ML17308A071

Auxiliary Feedwater Sys Automatic Initiation & Flow Indication, (F-16,F-17),technical Evaluation Rept

ML17308A071
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Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/23/1982
From:	VOSBURY F W FRANKLIN INSTITUTE
To:	KENDALL R NRC
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ML17256B208	List: ML17308A071
References
CON-NRC-03-79-118, CON-NRC-3-79-118 TER-C5257-287, NUDOCS 8207270149
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~~~a~/*4~TECHN)CALEYALUATIONREPORTAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMAUTOMATICINITIATIO.NANDFLOWINDICATION(F-j.6,F-l7)ROCHESTERGASAIIIDELECTRICCORPORATIONROBERTE.GINNANUCLEARPOHERPLANT-NRCDOCKETNO.50-244NRCTACNO.11706NRCCONTRACTNO.NRC43-79-11SFRCPROJECTC5257HFRCASSIGNMENT9FRCTASK287PreparedbyFranklinResearchCenter20thandRaceStreetPhiladelphia,PA19103Author:F.W.VosburyFRCGroupLeader:K.S.PertaerPreparedfoinuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555I'eadNRCEngineer:R.KendallM.WigdorJuly23,1982ThisreportwaspreparedasanaccountofworksponsoredbyanagencyoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.NeithertheUnitedStatesGovernmentno'ranyagencythereof,oranyoftheiriemployees,makesanywarranty,expressedorImplied,orassumesanylegalllabllltyorresponslbllltyforanythirdparty'suse,ortheresultsofsuchuse,ofanyInformation,appa-ratus,productorprocessdisclosedlnthisreport,orrepresentsthatItsusebysuchthird'artywouldnotInfringeprivatelyownedrights.Reviewedby:Approvedby:GroupLeaderPro'nagerDepartntDirctor'(~(~(yafoPRJ,'ranklinResearchCenterADivisionofTheFrankiininstitUteTheBenjaminFranklinParkway,Phila.,Pa.19103(215)448.1000 ll TERM5257-287SectionTitleP'acaeINTRODUCTION*~~~'~~~~~~~~11.1PurposeofReview1.2GenericIssueBackground1.3.Plant-SpecificBackgroundl.1~2REVIEHCRITERIA~~'~~~'e~~~~3TECHNICALEVALUATION~3.1GeneralDescriptionofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem3.2AutomaticInitiation.3.2.1Evaluation'.,3.2.2Conclusion:55668,3.3FlowIndication.933.13-3:2Evaluation,'onclusion:.3e4DescriptionofSteamGeneratorieCONCLUSIONS~~~'~~~~~~~~LevelIndication.~~~9~1010~'125RFZEHNCES~~~~,~~~~~~~~~~13~IÃFran}dinResearchCenterA~onQTheFnvklinIntoaac TERM5257-287ThisTechnicalEvaluationReportwaspreparedbyPranklinResearchCenterunderacontractwiththeU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation,DivisionofOperatingReactors)fortechnical.assistanceinsupportofNRCoperatingreactorlicensingactions.ThetechnicalevaluationwasconductedinaccordancewithcriteriaestabljshedbytheNBC.'"'r.P.W.Vosburycontributedtothetechnical'preparationofthisreport.throughasubcontractwithHESTECServices,Inc.bJvFrankiinResearchCenterI(("I,

'1 TER~257-2871oINTRODUCTION11PURPOSEOPREVIEW:Thepurposeofthisreviewistoprovideatechnicalevaluationoftheemergencyfeedwatersystemdesigntoverifythatsafety~radeautomaticinitiationcircuitryandflowindicationareprovidedattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPower'PlantAlthoughnotinthescopeofthisreview,thesteamgeneratorlevelindicationavailableattheGinnaplantisdescribedtoassistsubsequentNRCstaff.review.12GENERICISSUEBACKGROUNDApost-accidentdesignreviewbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NBC).aftertheMarch28<1979incidentatThreeMileIsland(TMI)Unit2estab-lishedthattheauxiliaryfeedwater(APH)systemshouldbetreatedasasafetysysteminapressurizedwaterreactor(PWR)plant.Thedesignsofsafetysystemsinanuclearpowerplantarerequiredtomeetgeneraldesign.criteria(GDC)specifiedinAppendixAof10CPR50[1].TherelevantdesigncriteriafortheAPWsystemdesignareGDC13,GDC20,andGDC34.GDC13setsforththerequirementforinstrumentationtomonitorvariablesandsystems(overtheiranticipatedrangesofoperation)thatcanaffectreactorsafetyGDC20requiresthataprotectionsystembedesignedtoinitiateautomaticallyinordertoassurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofanticipatedoperational4occurrences.GDC34requiresthatthesafetyfunctionofthedesignedsystem,thatis,theresidualheatremovalbytheAPW,system,beaccomplishedeveninthecaseofasinglefailure.OnSeptember13,1979,theNRCissuedaletter[2]toeachPWRlicenseethatdefinedasetofshort-termcontrol~raderequirementsforthe~system,.specified.inNUREG-0578[3].ZtrequiredthattheAMsystemhaveautomaticinitiationandsinglefailure-proofdesignconsistentwiththe,requirementsofGDC20andGDC34.Inaddition,itrequired~flow/indicationinthecontrolroominaccordance.withGDC13.'II!L!L~FrenkiinResearchCenter TER~257-287DuringtheweekofSeptember24,1979,seminarsvereheldinfourregionsof.thecountrytodiscusstheshort-termrequirements.OnOctober30,1979/,anotherlettervasissued-toeachPWRlicenseeprovidingaddit'ionalclarifica-tionoftheNRCstaffshort-termrequirementsvithoutalteringtheirintent[4].IIPost-TMIanalysesofprimarysystemresponsetofeedwatertransientsaridreliabilityofinstalledAFWsystemsalsoestablishedthat,inthelongterm,theAFWsystemshouldbeupgradedinaccordancevithsafety-graderequirements.Theselong-termrequirementswereclarifiedintheletterofSeptember5,1980[5]andformalizedintheletterofOctober31,1980[6].TheOctober-31='etter.incorporatedinonedocument,NUREG-0737f7]<allTMI-relateditemsapproved.bythecommissionforimplementationSectionII.E.1.2ofNUREG-0737clarifiestherequirementsfortheAFWsystemautomaticinitiationandflovindication.l.3PLANT-SPECIFICBACKGROUNDTheLicenseeoftheRobertEGinnaNuclearPowerPlant<RochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RG6E)<provideditsresponsetoReference3onOctober17,1979f8].InthisresponseRG&EindicatedthattheGinnaplantwasequippedwithasafety~rade<automaticallyinitiated2QWsystem,andthattheexistingflowindicationforeachgeneratorcompliedwiththerequirementsforacontrol-gradesystem.RG&EagreedtoupgradetheAFWflowindicationbyJanuary1,1981.Additionalcorrespondence[9-13]wasexchangedbetweenRGaEandtheNRCregardingtheAFWsystem,theimplementationofNUREG-0578,andthesubsequentclarification.issuedbytheNRCOnDecember30,1980[14]<RG&EprovideditsresponsetoNUREG-0737andincludedthedesigncriteriato'upgradetheAFWflovindicationtosafety~rade.OnAugust19,1981[15]<theNRCsentarequestforadditionalinformationtoaidinthecompletionofthisreport.RGRErespondedwiththeadditionalrequestedinformationonSeptember22,1981[13]u~JFr'anklin.ResearchCenteriiIii TER~257-.287~2~REVZEHCRITERIAToimprovethereliabilityoftheAHfsystem,theNRCrequiredlicenseestoupgrade.thesystem,wherenecessary<toensuretimelyautomaticinitiationwhenrequired.Thesystemupgradewastoproceedintwophases.Intheshortterm,asaminimum,control-gradesignalsandcircuitsweretobeusedtoauto-maticallyinitiatetheAPWsystem.Control~radesystemsweretomeetthefollowingrequirementsofNUBEG&578<Section2.1.7.a[3]:Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomaticinitiationof"theauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.2~Theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliaryfeedwatersystemfunction.3~Testabilityoftheinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign..4.Theinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybuses.5.Manualcapabilitytoinitiatetheauxiliaryfeedwatersys-temfromthecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplementedsothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnot'esultinthelossofsystemfunction.6."Theacmotor-drivenpumpsandvalvesintheauxiliaryfeed-vatersystemshallbeincludedintheautomaticactuation(simultaneousand/orsequential)oftheloadstotheemer-gencybuses.70TheautomaticinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapabilitytoinitiatetheAPHsystemfromthecontrolroom."Inthelongterm,thesesignalsandcircuitsweretobeupgradedinaccor>>dancewithsafety-graderequirements.Specifically,inadditiontotheabove1requirements,theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsweretohaveindependentchannels<useenvironmentallyqualifiedcomponents,havesystembypassed/inoperablestatusfeatures,andconformtocontrolsysteminteractioncriteria,asstipulatedinIEEEStd279-1971[17].'I4llllllFranklinResearchCenter TER~257<<287ThecapabilitytoascertaintheAPWsystemperformancefromthecontrolroommustalsobeprovided.Intheshortterm<steamgeneratorlevel,indicationandflowmeasurementweretobeusedtoassistthebperatorinmaintainingtherequiredsteamgeneratorlevelduringAB/systemoperation.ThissystemwastomeetthefollowingrequirementsfromNUREG-0578,Section.2.1.7.b[3),asclarifiedbyNUREG-0737,SectionII.E.1.2[7]:"1.Safety~radeindicationofauxiliaryfeedwaterflowtoeachsteamgeneratorshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.Theauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentchannelsshall-bepoweredfrom.theemergencybusesconsistentwithsatisfyingtheemergencypowerdiversityrequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemsetcnorthinAuxiliarySystemsBranchTechnicalPosition10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9[18}.":TheNRCstaffhasdeterminedthat<inthelongterm,theoverallflowrateindicationsystemforCombustionEngineeringandWestinghouse,plantsshouldincludeatleastoneAFHflowrateindicatorandonevide-rangesteamgenerator'.level.indicatorforeach"steamgeneratorortwoflowrateindicators.Theseflowindicationsystemsshouldbeenvironmentallyqualified;poweredfromahighlyreliable,batterybacked<non~lasslEpowersource;periodicallyItestablegpartoftheplant'squalityassuranceprogram;andcapableofdisplayondemand.Theoperatorreliesonsteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentation,inadditionto.APHflowindicatiori<todetermineAPHsystemperformance.TherequirementsforthissteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentationarespecifiedinRegulatory~Guide1.97,Revision2,"InstrumentationforLightWater-CooledNuclearPower1lPlants.toAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident"[19].~JIIIIJFranklinResearchCenter'is TER~257-2873~TECHNICALEVALUATION3.1GENERALDESCRIPTIONOFAUXILIARYPEEDWATERSYSTEMTheGinnaplantisaWestinghouse&esigned,two-3.oopnuclearpowerplant.TheAPWsystemconsistsofamainAPWsystemandastandbyAPWsystem.ThemainAFWsystemconsists.oftwomotorMrivenpumps(200gpmeach)andoneturbineMzivenpump(400gpm).Normally<eachmotor-drivenpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator<butthealignmentcanbealteredtoalloweithermotor-drivenpumptosupplybothsteam'generators.Theturbine&rivenpumpnormallysuppliesfeedwateztobothsteamgenerators.Eachpumpsupplies'thesteamgeneratorsthroughanormallyclosed,motor-operated,dischargevalve.OnlytheflowfromonemotorMrivenpump(200gpm)isnecessarytopreventthereactorcoolantsystemfromreachingthepressurerequiredtoactuateareliefbivalve.ThethreemainAPWpumpsarelocatedinthesameroomandcouldberenderedinoperableasaresultofahighenergylinebreak.ThestandbyAPWsystemwasinstalledtoprovideindependentAPWsystemcapabilityfollowingsuchaneventThestandbyAPWsystemconsistsoftwomotor-drivenpumps(200gpmeach)locatedinaplantareaseparatefrom'themainAPWsystem.ThestandbyAPWsystemismanuallyactuatedandalignedsothateachpuinpsuppliesonesteamgenerator.ThewatersourcesforthemainAPWsystemaretwo30,000-galloncondensatestoragetanks(non-seismic),a100<000~alloncondensatestoragetank(non-seismic)>andtheservicewatersystem(seismicCategoryI)~Thewater..sourceforthestandbyABCsystemistheservicewatersystem,whichdraws,itswaterfromLakeOntario.SteamgeneratorleveliscontrolledmanuallyfromthecontrolroombyadjustingthepositionofthemainAPWpumpmotormperateddischargevalves.k(I!ldFranklinResearchCenter TERM5257-28732AUTOMATICINITIATION3.2.1Evaluation'ThemainAPHsystemattheGinnaplantisdesignedasanengineeredsafe-guardssystemtoseismicCategoryI(withtheexceptionofthecondensatestoragetanks),Class1E,andtheautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsaredesignedtocomplywiththerequirementsofZEEEStd279-1971[17].'heGinnaplantmainAPHautomaticinitiationsystemconsistsoftwoindependentactuationtrains.Theactuationcircuitsarepoweredfromemergencydcbuses.,Theredundantchannelsarephysicallyseparatedand'Eelectricallyindependent.Areviewoftheautomaticinitiation'circuitryrevealednocrediblesinglefailurethatwouldinhibittheautomatic.'nit'iationsystemfromprovidingAPWflowtoatleastonegoodsteamgenerator.Thescopeofthesingle-failureanalysisinthisreportwaslimitedtotheredundancyofpowersupplies<diversityofactuatingsignals<'and'independenceandredundancyofautomaticinitiationcircuits.BoththemainandstandbyAPWmotor-drivenpumpsarepoweredbyindependentacemergencybuses.TheloadingofthemainAPHmotorMriven'pumpsontotheirrespective480-Vacemergencybusesispartofthepost-accident,au'tomaticloadsequencing.ThestandbyAPWmotorMrivenpumpsareinterlockedwiththemainAPHmotor-drivenpumpssothatbotharenotsimultaneouslyloaded'ontotheemergencybustopreventoverloadingduringlossof.offsitepower.Theturbine-drivenpump'receivesitssteamthroughamotor-operatedsteamadmiss'ionvalveineachoftwolinesthattapoffupstreamofthesteamgeneratorisolationvalves.ThefollowingsignalsareusedforautomaticiriitiationofthemainAPWsystem:Motor-drivenPumsolow-lowsteamgenerator..level(2outof3channelsoneither@teamgenerator)otripofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsosafetyinjection.~I~"Frankiin'ResearchCenter T~5257-287TurbineMrivenolow-lowsteamgenerator'level(2outof3channelsonbothsteamgenerators)olossofvoltageonboth4>>kVbusesThemainAPWsystemmaybemanuallyinitiatedfromthecontrolroombystartingthemotor-drivenAPWpumpsindividually;uponpumpstart,theassociateddischargevalveopens.ThemainAPWmotor~ivenpumpsdischargevalvesopenfullyonpumpstart.andthenthrottledowntolimitflowtoamaximumof230gpmtoeachsteamgeneratorThe'automaticthrottlingconservesauxiliaryfeedwaterandhelps.Limitthecooldownrate%eturbine&rivenpumpdischargevalveisnormallyopen;inaddition<whentheturbinMrivenpumpisautomaticallyinitiated(steamadmissionvalvesopen)<thedischargevalvereceivesanautomaticactuationsignaltoensurethatitisfullyopen.ThemainandstandbyAPWsystemandcomponentsaretestedinaccordancewi.thtechnicalspecifications.OperationoftheAPWpumpsandmotor-operatedvalvesischeckedmonthly.Evexy18monthseachmainAPWpumpandmainAPWmotor-operatedvalveisverifiedtooperatecorrectlyonreceiptofeachoftheautomaticinitiationsignals.Meautomaticinitiati'onlogicistestedmonthly.Thesystemdesignallowsonechanneltobebypassedformaintenancef~testing,andcalibrationduringpoweroperationwithoutinitiatingaprotectiveaction.Nhenachannelisbypassedfortesting,thebypassisaccompaniedby'asinglechannelalertandchannelstatuslightactuationinthecontrolroom.TheautomaticstartofthemainAPWmotorMrivenpumpsresultingfromthertrippingofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsmaybedefeatedduringstartuporshutdownwhentheturbinegeneratorisofftheline.Thedefeatswitchisautomaticallybypassedwhentheturbineislatched.Thisbypassisalarmedinthecontrolxoom.TheonlyinteractionbetweenthemainAPHsystemautomaticinitiationcircuitsandnormalsystemcontrolfunctionsoccursinthenarrow-rangesteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentation.:Theselevelinstrumentsareusedforboth-.I~,I$/s.~L~""FranklinResearchCenter TERM5257-287protection(reactortripandmainAFHinitiation)andnormalcontrolfunctions(narrow-rangechannelIonly)inthemainfeedwatersystem.Thecontrolsignalsareseparatedfromtheprotectionsignalsbyisolation'ransformerssothat.amalfunctioninthecontrolcircuitswillhavenoeffectonthe.protectionsignals.ThefollowingindividualalarmsareprovidedonthemaincontrolboardtoalerttheoperatorthatthemainAFWequipmentmaynotoperateproperly:olow-lowsteamgeneratorlevel(3channelseach)o2outof3low-lowsteamgeneratorlevels(1channeleach)Io3outof3low-lowsteamgenerator'evels(1channeleach)oemergencyshutdownequipmentlocalcontrolosafeguardsbreakertriposafeguardsequipmentlockmffomainAPHbypassindefeatlockout.osinglechannelalertostandbyAPHpumpCorDtripostandbyAPWpumptransferswitchoffnormal(1channeleach)'ostandbyAFHpumphigh'dischargeflow(1channeleach)ostandbyAPHpumphighdischargepressure(1channeleach)ostandbyAFHHVACtrouble.NoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamadmissionvalvesorAPHdischarge.valves.Areviewof.theautomaticandmanualinitiationcircuitryandsignalsrevealedthatnosinglefailureofeithercircuittrainwouldinhibitthecapabilityformanualinitiationfromthecontrolroomortheauxiliaryshutdownpanel.Theenvironmentalqualificationof.safety-relatedelectricalandmechanicalcomponents,includingAFWsystemcircuitsandcomponents,'sbeingreviewedseparatelybytheHRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthis.review.3.2.2ConclusionTheinitiationsignals,logic,andassociatedcircuitryoftheautomaticinitiationfeatureofthemainAFHsystemoftheGinnaplantcomplywiththeIJ~JLL'renklinResearchCenter

TERW5257-287.long-termsafety~raderequirementsofNORE~578,Section2.1.7.a,andthesubseeluentclarificationissuedbytheNRstaff..Znaddition,thefollowingpointmayeffectthereliabilityoftheAPHsystem:oNoalarmsadmissionareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamvalvesorAPHdischargevalves.3.3PLOWZNDZCATZON.3.3.1EvaluationThecapabilitytoevaluatetheperformanceofthemainandstandbyAPHsystemsattheGinnaplantisprovidedbythefollowingindications:o,mainAPHmotorMrivenpumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator(2channelseach)omainAPWturbineMrivenpumpdischargeflow(2channels)omainAPHturbine-drivenpumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator(2channelseach)ostandbyAPWmotor-drivenpumpflow(1channeleach)omainAPWpumpdischargepressureostandbyAPHpumpdischargepressuret~to,narrow-rangesteamgeneratorlevel(3channelseach)o"wide-rangesteamgeneratorlevel(1channeleach)omainandstandbyAZW'umpstatusindicationomainandstandbyAPH,valvepositionindicationocondensatestoragetanklevel(2channels).TheLicenseehasstatedthatthemainAPHflowindicationforeachsteamgeneratorissafety-grade.TheindividualsteamgeneratorAPHflowcircuitryispoweredfromseparatebattery-backedinstrumentbuses.PoreachmainAPWpump,thereisaprimaryandsecondaryflowinstrumentationchannel.The.primarychannelindicatesflowand,'forthemotor-drivenpumps,controlstheindividualdischargevalves.Thesecondaryflowinstrumentationindicatesflowonly.Theprimaryandsecondarychannelsarepoweredfromoppositeinstrumentbuses.Theprimaryandsecondaryflowindicationisprovidedonthemaincontrolboardbyadual-movementvertical-scaleindicator.)I)FranklinRes'earchCenter TERM5257-287SincethedischargeheaderfromtheturbineMrivenpump/ranchestosupplybothsteamgeneratois,anadditionalchannel'ofsafety~radeflowinstrumenta-tionisprovidedineachline.Safety~radewide-rangesteamgeneratorlevelindicationisprovidedasabackup.ThestandbyAPHsystemprovidesasingle..channelofsafety-guideflowinstrumentationforeachpump.Theflowindicationchannelsaretestedinaccordancewithtechnicalspecificatiohs.TheenvironmentalqualificationoftheAPHflowindicatorswillM.'IreviewedseparatelybytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3~3.2ConclusionItisconcludedthattheAPHflowinstrumentationattheGinnaplantcomplieswiththelong-termsafety~raderecyirementsof.NUREG-0578<Section2.1.7.b,andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.3~4DESCRIPTIONOP~STEAMGENERATORLEVELINDICATIONSteamgeneratorlevelindicationattheGinnapl'antconsistsofthreesafety-gradenarrow-rangelevelchannelsandonesafety~radewide-rangelevel.~channelpersteamgenerator.Theleveltransmittersandtheirpowersupplies*areasfollows:PSTEAMGENERATORAChannelTransmitterVitalBusHideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIII=LT-460LT-461LT-462LT-463AACDSTEAMGENERATORBChannelTransmitterVitalBusHideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIIILT-470LT-471LT-472LT-473BDABk'".'LlFranklinResearchCenter TERW5257-287Thesteamgeneratorlevelchannelsarecheckedeachshift,testedmonthly,andcalibratedduringrefueling.Thewide-rangechannelsforbothsteamgeneratorsareindicatedindividuallyononestripchartrecorder.Narrow-rangechannelsforboth'steamgeneratorsareindicatedonverticalgages.b3'ranMinResearchCenter

~i/

~a~aw~~a~~~>v~.TERM5257-2874~CONCLUSIONSTheinitiationsignals,logic,andassociatedcircuitryoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantauxiliaryfeedwatersystemcomplywiththelong-termsafety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.a[3],andthesub-sequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.Inaddition,thefollowingpointsmayaffectthereliabilityof-theAPW"system:oNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravai3.ableto=the=steamadmissionvalvesorAPWdischargevalves.Theauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentationcomplieswiththelong-termsafety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578'<Section2.1.7.b[3]<andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.r't~JP~~FranklinResearchCenter

~~~TER~257-2872~5~REFERENCES1CodeofFederalRegulations,Title10,OfficeoftheFederalRegister,NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration,RevisedJanuary1<1980.NRC<Genericlettertoall'PHRlicenseesregardingshort-termrequirementsresultingfromThreeMileIslandAccidentSeptember13,1979.304~5NUBEG-0578,"TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportand,.ShortMermRecommendationsNRC,July1979.NRC<Genericlettertoall'PWRlicenseesclarifyinglessonslearned'hort-termrequirements,October30;1979.NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesregardingshort-termrequirementresultingfromThreeMileIslandAccident,September5<1980.67~NRCGenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesregardingpost-TMIrequirements,October31,1980.INUREG-0737<"Clarification:ofTMIActionPlanRequirements;"NRC,November1980.89.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD,.L.Ziemann(NRC)October17<1979L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NHC)'November19,.197910.L.D.,White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November28<197911.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)December14,197912.13~D.M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoL.D.White(RG&E)July7,1980D;M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RG&E)Mayll,'1981.'I4L3[)FranMinResearchCenter

~~~~~':~~ITER~257-28714J.E.Maier(RC'4E)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield(NBC)December30,198015.D.M.Crutchfield(NBC)'ettertoJ.E.Maier(RGS,E)August19'98116.J.E.Maier(RGRE)LettertoD.MCrutchfield(NBC)September22,198117~,18'EEEStd279-1971,CriteriaforProtectionSystemsforNuclear-,powerGeneratingStations<"InstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers,Inc.,NewYork,NY.NUREG-75/087,StandardReviewPlangSection10..4.9tRev.1gUSNRC,nodate19RegulatoryGuide1.97(TaskRS917-4)<'InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandPollowinganAccident/Rev2gNRCtDecember1980 hC'Il~VPA'I TECHNICALEVALUATIONREPORTAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMAUTOMATICINITIATIONANDFLOWINDICATION(F-16,F-17)ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONROBERTE,GINNANUCLEARPOWERPLANT.NRCDOCKETNO.50-244NRCTACNO.11706NRCCONTRACTNO.NRG43-79-118FRCPROJECTCS257FRCASSIGNMENT9FRCTASK287PreparedbyFranklinResearchCenter20thandRaceStreetPhiladelphia,PA19103Auth01':F.W.VosburyFRCGroupLeader:K.S.FertnerPreparedfoiNuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555LeadNRCEngineer'.KendallM.WigdorJuly23,'1982ThisreportwaspreparedasanaccountofworksponsoredbyanagencyoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.NeithertheUnitedStatesGovernmentnoranyagencythereof,oranyoftheiremployees,makesanywarranty,expressedorImplied,orassumesanylegalliabilityorresponsibilityforanythirdparty'suse,ortheresultsofsuchuse,ofanyInformation,appa-ratus,productorprocessdisclosedInthisreport,orrepresentsthatitsusebysuchthird'artywouldnotInfringeprivatelyownedrights.Reviewedby:Approvedby;GroupLeaderPro'nagerDepartntDlrctorDESIGNATEDORIGINALCertified.By~~FId'ADivisionofTheFranklinInstituteTheBenjaminFrankiinParkwoy,Phila.,Pa.19103(215)4481000 TERM5257-287SectionTitlePacae2INTRODUCTION1.1PurposeofReview1.2GenericIssueBackground1.3Plant-SpecificBackgroundREVIEWCRITERIA~~111e2~33.2AutomaticInitiation.~~TECHNZCALEVALUATION3.1GeneralDescriptionofAuxiliaryPeedwaterSystem5563.2.1Evaluation3.2.2Conclusion:~i~~683.3PlowIndication.933.13'-3.-2Evaluation,'onclusion'.CONCLUSIONS3e4DescriptionofSteamGeneratorLevelIndication.9101012REFERENCES13)llFranMinResearchCenterADivisiondTheFrsnrrtinInserore TER~57-28.7ThisTechnicalEvaluationReportwaspreparedbyFranklinResearchCenterunderacontractwiththeU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation,DivisionofOperatingReactors)fortechnicalassistanceinsupportofNRCoperatingreactorlicensingactions.The~technicalevaluationwasconductedinaccordancewithcriteriaestablishedby~theNRC.Mr.F.W.Vosburycontributedtothetechnical'preparationofthisreportthroughasubcontractwithWESTECServices,Inc.FranklinResearchCenterADivisionot'sieFrenidinInsonrtev TER~257-2871,INTRODUCTION1.1PURPOSEOFREVIEWThepurposeofthisreviewistoprovideatechnicalevaluationoftheemergencyfeedwatersystemdesigntoverifythatsafety-gradeautomaticinitiationcircuitryandflowindicationareprovidedattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Althoughnotinthescopeofthisreview,thesteamgeneratorlevelindicationavailableattheGinnaplantisdescribedtoassistsubsequentNRCstaffreview.lo2GENERICISSUEBACKGROUNDApost-accidentdesignreviewbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC).aftertheMarch28,1979incidentatThreeMileIsland(TMI)Unit2estab-lishedthattheauxiliaryfeedwater(AW)systemshouldbetreatedasasafetysysteminapressurizedwaterreactor(PWR)plant.Thedesignsofsafetysystemsin'anuclearpowerplantarerequiredtomeetgeneraldesigncriteria(GDC)specifiedinAppendixAof10CFR50[1).TherelevantdesigncriteriafortheAFWsystemdesignareGDC13<GDC20'ndGDC34'DC13setsforththerequirementforinstrumentationtomonitorvariablesandsystems(overtheiranticipatedrangesofoperation)thatcanaffectreactorsafety.GDC20requiresthataprotectionsystembedesignedtoinitiateautomaticallyinordertoassurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.GDC34requiresthatthesafetyfunctionofthedesignedsystem,thatis,theresidualheatremovalbytheAFWsystem,beaccomplishedeveninthecaseofasinglefailure.OnSeptember13,1979,theNRCissuedaletter[2]toeachPWRlicenseethatdefinedasetofshort-termcontrol-graderequirementsfortheAFWsystem,specifiedinNUREG-0578[33.ItrequiredthattheAMsystemhaveautomaticinitiationandsinglefailure-proofdesignconsistentwiththerequirementsofGDC20andGDC34.Inaddition,itrequiredA1WflowindicationinthecontrolroominaccordancewithGDC13.IjljFranMinResearchCenterADiviisionotTheFfsnklinInsutu<t TER~257287DuringtheweekofSeptember24>1979,seminarswereheldinfourregionsofthecountrytodiscusstheshort-termrequirements.OnOctober30,1979,anotherletterwasissued-toeachPWRlicenseeprovidingadditionalclarifica-tionoftheNRCstaffshort-termrequirementswithoutalteringtheirintent[4]~Post-TMIanalysesofprimarysystemresponsetofeedwatertransientsandreliabilityofinstalledAFWsystemsalsoestablishedthat,inthelongterm,theAFWsystemshouldbeupgradedinaccordancewithsafety-graderequirements.Theselong-termrequirementswereclarifiedintheletterofSeptember5>1980[5]andformalizedintheletterofOctober31<1980[6].The'ctober-.31rletterincorporatedinonedocument,NUREG-0737[7],allTHI-relateditemsapprovedbythecommissionforimplementation.SectionII.E.1.2ofNUREG-0737clarifiestherequirementsfortheAFWsystemautomaticinitiationandflowindication.lo3PLANT-SPECIFICBACKGROUNDTheLicenseeoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,RochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RGhE),provideditsresponsetoReference3onOctober17,1979[8]~InthisresponseRGSEindicatedthattheGinnaplantwasequippedwithasafety-grade<automaticallyinitiatedAFWsystem,andthattheexistingflowindicationforeachgeneratorcompliedwiththerequirementsforacontrol~radesystem.RGREagreedtoupgradetheAFWflowindicationbyJanuary1,1981.Additionalcorrespondencef9-13]wasexchangedbetweenBG&EandtheNRCregardingtheAFWsystem,theimplementationofNUREG-0578,andthesubsequentclarification,issuedbytheNRC.OnDecember30,1980f14],RGaEprovideditsresponsetoNUREG-0737andincludedthedesigncriteriatoupgradetheAFWflowindicationtosafety-grade.OnAugust19,1981[15],theNRCsentarequestforadditionalinformationtoaidinthecompletionofthisreport.RGSErespondedwiththeadditionalrequestedinformationonSeptember22'981f13][illFranklinResearchCenterADon@IonotTheFrlnkh'nlnsotute TER~257-.2872REVIEWCRITERIAToimprovethereliabilityoftheABCsystem,theHRCrequiredlicenseesto.upgradethesystem,wherenecessary,toensuretimelyautomaticinitiationwhenrequired.Thesystemupgradewastoproceedintwophases.Intheshortterm,asaminimum,control-gradesignalsandcircuitsweretobeusedtoauto-maticallyinitiatetheAPHsystem.Control~radesystemsweretomeetthefollowingrequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.af3]:"1.Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomaticinitiationoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.2.Theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliaryfeedwatersystemfunction.3.Testabilityoftheinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.4.Theinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybuses.5.Manualcapabilitytoinitiatetheauxiliaryfeedwatersys<<ternfromthecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplementedsothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnotresultintheloss'ofsystemfunction.6.Theacmotor-drivenpumpsandvalvesintheauxiliaryfeed-watersystemshallbeincludedintheautomaticactuation(simultaneousand/orsequential)oftheloadstotheemer-gencybuses.7.TheautomaticinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapabilitytoinitiatetheAPWsystemfromthecontrolroom."Inthelongterm,thesesignalsandcircuitsweretobeupgradedinaccor-dancewithsafety~raderequirements.Specifically,inadditiontotheaboverequirements,theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsweretohaveindependentchannels,useenvironmentallyqualifiedcomponents,havesystembypassed/inoperablestatusfeatures,andconformtocontrolsysteminteractioncriteria,asstipulatedinIEEEStd279-1971f17].ll!)llFranMinResearchCenterADivisionofTheFnuk5nInsane TER~257-,287ThecapabilitytoascertaintheAPWsystemperformancefromthecontrolroommustalsobeprovided.Intheshorttean,steamgeneratorlevel1indicationandflowmeasurementweretobeusedtoassisttheoperatorin"maintainingtherequiredsteamgeneratorlevelduringAFHsystemoperation.'hissystemwastomeetthefollowingrequirementsfromNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7b[3],asclarifiedbyNUREG-0737>SectionII.E.1.2[7]:"3..Safety~radeindicationofauxiliaryfeedwaterflowtoeachsteamgeneratorshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.Theauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentchannelsshall.be=poweredfromtheemergencybusesconsistentwithsatisfyingtheemergencypowerdiversityrequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemsetforthinAuxiliarySystemsBranchTechnicalPosition10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9[18]."TheNRCstaffhasdeterminedthat,inthelongterm<theoverallflowrateindicationsystemf'rCombustionEngineeringandWestinghouseplantsshouldincludeatleastoneAPWflowrateindicatorandonevide-rangesteamgeneratorlevelindicatorforeachsteamgeneratoror.twoflowrateindicators.Theseflowindicationsystemsshouldbeenvironmentallyqualified~poweredfromahighlyreliable,batterybacked,nonmlass1Epowersource;periodicallytestable;partoftheplant'squalityassuranceprogram;andcapableofdisplayondemand.Theoperatorreliesonsteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentation,inadditiontoAPWflowindication<todetermineAPWsystemperformance.TherequirementsforthissteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentationarespecifiedinRegulatory'uide1.97,Revision2<"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandPollowinganAccident"[19].FranklinResearchCenterADMsion4TheFnuA!inInsotutc TERM5257-2873TECHNICALEVALUATION31GENERALDESCRIPTIONOPAVXILIARYPEEDWATERSYSTEMTheGinnaplantisaWestinghouse-designed,two-loopnuclearpowerplant.TheAFWsystemconsistsofamainAFWsystemandastandbyAFWsystem.ThemainAPWsystemconsistsoftwomotorMrivenpumps(200gpmeach)andoneturbine-drivenpump(400gpm).Normally<eachmotor-drivenpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator,butthealignmentcanbealteredtoalloweithermotor-drivenpumptosupplybothsteamgenerators.Theturbine-drivenpumpnormallysuppliesfeedwatertobothsteamgenerators.Eachpumpsuppliesthesteamgeneratorsthroughanormallyclosed,motor-operated,dischargevalve.OnlytheflowfromonemotorMrivenpump(200gpm)isnecessarytopreventthereactorcoolantsystemfromreachingthepres'surerequiredtoactuateareliefvalve.ThethreemainAPWpumpsarelocatedinthesameroomandcouldberenderedinoperableasaresultofahighenergylinebreak.ThestandbyAPWsystemwasinstalledtoprovideindependentAIWsystemcapabilityfollowingsuchanevent..ThestandbyAPWsystemconsistsoftwomotor<<drivenpumps(200gpmeach)locatedinaplantareaseparatefromthemainAFWsystem.ThestandbyAPWsystemismanuallyactuatedandalignedsothateachpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator.ThewatersourcesforthemainAPWsystemaretwo30,000~alloncondensatestoragetanks(non-seismic),a100,000~alloncondensatestoragetank(non-seismic),andtheservicewatersystem(seismicCategoryI).Thewater.sourceforthestandbyAPWsystemistheservicewatersystem,whichdrawsitswaterfromLakeOntario.SteamgeneratorleveliscontrolledmanuallyfromthecontrolroombyadjustingthepositionofthemainAFWpumpmotor-operateddischargevalves.IllFranMinResearchCenterACiMsionotTheFfsnkhnInstate TERM5257-2873.2AUTOMATICINITIATION3.2.1Evaluation-ThemainAFWsystemattheGinnaplantisdesignedasanenginee'redsafe-guardssystemtoseismicCategoryI(withtheexceptionofthecondensatestoragetanks),Class1E,andtheautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsaredesignedtocomplywiththerequirementsofIEEEStd279-1971f17].'heGinnaplantmainAWautomaticinitiationsystemconsistsoftwoindependentactuationtrains.Theactuationcircuitsarepoweredfromemergencydcbuses.Theredundantchannelsarephysicallyseparatedandelectricallyindependent.AreviewoftheautomaticinitiationcircuitryrevealednocrediblesinglefailurethatwouldinhibittheautomaticinitiationsystemfromprovidingAFWflowtoatleastonegoodsteamgenerator.Thescopeofthesingle-failureanalysisinthisreportwaslimitedtotheredundancyofpowersupplies,diversityofactuatingsignals,'ndindependenceandredundancyofautomaticinitiationcircuits.BoththemainandstandbyAFWmotor-drivenpumpsarepoweredbyindependentacemergencybuses.TheloadingofthemainAFWmotorMrivenpumpsontotheirrespective480-Vacemergencybusesispartofthepost-accidentautomaticloadsequencing.ThestandbyAFWmotorMrivenpumpsareinterlockedwiththemainAFWmotor-drivenpumpssothatbotharenotsimultaneouslyloadedontotheemergencybustopreventoverloadingduringlossofoffsitepower.TheturbineMrivenpumpreceivesitssteamthroughamotor-operatedsteamadmissionvalveineachoftwolinesthattapoffupstreamofthesteamgeneratorisolationvalves.ThefollowingsignalsareusedforautomaticinitiationofthemainAFWsystem:Motor-drivenPumsIolow-lowsteamgeneratorlevel(2outof3channelsoneithersteamgenerator)otripofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsosafetyinjection.)L'L<l.renklinResearchCenter T~5257-287Turbine-drivenolow-lowsteamgenerator,'level(2outof3channelsonbothsteamgenerators)olossofvoltageonboth4-kVbusesThemainAFWsystemmaybemanuallyinitiatedfromthecontrol,roomby.startingthemotor-drivenAPWpumpsindividually;uponpumpstart,theassociateddischargevalveopens.ThemainAPWmotor-drivenpumpsdischargevalvesopenfullyonpumpstart.andthenthrottledowntolimit'flowtoamaximumof230gpmtoeachsteamgenerator.Theautomaticthrottlingconservesauxiliaryfeedwaterandhelpslimitthecooldownrate.Theturbine&rivenpumpdischargevalveisnormallyopen;inaddition,whentheturbine-drivenpumpisautomaticallyinitiated(steamadmissionvalvesopen),thedischargevalvereceivesanautomaticactuationsignaltoensurethatitisfullyopen.ThemainandstandbyAPWsystemandcomponentsaretestedinaccordancewithtechnicalspecifications.,OperationoftheAB/pumpsandmotor-operatedvalvesischeckedmonthly.Every18monthseachmainAFWpumpandmainAPWmotor~peratedvalveisverifiedtooperatecorrectlyon'receiptofeachoftheautomaticinitiationsignals.Theautomaticinitiationlogicistestedmonthly.Thesystemdesignallowsonechanneltobebypassedformaintenance,~testing,andcalibrationduringpoweroperationwithoutinitiatingaprotectiveaction.When'achannelisbypassedfortesting,thebypassisaccompaniedbyasinglechannelalertandchannelstatuslightactuationinthecontrolroom.~TheautomaticstartofthemainAPWmotor&rivenpumpsresultingfromthetrippingofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsmaybedefeatedduringstartuporshutdownwhentheturbinegeneratorisofftheline.Thedefeatswitchisautomaticallybypassedwhentheturbineislatched.Thisbypassisalarmedinthecontrolroom.TheonlyinteractionbetweenthemainAFWsystemautomaticinitiationcircuitsandnormalsystemcontrolfunctionsoccursinthenarrow-rangesteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentation.'heselevelinstrumentsareusedforbothjfffiflrjL'uJFranklinResearchCenterhDivisionofnreFran@inInsrrnrre TERM5257-287protection(reactortripandmainAPHi.nitiation)andnormalcontrolfunctions.(narrow-rangechannelIonly)inthemainfeedwatersystem.ThecontrolsignaLsareseparatedfromtheprotectionsignalsbyisolationtransformerssothat.amalfunctioninthecontrolcircui.tswillhavenoeffecton-theprotectionsignals.Thefollowingindividualalarmsareprovidedonthemaincontrolboard.toalerttheoperatorthatthemainAPWequipmentmaynotoperateproperly:olow-lowsteamgeneratorlevel(3channelseach)o2outof3low-lowsteamgeneratorlevels(1channeleach)o3outof3low-lowsteamgeneratorlevels(1channeleach)oemergencyshutdownequipmentlocalcontrolosafeguardsbreakertriposafeguardsequipmentlockmffomainAPHbypassindefeatlockout~osinglechannelalertostandbyAFWpumpCorDtripo-standbyAPWpumptransferswitchoffnormal(1channeleach)ostandbyAFHpumphighdischargeflow(1channeleach)ostanctbyAPWpumphighdischargepressure(1channeleach)ostandbyAFNHVACtrouble..NoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamadmissionvalvesorAPWdischargevalves.Areviewoftheautomaticandmanualinitiationcircuitryandsignalsrevealedthatnosinglefailureofeithercircuittrainwouldinhibitthecapabilityformanualinitiationfromthecontrolroomortheauxiliaryshutdownpanel.Theenvironmentalqualificationofsafety-relatedelectricalandmechanicalcomponents,includingAFHsystemcircuitsandcomponents,isbeingreviewedseparatelybytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.I3.2.2ConclusionTheinitiationsignals,logic,andassociatedcircuitryoftheautomaticinitiationfeatureofthemainAFHsystemoftheGinnaplantcomplywiththeIIl)FranklinResearchCenterADivisionafTheFronkttnInt TERM5257-287,long-termsafety-graderequirementsofNURE&4578,Section2;1.7.a,andthe\subsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRCstaff.Inaddition,thefollowingpointmayeffectthereliabilityoftheAPHsystem:oNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamadmissionvalvesorAFWdischargevalves.3.3FLOWINDICATION3.3.1EvaluationCThecapabilitytoevaluatetheperformanceofthemainandstandbyAFHsystemsattheGinnaplantisprovidedbythefollowingindications:omainAPWmotor-drivenpumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator(2channelseach)omainAFWturbineMrivenpumpdischargeflow(2channels).omainAPHturbine-drivenpumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator(2channelseach)ostandbyAPHmotor-drivenpumpflow(1channeleach)omainAFWpumpdischargepressureostandbyAPWpumpdischargepressureonarrow-rangesteamgeneratorlevel(3channelseach)owide-rangesteamgeneratorlevel(1channeleach)omainandstandbyAPW'pumpstatusindicationomainandstandbyAPWvalvepositionindicationocondensatestoragetanklevel(2channels).TheLicenseehasstatedthatthemainAPWflowindicationforeachsteamgeneratorissafety~rade.TheindividualsteamgeneratorAFHflowcircuitryispoweredfromseparatebattery-backedinstrumentbuses.PoreachmainAFWpump,thereisaprimaryandsecondaryflowinstrumentationchannel.Theprimarychannelindicatesflowand,forthemotor-drivenpumps,controlstheindividualdischargevalves.Thesecondaryflowinstrumentationindicatesflowonly.Theprimaryandsecondarychannelsarepoweredfromoppositeinstrumentbuses.Theprimaryandsecondaryflowindicationisprovidedonthemaincontrolboardbyadual-movementvertical-scaleindicator.)llFranklinResearchCenterADnnsionofTheFrsnkbnInsatiate TERM5257-287Sincethedischargeheaderfromtheturbine-drivenpumpbranchestosupplybothsteamgenerators,anadditionalchannel'ofsafety~radeflowinstrumenta-tionisprovidedineachline.Safety~radewide-rangesteamgeneratorlevelindicationisprovidedasabackup.ThestandbyAPHsystemprovidesa.single-channelofsafety~uideflowinstrumentationforeachpump.Theflowindicationchannelsaretestedinaccordancewithtechnicalspecifications.TheenvironmentalqualificationoftheAPWflowindicatorswillhe-reviewedseparatelybytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3.3.2ConclusionItisconcludedthattheAPWflowinstrumentationattheGinnaplantcomplieswiththelong-termsafety~raderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.b,andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.3.4DESCRIPTIONOPSTEAMGENERATORLEVELINDICATIONSteamgeneratorlevelindicationattheGinnaplantconsists'ofthreesafety-gradenarrow-rangelevelchannelsandonesafety~radewide-rangelevel,channelpersteamgenerator.areasfollows:TheleveltransmittersandtheirpowersuppliesSTEAMGENERATORAChannelTransmitterVitalBusWideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIZNarrowRangeIIILT-460LT-461LT-462LT-463AACDSTEAMGENERATORBChannel'ideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeZZNarrowRangeZZZTransmitterILT-470LT-471LT-472LT-473VitalBusBDABIjl)FranMlnResearchCenterh~ae TERM5257-287Thesteamgeneratorlevelchannelsarecheckedeachshift<tested.monthly,andcalibratedduringrefueling.Thewide-rangechannelsforbothsteamgeneratorsareindicatedindividuallyononestripchartrecorder.Narrow-,rangechannelsforbothsteamgeneratorsareindicatedonverticalgages.)llFranMinResearchCenterADresisnotTheFranklinInstitute TERM5257-2874CONCLUSIONSTheinitiationsignals,logic,andassociatedcircuitryoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantauxiliaryfeedwatersystemcomplywiththe'long-termsafety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.a[3],andthesub-sequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.IZnaddition,thefollowingpointsmayaffectthereliabilityof.theAPWsystem0o"Noalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailableto=thesteamadmissionvalvesorAFHdischargevalves.Theauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentationcomplieswiththelong-term~safety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.b[3],andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.l)llFranMinResearchCenterADivisionorTheFrontonInsutute TERW5257-287REFERENCES2~3~4~CodeofFederalRegulations,Title10,OfficeoftheFederalRegister,NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration,RevisedJanuary1,1980.NRC,Genericlettertoall'WRlicenseesregardingshort-termrequirementsresultingfromThreeMileIslandAccidentSeptember13,1979.INUHEG-0578,"TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForceStatusReportandShortMermRecommendations'<"NRC,July1979.NRC,Genericlettertoall'WRlicenseesclarifyinglessonslearnedshort-termrequirements,October30,1979.5~NRC,Genericlettertoall'PWRlicenseesregardingshort-termrequirementresultingfromThreeMileIslandAccident,September5,1980'.7~8.9.NRCGenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesregardingpost-TMIrequirements,October31,1980.INUREG-0737,"ClarificationiofTMIActionPlanRequirements;"NRC,November1980.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)October17,1979L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NBC)November19,197910'1.L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November28<1979L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)December14,197912.13.D.M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoL.D.White(RG&E)July7i1980ID.M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RG&E)Mayll,1981!FranklinResearchCenterADnbiondTheFranklinInsowte TER~257-28714.J.E.Maier(RGSE)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield(NRC)December30,198015.D.M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RGaE)August19<198116.J.E.Maier(RG&E)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield(NRC)September22,198117.IEEEStd279-1971,'CriteriaforProtectionSystemsforNuclear--PowerGeneratingStations,"InstituteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers,Inc.,NewYork/NY.18.NUREG-75/087'StandardReviewPlang'ection10.4.9gRev.lgUSNRC,nodate.19.RegulatoryGuide1.97(TaskRS917-4)<"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandPollowinganAccident,'ev.2,NRC,December1980.III)FranklinResearchCenterI TECHNICALEVALUATIONREPORTAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMAUTOMATICINITIATIONANDFLOWINDICATION<F-16.F-37)ROCHESTERGASANDELECTRICCORPORATIONROBERTE,GINNANUCLEARPONERPLANTNRCDOCKETNO.50-244NRCTACNO.11706NRCCONTRACTNO.NRC43-79-118FRCPROJECTC5257FRCASSIGNMENT9FRCTASK2S7PreparedbyFranklinResearchCenter20thandRaceStreetPhiladelphia,PA19103Author:F.W.VosburyFRCGroupLeader:K.S.FertnerPreparedforNuclearRegulatoryCommissionWashington,D.C.20555LeadNFICEngineer:R.KendallM.WigdorJuly23,19S2ThisreportwaspreparedasanaccountofworksponsoredbyanagencyoftheUnitedStatesGovernment.NeithertheUnitedStatesGovernmentno'ranyagencythereof,oranyoftheiremployees,makesanywarranty,expressedorImplied,orassumesanylegalliabilityorresponsibilityforanythirdparty'suse,ortheresultsofsuchuse,ofanyInformation,appa-ratus,productorprocessdisclosedInthisreport,orrepresentsthatitsusebysuchthird'artywouldnotInfringeprivatelyownedrights.Reviewedby:Approvedby:GroupLeaderPro'nagerDepartntDirctor".8207270149.820723.DOCK05000244CF9IlFranklinResearchCenterADivisionofTheFranklininstitute7heBenjaminFranklinParkway,Phila.,Pa.19103(215)448-1000 TERM5257-287CONTENTSSectionTitle~PaeINTRODUCTION~1.1PurposeofReview1.2GenericIssueBackground1.3Plant-SpecificBackground1112REVIEWCRITERIA~3TECHNICALEVALUATION~3.1GeneralDescriptionofAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystem3.2AutomaticInitiation.3.2;1Evaluation3.2.2Conclusion556683.3FlowIndication.93.3.1Evaluation3.3,.2Conclusion3a4DescriptionofSteamGeneratorLevelIndicationCONCLUSIONSREFERENCES910101213~llllFranklinResearchcenterrtkDMeiOnOlTbt:FranMtnInSututt:

TERM5257-287FOREWORDThisTechnicalEvaluationReportwaspreparedbyFranklinResearchCenterunderacontractwiththeU.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommission(OfficeofNuclearReactorRegulation,DivisionofOperatingReactors)fortechnicalassistanceinsupportofNRCoperatingreactorlicensingactions.ThetechnicalevaluationwasconductedinaccordancewithcriteriaestablishedbytheNRC.Mr.F.W.VosburycontributedtothetechnicalpreparationofthisreportthroughasubcontractwithWESTECServices,Inc.~llllFranklinResearchCenterADivlslonofTheFrenItlnInstitute J

aTER-C5257-287l.INTRODUCTION1.1PURPOSEOFREVIEWThepurposeofthisreviewistoprovideatechnicalevaluationoftheemergencyfeedwatersystemdesigntoverifythatsafety-gradeautomaticinitiationcircuitryandflowindicationareprovidedattheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant.Althoughnotinthescopeofthisreview,thesteamgeneratorlevelindicationavailableattheGinnaplantisdescribedtoassistsubsequentNRCstaffreview.1.2GENERICISSUEBACKGROUNDApost-accidentdesignreviewbytheNuclearRegulatoryCommission(NRC)aftertheMarch28,,1979incidentatThreeMileIsland(TMI)Unit2estab-lishedthattheauxiliaryfeedwater(AFW)systemshouldbetreatedasasafetysysteminapressurizedwaterreactor(PWR)plant.Thedesignsofsafetysystemsinanuclearpowerplantarerequiredtomeetgeneraldesigncriteria(GDC)specifiedinAppendixAof10CFR50[1].TherelevantdesigncriteriafortheAFWsystemdesignareGDC13,GDC20,andGDC34.GDC13setsforththerequirementforinstrumentationtomonitorvariablesandsystems(overtheiranticipatedrangesofoperation)thatcanaffectreactorsafety.GDC20requiresthataprotectionsystembedesignedtoinitiateautomaticallyinordertoassurethatacceptablefueldesignlimitsarenotexceededasaresultofanticipatedoperationaloccurrences.GDC34requiresthatthesafetyfunctionofthedesignedsystem,thatis,theresidualheatremovalbytheAFWsystem,beaccomplishedeveninthecaseofasinglefailure.OnSeptember13,1979,theNRCissuedaletter[2]toeachPWRlicenseethatdefinedasetofshort-termcontrol-graderequirementsfortheAFWsystem,specifiedinNUREG-0578[3].ItrequiredthattheAFWsystemhaveautomaticinitiationandsinglefailure-proofdesignconsistentwiththerequirementsofGDC20andGDC34.Inaddition,itrequiredAFWflowindicationinthecontrolroominaccordancewithGDC13.~llllFranklinResearchcenterrstDltrlslonofTheFranklnInstitttte TER-C5257-287DuringtheweekofSeptember24,1979,seminarswereheldinfourregionsofthecountrytodiscusstheshort-termrequirements.OnOctober30,1979,anotherletterwasissuedtoeachPWRlicenseeprovidingadditionalclarifica-IItionoftheNRCstaffshort-termrequirementswithoutalteringtheirintent[4].Post-TMIanalysesofprimarysystemresponsetofeedwatertransientsandreliabilityofinstalledAFWsystemsalsoestablishedthat,inthelongterm,theAFWsystemshouldbeupgradedinaccordancewithsafety-graderequirements.Theselong-termrequirementswereclarifiedintheletterofSeptember5,1980[5]andformalizedintheletterofOctober31,1980[6].TheOctober31letterincorporatedinonedocument,NUREG-0737[7],allTMI-relateditemsapprovedbythecommissionforimplementation.SectionII.E.1.2ofNUREG-0737clarifiestherequirementsfortheAFWsystemautomaticinitiationandflowindication.13PLANT-SPECIFICBACKGROUNDTheLicenseeoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlant,RochesterGasandElectricCorporation(RGGE)rprovideditsresponsetoReference3onOctober17,1979[8].InthisresponseRGt'EindicatedthattheGinnaplantwasequippedwithasafety-grade,automaticallyinitiatedAFWsystem,andthattheexistingflowindicationforeachgeneratorcompliedwiththerequirementsforacontrol-gradesystem.RG6EagreedtoupgradetheAFWflowindicationbyJanuary1,1981.Additionalcorrespondence[9-13]wasexchangedbetweenRGGEandtheNRCregardingtheAFWsystem,theimplementationofNUREG-0578,andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.OnDecember30,1980[14],RGaEprovideditsresponsetoNUREG-0737andincludedthedesigncriteriatoupgradetheAFWflowindicationtosafety-grade.OnAugust19,1981[15]rtheNRCsentarequestforadditionalinformationtoaidinthecompletionofthisreport.RG&ErespondedwiththeadditionalrequestedinformationonSeptember22,1981[13].(IllFranklinResearchCenterA(anionorTheFranMlnInaarure TER-C5257-2872~REVIEWCRITERIAToimprovethereliabilityoftheAMsystem,theNRCrequiredlicenseestoupgradethesystem,wherenecessary,toensuretimelyautomaticinitiationwhenrequired.Thesystemupgradewastoproceedintwophases.Intheshortterm,asaminimum,control-gradesignalsandcircuitsweretobeusedtoauto-maticallyinitiatetheAFWsystem.Control-gradesystemsweretomeetthefollowingrequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.a[3]:"1.Thedesignshallprovidefortheautomaticinitiationoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystem.2.Theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothatasinglefailurewillnotresultinthelossofauxiliaryfeedwatersystemfunction.3.Testabilityoftheinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbeafeatureofthedesign.4.Theinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybuses.5.'Manualcapabilitytoinitiatetheauxiliaryfeedwatersys-temfromthecontrolroomshallberetainedandshallbeimplementedsothatasinglefailureinthemanualcircuitswillnotresultintheloss'ofsystemfunction.6.Theacmotor-drivenpumpsandvalvesintheauxiliaryfeed-watersystemshallbeincludedintheautomaticactuation(simultaneousand/or'equential)oftheloadstotheemer-gencybuses.7.TheautomaticinitiatingsignalsandcircuitsshallbedesignedsothattheirfailurewillnotresultinthelossofmanualcapabilitytoinitiatetheAkWsystemfromthecontrolroom."Inthelongterm,thesesignalsandcircuitsweretobeupgradedinaccor-dancewithsafety-graderequirements.Specifically,inadditiontotheaboveYrequirements,theautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsweretohaveindependentchannels,useenvironmentallyqualifiedcomponents,havesystembypassed/inoperablestatusfeatures,andconformtocontrolsysteminteractioncriteria,asstipulatedinIEEEStd279-1971[17].()llFranklinResearchCenterAChilonofTheFranklinInstitute TER-C5257-287ThecapabilitytoascertaintheAFWsystemperformancefromthecontrolroommustalsobeprovided.Intheshortterm,steamgeneratorlevelindicationandflowmeasurementweretobeusedtoassisttheoperatorinmaintainingtherequiredsteamgeneratorlevelduringAFWsystemoperation.ThissystemwastomeetthefollowingrequirementsfromNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.b[3],asclarifiedbyNUREG-0737,SectionII.E.1.2[7]:"l.Safety-gradeindicationofauxiliaryfeedwaterflowtoeachsteamgeneratorshallbeprovidedinthecontrolroom.2.TheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentchannelsshallbepoweredfromtheemergencybusesconsistentwithsatisfyingtheemergencypowerdiversityrequirementsoftheauxiliaryfeedwatersystemsetforthinAuxiliarySystemsBranchTechnicalPosition10-1oftheStandardReviewPlan,Section10.4.9[18]."TheNRCstaffhasdeterminedthat,inthelongterm,theoverallflowrateindicationsystemforCombustionEngineeringandWestinghouseplantsshouldincludeatleastoneAFWflowrateindicatorandonewide-rangesteamgeneratorlevelindicatorforeachsteamgeneratorortwoflowrateindicators.Theseflowindicationsystemsshouldbeenvironmentallyqualified;poweredfromahighlyreliable,batterybacked,non-class1Epowersource;periodicallytestable;partoftheplant'squalityassuranceprogram;andcapableofdisplayondemand.Theoperatorreliesonsteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentation,inadditiontoAFWflowindication,todetermineAFWsystemperformance.TherequirementsforthissteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentationarespecifiedinRegulatoryGuide1.97,Revision2,InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident"[19].0PFranklinResearchCenterADMslonoITheFtenMinInstitute 4,

TERM5257-2873~TECHNICALEVALUATION3.lGENERALDESCRIPTIONOFAUXILIARYFEEDWATERSYSTEMTheGinnaplantisaWestinghouse-designed,two-loopnuclearpowerplant.TheAFWsystemconsistsofamainAFWsystemandastandbyAFWsystem.ThemainAFWsystemcon'sistsoftwomotor-drivenpumps(200gpmeach)andoneturbine-drivenpump(400gpm).Normally,eachmotor-drivenpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator,butthealignmentcanbealteredtoalloweithermotor-drivenpumptosupplybothsteamgenerators.Theturbine-drivenpumpnormallysuppliesfeedwatertobothsteamgenerators.Eachpumpsuppliesthesteamgeneratorsthroughanormallyclosed,motor-operated,dischargevalve.Onlytheflowfromonemotor-drivenpump(200gpm)isnecessarytopreventthereactorcoolantsystemfromreachingthepressurerequiredtoactuateareliefvalve.ThethreemainAFWpumpsarelocatedinthesameroomandcouldbe-renderedinoperableasaresultofahighenergylinebreak.ThestandbyAFWsystemwasinstalledtoprovideindependentAFWsystemcapabilityfollowingsuchanevent.ThestandbyAFWsystemconsistsoftwomotor-drivenpumps(200gpmeach)locatedinaplantareaseparatefromthemainAFWsystem.ThestandbyAFWsystemismanuallyactuatedandalignedsothateachpumpsuppliesonesteamgenerator.ThewatersourcesforthemainAFWsystemaretwo30,000-galloncondensatestoragetanks(non-seismic),al00,000~alloncondensatestoragetank(non-seismic),andtheservicewatersystem(seismicCategoryI).ThewatersourceforthestandbyAFWsystemistheservicewatersystem,whichdrawsitswaterfromLakeOntario.SteamgeneratorleveliscontrolledmanuallyfromthecontrolroombyadjustingthepositionofthemainAFWpumpmotor-operateddischargevalves.~llllFranklinResearchCenterADMslonoiTheFranklinInariture 0

0TER-C5257-2873.2AUTOMATICINITIATION3.2.1EvaluationThemainAFWsystemattheGinnaplantisdesignedasanengineeredsafe-guardssystemtoseismicCategoryI(withtheexceptionofthecondensatestoragetanks),ClasslE,andtheautomaticinitiationsignalsandcircuitsaredesignedtocomplywiththerequirementsofIEEEStd279-1971[17].The'GinnaplantmainAFWautomaticinitiationsystemconsistsoftwoindependentactuationtrains.Theactuationcircuitsarepoweredfromemergencydcbuses.Theredundantchannelsarephysicallyseparatedandelectricallyindependent.AreviewoftheautomaticinitiationcircuitryrevealednocrediblesinglefailurethatwouldinhibittheautomaticinitiationsystemfromprovidingAFWflowtoatleastonegoodsteamgenerator.Thescopeofthesingle-failureanalysisinthisreportwaslimitedtotheredundancyofpowersupplies,diversityofactuatingsignals,andindependenceandredundancyofautomaticinitiationcircuits.BoththemainandstandbyAFWmotor-drivenpumpsarepoweredbyindependentacemergencybuses.TheloadingofthemainAFWmotor-drivenpumpsontotheirrespective480-Vacemergencybusesispartofthepost-accidentautomaticloadsequencing.ThestandbyAPWmotor-drivenpumpsareinterlockedwiththemainAFWmotor-drivenpumpssothatbotharenotsimultaneouslyloadedontotheemergencybustopreventoverloadingduringlossofoffsitepower.Theturbine-drivenpumpreceivesitssteamthroughamotor-operatedsteamadmissionvalveineachoftwolinesthattapoffupstreamofthesteamgeneratorisolationvalves.ThefollowingsignalsareusedforautomaticinitiationofthemainAPWsystem:Motor-drivenPumsolow-lowsteamgeneratorlevel(2outof3channelsoneithersteamgenerator)otripofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsosafetyinjection.tillFranklinResearchCenterADlvhtonoI'nteFranklinInstitute TERM5257-287Turbine-drivenPumolow-lowsteamgeneratorlevel(2outof3channelsonbothsteamgenerators)olossofvoltageonboth4-kVbusesThemainAFHsystemmaybemanuallyinitiatedfromthecontrolroombystartingthemotor-drivenAFHpumpsindividually;uponpumpstart,theassociateddischargevalveopens.ThemainAFWmotor-drivenpumpsdischargevalvesopenfullyonpumpstartandthenthrottledowntolimitflowtoamaximumof230gpmtoeachsteamgenerator.Theautomaticthrottlingconservesauxiliaryfeedwaterandhelpslimitthecooldownrate.Theturbine-drivenpumpdischargevalveisnormallyopen;inaddition,whentheturbine-drivenpumpisautomaticallyinitiated(steamadmissionvalvesopen),thedischargevalvereceivesanautomaticactuationsignaltoensurethatitisfullyopen.ThemainandstandbyAFWsystemandcomponentsaretestedinaccordancewithtechnicalspecifi.cations.OperationoftheAFHpumpsandmotor-operated/valvesischeckedmonthly.Every18monthseachmainAFWpumpandmainAFWmotor-operat:edvalveisverifiedtooperatecorrectlyonreceiptofeachoftheautomaticinitiationsignals.Theautomaticinitiationlogicistestedmonthly.Thesystemdesignallowsonechanneltobebypassedformaintenance,testing,andcalibrationduringpoweroperationwithoutinitiatingaprotectiveaction.Whenachannelisbypassedfortesting,thebypassisaccompaniedbyasinglechannelalertandchannelstatuslightactuationinthecontrolroom.TheautomaticstartofthemainAFHmotor-drivenpumpsresultingfromthetrippingofbothmainfeedwaterpumpsmaybedefeatedduringstartuporshutdownwhentheturbinegeneratorisofftheline.Thedefeatswitchisautomaticallybypassedwhentheturbineislatched.thecontrolroom.ThisbypassisalarmedinTheonlyinteractionbetweenthemainAFHsystemautomaticinitiationcircuitsandnormalsystemcontrolfunctionsoccursinthenarrow-rangesteamgeneratorlevelinstrumentation.TheselevelinstrumentsareusedforbothIFranklinResearchCenterADivisionof'nteFrenitfinInstitute

0oTER-C5257-287protection(reactortripandmainAFWinitiation)andnormalcontrolfunctions(narrow-rangechannelIonly)inthemainfeedwatersystem.Thecontrolsignalsareseparatedfromtheprotectionsignalsbyisolationtransformerssothatamalfunctioninthecontrolcircuitswillhavenoeffectontheprotectionsignals.Thefollowingindividualalarmsareprovidedon,themaincontrolboardtoalerttheoperatorthatthemainAFWequipmentmaynotoperateproperly:I'low-lowsteamgeneratorlevel(3channelseach)o2outof3low-lowsteamgeneratorlevels(1channeleach)o3outof3low-lowsteamgeneratorlevels(lchanneleach)oemergencyshutdownequipmentlocalcontrolosafeguardsbreakertriposafeguardsequipmentlock-offomainAFWbypassindefeatlockoutosinglechannelalertostandbyAFHpumpCorDtripostandbyJQWpumptransferswitchoffnormal(lchanneleach)ostandbyAFWpumphighdischargeflow(lchanneleach)ostandbyAFHpumphighdischargepressure(lchannel'each)ostandbyAFHHVACtrouble.NoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamadmissionvalvesorAFWdischargevalves.Areviewoftheautomaticandmanualinitiationcircuitryandsignalsrevealedthatnosinglefailureofeithercircuittrainwouldinhibitthecapabilityformanualinitiationfromthecontrolroomortheauxiliaryshutdownpanel.Theenvironmentalqualificationofsafety-relatedelectricalandmechanicalcomponents,includingAFHsystemcircuitsandcomponents,isbeingreviewedseparatelybytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3.2.2ConclusionTheinitiationsignals,logic,andassociatedcircuitryoftheautomaticinitiationfeatureofthemainAFWsystemoftheGinnaplantcomplywiththe!)llFranklinResearchCenterADivfshnofTheFcanMlnInstitute QTERW5257-287long-termsafety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.a,andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRCstaff.Znaddition,thefollowingpointmayeffectthereliabilityoftheAFWsystem:oNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamadmissionvalvesorAFWdischargevalves.3~3FLOWZNDZCATZON3.3.1EvaluationThecapabilitytoevaluatetheperformanceofthemainandstandbyAFWsystemsattheGinnaplantisprovidedbythefollowingindications:omainAFWmotor-drivenpumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator(2channelseach)omainAFHturbine-drivenpumpdischargeflow(2channels)omainAFWturbine-drivenpumpflowtoeachsteamgenerator(2channelseach)ostandbyAPWmotor-drivenpumpflow(1channeleach)omainAFHpumpdischargepressureostandbyAFWpumpdischargepressureonarrow-rangesteamgeneratorlevel(3channelseach)owide-rangesteamgeneratorlevel(1channeleach)omainandstandbyAPW'umpstatusindicationomainandstandbyAFHvalvepositionindicationocondensatestoragetanklevel(2channels).TheLicenseehasstatedthatthemainAFWflowindicationforeachsteamgeneratorissafety-grade.TheindividualsteamgeneratorAPWflowcircuitryispoweredfromseparatebattery-backedinstrumentbuses.PoreachmainAFHpump,thereisaprimaryandsecondaryflowinstrumentationchannel.Theprimarychannelindicatesflowand,forthemotor-drivenpumps,controlstheindividualdischargevalves.Thesecondaryflowinstrumentationindicatesflowonly.Theprimaryandsecondarychannelsarepoweredfromoppositeinstrumentbuses.Theprimaryandsecondaryflowindicationisprovidedonthemaincontrolboardbyadual-movementvertical-scaleindicator.l)llFranldinResearchCenterADivlslonotTheFrsnk5nInsdtute

~~TERM5257-287Sincethedischargeheaderfromtheturbine-drivenpumpbranchestosupplybothsteamgenerators,anadditionalchannelofsafetygradeflowinstrumenta-tionisprovidedineachline.Safety-gradewide-rangesteamgeneratorlevelindicationisprovidedasabackup.ThestandbyAFWsystemprovidesasinglechannelofsafety-guideflowinstrumentationforeachpump.Theflowindicationchannelsaretestedinaccordancewithtechnicalspecifications.Theenvironmentalqualificati'onoftheAFWflowindicatorswillbereviewedseparatelybytheNRCandisnotwithinthescopeofthisreview.3.3.2ConclusionItisconcludedthattheAFWflowinstrumentationattheGinnaplantcomplieswiththelong-termsafety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.b,andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.3.4DESCRIPTION.OFSTEAMGENERATORLEVELINDICATIONSteamgeneratorlevelindicationattheGinnaplantconsistsofthreesafety-gradenarrow-rangelevelchannelsandonesafety-gradewide-rangelevelchannelpersteamgenerator.Theleveltransmittersandtheirpowersuppliesareasfollows:STEAMGENEBATORAChannelTransmitterVitalBusWideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIIILT-460LT-461LT-462LT-463AACDSTEAMGENERATORBChannelTransmitterVitalBusWideRangeNarrowRangeINarrowRangeIINarrowRangeIIILT-470'T-471LT-472LT-473BDAB~llllFranklinResearchCenterADMsioncITheFtentrIinInstitute eTERM5257-287Thesteamgeneratorlevelchannelsarecheckedeachshift,testedmonthly,andcalibratedduringrefueling.Thewide-rangechannelsforbothsteamgeneratorsareindicatedindividuallyononestripchartrecorder.Narrow-rangechannelsforbothsteamgeneratorsareindicatedonverticalgages.I'I~llllFranklinResearchCenterADMsionofTheFrenklinInsliltste Qr~TER-C5257-2874.CONCLUSIONSTheinitiationsignals,logic,andassociatedcircuitryoftheRobertE.GinnaNuclearPowerPlantauxiliaryfeedwatersystemcomplywiththelong-termsafetygraderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.a[3],andthesub-sequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC..~IInaddition,thefollowingpointsmayaffectthereliabilityoftheAFWsystem:IoNoalarmsareprovidedtomonitorthepoweravailabletothesteamadmissionvalvesorAFWdischargevalves.ETheauxiliaryfeedwaterflowinstrumentationcomplieswiththelong-termsafety-graderequirementsofNUREG-0578,Section2.1.7.b[3],andthesubsequentclarificationissuedbytheNRC.~llllFranklinResearchCenterADivisionolTheFsenklnInrritttte

TER-C5257-2&75.REFERENCESCodeofFederalRegulations,Title10,OfficeoftheFederalRegister,NationalArchivesandRecordsService,GeneralServicesAdministration,RevisedJanuary1,1980.2~NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesregardingshort-termrequirementsresultingfromThreeMileIslandAccidentSeptember13,1979.3~4~NUREG-0578,"TMI-2LessonsLearnedTaskForce,StatusReportandShort-TermRecommendations,"NRC,July1979.NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesclarifyinglessonslearnedshort-termrequirements,October30,1979.5.NRC,GenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesregardingshort-termrequirementresultingfromThreeMileIslandAccident,September5,1980.NRCGenericlettertoallPWRlicenseesregardingpost-TMIrequirements,October31,1980.7~NUREG-0737,"ClarificationofTMIActionPlanRequirements;"NRC,November1980.8~r9~L.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)October17,1979eL.D.White(RG&E)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November19,197910'.D.White(RGaE)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)November28,1979L.D.White(RGaE)LettertoD.L.Ziemann(NRC)December14,197912.D.M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoL.D.White(RGaE)July7,198013.D.M.Crutchfield(NRC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RGaE)Mayll,1981~IIIIFrantttinResearchCenterADlvblonol7heFsankmnInsulute I~,Q 4TER-C5257-28714.J.E.Maier(RGaE)LettertoD.M.Crutchfield(NRC)December30,198015.D.M.Crutchfield(NBC)LettertoJ.E.Maier(RG&E)August19,198116.J.E.Maier(RG&E)ILettertoD.M.Crutchf'ield(NBC)September22,1981k17.IEEEStd279-1971,"CriteriaforProtectionSystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations,"InstitpteofElectricalandElectronicsEngineers,Inc.,NewYork,NY.18.NUREG-75/087,"StandardReviewPlan,"Section10.4.9,Rev.1,USNRC,nodate.19.RegulatoryGuide1.97(TaskRS917-4),"InstrumentationforLight-Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlantstoAssessPlantandEnvironsConditionsDuringandFollowinganAccident,"Rev.2,NRC,December1980.00FranMinResearchCenterADlvfshnefTheFtenkSnInstitute 0~,Q~