05000317/FIN-2014004-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | TS 3.4.10, Pressurizer Safety Valves, requires two pressurizer safety valves to be operable during Modes 1 and 2, and in Mode 3 when all RCS cold leg temperatures are greater than 365F for Unit 1 or 301F for Unit 2. With one pressurizer safety valve inoperable, TS 3.4.10, Condition A, requires the inoperable valve to be restored within 15 minutes. If this is not able to be completed or if two pressurizer safety valves are inoperable, then TS 3.4.10, Condition B, is entered which requires the unit to be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> AND the unit to be cooled down to below 365F for Unit 1 or 301F for Unit 2 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Contrary to the above, on March 12, 2013, Unit 2 pressurizer safety valve BNO4375, which had been installed in position 2RV200 during the previous operating cycle, was measured higher than its TS allowable value during as-found lift point testing. On February 28, 2014, Unit 1 pressurizer safety valves BN04373 and BM07952, which had been installed in positions 1RV200 and 1RV201 respectively during the previous operating cycle, were measured lower than their TS allowable value during as-found lift point testing. In both cases, the valves had been replaced with tested, operable valves prior to discovery of the as-found condition. Exelon concluded that the valve had been inoperable for a period of time greater than the allowed TS outage times specified in TS 3.4.10. Exelon entered both issues into their CAP as CR-2013-002415, CR- 2014-002236, and CR-2014-002237. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings at Power, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, the inspectors determined that each example was a finding of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual loss of the pressurizer safety valve systems credited safety function to relieve pressure to prevent RCS pressure from exceeding 110 percent of RCS pipings design pressure. |
Site: | Calvert Cliffs |
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Report | IR 05000317/2014004 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook B Fuller D Schroeder E Burket E Torres G Callaway J Nicholson P Presby R Clagg S Stewart |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Calvert Cliffs - IR 05000317/2014004 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Calvert Cliffs) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Calvert Cliffs)
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