05000382/FIN-2009005-04

Finding

Title

Licensee-Identified Violation

Description

Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Appendix A lists procedures for access control to radiation areas. Procedure EN-RP-100, Radworker Expectations, Revision 3, Section 5.3[9] requires the radiation work permit to be read, understood, and obeyed as a condition of radiologically controlled area access. Procedure EN-RP-100, Radworker Expectations, Revision 3, Section 5.4[3](h) requires the worker know where to properly perform his/her task. Section 5.3[17] requires the worker be briefed and sign on the appropriate radiation work permit. Section 5.3[11] requires the worker know the radiological conditions in the work area. The licensee identified an example of a worker entering a high radiation area using an inappropriate radiation work permit and without knowing the dose rates in the area. On October 24, 2009, a security officer entered shutdown heat exchanger Room B and received an electronic dosimeter dose rate alarm. The room was posted as a high radiation area and dose rates within the area were as high as 140 millirem per hour. The officer entered the radiological controlled area using Radiation Work Permit 2009005, Tours and Inspection in All Radiological Controlled Areas, Except High Radiation Areas, Locked High Radiation Areas, Very High Radiation Areas, and the Reactor Containment Building. Because the radiation work permit did not allow entry into high radiation areas, radiation protection personnel did not anticipate the officer would enter the room and did not brief the officer on the dose rates in the area. In response, the licensee conducted a human performance error review and counseled the officer. This finding was of very low safety significance because it did not involve an actual or substantial potential of an overexposure. This finding was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2009-05648.

04
Site:	Waterford
Report	IR 05000382/2009005 Section 4OA7
Date counted	Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4)
Type:	NCV: Green
cornerstone	Mitigating Systems
Identified by:	Licensee-identified
Inspection Procedure:
Inspectors (proximate)	L Ricketson P Elkmann J Clark R Azua D Overland M Bloodgood S Anderson T Buchanan N Greene
INPO aspect
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v • d • e

Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2009005

1(0)2(2)3(3)4(1)5(4)6(3)7(0)8(1)9(7)10(1)201(0)301(0)401(0)402(0)403(0)404(1)405(0)501(0)

IR 05000382/2009005: 1 2 3 4

Finding List (Waterford) @ 2009Q4

CCA Matrix: 2009Q4

	Q	CCA	Title
05000382/FIN-2009002-01	2009Q1	H.13	Failure to Follow Commitment Tracking Procedures
05000382/FIN-2009002-02	2009Q1	P.3	Failure to Obtain Voltage Readings Following a Single Cell Battery Charge
05000382/FIN-2009003-01	2009Q2		Licensee Practices Result in Protective Action Recommendations for Areas Where Protective Action Guides are Not Exceeded
05000382/FIN-2009003-03	2009Q2	H.11 H.12	Failure to Determine the Cause of a 125 Vdc Battery Failure
05000382/FIN-2009006-01	2009Q2	H.7	Failure to identify conditions adverse to fire protection
05000382/FIN-2009006-02	2009Q2		Failure to provide area wide sprinkler coverage as required in an Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c fire area
05000382/FIN-2009006-03	2009Q2		Failure to ensure post-fire safe shutdown valves could be operated
05000382/FIN-2009404-01	2009Q2	P.1	Security
05000382/FIN-2009003-02	2009Q2	P.2	Failure to Correct Several Conditions Adverse to Quality
05000382/FIN-2009009-07	2009Q3		Failure to Verify or Check the Adequacy of Design Changes for the Emergency Diesel Generator Protective Relay IGCV-51V
05000382/FIN-2009009-04	2009Q3	P.6	Failure to Properly Analyze the Affect of Acceptable Reverse Flow Through the Emergency Feedwater Check Valves
05000382/FIN-2009009-03	2009Q3		Failure to Have an Operating Procedure for Executing an Evolution Credited in the UFSAR and in a Request for a License Amendment
05000382/FIN-2009009-02	2009Q3	P.6	Failure to Establish Proper Design Control Measures to Assure Adequate Design and to Properly Translate the Design Into Test Procedures
05000382/FIN-2009009-01	2009Q3	P.5 P.2(a)	Failure to Account for Reduction of Flow from the Emergency Feedwater System to the Steam Generators
05000382/FIN-2009009-06	2009Q3		Failure to Incorporate START-UP Transformer Protective Relay Design Bases Into Instructions, Procedures or Drawings
05000382/FIN-2009009-05	2009Q3		Installation of Emergency Feedwater Turbine Driven Pump Discharge Check Valve 207 AB
05000382/FIN-2009005-02	2009Q4	H.5	Reactor Coolant Pump Vapor Seal Leakage
05000382/FIN-2009004-01	2009Q4	H.14	Failure to Follow Technical Specification Requirements for Reactor Protective Instrumentation
05000382/FIN-2009005-03	2009Q4	P.5 P.2(b)	Failure to Update Drawings after Design Change
05000382/FIN-2009005-01	2009Q4	H.11 H.12	Failure to follow radiation protection procedural requirements
05000382/FIN-2009010-01	2009Q4		Failures to Evaluate Adverse Conditions for Reportability to the NRC

Self-Identified List (Waterford)

	Q	Title
05000382/FIN-2009008-01	2009Q3	Inoperable 125 Vdc battery because electricians failed to follow work instructions
05000382/FIN-2009005-04	2009Q4	Licensee-Identified Violation

[Waterford Findings full list]

05000382/FIN-2009005-04

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