ML18040B039

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Evaluation of Detailed Control Room Design Review for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML18040B039
Person / Time
Site: Susquehanna  Talen Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/25/1984
From:
SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY
To:
NRC
Shared Package
ML17139C196 List:
References
CON-NRC-03-82-096, CON-NRC-3-82-96, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 SAI-186-351-73, NUDOCS 8402030532
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SAI-186.-351-73 EVALUATION OFTHEDETAILEDCONTROLROOMDESIGNREVIEMFORSUSQUEHANNA STEAMELECTRICSTATIONTechnical Evaluation ReportPreparedfor:U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Washington, D.C.ContractNRC-03>>82-096

~~SectionTABLEOFCONTENTS~PaeOREWORDe~~~~~~e~~~~e~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~FBACKGROUND.

PLANNINGPHASEe~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.PrearationandSubmission ofProramPlan.2.Establishment ofaualifiedNultidisci linarReviewTeam..REVISPHASEe~~~~~~~e~~~~~1.SstemsFunctionandTaskAnal2.ControlRoomInventor3.ControlRoomSu>ye.4.Reviewof0eratinExeriencesis~~e~~~3581010ASSESSMENT ANDIMPLEMENTATION PHASE.1.HEDAssessment Methodolo 2.Selection ofDesinImrovements

.3.Verification thatSelectedOesinImrovements WillProvidetheNecessarCorrection.

........4.Verification thatImrovements canbeIntroduced intheControlRoomWithoutCreatinAnUnaccetableHEOs.............,.....5.Coordination ofControlRoomImrovements WithChanesResultinFromOtherImrovementProrams.6.ProosedSchedules forImlementinDesinChanes.ANALYSISOFPROPOSEDDESIGNCHANGESANDJUSTIFICATION FORHEDSWITHSAFETYSIGNIFICANCE THATARETOBELEFTUNCORRECTED ORPARTIALLY CORRECTED

.1.AnalsisofProosedDesinChanes.2.nasisofJustifscations forHEDswithSafetSinificance ThatAretobeLeftUncorrected

.11111112:121213131315.REPORTING PHASE.CONCLUSION.

.......eREFERENCES.

APPENDIXAAPPENDIXB~~~~~~~~~~~171720 FOREMORDThisTechnical Evaluation Report(TER)waspreparedbyScienceAppli-cations,Inc.(SAI)underContractNRC-03-82-096, Technical Assistance inSupportofNRCLicensing Actions:ProgramIII.Thee'valuation wasperformed insupportoftheDivisionofHumanFactorsSafety,HumanFactorsEngineering Branch(HFEB).NRCpreviously evaluated Pennsylvania Power&LightCompany's (PP&L)programplan(Reference 2)forconducting DetailedControlRoomDesignReviews(DCRDRs)attheSusquehanna SteamElectricStation.NRCstaffcommentsonPP&L'sprogramplanwereforwarded tothe'icenseeonJuly15,1983(Reference 3).NRCreviewoftheprogramplanledtoafavorable conclusion; processes described intheplanwerefoundtobecomplete.

TheSAI.evaluation teamhelddiscussions withtheHFEBstaffinthecourseoftheevaluation oftheSu@naryReport(Reference 1).

Evaluation oftheDetailedControlRoomDesignReviewForSusquehanna SteamElectricStationThisreportdocuments ScienceApplications, Inc.'s(SAI)evaluation oftheDetailedControlRoomDesignReview(DCRDR)SummaryReportsubmitted totheNuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)byPennsylvania Power8LightCompany(PP8L)forSusquehanna SteamElectricStation(Reference 1).PP8L'sreviewwasconducted inaccordance withtheprogramplan(Reference 2)submitted totheNRCJune3,1982.NRCstaffevaluated theprogramplanand-forwarded theircomments(Reference 3)tothelicenseeonJuly15,1983.TheNRCreviewoftheprogramplanledtoafavorable conclusion; processes described intheprogramplanwerefoundtobecomplete.

ResultsoftheSAIevaluation followabriefoverviewofthebackground leadinguptotheDCRDRsumnaryreport.BACKGROUND Licensees andapplicants foroperating licensesarerequiredtoconductaDetailedControlRoomDesignreview(DCRDR).Theobjective isto"...improve theabilityofnuclearpowerplantcontrolroomoperators topreventaccidents orcopewithaccidents iftheyoccurbyimproving theinformation providedtothem"(NUREG-0660, ItemI.D).TheneedtoconductaDCRDRwasconfirmed inNUREG-0737 andinSupplement 1toNUREG-0737.

OCRDRrequirements inSupplement 1toNUREG-0737 replacedthoseinearlierdocuments.

Supplement 1toNUREG-0737 requireseachapplicant orlicenseetoconducttheirDCRDRonaschedulenegotiated withtheNRC.Guidelines forconducting aDCRORareprovidedinNUREG-0700 while.criteriaforNRC'sevaluation ofaDCRDRarecontained inNUREG-0801 (draft).(TheNUREGdocuments citedarelistedasReferences 4-8.)ADCRDRistobeconducted according tothelicensee's ownprogramplan(whichmustbesubmitted totheNRC);according toNUREG-0700 itshouldincludefourphases:(1)planning, (2)review,(3)assessment, and(4)re-porting.Theproductofthelastphaseisasummaryreportwhichmustincludeanoutlineofproposedcontrolroomchanges,theirproposedschedules

.forimplementation, andsummaryjustification forhumanengineering discrepancies withsafetysignificance tobeleftuncorrected or partially corrected.

Uponreceiptofthelicensee's summaryreportandpriortoimplementation ofproposedchanges,NRCmustprepareaSafetyEvaluation Report(SER)indicating theacceptability oftheDCRDR{notjustthesummaryreport).TheNRC'sevaluation encompasses alldocumentation aswellasbriefings, discussions, andauditsifanywereconducted.

Thepurposeofthistechnical evaluation reportistoassisttheNRCin-thetechnical evaluation processbyproviding anevaluation oFthePP&Lsummaryreport.TheDCRDRrequirements asstatedinSupplement 1toNUREG-0737 canbesummarized intermsofninespecificissues,alistofwhichprovidesaconvenient outlineoftheareascoveredinthistechnical evaluation.

Thenineissuesare:1.Establishment ofaqualified multidisciplinary reviewteam.2.Useoffunctionandtaskanalysestoidentifycontrolroomoperatortasksandinformationandcontrolrequirements duringemergency operations.

3.Acomparison ofdisplayandcontrolrequirements withacontrolroominventory.

4.Acontrolroomsurveytoidentifydeviations fromacceptedhumanfactorsprinciples.

5.Assessment ofhumanengineering discrepancies (HEDs)todetermine whichHEDsaresignificant andshouldbecorrected.

6.Selection of.designimprovements thatwillcorrectthosediscrepan-cies.7.Verification thatselecteddesignimprovements willprovidethenecessary correction.

8.Verification thatimprovements canbeintroduced inthecontrolroomwithoutcreatinganyunacceptable humanengineering discrepan-cies.9.Coordination ofcontrolroomimprovements withchangesresulting fromotherimprovement programssuchasSPDS,operatortraining, newinstrumentation, Reg.Guide1.97(Rev.2),andupgradedemergency operating procedures.

PlanningPhase1.PrearationandSubmission ofaProramPlanTheDCRDRProgramPlanforSusquehanna 1and2wassubmitted inJune1982.TheNRCreviewofthelicensee's programplanincludedcommentsontheplanforreviewteamstructure andqualification, andtheprocessusedfor:(1)functionandtaskanalyses, (2)controlroominventory, (3)controlroomsurvey,(4)HEDassessment, (5)selection ofdesignimprovements, (6)veri-ficationofimprovements, including theassessment thatnonewHEOsareintroduced, and(7)the.coordination ofDCRDRactivities withotherpro-grams.TheNRCconcluded thatthescopeoftheplancoveredallmajorpointsofconcernstatedinNUREG-0737, Supplement l.2.Establishment ofauglifiedMultidisci 1inarReviewTeamPPSL'sreviewteamappearstomeetthequalifications requi~edforaDCRDRmultidisciplinary reviewteam.ReviewPhasePP&L'sDetailedControlRoomDesignReviewrepresents bothUnits1and2controlrooms.However,theOCRORcoveredonlyUnit1controlroom.Asindicated inthesummaryreport,thecontrolroomsare~nearlidentical.

BecauseUnit2controlroomwasunderconstruction itwasnotavailable duringtheDCROR.PPKLindicates thatfindingsfromtheUnit1controlroomreviewwillbeapplicable toUnit2.Thisisanopenissue-untilanydifferences betweenthetwocontrolroomsaredocumented andseparately evaluated.

SAI'sevaluation, however,pertainsonlytoUnitl.

PP&L'ssummaryreportprovides9pagesdevotedtoplanthistoryandbackground.

Althoughinteresting reading,onthewholesuchinformation isextraneous toourobjective, whichistoevaluatethesummaryreportoftheDCRDR.Whatisrelevant, however,isthefactthatin1971aPreliminary Conceptualization andOptimization Studyincorporated humanfactorsguide-linesintotherecommended controlroomconfiguration (Reference 1,p.1).TheresultofthestudyandfinaldesignwasanadvancedcontrolroomwhichthelicenseeassurestheNRCwas"designed foroperatorconvenience" (Ref-erence1,p.9).Themethodology andprocedures conducted fortheDCRDRaredescribed infourpagesofthereport(Reference 1,p.10-14).Theseinclude:1.SystemsFunctionandTaskAnalysis2.ControlRoomInventory 3.ControlRoomSurvey4.Operatorguestionnaire 5.Verification ofTaskPerformance Capabilities 6.Validation ofControlRoomFunctions 7.Preliminary ReviewItemsTheaboveactivities arethoserecommended byNUREG-0700 (Reference 5)guidelines ascontributing totheaccomplishment ofreviewphaseobjectives.

Activities 2through4contribute totheaccomplishment ofspecificDCRDRrequirements contained inSupplement 1toNUREG-0737.

Inaddition, PPSLincludeddescriptions ofmethodologies forfourotheractivities (notexpli-citlyrequiredbytheNRC):4)Operating Experience Review,5)Verif-icationofTaskPerformance Capabilities, 6)Validation ofControlRoomFunctions, and7)Preliminary ReviewFindings.

Theselastfourreviewactivities arenotexplicitly coveredinthisevaluation exceptastheyimpactoraugmentthoserequiredbyNUREG-0737, Supplement 1(Reference 7).Ourevaluation oftheaboveactivities ispresented inthefollowing order:1.SystemsFunctionandTaskAnalysis2.ControlRoomInventory 3.'ControlRoomSurvey4.ReviewofOperating Experience 1.SstemsFunctionandTaskAnalsisLicenseeActionPP&Lperformed asystemsfunctionandtaskanalysisinordertodetermine theinputandoutputrequirements ofoperatortasksinvolvedinselectedoperating events.Theindividual stepsundertaken bythelicenseewere:1)toidentifysystems;2)todescribesystemfunctions; 3)toidentifyoperating events;and4)toperformataskanalysis.

Abriefdes-criptionoftheseind1vidual steps,takenfromtheSusquehanna DCRDRSummaryReport,isgivenheretofacilitate adiscussion oftheadequacies andinadequacies ofthistask.Systemsimportant tosafetyand/orsignificant tounitoperation wereidentified onthebasisofthreeconsiderations:

1)systemsdesignated assafetyrelated,2)manualcontrolsystemsneededbytheoperatorforreal-timesupporttopreventplanttrips,and3)manualsystemsneededforpost-tripcontrolofdecay-heat transferfromthe'ore'(Reference 1,p.11).Descriptions ofsystemfunctions includedsystemfunction(mission) conditions forsystemuse,andabriefexplanation ofsystemoperation (Reference 1,p.12).Safety-important systemswereusedtoidentifytheeventsequences tobeanalyzed.

Variousplantprocedures werereviewedtoascertain whichprocedures requiredtheoperation ofthesesystems.Theoperating eventswerethendeveloped fromtheprocedures (Reference 1,p.12).Matricesweredeveloped tocomparesafety-important systemstooperating events.Thetaskanalysiswasperformed bypre-filling taskanalysisformsusingprocedures orportionsofprocedures associated withtheselectedoperating events(Reference 1,p.12).Thedatapre-filled onthetask'analysis formsincluded:

operatorsubtaskq, element,time,system,controlroominformation sources,controlroominformation requirements met,controlmanipulated byoperatororpotential branching point,systemresponsefrom display,performance

criteria, andoperatorerror(Reference 2,AppendixB).Thisdatawasthenusedinthevideo-taping ofsimulator exercisesessionsfortheverification oftaskperformance capabilities andvalidation ofcontrolroomfunctions.

Thesimulator exercises wereessentially amethod-ologyforperforming theverification andvalidation subtasks.

Inadditiontothevideo-taping ofthesimulator exercises, PP&Lperformed alinkanalysistotracksuccessive operatormovements andinteraction.

SAIevaluation ThePP&LOCRORusedsafety-important systemsasabasisforidentifying operating eventsequences tobeanalyzed.

Thecriteriausedwerethethreeitems:1)systemsdesignated asimportant tosafety,2)manualcontrolsystemsneededbytheoperatorforreal-time supporttopreventplanttrips,and3)manualcontrolsystemsneededforpost-trip controlofdecay-heat.

transferfromthecore.Theprogramplanstatedthatafourthfactor,inadditiontotheabovethree,wouldbeusedtoidentifysystems.ThedegreeIofinterconnection ofnon-class lEsystemsdoesnotappeartohavebeenconsidered inthesummaryreport.ThisiscontrarytoNUREG-0700 paragraph 3.4.2.2.Inconclusion, itisnotpossibletodetermine ifallsystemsimportant tosafetyhavebee'nconsidered.

~~~Themethodology foridentifying anddescribing systemfunctions wasnotpresented insufficient detailtobeabletojudgeifitisadequate.

Itappearsasthoughthefunctionidentification subtaskwasbasedonplantoperating procedures, althoughthiswasnotstated.Ifthisisthecase,PP&Lhasnotdocumented this.Inanyevent,PP&Lhasnotdemonstrated thatthesystemfunctions andcontrolroomoperatorinterfaces havebeencom-pletc1yidentifiedand.analyzed.

"Yariousplantprocedures" werereviewedbythelicenseetoidentifywhichprocedures requiredtheoperation ofsafety-related systems(Reference 1,p.12).PP&LdidnotstatethatallupdatedEOPswereused.Itistherefore possiblethatsomeprocedures wereomittedorversionspre-dating TNI-IIwereused.Infact,twooperating procedures listedinTable1ofthesummaryreportfallinthelattercategory.

TheservicewatersystemOP-11-001 wasdated8/30/78,andthereactorcoreisolation coolingOP-50-001wasdated9/1/78.Becausetheoperating eventsequences weredeveloped fromtheplantprocedures, PPSLhasnotprovidedassurance thatallupdatedEOPswereused.AlsoPP8Lha'snotdemonstrated thattheeventsequences selectedreflectthespectrumofplantoperations withemphasisonemergency conditions.

Thesummaryreportdoesnotmentionthatanoperating experience reviewwasusedtoaugmenttheeventsequenceidentification process.Thisisavariation fromtheprogramplan(Reference 2,p.32).ThetaskanalysisportionoftheFATAprocesswasnota"classical" taskanalysis, ratheritwasavalidation ofcontrolroomfunctions andverification oftaskperformance capabilities.

Thisconclusion canbereachedbyreviewing theexampleofthepre-filled tapkanalysisformssubmitted withtheprogramplan.Therewasnocolumninthetaskanalysisformforinformation andcontrolrequirements.

Itmayalsobeinferredfromtheparagraphs describing taskanalysisandverification andvalidation inthesummaryreport(Reference 1,pp.13-14).PP8Ldidnotdetermine information andcontrolrequirements basedonthefunctionanalysisforeacheventsequence, independently oftheexistingcontrolroom.(Information andcontrolrequirements arenecessary inordertodiscoverwhatkindofcontrolsandinstruments areappropriate forthesystemfunctionaswellastoestablish whatmustbeavailable inthecontrolroomtoperformthetask.)PP&Lappearstohaveusedtheplantprocedures exclusively todeter-minetheinstrumentation

.andcontrolrequirements.

HencePPLLmaynothavediscovered thatsomecontrolsand/ordisplaysaremissingfromthecontrolroomorareunsuitedtothefunctionfromahumanengineering standpoint.

Thetaskanalysissegmentistherefore unsatisfactory.

NUREG-0700, para-graph3.4.24givesguidanceonthissegmentoftheDCRDR.Thelinkanalysisperformed byPP&Lshowedthatthelayoutofcontrolsandpanelswas"excellent withregardtooperatorplacement/movement" (Ref-erence1,p.14).Becausenomethodology waspresented withtheformsinAppendixDofthesummaryreport,noattemptwasmadetoassessthisportion.Apossibleindication thatthePPSLtaskanalysisdidnotachievetheexpectedresultsofidentifying humanengineering discrepancies isthatonlytwoHEDsinthe"noactionrequired" implementation categoryandonlyoneHEDinthe."todo"categorywereidentified bythisstep..Theother107HEDs,whichweresubmitted forreview,wereidentified-bythecontrolroom survey.Thisresultcouldhavebeenpredicted becausethetaskanalysis, asperformed byPP&L,usedoperating procedures tovalidatecontrolroomfunctions insteadofcomparing information andcontrolroomrequirements withexistinginstruments/controls.

BecausePPELdidnotsubmittheremaining 358HEDsforreview,itisnotpossibletodetermine ifanyofthemwereidentified bythetaskanalysisprocess.Overall,themethodology forsystemsfunctionandtaskanalysisonlypartially satisfies therequirements ofNUREG-0737, Supplement 1.oPPSLhasnotprovidedassurance thatallsafety-impor tantsystemshavebeenidentified andincludedintheirmatrix(Figures2and3).Non-class 1Esystemswerenotaddressed, therefore itisnotpos-sibletoverifythatnohighlyinterconnected systemshavebeenoverlooked.

o'PPSLhasnotconfirmed thatonlyupdatedprocedures wereusedtoidentifysystemfunctions'nd controlroomoperatorinterfaces.

oPPSLhasnotdemonstrated thattheeventsequences selectedreflecttheentirespectrumofplantopeiations withemphasisonemergency conditions.

oThetaskanalysisisinappropriate.

PPSLhasnotprovidedevidencetodetermine ifinformation andcontrolrequirements basedonthefunctionanalysisindependently oftheexistingcontrolroomwasmade.Thisimpliesthatadditional verification andvalidation aswellasHEDdocumentation andproposedcontrolroomchangeswillhavetobeperformed.

2.TheControlRoomInventorAccording tothe-NRCrequirement statedinNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,thereviewshouldconsistof:"(iii)Acomparison ofthedisplayandcon-trolrequirements withacontrolroominventory toidentifymissingdisplaysandcontrols."

(Reference 7,p.10)

PP8L'ssummaryreportcontainsabriefescription ofthecontrolroominventory whichwasgenerated fromup-to-date paneldrawings, engraving listsforcomponent identification, andacompletesetofphotographs ofthecontrolroom.Communications andancillary equipment werealsodocumented (Reference 1,p.11).PP8Lhasneitherreportedwhattheinventory contains,'uch ascomponent,

location, parameters, andotherequipment characteristics norhavetheyreportedhowtheinventory wasusedtomeettheabovestatedrequirement.

Theinformation presented inthesummaryreportdepartsfromthatintheprogramplaninasignificant way.Theprogramplandescribes thecollection ofaninventory ofallcontrolroominstrumentation andequipment withtheassociated systems,subsystems, andfunctional groupings; instrumentation relatedtoeach;emergency equipment andcommunication devices(Reference 2,p.28).Theyalsostate:theresultswillbedocumented inaformsuitableforuseduringtheverification oftaskper-formancecapabilities (Reference 2,p.29).Theprocedure fortheverifica-tionoftaskperformance capabilities asdescribed intheprogramplanincludesstepstakentodetermine ifthenecessary instrumentation andcontrolsareavailable andifinstrumentation'and controlfeaturesallowforsuccessful taskcompletion (Reference 2,pp..34,35).Thediscrepancy betweentheprogramplanandthesummaryreportisevidenced bythephaseentitled, TheVerification ofTaskPerformance Capa-bilities.

DuringthisphasePPEL'ssummaryreportstatesthatinstrumentation andcontrolsthatarerequiredtoperformtheselectedoperating eventsareavailabletotheoperators asdetermined byacomparison.

ofinputandoutputrequirements fromtaskanalysiswiththeexistingcontrolroomequipment viatheSSESSimulator.

Inconclusion, PPSLconducted aninventory ofcontrolroominstrumenta-tionandequipment butdoesnotidentifyitsfunction.

Thesummaryreportleadsustobelievethatitwas,infact,notusedforcomparison withdisplayandcontrolrequirements.

Inaddition, sincewehaveconcluded thatthetaskanalysisconducted toidentifyinformation andcontrolrequirements wasunsatisfactory, thecomparison ofthisdatawiththeinventory (orexistingcontrol,room)wouldleadtoinappropriate results;missingcontrolsanddisplaysmaynothavebeenthoroughly identified.

3.TheControlRoomSurvePP8Lperformed acontrolroomsurveyin1981usingchecklists developed fromhumanengineering guidelines presented inNUREG/CR-1580 andNUREG-0700 (Reference 1,p.10).Anydifferences ordiscrepancies betweenNUREG/CR-1580andNUREG-0700 guidelines werenotedandasupplemental checklist wasdeveloped (Reference 1,p.10).Thelicenseenotesthat"particular atten-tionwaspaidtothoseNUREG-0700 guideli.nes thatspecified

-stricter tolerances thanthoseinNUREG-1580 (Reference 1,p.10).PPEL'sreportliststhecontrolroompanelswhichwereincludedinthechecklist evalua-tion.Theyhavenot,however,statedthatthislistofpanelsencompasses theentireprimaryoperating controlpanels.Adrawingofthecontrolroomlayoutincluding allpanelssurveyedwouldbenecessary forourreview.Itisimportant tonotethattheremoteshutdownpanelisincludedinthelistofcontrolpanelstobesurveyed.

Althoughnotexplicitly identified asarequirement inSupplement 1toNUREG-0737

{Reference 7)theNRCstaffhasrecommended thatahumanengineering evaluation oftheRemoteShutdownCapa-bilitybeincludedwithinthescopeoftheDCRDR.Itisclearfromthedescription ofguidelines usedtodevelopcheck-liststhatathoroughsetofitemsandindicators wasincludedinthechecklists.

However,PPKLhasnotdescribed thechecklist methodology northeprocedures usedtoconductthecontrolroomsurvey.Therefore wecannotfullyevaluatethisreviewactivityuntil,PP&Lprovidesthisadditional information.

Thesummaryreportcouldbeenhancedwithadditional informa-tiondescribing theidentityandnumberofpersonnel andlevelsofeffortofthosewhoperformed thecontrolroomsurvey.4.Reviewof0eratinExerienceTheoperating experience reviewconsisted ofaquestionnaire giventooperators andareviewofdocumented operational errorssuchasthoseinaLicenseeEventReport(LER).Althoughthesummaryreportdoesnotexpli-citlymentiontheprocedures toreviewLERdocuments, PPSLstatesintheprogramplanthatLERsandFSARswouldbeconsidered aspossiblereviewdocuments

{Reference 2,p.27).SincePPSL'scategorization processfor10 HEDsplacesdocumented errorsinCategory1,itwouldbehighlyinappro-priateifLERsandotherhistorical recordswerenotreviewed.

Conse-quently,additional clarification oftheuseofLERstoidentifyoperational errorsandHEDsisnecessary toassessthisreviewactivity.

Althoughthisactivityisnotexplicitly requiredbyNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,itispertinent toPP&L'sHEDassessment phasesincedocu-mentedoperational errorsconstitute CategoryIHEDs(seealsosectiononA<<~tdWhiletheoperatorquestionnaire methodology appearstohavebeensatisfactory, weconcludethattheHEDcategorization processwouldbeunsatisfactory withoutareviewofLERs.PP&Ldidnotprovideadditional information describing thisreviewstepasitimpactstheHEDcategorization process.Assessment andImplementation PhaseiPP&L'sassessment andimplementation phaseisaddressed inSection4,page19ofthesum'maryreport.AppendixCcontainstwogroupings ofhumanengineering" di'screpancies(HEDs):1)thoseHEDsclassified as"NoActionRequired:

SystemsRelatedtoSafety,"and2)thoseHEDs"tobecorrected."

1.HEDAssessment Methodolo TheHEDassessment methodology aspresented intheSummaryReportisidentical tothatintheprogramplanwhichwasfoundtoconformtoNRCguidanceonthisprocess.However,theassessment methodology inthesum-maryreportexcludestheirproposedschedules fortheimplementation ofcorrections which,asstatedinNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,shouldbesubmit-tedinthesummaryreport(Reference 7,p.11).Therefore,thisaspectoftheassessment methodology cannotbeevaluated andisunsatisfactory untilPP&Lcanprovideadditional information.

2.Selection ofDesinImrovements PP&L'ssummaryreportprovidesverylittleinformation describing theprocesstoselectdesignimprovements forHEDsthatwereanalyzedfor corrections.

Onpage22thereportstatesthatexistingplantprogramswillbeusedtoeffectchanges;however,furtherinformation describing theprocesstoexaminevariousalternative solutions, theirintegrated effectsonoperatorperformance andthearrivalatafinaldesignsolutionwerenotprovided.

Therefore, thisstageofPP&L'sAssessment andImplementation phaseisfoundincomplete untilasummarydescription isprovided.

3.Verification ThatSelectedDesinImrovements WillProvidetheNecessarCorrection Thesummaryreportismissinginformation describing howdesignimprovements willbeverifiedtoassurethattheydoinfactprovidethenecessary corrections.

Therefore, theverification processcannotbeevaluated andisjudgedunsatisfactory untiltherequiredinformation canbeprovidedbyPP&L.Also,itisnotclearhowtheproposedimplementations associated withHEDstobecorrected weredetermined withoutthiseffort.4.Verification ThatImrovements canbeIntroduced intheControlRoomWithoutCreatinAnUnaccetableHumanEnineerinDiscre-~anc$esThesummaryreportdoesnotprovideaprocedure toassurethatproposedimprovements canbeintroduced i'ntothecontrolroomwithoutintroducing newHEDs.Therefore thisverification stepcannotberevieweduntiladescrip-tionisprovided.

5.Coordination ofControlRoomImrovements WithChanesResultinfromOtherImrovementProramsThesummaryreportcontainsnodescription astohowandwhenthecoordination oftheDCRDRwithotherprograms(e.g.,SPDS,operatortraining, Reg.Guide1.97,andupgradedemergency operating procedures) willbeaccomplished.

Therefore, thisprocesscannotbeevaluated andisjudgedunsatisfactory untiltherequiredinformation canbeprovidedbyPP&L.

6.ProosedSchedules forImlementinDesinChanesPP&Lstatesinthesummaryreportthat"HEOsinthiscategory(tobecorrected) willbecorrected byMay14,1985."Mhilethisisanadequatefinalcompletion date,furtherdescription astothescheduled integration ofchangeswithothercontrolroomchanges(SPDS,Reg.Guide1.97)thatmayimpacttheOCRDRisrequiredinordertoconfirmthatanadequatescheduleisinplace.Also,animplementation scheduleisnecessary todifferentiate betweennear-term andlong-term corrective actionsandtheirrespective degreeofsignificance orpotential todegradeoperatorperformance.

Finally,asstatedinNUREG-0737 (Reference 7,p.11),"Imp<ovementsthatcanbeaccomplished withanenhancement program(paint-tape-label) shouldbedonepromptly."

Inconclusion, thesummaryreportdoesnotdescribethisactivity, therefore thisprocesscannotbeevaluated untilPP&Lprovidesadditional information.

AnalysisofProposedDesignChangesandJustification

.forHEOswithSafetyISignificance thatareto'hLeftUncorrected orPartially Corrected 1.AnalsisofProosedDesinChanesAppendixCofPP&L'ssummaryreportcontainstwosubgroupings ofHEDs:thefirstgroupsallHEDsclassified as"NoActionRequired:

SystemsRelatedtoSafety,"thesecondgroupsthe"To-Do"categoryofHEDs.Thefollowing isadiscussion oftheoveralladequacyofproposedcorrections.

Pleasenotethatitisdifficult toevaluatetheproposedcorrections becauseofourunfamiliarity withtheactualcontrolpanelsandthevariousdesignsolutions thatPP&Lhasexplored.

Theprocessforselecting designsolutions andthetechnique toverifythatsolutions correcttheHEDwithoutcreatingnewoneswerenotdescribed inthesummaryreport.(Appendix AcontainsalistingoftheHEDNumberandthegenericcommentonPP&L'sproposedimprovement forthoseHEDstobecorrected.)

1)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitismissing,e.g.,HEDNo.466.2)Proposedimplementation description isunsatisfactory becauseitistoobrieforthenecessary information isnotprovidedtodetermine whatPP8Lintendstodotocorrectthediscrepancy, e.g.,HEDNo.176-"PMR83-317willcorrect"3)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitdoesnotcorrespond withtherecommendation orignorespartoftherecom-mendedsolutionwithoutexplanation, e.g.,HEDNo,97:Control/displayrelationship isunclear.Recommendation:

enhancewithdemarcation orlabeling.

Implementation:

discusses labelingonly.4)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitdoesnotaddressHED,e.g.,HEONo160:Annunciator AlarmSignalIntensity isnotcontrolled byadministrative procedure.

Implementation:

Conductasoundsurveytodetermine theappropriate level.(Minimalsignalintensity ispertinent information forresolution ofthisHEO;however,asthediscrepancy indicates, thesignal-intensity shouldbeadministratively controlled toavoidalteration.)

5)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitcallsforfurtherevaluation oranalysiswhichsuggestseitheraplantodevelopasolutionorsuggestsaplantodevelopajustification fornocorrection, e.g.,HEDNo.224.6)Proposedimplementation appearstooverlooktheinteraction ofHEDsorthecreationofanewHEDwhileselecting adesignsolution, e.g.,HEDNo.300:Controlswerefoundtobelocatedbelowtheminimumheight.Implementation:

Collarsprovidedondiscrepant controls'ill preventinadvertent activation.

Thisimplementation maycorrecttheaccidental activation problem;however,apotential operability problemmayresultforcontrolswithcollarsatthisheight.Thisadditional HEDhasnotbeenaddressed intheproposedimplementation.

7)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitonlypartially correctstheHED,eg.,HEDNo.300:Controls/Displays are.locatedbelowtherecommended height.Implementation:

Thesolu-tionaddresses thelocationofcontrolsbutomitsany.discussion ofhowtoresolvethelocationofdisplays.

8)Proposedmodification isunsatisfactory becauseitwillnotcorrectthe,HED,e.g.,HEONo.373:Components arelaidoutinanimproperoperational sequence.

Implementation:

Thesolutionistoimplement demarcation toclarifysequence.

Itisnotclearhowdemarcation willplacethesecomponents inthepropersequenceorhowdemarcation willenhancetheiroperability toreduceerror.Theaboveeightcommentsrepresent genericissueswehaveidentified fromtheevaluation ofPP&L'sproposedimplementations forHEOstobecorrected.

Ingeneral,thesecommentsindicatethatfurtherinformation addressing this,phaseoftheOCRDR-"Assessment andImplementation"

-isrequiredforathoroughevaluation todetermine theadequacyofPP&L'ssummaryreport.PP&Lshouldconductfurtherdesignsolutionactivities, iftheyhavenotalreadydoneso,andprovidethedocumentation ofthoseactivities andanalyses.

AsstatedinNUREG-0737, Supplement 1,licensees aretosubmitasummaryreportofthecompleted reviewoutlining proposedcontrolroomchanges,including theirproposedschedules forimplementation (Reference 7,p.11).Inconclusion, PP&Lhasnotcompletely fulfilled therequirements duetoeitherinadequate, missing,orincomplete proposals forimplementation ofchangesforHEDstobecorrected.

Inaddition, PP&L'sproposedschedules fortheimplementation ofdesignchangeshavenotbeensubmitted.

Untiladditional information issubmitted byPP&L,thisaspectoftheHEDassess-mentandimplementation phaseisjudgedunsatisfactory.

2.'nalsisofJustifications forHEDswithSafetSinificance thataretobeLeftUncorrected TheOCRORreviewprocessgenerated 468HEDs.Ofthese,145weredeleted,166requirednoaction,112werecompleted and45remained"todo"(Reference 1,p'.21).Ofthe166requiring noaction,only65weresubmit-tedinAppendixAofthesummaryreport,andtherefore itisincomplete.

Itisnotclearwhytheother101HEOsinthiscategorywerenotsubmitted asrequiredbyNUREG-0737.

Thisreviewaddresses theadequacyofPP&L'sjustifi'cation nottocorrectthe65HEDswhichweresubmitted.

Thejustification nottocorrect15 manyHEDswasadequately provided; however,therewereinstances forwhichadequatejustification wasnotprovided.

Several"generic" subgroups wereidentified forthelattergroup.Theyarediscussed below.Reasonsforinadequate justification nottocorrectaHEO:1.Brevityofjustification makesevaluation impossible, e.g.,No.70:Norecommendation, implementation, orjustification whatsoever wasprovided.

2.Degreeofdeviation fromastandardisnotanadequatereasonfordecidingnottoimplement asolutionforaKED,e.g.,No.170.3.PP&Ldoesnotappeartohaveaconsistent colorcodingconvention asindicated bythenumerousHEDs,e.g.,Nos.242,199,111,112.4.SomeHEDswereevaluated byaNUREG-0700 guideline whichwasnotapplicable orinappropriate, e.g.,No.452.Guideline 6.6.3.7adoesnotaddresssequential operation ofcomponents.

5.Cumulative effectsofgroupsofseveralHEDs,eachwithminordeviations fromguidelines, werenotaddressed, e.g.,Nos.268,271,272and274allhavevariousvisibility problemswithmetersandrecorders locatedonsamepanel.6.TodismissaKEDbasedononejustification ifthatHEDviolatesmorethanoneNUREG-0700 guideline isnotsatisfactory, e.g.,No.122violates0700,paragraph 6.4.4.laaswellas6.9.1.2C3.

7.Somejustifications contradict theHEDdescription aswellasignorethespecificNUREG-0700 guidelines, e.g.No.112-colorcodeshavemultiplemeanings.

8.Inadequate justification.

Aviolation ofthe0700guidelines cannotbedismissed bycitingutilityconvention orabsence"ofoperatorerrorsduringwalk-throughs, e.g.,No.192.

Adeviation inmethodology fromthePP&LprogramplanoccurswhenHEDswerenotcategorized inoneoffourgroupings (Reference 2,p.39,Reference 1,p.19).Thefollowing HEDswerenotcategorized:

Nos.75,104,105,121,123,208,218,392,398,420,463.TheabovecommentsprovidePP&Lwithgenericreasonswhysomeofthejustifications fornotcorrecting someHEDsareinadequate.

AppendixBofthisreportcategorizes HEDnumbersunderthesegenericgroupings.

Insummary,moreappropriate arguments wouldbebasedonademonstra-tionof:1)aHEDhavingminimalrisktoplantsafety;2)lowconsequence ofHEDimpacting emergency operations.

Reporting PhaseAspreviously notedintheplanningphase,PP&Lsubmitted aprogramplanonJune3,1982(Reference2).NRCcommentswereforwarded tothelicenseeonJuly15,1983(Reference 3).Theprocesses described intheprogramplanwerefoundtobecompleteandfavorable according toNRCcom-ments.ThePP&LsummaryreportprovidedthebasisforthisSAIreviewandevaluation.:

Whereappropriate, methodsdescribed inthesummaryreportwerecomparedwiththoseproposedintheprogramplantodetermine whethervaria-tionsfromtheprogramplanwereintroduced.

Ascanbeseeninourconcluding remarks,thesummaryreportomitsmuchoftheinformation andrequiredprocesses asreportedintheprogramplan.Therefore thosespeci-ficprocesses havebeenleftasopenitemsuntilfurthersummaryinformation

,isprovidedbyPP&L.Conclusion Weconcludethat,overall,PP&Lhasnotsubmitted anappropriatesummaryreportfortheirDetailedControlRoomDesignReviewfortheSusquehanna SteamElectricStation.Thisconclusion wasreachedbecauseofvariousissuesleftopeninthereport,whichshouldaddressallrequire-mentsstatedinSupplement 1toNUREG-0737.

Furthermore, theSummaryReportdepartsfromtheprogramplan(whichwasfoundappropriate byanNRCreview(Reference 3))inseveralrespectswithoutexplanation.

Althoughwehaveconcluded thattherequirement toconductaDCRDRhas'notbeenfullymet,17 thereareseveralpositivepointswebelievethesummaryreporthasmade.Theyareasfollows:oTheeventscenarios selectedforthefunctionandtaskanalysisincludedPlantStartupandPlantShutdown.

oThecontrolroomsurveyincludedasurveyoftheremoteshutdownpanels.oPP8Lprovidedhumanfactorseducation toplantpersonnel involvedintheDCRDR.oThecontrolroomsurveychecklist criteriawerebasedonNUREG-0700 guidance.

Thefollowing areissuesleftopenwhichshouldberesolvedinameetingwiththelicenseeandbythesubmittal ofsupplemental information.

oLackofadescription ofanLERreviewtoidentifydocumented opera-tionalerrorsandlackofevidence.to showthatthesefindingswereusedtoidentifyCategory1'EDs.oTheFunctionandTaskAnalysiswasfoundinadequate basedonthefollowing issues:oTheassurance thatalleventsequences reflecting thespectrumofplantoperations withemphasisonemergency conditions hasbeenselectedandanalyzed.

oThemethodology foridentifying operatorinformation andcontrolrequirements.

oThecomparison oftheoperatorinformation andcontrolrequirements withacontrolroominventory.

oAssurance thatallsafety-important systemsandassociated taskinterfaces wereanalyzed.

oTheomissionofnon-class 1Esystemswithahighdegreeofinterconnection fromtheDCRDRprocess.oTheidentification anddescription ofsystemsfunction.

oTheuseofallup-datedEOPsforthefunctionandtaskanalysis.

oThecontentandfunctionofthecontrolroominventory.

oAssurance thatthecontrolroomsurveyincludedallprimarycontrolroompanels.oTheschedulefortheimplementation ofHEDsolutions.

oTheprocesstoselectdesignimprovements.

IoTheprocesstoverifythatimprovements providethenecessary correctionwithoutintroducing newHEDs.oTheprocessandscheduletocoordinate thechangesfromtheDCRDRwithotherimprovement programchanges.oJustification forproposedimprovements foundinappropriate inAppendixAofthisreport.oJustification forHEDproblemsinAppendixBofthisreport.19 REFERENCES'.

Susquehanna SteamElectricStationDetailedControlRoomDesignReview-SummaryReport,Pennsylvania PowerandLightCompany,undated.2.Susquehanna SteamElectricStationDetailedControlRoomDesignReviewProgramPlan,June3,1982.3."NRCCommentsontheSusquehanna Steam"Electric StationDetailedControlRoomDesignReview,"Attachment toMemorandum fromD.L.Ziemann,NRC,toT.M.Novak,NRC,datedJuly15,1983.4.NUREG-0600, Vol.1,"NRCActionPlanDeveloped asaResultoftheTMI-2Accident,"

May1980;Revision1,August1980.5.NUREG-0700, "Guidelines forControlRoomDesignReviews,"

September 1981.6.NUREG-0737, "Clarification ofTMIActionPlanRequirements,"

November1980.7.NUREG-0737, "Clarification ofTMIActionPlanRequirements,"

Supplement 1,December1982.8.NUREG-0801, "Evaluation CriteriaforDetailedControlRoomDesignReviews,"

October1981,draftreport.20 APPENDIXA'IGenericcommentsonproposedimprovements forthoseHEDstobecorrected.

1)Proposedimpl'ementation isunsatisfactory becauseitismissing.HEDNos.462,466.2)Proposedimplementation description isunsatisfactory becauseitistoobrieforthenecessary information isnotprovidedtodetermine whatPP8LintendstodotocorrecttheHED.HEDNos.4,97,176,230,375,376,437.3)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitdoesnotcorrespond withtherecommendation orignorespartoftherecommended solutionwithoutexplanation.

HEDNos.300,367.4)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitdoesnotcorrectHED.HEDNo.108,373,465.5)'roposed implementation isunsatisfactory becauseitdoesnotaddressHED.HEDNo.160.6)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitcallsfor'furtherevaluation oranalysiswhichsuggestseitheraplantodevelopasolutionorsuggestsaplantodevelopajustification fornocorrection.

HEDNos.4,97,184,211,224,230,232,261,283,324,329,344,349,350,367,369,431,449,465,467.7)Proposedimplementation appearstooverlooktheinteraction ofHEDsorthepossiblecreationofanewHEDwhileselecting adesignsolution.

HEDNo.300.8)Proposedimplementation isunsatisfactory becauseitonlypartially correctsthe-.HED.

'HEDNos.2,300.9)Guideline addresses onlypartoftheHEDandproposedimplementa-tioncorrectsonlythatpartoftheHED.HEDNo.467.

(Theproposedimplementation HEDNos.notfounlistedabovewerebelievedtohavebeenappropriate withintheconstraints ofthebrevityoftheimplementation description andourunfamiliarity withtheactualcontrolpanels.)IlL13 APPENDIX8Reasonsforinadequate justification nottocorrectHEDsl.Brevityofjustification makesevaluation impossible.

'requently nojustification whatsoever wasprovided.

Nos.70,196,204,322,326,463.2.Degreeofdeviation fromastandardisnot.anadequatereasonfordecidingnottofindandimplement asolutiontoaHED.Nos.170,239,304,383.3.PP&Ldoesnotappeartohaveaconsistent colorcodingconvention asindicated bythenumerousHEDs.Occasionally therearetwodifferent meaningsattachedtoonecolor-greenforexample.Nos.111,112,199,242.4.SomeHEDswereevaluated byanNUREG-0700 guideline whichwasnotapplicable orinappropriate.

Nos.400,452.5.Cumulative effectsofgroupsofHEDs,eachwithaminordeviation fromtheguidelines, wereinadequately addressed.

Lackofconsistent mimics,colorcoding,legibility ofinstruments andcontrolsareexamplesof'hiscategory.

Nos.75,111,112,121,122,199,239,242,268,271,272,274,400.6.TodismissaHEDbasedononejustification ifthatHEDviolatedmorethanoneguideline isnotsatisfactory.

No.122violates0700paragraph 6.4.4.1aaswellas6.9.1.2.C3.

7.Somejustifications contradict theHEDdescription aswellasignorespecificNUREG-0700 guidelines.

Nos.112,286,391,392,407.8.Inadequate justification.

Aviolation ofthe0700guidelines cannotbedismissed bycitingutilityconvention orabsenceofoperatorerrorsduringwalk-throughs.

Nos.192,109,122,218,398,406,413.

Inadditiontotheabovegroupings, adeviation inmethodology from.thePPELprogramplanoccurswhenHEDswerenotplacedinassessment categories (Reference 2,p.39,Reference 1,p.19).Thefollowing HEDSwerenotcategorized:

Nos.75,104,105,121,123,208,218,392,398,420,463.Thejustification fornotcorrecting allotherHEDsinthe"not-to-do" categoryisjudgedasappropriate withintheconstraints ofthebrevityofthedescription andourunfamiliarity withtheactualcontrolpanels.

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