05000382/FIN-2009003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Determine the Cause of a 125 Vdc Battery Failure |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (Corrective Action), for the failure to promptly correct conditions adverse to quality. The licensee had documented several conditions adverse to quality and then transferred the concerns to other condition reports. Then, the licensee closed those condition reports without addressing the concerns. Identified conditions included (1) the Train B 125 Vac discharge test data indicated a loose battery connection but the battery was permitted to pass the test anyway; (2) the root cause determination for the failed battery was focused on the statements of one person and failed to address other information; (3) the root cause determination failed to address conflicting information; and (4) the root cause determination failed to properly address other potential causes for the inoperable battery, such as tampering. Plant personnel had failed to accurately translate the issues when transferring information from one condition report to another. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-WF3-2009-1177. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern. For example, the failure to include acceptance criteria in the battery discharge test (intended to identify and correct loose battery connections) could result in another inoperable 125 Vdc battery for an extended period. The inspectors evaluated the finding using Inspection Manual Chapter 609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet and determined that the finding was of very low risk significance because it did not result in another battery becoming inoperable or nonfunctional. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance (Work Practices Component) because plant personnel failed to effectively use human error prevention techniques, such as self and peer checking, when transferring concerns between condition reports H.4(a) |
| Site: | Waterford  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000382/2009003 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2009 (2009Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Guerra P Elkmann J Clark D Overland |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
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Finding - Waterford - IR 05000382/2009003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Waterford) @ 2009Q2
Self-Identified List (Waterford)
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