The inspectors documented a self-revealing noncited violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, for the failure to follow a site
scaffolding procedure, in that operators and the
scaffolding certifying official failed to identify that
scaffolding impeded the operation of the outboard chill water return containment isolation valve. The valve could not close to perform its safety function. This issue was entered into the licensee\\\\\\\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-ANO-2-2008-0473. The finding was more than minor because it was similar to nonminor Example 4.a in NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues. Specifically, the
scaffolding had an adverse impact on a safety-related containment isolation valve. In addition, this finding was associated with the configuration control attribute of the
Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using the Manual Chapter 0609,
Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheet, the finding had very low safety significance because the condition did not represent a degradation of the barrier functions of the control room or auxiliary building; did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment; and did not involve an actual reduction in the function of
hydrogen ignitors in the reactor containment. The finding had a crosscutting aspect in the human performance area, work practices component
H.4(c), because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety was supporte
