingle-failure analysisinthisreportwaslimitedtotheredundancy ofpowersupplies, diversity ofactuating signals,andindependence andredundancy ofautomatic initiation circuits.

BoththemainandstandbyAFWmotor-driven pumpsarepoweredbyindependent acemergency buses.TheloadingofthemainAFWmotor-driven pumpsontotheirrespective 480-Vacemergency busesispartofthepost-accident automatic loadsequencing.

ThestandbyAPWmotor-driven pumpsareinterlocked withthemainAFWmotor-driven pumpssothatbotharenotsimultaneously loadedontotheemergency bustopreventoverloading duringlossofoffsitepower.Theturbine-driven pumpreceivesitssteamthroughamotor-operated steamadmission valveineachoftwolinesthattapoffupstreamofthesteamgenerator isolation valves.Thefollowing signalsareusedforautomatic initiation ofthemainAPWsystem:Motor-driven Pumsolow-lowsteamgenerator level(2outof3channelsoneithersteamgenerator) otripofbothmainfeedwater pumpsosafetyinjection.

tillFranklinResearchCenterADlvhtonoI'nteFranklinInstitute TERM5257-287Turbine-driven Pumolow-lowsteamgenerator level(2outof3channelsonbothsteamgenerators) olossofvoltageonboth4-kVbusesThemainAFHsystemmaybemanuallyinitiated fromthecontrolroombystartingthemotor-driven AFHpumpsindividually; uponpumpstart,theassociated discharge valveopens.ThemainAFWmotor-driven pumpsdischarge valvesopenfullyonpumpstartandthenthrottledowntolimitflowtoamaximumof230gpmtoeachsteamgenerator.

Theautomatic throttling conserves auxiliary feedwater andhelpslimitthecooldownrate.Theturbine-driven pumpdischarge valveisnormallyopen;inaddition, whentheturbine-driven pumpisautomatically initiated (steamadmission valvesopen),thedischarge valvereceivesanautomatic actuation signaltoensurethatitisfullyopen.ThemainandstandbyAFWsystemandcomponents aretestedinaccordance withtechnical specifi.cations.

Operation oftheAFHpumpsandmotor-operated

/valvesischeckedmonthly.Every18monthseachmainAFWpumpandmainAFWmotor-operat:ed valveisverifiedtooperatecorrectly onreceiptofeachoftheautomatic initiation signals.Theautomatic initiation logicistestedmonthly.Thesystemdesignallowsonechanneltobebypassedformaintenance, testing,andcalibration duringpoweroperation withoutinitiating aprotective action.Whenachannelisbypassedfortesting,thebypassisaccompanied byasinglechannelalertandchannelstatuslightactuation inthecontrolroom.Theautomatic startofthemainAFHmotor-driven pumpsresulting fromthetrippingofbothmainfeedwater pumpsmaybedefeatedduringstartuporshutdownwhentheturbinegenerator isofftheline.Thedefeatswitchisautomatically bypassedwhentheturbineislatched.thecontrolroom.ThisbypassisalarmedinTheonlyinteraction betweenthemainAFHsystemautomatic initiation circuitsandnormalsystemcontrolfunctions occursinthenarrow-range steamgenerator levelinstrumentation.

Theselevelinstruments areusedforbothIFranklinResearchCenterADivisionof'nteFrenitfin Institute

0oTER-C5257-287 protection (reactortripandmainAFWinitiation) andnormalcontrolfunctions (narrow-range channelIonly)inthemainfeedwater system.Thecontrolsignalsareseparated fromtheprotection signalsbyisolation transformers sothatamalfunction inthecontrolcircuitswillhavenoeffectontheprotection signals.Thefollowing individual alarmsareprovidedon,themaincontrolboardtoalerttheoperatorthatthemainAFWequipment maynotoperateproperly:

I'low-lowsteamgenerator level(3channelseach)o2outof3low-lowsteamgenerator levels(1channeleach)o3outof3low-lowsteamgenerator levels(lchanneleach)oemergency shutdownequipment localcontrolosafeguards breakertriposafeguards equipment lock-offomainAFWbypassindefeatlockoutosinglechannelalertostandbyAFHpumpCorDtripostandbyJQWpumptransferswitchoffnormal(lchanneleach)ostandbyAFWpumphighdischarge flow(lchanneleach)ostandbyAFHpumphighdischarge pressure(lchannel'each) ostandbyAFHHVACtrouble.Noalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamadmission valvesorAFWdischarge valves.Areviewoftheautomatic andmanualinitiation circuitry andsignalsrevealedthatnosinglefailureofeithercircuittrainwouldinhibitthecapability formanualinitiation fromthecontrolroomortheauxiliary shutdownpanel.Theenvironmental qualification ofsafety-related electrical andmechanical components, including AFHsystemcircuitsandcomponents, isbeingreviewedseparately bytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3.2.2Conclusion Theinitiation signals,logic,andassociated circuitry oftheautomatic initiation featureofthemainAFWsystemoftheGinnaplantcomplywiththe!)llFranklinResearchCenterADivfshnofTheFcanMlnInstitute QTERW5257-287 long-term safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.a,andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRCstaff.Znaddition, thefollowing pointmayeffectthereliability oftheAFWsystem:oNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamadmission valvesorAFWdischarge valves.3~3FLOWZNDZCATZON 3.3.1Evaluation Thecapability toevaluatetheperformance ofthemainandstandbyAFWsystemsattheGinnaplantisprovidedbythefollowing indications:

omainAFWmotor-driven pumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator (2channelseach)omainAFHturbine-driven pumpdischarge flow(2channels) omainAFWturbine-driven pumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator (2channelseach)ostandbyAPWmotor-driven pumpflow(1channeleach)omainAFHpumpdischarge pressureostandbyAFWpumpdischarge pressureonarrow-range steamgenerator level(3channelseach)owide-range steamgenerator level(1channeleach)omainandstandbyAPW'umpstatusindication omainandstandbyAFHvalvepositionindication ocondensate storagetanklevel(2channels).

TheLicenseehasstatedthatthemainAFWflowindication foreachsteamgenerator issafety-grade.

Theindividual steamgenerator APWflowcircuitry ispoweredfromseparatebattery-backed instrument buses.PoreachmainAFHpump,thereisaprimaryandsecondary flowinstrumentation channel.Theprimarychannelindicates flowand,forthemotor-driven pumps,controlstheindividual discharge valves.Thesecondary flowinstrumentation indicates flowonly.Theprimaryandsecondary channelsarepoweredfromoppositeinstrument buses.Theprimaryandsecondary flowindication isprovidedonthemaincontrolboardbyadual-movement vertical-scale indicator.

l)llFranldinResearchCenterADivlslonotTheFrsnk5nInsdtute

~~TERM5257-287Sincethedischarge headerfromtheturbine-driven pumpbranchestosupplybothsteamgenerators, anadditional channelofsafetygrade flowinstrumenta-tionisprovidedineachline.Safety-grade wide-range steamgenerator levelindication isprovidedasabackup.ThestandbyAFWsystemprovidesasinglechannelofsafety-guide flowinstrumentation foreachpump.Theflowindication channelsaretestedinaccordance withtechnical specifications.

Theenvironmental qualificati'on oftheAFWflowindicators willbereviewedseparately bytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3.3.2Conclusion Itisconcluded thattheAFWflowinstrumentation attheGinnaplantcomplieswiththelong-term safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.b,andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.3.4DESCRIPTION.

OFSTEAMGENERATOR LEVELINDICATION Steamgenerator levelindication attheGinnaplantconsistsofthreesafety-grade narrow-range levelchannelsandonesafety-grade wide-range levelchannelpersteamgenerator.

Theleveltransmitters andtheirpowersuppliesareasfollows:STEAMGENEBATOR AChannelTransmitter VitalBusWideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIIILT-460LT-461LT-462LT-463AACDSTEAMGENERATOR BChannelTransmitter VitalBusWideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIIILT-470'T-471 LT-472LT-473BDAB~llllFranklinResearchCenterADMsioncITheFtentrIin Institute eTERM5257-287 Thesteamgenerator levelchannelsarecheckedeachshift,testedmonthly,andcalibrated duringrefueling.

Thewide-range channelsforbothsteamgenerators areindicated individually ononestripchart recorder.

Narrow-range channelsforbothsteamgenerators areindicated onverticalgages.I'I~llllFranklinResearchCenterADMsionofTheFrenklinInsliltste Qr~TER-C5257-287 4.CONCLUSIONS Theinitiation signals,logic,andassociated circuitry oftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantauxiliary feedwater systemcomplywiththelong-term safetygrade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.a[3],andthesub-sequentclarification issuedbytheNRC..~IInaddition, thefollowing pointsmayaffectthereliability oftheAFWsystem:IoNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailable tothesteamadmission valvesorAFWdischarge valves.ETheauxiliary feedwater flowinstrumentation complieswiththelong-term safety-grade requirements ofNUREG-0578, Section2.1.7.b[3],andthesubsequent clarification issuedbytheNRC.~llllFranklinResearchCenterADivisionolTheFsenklnInrritttte

TER-C5257-2&7 5.REFERENCES CodeofFederalRegulations, Title10,OfficeoftheFederalRegister, NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration, RevisedJanuary1,1980.2~NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicensees regarding short-term requirements resulting fromThreeMileIslandAccidentSeptember 13,1979.3~4~NUREG-0578, "TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForce,StatusReportandShort-Term Recommendations,"

NRC,July1979.NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicensees clarifying lessonslearnedshort-term requirements, October30,1979.5.NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicensees regarding short-term requirement resulting fromThreeMileIslandAccident, September 5,1980.NRCGenericlettertoallPWRlicensees regarding post-TMIrequirements, October31,1980.7~NUREG-0737, "Clarification ofTMIActionPlanRequirements;"

NRC,November1980.8~r9~L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)October17,1979eL.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November19,197910'.D.White(RGaE)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November28,1979L.D.White(RGaE)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)December14,197912.D.M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoL.D.White(RGaE)July7,198013.D.M.Crutchfield (NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RGaE)Mayll,1981~IIIIFrantttin ResearchCenterADlvblonol7heFsankmnInsulute I~,Q 4TER-C5257-287 14.J.E.Maier(RGaE)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield (NRC)December30,198015.D.M.Crutchfield (NBC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RG&E)August19,198116.J.E.Maier(RG&E)ILettertoD.M.Crutchf'ield (NBC)September 22,1981k17.IEEEStd279-1971, "Criteria forProtection SystemsforNuclearPowerGenerating Stations,"

Institpte ofElectrical andElectronics Engineers, Inc.,NewYork,NY.18.NUREG-75/087, "Standard ReviewPlan,"Section10.4.9,Rev.1,USNRC,nodate.19.Regulatory Guide1.97(TaskRS917-4),"Instrumentation forLight-Water-Cooled NuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditions DuringandFollowing anAccident,"

Rev.2,NRC,December1980.00FranMinResearchCenterADlvfshnefTheFtenkSnInstitute 0~,Q~

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