05000313/FIN-2008003-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Station Procedures While Troubleshooting |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding because the Fix-it-Now team failed to follow site procedures when working on high energy line break barrier Door 62, which protected one train of the Unit 1 emergency switchgear. While performing troubleshooting activities on the door to determine the cause of the previous failure associated with the operating mechanism, the team maintained the door open for approximately 15 minutes and made an on the spot decision to turn this troubleshooting activity into minor maintenance, which was not permitted in this instance. In addition, the team failed to: (1) obtain an approved work order; and 2) inform the control room of the activity, which would have required entry into an 8.0 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> Technical Specification shutdown action statement. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report ANO-1-2008-0603. The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could result in a more significant concern. Specifically, by circumventing site procedural requirements, the Fix-it-Now team could render more risk significant equipment inoperable without the knowledge and approval of site management or control room personnel. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, this finding was determined to have very low safety significance because: (1) the finding was a qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of functionality of Door 62; (2) it did not lead to an actual loss of safety function of the system or train; (3) it did not result in the loss of one or more trains of non-Technical Specification equipment; (4) it did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of Human Performance associated with Work Control H.3(b), in that the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities associated with Door 62 by incorporating actions to address the impact of changes to the work scope on the plant, and the need to keep personnel apprised of work status and the operational impact of work activitie |
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000313/2008003 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2008 (2008Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | L Ricketson P Elkmann G George S Graves A Sanchez W Walker W Sifre J Josey S Alferink C Young G Apger S Makor B Rice |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Arkansas Nuclear - IR 05000313/2008003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Arkansas Nuclear) @ 2008Q2
Self-Identified List (Arkansas Nuclear)
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