05000313/FIN-2008003-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Maintain Containment Closure Capability |
Description | The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Unit-2 Technical Specification 6.4.1.a, Procedures, associated with the licensees failure to maintain containment closure capability as required by Station Procedure OP-1015.008, Unit 2 SDC Control, Revision 23. The licensee was installing a Hawke seal at Containment Penetration 2P-53 to support outage work. However, seal installation would take approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and none of the workers had been designated as the responsible individual nor had the required materials been staged to ensure that they could accomplish containment closure in no more than 30 minutes. At the time, the estimated time to reactor coolant system boiling (assuming a loss of mitigating equipment) was 18 minutes. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR ANO-2-2008-0461. The finding was greater than minor because it affected the configuration control attribute of the barrier integrity cornerstone, and it directly affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that a Phase 2 evaluation was required. The inspectors performed a Phase 2 analysis using Appendix H, Table 6.4, Phase 2 Risk Significance-Type B Findings at Shutdown, and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because there was no mitigating equipment out of service and the finding existed for less than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with the resources component H.2(c), because the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate and up-to-date procedures and work packages for the installation of the Hawke seal which ensured that the ability to maintain containment closure was directe |
Site: | Arkansas Nuclear |
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Report | IR 05000313/2008003 Section 1R20 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson P Elkmann G George S Graves A Sanchez W Walker W Sifre J Josey S Alferink C Young G Apger S Makor B Rice |
CCA | H.7, Documentation |
INPO aspect | WP.3 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2008003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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