ML16285A396

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FEMA, Submittal of St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Final After Action Report for Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Conducted on 02/24/2016
ML16285A396
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/26/2016
From: Szczech G B
US Dept of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency
To: Wert L
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-II
References
Download: ML16285A396 (40)
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Text

SEP 2 6 2016 Leonard Wert, Regional Administrator -RII US Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Marquis Tower 245 Peachtree Center Avenue, Suite 1200 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Wert:

Department of Homeland Security Region IV 3003 Chamblee-Tucker Road Atlanta, Georgia 30341 FEMA Enclosed is a copy of the final exercise report for the February 24, 2016, St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant full participation plume phase exercise. This report addresses the evaluation of the plans and preparedness for the State of Florida; St. Lucie and Martin Counties, risk counties; and Palm Beach, Indian River and Brevard Counties, host counties. This successful exercise demonstrated the commitment to protecting the health and safety of the public by the State of Florida and the affected counties. Federal evaluators did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings. Based on the results of this exercise, and FEMA's review of Florida's 2015 Annual Letter of Certification, the off site radiological emergency response plans and preparedness for the State of Florida and the affected local jurisdictions site-specific to the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant can be implemented. They are adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate measures can be taken off site to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the site. The Title 44 CFR, Part 350, approval of the off site radiological emergency response plans and preparedness site-specific to the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, granted on February 14, 1984, for the State of Florida will remain in effect. Should you have any questions, please contact Conrad Burnside at 770/220-5486. Regional Administrator

  • Enclosure cc: Ms. Vanessa_E. Quinn, Branch Chief Federal -ergency Management Agency Headquarters C Headquarters Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 I I I : Final After Action Report I St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise I Exercise Date: February 24, 2016 I September 26, 2016 I I FEMA I ,,., ... "

I I : Final After Action Report I St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Exercise Date: February 24, 2016 I September 26, 2016 I I FEMA I <-iND stc; Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant This page is intentionally blank .1 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I* I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Table of Contents Page Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. 3 Executive Summary ......................................................................................................................... 5 Section 1: Exercise Overview ......................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Exercise Details ............................................................................................................. 7 1.2 Exercise Planning Team Leadership ............................................................................. 8 1.3 Participating Organizations ........................................................................................... 8 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary ............................................................................................. 9 2.1 Exercise Purpose and Design ......................................................................................... 9 2.2 FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities ........................................................ 9 2.3 Scenario Summary ....................................................................................................... 10 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities ............................................................................................... 11 3.1 Exercise Evaluation and Results .................................................................................. 11 3.2 Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation .................................................................... 11 Table 3.2 -Summary of Exercise Evaluation .............................................................. 15 3 .3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation ............................................. 16 3 .3 .1 Florida Emergency Management Agency ....................................................... 16 3 .3 .1.1 State Emergency Operations Center .............................................. 16 3.3.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility ..................................................... 17 3.3.1.3 Bureau of Radiation Control.. ........................................................ 18 3.3.2 Risk Counties ................................................................................................... 19 3 .3 .2.1 St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center. .......................... 19 3.3.2.2 Martin County Emergency Operations Center .............................. 21 3.3.3 Host Counties ................................................................................................... 22 3.3.3.1 Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center ...................... 22 3.3.3.2 Brevard County Emergency Operations Center ............................ 23 3.3.3.3 Indian River County Emergency Operations Center ..................... 24 Section 4: Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 27 Appendix A: Exercise Timeline ................................................................................................... 29 Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders .................................................................. 31 Appendix C: Extent-of-Play Agreement ............................................................. : ........................ 33 3 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant This page is intentionally blank 4 ,I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Executive Summary On February 24, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region IV, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program staff evaluated a full participation exercise in the emergency planning zone around the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant is located on Hutchinson Island, approximately 4 miles northeast of the City of Port St. Lucie, approximately 8 miles southeast of the City of Fort Pierce in St. Lucie County, approximately 5.5 miles north of the Martin County/St. Lucie County boundary line. This facility is owned and operated by the Florida Power & Light Company. Parts of St. Lucie and Martin counties lie within the 10-mile plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone. Indian River, Brevard, and Palm Beach counties have agreed to host evacuees from the 10-mile emergency planning zone, should evacuation be necessary. FEMA's overall objective for the exercise was to assess the level of state and local preparedness in responding to a radiological emergency at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. This exercise was conducted in accordance with FEMA' s policies and guidance concerning the exercise of state and local radiological emergency response plans and procedures. The previous federally evaluated exercise was conducted on February 19, 2014. The qualifying Radiological Emergency Preparedness exercise was conducted on October 20 and 21, 1980. Officials from various state and local government agencies and organizations demonstrated the knowledge of and the ability to successfully implement their radiological emergency response plans and procedures. All jurisdictions met their exercise objectives and successfully demonstrated the corresponding core capabilities identified in Section 2.2 of this report. FEMA did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success. The professionalism and teamwork of the participants was evident throughout all phases of the exercise. 5 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant This page is intentionally blank. . 6 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Section 1: Exercise Overview 1.1 Exercise Details Exercise Name 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Plume Exposure Pathway Exercise Type of Exercise Full Scale Exercise Exercise Date February 24, 2016 Locations

  • State of Florida: 1. State Emergency Operations Center, Tallahassee, FL. 2. Emergency Operations Facility, Fort Pierce, FL. 3. Emergency News Center, Fort Pierce, FL. 4. Field Evaluations, Fort Pierce, FL.
  • St. Lucie County: 1. Emergency Operations Center, Fort Pierce, FL. 2. Emergency Operations Facility, Fort Pierce, FL. 3. Emergency News Center, Fort Pierce, FL.
  • Martin County: 1. Emergency Operations Center, Stuart, FL 2. Emergency Operations Facility, Fort Pierce, FL. 3. Emergency News Center, Fort Pierce, FL.
  • Brevard County: 1. Emergency Operations Center, Rockledge, FL.
  • Indian River County: 1. Emergency Operations Center, Vero Beach, FL.
  • State of Florida Division of Emergency Management
  • State of Florida Department of Health /Bureau of Radiation Control
  • St. Lucie County Department of Public Safety and Security/Emergency Management
  • Martin County Fire Department/Emergency Management * * ** Palm Beach County Emergency Management
  • Indian River County Emergen.cy Management
  • Brevard County Emergency Management *
  • Florida Power and Light/St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant
  • FEMA 1.3 Participating Organizations Agencies and organizations of the following jurisdictions participated in the .St. Lucie Nuclear.PowerPlant exercise: * *
  • State Jurisdictions: 1.: *. State bf Florida Division of Emergency Management 2 ... State of Department of Health/Bureau of Radiation Control . **
  • Risk Jurisdictions: 1. *St.Lucie County 2. ** Martin County
  • Host Jtirisdictions: 1. Palm Beach County 2. Indian River County 3. Brevard Ccmnty
  • Federal Agency 1. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • Private Organizations: 1. Florida Power and Light/St .. Lucie Nuclear PO\yer Plant. 8 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 2.1 2.2 Section 2: Exercise Design Summary Exercise Purpose and Design FEMA administers the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program pursuant to the regulations found in Title 44 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 350, 351 and 352. 44 CFR 350 codifies 16 planning standards that form the basis for radiological emergency response planning for licensee, state, tribal, and local governments impacted by the emergency planning zones established for each nuclear power plant site in the United States. 44 CFR 350 sets forth the mechanisms for the formal review and approval of state, tribal, and local government radiological emergency response plans and procedures by FEMA. One of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program's cornerstones established by these regulations is the biennial exercise of offsite response capabilities. During these exercises, state, tribal, and local governments demonstrate their ability to implement their plans and procedures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency at the nuclear plant. The results of this exercise, together with review of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness plans and procedures and verification of the periodic requirements set forth in NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, through the annual letter of certification and staff assistance visits, enables FEMA to provide a statement with the transmission of this final After Action Report to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission that state, tribal, and local plans and preparedness are: (1) adequate to protect the health and safety of the public living in the vicinity of the nuclear facility by providing reasonabk assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency; and (2) capable of being implemented. Formal submission of the radiological emergency response plans for the St Lucie Nuclear Power Plant to FEMA by the State of Florida was made on August 26, 1983. Formal approval of these radiological emergency response plans was granted on February 14, 1984. FEMA Exercise Objectives and Core Capabilities Core capabilities-based planning allows for exercise planning teams to develop exercise objectives and observe exercise outcomes through a framework of specific action items. Using the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program methodology, the exercise objectives meet the Radiological Emergency Preparedness program requirements and encompass the program's emergency preparedness evaluation areas. The critical tasks to be demonstrated were negotiated with the State of Florida and the participating counties. The core capabilities scheduled for demonstration during this exercise were Operational Coordination, Public Information and Warning, and Environmental Response/Health and Safety. The St. Lucie Task Force developed the exercise objectives. The exercise objectives when successfully demonstrated meet the core capability and Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program requirements. 9 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 2.3 The exercise objectives were as follows:
  • Objective 1: Demonstrate the ability to provide emergency operations center management, including direction and control through the state and county emergency operations centers.
  • Objective 2: Demonstrate the ability to provide protective action decision making for state and county emergency workers and the public through exercise play and discussions of plans and procedures.
  • Objective 3: Demonstrate the ability to physically implement protective actions for state and county emergency workers and the public through exercise demonstration.
  • Objective 4: Demonstrate the ability to activate the prompt alert and notification system by activating sirens and broadcasting Emergency Alert System messages through exercise play.
  • Objective 5: Demonstrate the effectiveness of plans, policies, and procedures in the emergency news center for public and private sector emergency information -communications.
  • Objective 6: Demonstrate the ability to provide accurate data and data analysis for the formulation of protective action recommendations. Scenario Summary
  • 0735, a steam generator tube leak occurs in Unit 2 "A" Steam Generator. An Alert will be declared due to Emergency Action Level (EAL) :F.f.,.1, Joss of the Rea_ctor Coolant System (RCS) boundary.
  • 0830, a loss* of off site power_ occurs and a secondary steam leak inside containment
  • 1030, the Unit 2 "A" Feed-water Pump shaft seizes resulting in loss of the RCS heat removal safety function. A General Emergency (GE) will be declared based on EAL FG 1, with the loss of the cladding barrier. The resultant Protective Action Recommendations are to evacuate two miles around and out to five miles downwind (sectors P, Q, and R). Licensee dose projections indicate that no upgrade to the PARs is required. 10 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.1 3.2 Section 3: Analysis of Capabilities Exercise Evaluation and Results This section contains the results and findings of the evaluation of all jurisdictions and functional entities that participated in the February 24, 2016, plume exposure pathway exercise. Each jurisdiction and functional entity was evaluated based on their demonstration of core capabilities and their equivalent Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program criteria as delineated in the FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program Manual dated January 2016. Exercise criteria are listed by number and the demonstration status of those criteria are indicated by the use of the following terms:
  • M: Met (no level 1 or level 2 findings assessed and no unresolved findings from prior exercises)
  • 1: Level 1 finding (formerly deficiency) assessed
  • 2: Level 2 finding (formerly area requiring corrective action) assessed or an unresolved level 2 finding(s) from a prior exercise
  • P: Plan issue
  • N: Not demonstrated Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program evaluation methodology is an analytical process used to assess the demonstration of specific capabilities during an exercise. A capability provides a means to perform one or more critical tasks under specified conditions and to specific performance standards. The previously described core capabilities form the foundation of the FEMA Region IV Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program. The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. Each jurisdiction's standalone capability summaries are listed in Section 3 .3 of this report. Operational Coordination: Jurisdictions demonstrated this capability at different locations during the exercise. All jurisdictions established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and implemented processes to appropriately integrate all critical stakeholders and supports to execute this capability. Operational Coordination was evaluated against the following capability targets:
  • Emergency Operations Management: Jurisdictions effectively used procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner in accordance with their plans and procedures as modified by the exercise extent-of-play agreement. More than two communications systems were available 11 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant and operational during the exercise, which enabled the jurisdictions to establish and maintain communication links with locations, state agencies, and county departments outside their emergency operations center and the emergency operations facility. State and local emergency operations centers were well-equipped and able to support and maintain operations for a prolonged period of time. Dosimetry, potassium iodide, and monitoring instruments were evaluated as part of the site assistance visit.
  • Protective Action Decision Making: State and county governments established direction and control at various locations to effectively respond to the event at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The decision makers used a collaborative process to reach protective action decisions for the general public and for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. The decision-making process included the consideration of appropriate factors both onsite and offsite. The collaborative discussions included representatives from the licensee, the state assistance team, and the Nuclear Regulatory
  • Protective Action Implementation: During conference calls, each decision maker discussed the agreed upon protective actions to be implemented by the risk counties, and emergency operations center staff provided the decision makers with local information and assessment of. the county's evacuation routes and possible impediments to implementing*evacuation orders for their respective evacuation zones. They *also implemented precautionary protective actions* for schools and persons with disabilities and access/functional needs. Risk county emergency operations center staffs discussed the evacuation of the residents, the opening of reception ahd congregate care centers, and the establishment of traffic and access* control points, with the host counties' directors. Public Information and Warning: Representatives from the state and Martin and St. Lucie Counties delivered coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community. They used a variety of methods to provide clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate information regarding the event at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant as well as the state and local governments' response and any protective actions to be taken by the public. Public Information and Warning was evaluated against the following capability target:
  • Emergency Notification and Public Information: The activation of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant siren system to alert the public was completed in a timely manner following the decision to notify the public of an emergency situation at St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. When St. Lucie County's attempt to activate the siren system failed, they immediately called the Martin County emergency operations center and asked them to activate the siren system. Following the successful activation of the siren system, the Emergency Alert System messages were coordinated and disseminated by St. Lucie County. Messages to the public included elements required by current FEMA Radiological Emergency Preparedness program guidance as well as the appropriate information/instructions, and were disseminated 12 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant with a sense of urgency and without undue delay. The risk counties coordinated waterway warning and backup routing alert and notification with the appropriate county departments and state and federal agencies. State and risk counties' information products were composed from pre-scripted templates and sent to the emergency news center for coordination and release to media outlets. Environmental Response/Health Safety: Personnel from the Department of Health/Bureau of Radiation Control used guidance and resources to effectively assess radiological and plant conditions and to make well-reasoned recommendations and decisions in response to a radiological incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Environmental Response/Health Safety was evaluated against the following capability target:
  • Field Measurement and Analyses: Dose assessment, field teams, and the mobile lab personnel had sufficient equipment, maps, displays, and other supplies to support emergency operations. Each position was equipped with a computer and appropriate software for their position. The dose assessment staff established, maintained, and managed primary and auxiliary communications capabilities. The field monitoring teams were assigned to perform radiological surveys by traversing downwind locations within the plume emergency planning zone, and conducted air sampling at selected locations. The assigned radiation monitoring locations allowed the field , monitoring teams to locate both the plume edges and obtain maximum readings at the . plume centerline. *Field radiation measurements were immediately communicated to
  • the dose assessment personnel for use in calculating dose projections and making protective action recommendations. Mobile lab personnel demonstrated sample receipt, processing, and analysis capabilities. Participants followed procedures, established appropriate radiological control areas, and demonstrated appropriate contamination controls during sample receipt and handling. 13 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant This page is intentionally blank *,! 14 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I' I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Table 3.2 -Summary of Exercise Evaluation I DATE: 2016-02-24: Plan Issue, N: Not Demonstrated SITE: St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, FL I I I > c: c: ::l '" > 0 ::l c: c u 0 ::l c: ::l ... u "' 0 0 ::l 0 .. ii e;:: u 0 u > *;:: '" u .. u Ci: '" ... "E .. 0 z *;:; *f c: CQ *;:: ::l '" u u ....l > '" E u < u ci:: ci:: '" .. '6 -;;; M: MET, l: Level I Finding, 2: Level 2 Finding c "' "' ...., CQ CQ ci5 '" Q:i ..:: "" 0 *;: P: Plan Issue, NR: Not Required, N: Not Demonstrated, "' :I D: Not Scheduled for Demonstration -; u lo. lo. lo. .,, u u u u u > 0 0 0 0 -.; 0 0 0 0 0 i:.:i w w w w w w w w w Emer2encv Ooerations Mana2ement Alert And Mobilization lal M M M M M M M M I Facilities lbl Direction And Control lei M M M M M M M M M Communications Equipment ldl M M M M M M M M M Eauipment And Supplies To Suooort Ooerations lei M M M M M M M M I Protective Action Decision Makin!? Emergency Worker Exoosure Control 2al M M Dose Assessment & Pars & PADS For The Emergency Event 2bl M M Dose Assessment & Pars & Pads For The General Public 2b2 M M I Pads For The Protection Of Persons With Disabilities And Access/Functional Needs 2cl M Radiological Assessment And Decision-Making For The Ingestion Exoosure Pathway 2dl Radiological Assessment & Decision-Making Concerning Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentrv, & Return 2el I Protective Action Implementation Implementation Of Emergency Worker Exposure Control 3al M lmolementation Of Kl Decision For Institutionalized Individual And The Public 3bl M M M M M Implementation Of Protective Actions For Persons With Disabilities And Access/Functional Needs 3cl M M M M M I Implementation Of Protective Actions For Schools 3c2 M M Implementation Of Traffic And Access Control 3dl M M M M M Impediments To Evacuation Are Identified And Resolved 3d2 M M M M M lmolementation Of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3el lmolementation Of Ingestion Pathway Decisions 3d2 I implementation Of Post-Plume Phase Relocation, Reentrv, And Return Decision 3fl Field Measure and Analysis RESERVED 4al Plume Phase Field Measurement And Analyses 4a2 M 'I Plume Phase Field Measurement And Analyses 4a3 M Post Plume Phase Measurement And Sampling 4bl Laboratory Operations 4cl M I Emergencv Notification And Public Info Activation Of The Prompt Alert And Notification System 5al M M M RESERVED 5a2 Provide Waterway Warning/Backup Alert And Notification Of The Public 5a3 M M I Provide Accurate Emergency Information And Instructions To The Public And The News Media 5bl M M M M M M M I I I 15 I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.3 Jurisdictional Summary Results of Exercise Evaluation The core capability summaries below provide an overall combined assessment of state and local jurisdictions based upon their collective demonstrated performance as it relates to the specific core capability. 3.3.1 Florida Emergency Management Agency 3.3.1.1 State Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: The Florida Division of Emergency Management successfully demonstrated this capability by alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency personnel; activating the emergency operations center; communicating with the Florida Division of Emergency Management State Assistance Team; and coordinating and supporting the implementation of the protective action decisions. The State Emergency Response Team Chief ensured the staff maintained situational awareness through frequent operational briefings. The interface between the state emergency operations center, emergency operations facility, and the area coordinators deployed to each risk county's emergency operations center enhanced the ability to provide a central location for operational information sharing, resource coordination, and communications. Coordination was maintained throughout the exercise with landline, cellphone, action tracker database, and web email. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a. l, l.c.1, l.d.1, l.e. l. Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: The Florida Division of Emergency Management successfully demonstrated this capability by supporting and coordinating public information. The state's emergency support function 14, public information, was responsible for supporting, coordinating, and disseminating information to both the national media market and concerned residents in accordance with their policies, plans, and procedures. They received numerous internal and external inquiries. These calls were answered, noted, and information that was incorrect or needed additional clarification was relayed to the emergency news center; the information was included in future press releases. Emergency support function 14 established a 24-hour hotline, which included the capability for hearing impaired residents to receive information. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.b. l. 16 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.1.2 Emergency Operations Facility Operational Coordination Capability Summary: The state assistance team and decision makers from St. Lucie and Martin Counties successfully demonstrated this capability by formulating, coordinating, and communicating decisions for implementation with their counties, with support from the state emergency operations center. They collectively assessed the utility's protective action recommendation to determine the appropriate protective action decision. Orice made, they directed their county emergency operations center staff to implement the protective action decision. The protective action decision process was completed in accordance with the protocols described in the Florida Division of Emergency Management state assistance team standard operating guide and the counties' plans and procedures. Overall, the state assistance team commander and county decision makers maintained close coordination with the utility's recovery manager. The state assistance team commander provided situational awareness and operational planning to the state emergency response team and state coordinating officer at the state emergency operations center. The county decision makers remained in: contact with their local emergency operations centers, informing one another of the events occurring at their respective locations and serving as an informational conduit between the emergency operations centers and emergency operations facility. Command and control, decision making, communications, coordination, support, and the flow of technical information among the utility operator, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the state and applicable local government officials were exemplary. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l .a. l, 1 ;c.1, 1.d.1, 2.a.1, 2.b. l, 2.b.2, 2.c. l. Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: The state assistance team and risk counties successfully demonstrated this capability by developing, and disseminating emergency public .information to the public and media at the emergency news center. The emergency news center served as the focal point for the distribution and release _of information to the media and public during this simulated emergency at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. This facility offered ample space for the representatives from the state, counties, licensee, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 17 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant The arriving public information officers conducted communications checks with their respective counter parts at the emergency operations center and jurisdictional leads. All means of communication were operational and no failures were noted during the exercise. Media briefings were conducted throughout the exercise. Prior to each briefing, the public information officers discussed and coordinated their messages for the briefing. Each briefing began with the utility spokesperson defining plant conditions, which preceded state and local emergency protective actions. Established protocols were followed when preparing, coordinating; and disseminating news releases. All messages were professionally scripted and contained language terms to convey the intended message. Media releases from host counties concerning their activities in support of the risk counties were sent to the emergency news center staff via the state's action tracker database. The host county media releases were not released from the emergency news center. For this capability the following REP.criteria were MET: l.d.l, l.e.l, 5.b.1. 3.3.1.3 Bureau of Radiation Control Environmental Response/Health and Safety Capability Summary: Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Control, mobile emergency radiological laboratory, and field team staffs successfully demonstrated the ability to
  • perform independent accident assessments; manage field teams; perform radiological monitoring sampling; receive, prepare; and analyze radiological environmental air samples; and provide appropriate technical advice to the state assistance team commander and local decision makers. The Bureau of Radiation Control operations officer .and assistant operations officer at the
  • emergency operations facility maintained overall direction and control of the Bureau of Radiation Control response effort and participated in all protective action decision meetings. Bureau of Radiation Control staff members worked closely with utility personnel to ensure they understood plant conditions and dose projection assumptions. Bureau of Radiation Control dose assessment specialists were knowledgeable in the use of dose projection software. They compared their projections with those calculated by utility personnel, and investigated any discrepancies between the two. The Bureau of Radiation Control field team directors instructed field teams to take radiation measurements and air samples in appropriate locations from St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant in coordination with utility field teams. Redundant systems were available for communicating with the teams. 18 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.2 Field team equipment and supplies were sufficient to support radiological monitoring functions, and instruments were operationally checked prior to deployment. The mobile emergency radiological laboratory supervisor and field team supervisor managed and employed staff effectively. Field team staff properly followed monitoring and sampling procedures to obtain radiation measurements and air samples, and promptly reported their results. Upon return to the mobile emergency radiological laboratory, field team staff and mobile emergency radiological laboratory contamination control specialists followed procedures to transfer samples at the hot line. Mobile emergency radiological laboratory personnel carried all necessary equipment and supplies to support emergency operations, and all personnel were proficient in carrying out their procedures. Analytical equipment in the mobile emergency radiological laboratory consisted of a gamma spectroscopy system, including two high purity germanium detectors. The mobile emergency radiological laboratory personnel successfully demonstrated the ability to receive, prepare, and analyze environmental air samples. All field personnel wore appropriate dosimetry and protective clothing. They described the proper use of dosimetry, administrative dose limits, use of potassium iodide, and recordkeeping requirements. Proper contamination control techniques were demonstrated throughout the exercise, and appropriate sample control and custody documents were completed and maintained. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a. l, l.c. l, l.d. l, l.e.1, 2.a. l, 2.b. l, 2.b.2, 3.a. l, 4.a.2, 4.a.3, 4.c. l. Risk Counties 3.3.2.1 St. Lucie County Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: St. Lucie County demonstrated the operational coordination capability by alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency personnel, activating the emergency operations center, and implementing the protective action decisions. The 911 supervisor, responsible for notification, was knowledgeable and very familiar with the protocols, plans, and associated checklists, and was able to demonstrate and explain the process, all of which were consistent with established county plans. The operations room manager directed a partial activation of the emergency operations center and mobilized key staff. All communications functioned during this exercise. Processes and procedures were in place to address equipment failures and to implement use of redundant systems. 19 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant The St. Lucie County operations room manager effectively demonstrated direction and control and implementation of protective action decisions through discussions and direct coordination with county emergency support functions. The St. Lucie County radiation safety officer thoroughly discussed the issuance of dosimetry, potassium iodide implementation and ingestion procedures, management of radiological exposure to emergency workers, and action levels in a,ccordance with the plans and procedures. At the direction of the operations room manager, the emergency operations center staff implemented the protective action decision to evacuate all schools within five miles of the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. The St. Lucie Health Department, the St. Lucie School District, and the American Red Cross worked in concert to ensure persons with access and/or functional ne_eds within five miles of the St. Lucie Nuclear,F>,ower Plant were notified, and provided transportation for the evacuation as requested. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.l, 1.c,l; 1.d.l; l.e.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3.c.2, 3.d.l, 3.d.2. Public I1;1formation and Warning Capability Summary_: The St. Lucie County Department of Puqlic pub.lie information staff demonstratec:l this capability by developing,-and disseminating county specific emergency public information and activating _the Emergency Alert System. -. i .. During the exercise, at the declaration of the Site Area Emergency, the siren system activation failed; however, the emergency operations center communication specialist followed established protocol and notified Martin County _of thefaUure. A succ,essful coordinated siren system activation was completed by the Martin County Warning Point. The public information officer worked closely with the operations room manager and the . public officer at the emergency news center to disseminate prompt, reliable, , and actionable information to the w:tiole community thrqugh the use qf clear, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods that effectively relayed information regarding the situation at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Rumor control/public inquiry was demonstrated by n 1 center personnel; they staffed the St. Lucie County public information line in the call center, responded to calls from the public, and answered with approved information from countypress releases and joint press releases from the emergency news center. *For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a.l, 5.a.3, 5.b.1. 20 I I I I I I I I I I I I:, I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I *I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After* Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.2.2 Martin County Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: The Martin County Fire Rescue Division of Emergency Management staff demonstrated the operational coordination capability by alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency personnel, activating the emergency operations center, and implementing the protective action decisions. They established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and process. The *emergency operations center was activated in a timely manner and soon became fully operational; each agency maintained its own AIB shift rosters, enabling 24-hour operations if needed. Upon activation of the emergency operations center, direction and control was established immediately by the incident commander and maintained throughout. Coordination with outside agencies, particularly Palin Beach County, was frequent and effective. Decisions were jointly made at the emergency operations facility by state and county leadership and implemented by the emergency operations center staff. Emergency operations center staff were well-trained, professional, and performed their duties in accordance with plans and procedures. Actions were defined and deliberate. Standard operating guides and detailed check lists aided staff in carrying out coordinated responsibilities with internal and externci.J. agencies, and ensured procedural compliance activities were effectively logged, chronicled, and filed. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.l, l.c.l, l.d.l, l.e.1, 3.b.l, 3.c.1, 3;c.2, 3.d.l, 3.d.2. Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: The Martin County public information staff demonstrated this capability by developing, coordinating, and disseminating emergency public information and activating the Emergency Alert System. All Emergency Alert System messages and press releases were formulated at the emergency news center, and approved by the incident commander to ensure the appropriate messages would be broadcast. After the risk counties
  • concurrence, they were faxed back to the emergency operations center for dissemination to the public by the National Weather Service, Emergency Alert System messages, and the radio/television station (press releases). The incident commander participated in the protective action decision-making calls with the county decision maker to coordinate and approve decisions to activate the Emergency Alert System. During the exercise, the siren system failed to activate in St. Lucie County; however, they followed established protocol and notified Martin County of the failure. A successful siren activation was completed by the Martin County Warning Point without a delay. 21 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.a. l, 5.a.3, 5.b.1. 3.3.3 Host Counties 3.3.3.1 Palm Beach County Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: Palm Beach County staff demonstrated the operational coordination capability by alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency personnel, activating the emergency operations center, and implementing their plans and procedures to receive, monitor, and provide shelter to the evacuating population. The executive policy group leadership was proactive and displayed remarkable concern for the safety and well-being of all evacuees, county residents, and county emergency workers. The director participatedin periodic status briefings-with the emergency* operations center staff to maintain situational awareness. The Palm Beach County Sheriff was fully prepared to establish and maintain appropriate traffic and access control measures for the evacuation of residents from the risk counties to the reception center and congregate. care facility. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 1.a.1, 1.c.l, 1.d.l, Le.1;3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2. Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: .. . ', !, The Palm Beach County public information staff demonstrated this capability by developing, coordinating, and disseminating emergency public information to the media market and social media. The public information officer actively participated in a series of executive.policy group meetings, which ensured access to the latest and most accurate information to provide to all media avenues.* Using a combination of pre-scripted, modifiable news releases, the most current information was rapidly made available to. the news media; Numerous calls to the risk and host counties* were made during the exercise to facilitate and coordinate information for the county news releases. All news releases were shared with the state via the action tracker database and calls to the emergency news center. While available to the emergency news center staff via the state's action tracker database, the news releases were not formally vetted with the state and risk counties. This vetting process should be formulated and incorporated into the emergency news center and risk and host county procedures. Coordination among state, risk, and host counties would enhance public messaging and perception.
  • For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.b.1. 22 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant 3.3.3.2 Brevard County Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: Brevard County staff demonstrated the operational coordination capability by alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency personnel, activating the emergency operations center, and implementing their plans and procedures to receive, monitor, and provide shelter to the evacuating population. They established and maintained a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that integrated all Brevard County emergency support functions, state, risk counties, and other host counties. Personnel were well-trained and familiar with their responsibilities. The Brevard County emergency management director conducted both internal and external coordination competently and professionally. Emergency operations center staff were activated and mobilized using an automated call system. The director received emergency notifications from the state via fax and emails. County health personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements for issuing potassium iodide to evacuees and the plans for assisting access and/or functional needs individuals. The sheriff's office staff knew their responsibilities as they pertained to traffic control and handling impediments ** to evacuation routes. Overall, the Brevard County emergency operations staff were well-trained and capable of performing their required duties in support of an incident at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.1, l.c.1, l.d.1, l.e.1, 3.b.1, 3.c.1, 3.d.1, 3.d.2. Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: The Brevard County public affairs staff demonstrated this capability by developing, coordinating, and disseminating emergency public information to the media market and social media. They utilized multiple media avenues and methods to effectively relay information regarding the actions being taken and the assistance made available to the public. Numerous calls to the risk and host counties were made during the exercise to facilitate and coordinate information for the county news releases. All news releases were shared with the state via an action tracker database and calls to the emergency news center. While available to the emergency news center staff via the state's action tracker database, the news releases were not formally vetted with the state and risk counties. This vetting process should be formulated and incorporated into the emergency news center and risk and host county procedures. Coordination among the state and risk and host counties would enhance public messaging and perception. 23 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant The questions and rumors were promptly addressed by the public information officer or the social media representative. Social media was a significant component to Brevard County's public information strategy. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.b. l. 3.3.3.3 Indian River County Emergency Operations Center Operational Coordination Capability Summary: Indian River County staff demonstrated the operational coordination capability by alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency personnel, activating the emergency operations center, and implementing their plans and procedures to receive, monitor, and provide shelter to the evacuating population. Indian River County responsibilities as a host county consist of monitoring, decontamination, and sheltering of evacuees along with the establishment and operation of traffic control points to facilitate the evacuation of the general public from the risk counties. Indian River County sent a liaison to the emergency operations facility in order to provide county leadership with up-to-the-minute situational awareness. The value of the liaison was quickly validated. The liaison provided the county the current operational status, information concerning state and risk county discussions concerning unmet needs, and protective action recommendations. This information allowed Indian River County and the other host counties to better support the risk counties and their implementation of their plans and procedures to receive, monitor, and provide shelter to the evacuating population. The liaison was also able to advise risk county decision makers on the status and readiness of the host counties. The liaison played a crucial role in enhancing the ability of the host counties to prepare for the receipt of evacuees and provide support to the risk counties. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: l.a.1, l.c. l, l.d.1, l.e. l, 3.b.l, 3.c.l, 3.d.l, 3.d.2. Public Information and Warning Capability Summary: Indian River County staff demonstrated this capability by developing, coordinating, and disseminating emergency public information to the media market and social media. The emergency services public information officer chief at the emergency operations center generated all press releases; they were pre-scripted with only minor modifications being needed. With each release, the director reviewed and approved by initialing in the upper right comer. The releases were photocopied, placed in the media room of the 24 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant emergency operations center, and uploaded to the state's action tracker database. While available to the emergency news center staff via the state's action tracker database, the news releases were not formally vetted with the state and risk counties. This vetting process should be formulated and incorporated into the emergency news center and risk and host county procedures. The county emergency operations facility liaison was also used to advise the emergency news center of the county's public messaging. Coordination among the state and risk and host counties would enhance public messaging and perception. The county was cognizant of and concerned with public information. As such, they generated and released 12 press releases. Each release was clear and consistent with county response actions. For this capability the following REP criteria were MET: 5.b.1.
  • 25 Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant ' .*._,' '.' This page is intentionally blank
  • 26 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Section 4: Conclusion The State of Florida and the counties of St Lucie, Martin, Brevard, Indian River and Palm Beach completed all exercise objectives, demonstrated all assigned capabilities, and successfully implemented their emergency response plans and procedures during this exercise. The teamwork and professionalism of the participants were evident throughout all phases of the exercise. The decision makers at the emergency operations facility effectively coordinated their activities and communicated to their counties so that the decisions could be implemented. The liaison from Indian River County proved to be a valuable asset in keeping the host counties informed so that they could better support the actions of the risk counties to protect the public. The host counties issued press releases concerning their actions to support evacuees; however, operations could be improved with a more proactive relationship with the emergency news center. FEMA wishes to acknowledge the efforts of the many individuals who participated and made the exercise a success. Protecting the public health and safety is the full-time job of some of the exercise participants, and an additional assigned responsibility for others. Still others have willingly sought this responsibility by volunteering to provide vital emergency services to their communities and that commitment should not go unrecognized. FEMA did not identify any level 1 or level 2 findings during this exercise. 27 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant *.1: This page is intentionally blank '* :,* ' 28 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program I After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant I Appendix A: Exercise Timeline I 2016 SLN Plume Exercise Time that notification was received or action was taken Indian Palm Emergency Time State of St. Lucie Martin Brevard River Beach Classification Level Utility Florida County County County County County of Activation Declared EOC SAT/DM JIC BRC EOC EOC EOC EOC EOC I Unusual Event Alert 0745 0757 0757 0757 0757 0757 0812 0807 0809 Site Area Emergency 0847 0900 0900 0900 0900 0900 0915 0915 0909 I General Emergency 1032 1048 1032 1035 1035 1048 1048 1057 1056 1055 Simulated Rad. 0845 0900 0900 0900 0900 0900 0915 0915 0909 Release Started I Simulated Rad. Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing Release Ended Facility Declared 0920 0800 0920 0930 0925 0925 0910 0830 0830 0900 Operational I Exercise Terminated 1156 1156 1156 1156 1156 1159 1159 1200 1215 1156 Declaration of State Local: 0824 0822 0905 0948 0925 0847 I of Emergency State: 0953 Early Precautionary Actions: Schools Evacuation and Special 0942 0902 0902 Populations Call-Down, within I the Plume/IO miles Water Clearance 0942 0924 0924 I 1st Protective Action Decision: 0940 0940 0940 Stay Tuned and Sound Sirens I st Siren Activation: St Lucie I I siren control failed and Martin 0948 0948 0950 sounded at 0950 1st EAS Message (Stay Tuned) 0948 0948 I st WS Message (Stay Tuned) 0948 0948 2nd Protective Action Decision: I Evacuate Zones: I, 2, 8 1105 1058 1105 1058 1058 1058 Shelter in Place Zones: 3,4, 5,6, 7 2nd Siren Activation 1106 1106 1106 1106 1106 2nd EAS Message 1106 1106 1106 1106 1106 2nd NWS Message 1106 1106 1106 1106 1106 I I I I 29 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant This page is intentionally blank 30 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Unclassified I After Action Report Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant I Appendix B: Exercise Evaluators and Team Leaders I Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair: Conrad Burnside Section Chief: Randy Hecht Site Specialist: Alex Sera I Location/Venue Evaluators Core Capability State Emergency Operations Center Rupert Dennis Operational Coordination Tallahassee, FL Daphne Williams Public Information and Warning Emergency Operations Facility Alex Sera Operational Coordination I I SAT Erica Houghton Risk Counties Chanel Jones Emergency News Center Bob Spence Public Information and Warning John Simpson Bureau of Radiation Control John Fill Operational Coordination I Field Team 1 Deborah Blunt Environmental Response/Health and Safety Field Team 2 Jill Leatherman Environmental Response/Health and Safety Field Team 3 (Evaluation for training ONLY) Mario Vigliani Environmental Response/Health and Safety I Mobile Lab John Wiecjorek Environmental Response/Health and Safety RISK COUNTIES I St. Lucie Co. Emergency Operations Center Gerald McLemore Operational Coordination Odis Spencer Public Information and Warning I Martin Co. Emergency Operations Center Walt Cushman Operational Coordination Robert Nash Public Information and Warning I HOST COUNTIES Palm Beach Co. I Emergency Operations Center Mike Dolder Operational Coordination Ron Shaw Public Information and Warning Brevard Co. I Emergency Operations Center Joe Harworth Operational Coordination Matt Bradley Public Information and Warning Indian River Co. I Emergency Operations Center JT Ackerman Operational Coordination Lorenzo Lewis Public Information and Warning I I I I 31 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant . ... '* **.! This page is intentionally blank 32 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Appendix C: Extent-of-Play Agreement PLUME PHASE FULL PARTICIPATION RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS (REP) EXERCISE All activities will be demonstrated fully in accordance with respective plans and procedures as they would be in an actual emergency. The FEMA Regional Office must receive these plans, guides and procedures at least 60 days before the exercise. This Extent-of-Play Agreement (XPA) is written by exception. If it is not listed as an exception it will be demonstrated as described in the plans, SOGs and/or standard operating procedures (SOP). Any issue or discrepancy arising during exercise play may be re-demonstrated if allowed by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) Chair or as listed herein. This allowance may be granted if it is not disruptive to exercise play and is mutually agreed to by the Off-site Response Organization (ORO) Exercise Controller and FEMA Evaluator. Core Capability: Operational Coordination Definition: Establish and maintain a unified and coordinated operational structure and process that appropriately integrates all critical stakeholders and supports the execution of core capabilities. Capability Target: Emergency Operations Management Performance Measure: Procedures to alert and notify personnel will be demonstrated and personnel will respond only upon notification. Identified communications will be operational. Equipment, monitoring instruments and dosimetry must be available and will be operational which includes an affixed current calibration and range of readings sticker if applicable; quantities of KI and expirations will be verified. Critical Task: OROs use effective procedures to alert, notify, and mobilize emergency personnel and activate facilities in a timely manner (NUREG-0654 A.I.a, e; A.3, 4; C.1, 4, 6; D.4; E.1, 2; F.l, 2 H.3, 4; Criterion lal).
  • Pre-position 1. State (EOC, SAT, BRC) 2. St. Lucie County 3. Martin County 4. Palm Beach County
  • Per current plans and procedures 1. Indian River County 2. Brevard County 33 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654 F.1, 2; Criterion ldl).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 'zl. Critical Task: Equipment, maps, displays, monitoring instruments, dosimetry, KI, and other supplies are sufficient to support emergency operations (NUREG-0654 H.7,.l0; .. L7, 8, 9,; J.10.a, b, e; J.11, 12; K.3.a; K.5.b; Criterion lel). 'I'._
  • All SA Vs were performed in October, during the SAV the following items were inspected: equipment, monitoring instruments, dosimetry and KI. Capability Target: ,Protective Action Decision-making
  • Performance Measure: Key personnel with leadership roles will provide direction and control; protective action decision-making w*ill be demonstrated by the OROs. . .,-. Critical Task: Key personnel with leadership roles for the ORO provide direction and control to. that part of the overall response effort for which they are responsible (NUREG-0654 A.1.d; A.2.a, b; A.3; C.4, 6; Criterion lcl). ; .
  • Per current plans and procedures. Critical Task: OROs use a decision-making process, considering relevant factors and *. *
  • appropriate coordination, to ensure that an exposure control system, including the use of. KI, is in place for EWs including provisions to authorize radiation exposure in excess of administrative limits or protective action guidelines (PAGs) (NUREG-0654 C.6; J.10.e, f; K.4 Criterion 2al).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. State (BRC) (EOF) 2. Risk Counties Critical Task: A decision-making process involving consideration of appropriate factors and necessary coordination is used to make protective action decisions (P ADs) the general public (including the recommendation for the use of KI, if ORO policy) (NUREG-0654 A.3; C.4, 6; D.4; J.9; J.10.f, m Criterion 2b2).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 3. State (SAT, BRC).
  • 4. Risk Counties 34 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Unclassified Radiological.Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Critical Task: Protective action decisions are made, as appropriate, for groups of persons with disabilities and access/functional needs (NUREG-0654 D.4; J.9; J.10.d, e; Criterion 2cl).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. Risk Counties Capability Target: Protective Action Implementation Performance Measure: Demonstrate the capability to implement EW exposure control; KI decision for institutionalized individuals and the general public; protective actions for persons . with disabilities and access/functional needs; schools; traffic and access control and impediments to -evacuation. . Critical Task: KI and appropriate instructions are available if a decision to recommend use of KI is made. Appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI for institutionalized individuals
  • and the general public is maintained (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, f; Criterion 3bl).
  • In sequence during exercise play, demonstrated by discussion and interview. 1. Risk Counties 2.
  • Host Counties Critical Task: Protective action decisions are implemented for persons with disabilities and access/functional needs other than schools within areas subject to protective actions (NUREG-0654 J.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3cl).
  • In sequence during exercise play, demonstrated by discussion and interview. 1. Risk Counties 2. *Host Counties Critical Task: OROs/School officials implement protective actions for schools (NUREG-0654 CJ.10.c, d, e, g; Criterion 3c2).
  • In sequence during exercise play, demonstrated by discussion and interview. 1. Risk Counties Critical Task: Appropriate traffic and access control is established. Accurate instructions are provided to traffic and access control personnel (NUREG-0654 A.3; C.1, 4; J.10.g, j;.Criterion 3dl).
  • In sequence during exercise play, demonstrated by discussion and interview. Traffic Control Points (TCPs) will be coordinated real time and scenario driven. 1. Risk Counties 2. Host Counties 35 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Critical Task: hnpediments to evacuation are identified and resolved (NUREG-0654 J.10.k; Criterion 3d2).
  • In sequence during exercise play, demonstrated by discussion or interview. 1. Risk Counties 2. Host Counties .*, Core Capability: Public Information and Warning ... , .. , ;' . *: . ;,*'.' Definition: Deliver coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the, whole community through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard and, as appropriate, the actions being taken and the *assistance being made available. Capability Target: Emergency Notification and Public Information Performance Measure: If activation of initial siren activation maybe be completed by a * "silent" test of that system as exercise play dictates; subsequent activdtions will be'simulated. Initial activation of the EAS will be demonstrated up to the point of actual broadcast to the public; Backup route alerting will be demonstrated only if a siren failure is indicated; if there is no failure, backup route alerting procedures will be completed via interview. Waterway warning will be demonstrated during Off Scenario/Out-of-Sequence ( OOS) and will be discussed during the exercise. Critical Task: Activities associated with primary alerting and notification of the public *are completed in a timely manner following the initial decision by authorized offsite emergency officials to notify the public of an emergency situation. The initial instructional message to the public must include as a minimum the elements required by current FEMA REP Guidance (Timely: The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to* disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654 E.5, 6, 7; Criterion Sal).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. Risk Counties Critical Task: Waterway warning/backup alert and notification of the public is completed within a reasonable time following the detection by the ORO of a failure of the primary.alert and notification system (NUREG-0654 E.6; Appendix 3.B.2.c; Criterion 5a3).
  • In sequence during exercise play, demonstrated by discussion and interview.* 1. State (BRC) 36 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Critical Task: Ensure OROs provide accurate emergency information and instructions to the public and the news media in a timely manner (The responsible ORO personnel/representatives demonstrate actions to disseminate the appropriate information/instructions with a sense of urgency and without undue delay) (NUREG-0654 E.5, 7; G.3.a; G.4.a, c; Criterion 5bl).
  • Per current plans and procedures. Core Capability: Environmental Response/Health and Safety Definition: Ensure the availability of guidance and resources to address all hazards including HazMats, acts of terrorism, and natural disasters in support of the responder operations and the affected communities. Capability Target: Field Measurement and Analyses Performance Measure: OROs will demonstrate the capability to deploy Field Monitoring Teams (FMT) with the equipment, methods, and expertise necessary to determine the location of airborne radiation and particulate deposition on the ground from an airborne plume. OR Os must have the capability to use.FMTs within the plume exposure pathway EPZ to detect airborne radio iodine in the presence of noble* gases and radioactive particulate material in airborne plume.* Critical Task: At least two communications systems are available, at least one operates properly, and communication links are established and maintained with appropriate locations. Communications capabilities are managed in support of emergency operations (NUREG-0654 F.1, 2; Criterion ldl).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. State (BRC) Critical Task: OROs issue appropriate dosimetry, KI, and procedures, and manage radiological exposure to EWs in accordance with the plans/procedures. EWs periodically and at the end of each mission read their dosimeters and record the readings on the appropriate exposure record or chart. OROs maintain appropriate record-keeping of the administration of KI to EW s (NUREG-0654 J.10.e, K.3.a, b, K.4; Criterion 3al).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. State (BRC) Critical Task: Field teams (two or more) are managed to obtain sufficient information to help characterize the release and to control radiation exposure (NUREG C.1; H.12; I.7, 8, 11; J.10.a; Criterion 4a2). 37 Unclassified Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program After Action Report
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. State (BRC) 2016 St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant Critical Task: Ambient radiation measurements are made and recorded at appropriate locations, and radioiodine and particulate samples are collected. Teams will move to an appropriate low background location to determine whether any significant (as specified in the plan and/or procedures) amount of radioactivity has been collected on the sampling media. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1; H.12: 1.8, 9; J.10.a; Criterion 4a3).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. State (BRC) Critical Task: The laboratory is capable of performing required radiological analyses to support protective action decisions. (NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1, C.1, 3; J.11; Criterion 4cl).
  • Per current plans and procedures. 1. State (BRC) 38 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
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