05000313/FIN-2017001-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | On January 16, 2017, Unit 1 operators noticed reduced pressure and flow from service water pump C while placing it in service. The licensee declared the pump inoperable, found and removed approximately 10 feet of 12-inch polymer tube that was obstructing the suction path of the pump, and completed a successful test and inspection of the pump before returning it to service. The licensee determined that the hose was inadvertently introduced while the service water bay was open for maintenance during the fall 2016 Unit 1 refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of pump functionality and concluded that the pump could produce enough flow and pressure to fulfill its safety function, and that the pump could withstand fully ingesting the hose without significant damage to the pump or system. Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be accomplished in accordance with documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances. Licensee Procedure EN-MA-118, Foreign Material Exclusion, Revision 10, an Appendix B quality-related procedure, provides instructions for controlling foreign material, an activity affecting quality. Procedure EN-MA-118, Step 5.4, requires, in part, that only necessary material be allowed in the foreign material exclusion zone. Contrary to the above, between September 14, and November 25, 2016, the licensee failed to only allow necessary material in the foreign material exclusion zone. Specifically, when the Unit 1 service water pump C bay was open for maintenance, a hose was unnecessarily introduced and then left in the bay after the maintenance. The licensee documented the issue in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2017-00164. To correct the issue, the licensee removed the hose, inspected and tested the pump, and inspected all other potentially affected service water bays to verify no foreign material was present. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the degraded pump would still be able to perform its safety function, despite the flow capability reduction. |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
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| Report | IR 05000313/2017001 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2017 (2017Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | B Correll B Tindell E Uribe J Choate M Kirk M Tobin N O'Keefe |
| Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2017001 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2017Q1
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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