NRC Generic Letter 1985-11
TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEARPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER 85- 11)On December 22, 1980, NRC issued a generic letter (unnumbered) which wassupplemented February 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regarding NUREG-0612,"Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This letter requestedthat you implement certain interim actions and provide the NRC informationrelated to heavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals were requestedin two parts; a six month response (Phase I) and a nine month response(Phase II).All licensees have completed the requirement to perform a review and submita Phase I and a Phase II report. Based on the improvements in heavy loadshandling obtained from implementation of NUREG-0612 (Phase I), further actionis not required to reduce the risks associated with the handling of heavyloads (See enclosed NUREG-0612 Phase II). Therefore, a detailed Phase IIreview of heavy loads is not necessary and Phase II is considered completed.However, while not a requirement, we encourage the implementation of anyactions you identified in Phase II regarding the handling of heavy loadsthat you consider appropriate.For each plant which has a license condition requiring commitmentsacceptable to the NRC regarding Phase II, an application for licenseF amendment may be submitted to the NRC to delete the license condition citingthis letter as the basis. If you have any questions, contact your ProjectManager or Don Neighbors (301) 492-4837.Sincerely,Original Signed byHuah L. Thompson, Jr.Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorAs SDivision of LicensingEnclosure:As Stated )*See previous concurrencesORB#1:DL* ORB#1:DL* BC-ORB#1:DL* D/DSI* AD:OR:DL* D:DLCParrish JDNeighbors SVarga RBernero GLainas HThompson3/7/85 5/6/85 3/11/85 3/13/85 3/19/85 5/:hd/85AD/L* OELD*TNovak 8506270M .3/21/85 4/22/854{fs Enclosure 1HUREG-0612, NCONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT.,NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS' ,RESOLUTION OF PHASE IIGeneric Technical Activity A-36 was established to systematically examine thestaff's licensing criteria, adequacy of measures in effect at operating plantsand recommend necessary changes to assure the safe handling of heavy loads.The task involved review of licensee information, evaluation of historicaldata, performance of accident analyses and criticality calculations,development of guidelines for operating plants,. and.review of licensingcriteria. The review indicated that the.major causes of load handlingaccidents include operator errors, rigging failures, lack of adequate inspec-tLon and inadequate procedures. The results of the review culminated in theissuance of NUREG-0612, Control 'of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants' inJuly 1980. NUREG-0612 described a resolution of Task A-36.NUREG-0612 presents an overall philosophy that provides a defense-in-depthapproach for controlling the handling of heavy loads. The approach is directedto preventing load drops. The following summarizes this defense-in-depthapproach:1. Assure that there is a well designed handling system.2. Provide sufficient operator training, load handling instructions, andequipment inspection to assure reliable operation of the handling system.3. Define safe load travel paths and procedures and operator training toassure to the extent practical that heavy loads are not carried over ornear irradiated fuel or safe shutdown equipment.4. Provide mechanical stops or electrical interlocks to prevent movement ofheavy loads over irradiated fuel or in proximity to equipment associatedwith redundant shutdown paths.
.25. Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks cannot be provided.provide a single-failure-proof crane or perform load drop analysesto demonstrate that unacceptable consequences will not result..IBy Generic Letters dated December 22, 1980, and February 3, 1981- (GenericLetter 81-07), all utilities were requested to evaluate their plants againstthe guidance of NUREG-0612 and to provide their submittals in two parts; PhasesI (six month response).and Phase !I (nine month response). Phase I responseswere to address Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 which covers the following areas:1. Definition of safe load paths2. Development of load handling procedures3. Periodic inspection and testing of cranes4. Qualifications, training and specified conduct of operators-L5. Special lifting devices should satisfy the guidelines of ANSI 114.6 6.6. Lifting devices that are not specially designed should be installed andused in accordance with the guidelines of ANSI 830.97. Design of cranes to ANSI 830.2 or CMAA-70Phase II responses were to address Sections 5.1.2 thru 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612which cover the need for electrical interlocks/mechanical stops, oralternatively, single-failure-proof cranes or load drop analyses in the spentfuel pool area (PWR), containment building (PWR), reactor building (BWR), otherareas and the specific guidelines for single-failure-proof handling systems.We have completed our review of the utilities' submittals for Phase I fornearly all operating reactors. Only one plant still remains to be reviewed.During our review we verified that the seven guidelines listed above wereproviding the desired level of safety indicated in NUREG-0612. By way ofthe utilities' responses to the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1and through discussions with our consultants based on their experiencesfrom the reviews, we have concluded that the Phase I guidelines have providedan increased awareness by the utilities of the importance of heavy loadhandling.Our review has indicated that satisfaction of the Phase I guidelines assuresthat the potential for a load drop is extremely small. We have noted d3improvements in heavy load handling procedures and training and crane andhandling tool inspection and testing. These changes have been geared tolimiting the handling of heavy loads over safety-related equipment and spentfuel to the extent practical, but where this can not be ivoided, poaccomplishing it with the operational and other features of the froaram imDlementedin Phase I. We therefore conclude that the Puidelines of Phase I are adequatelyproviding the intended level of protection against load drop accidents.To date we have received Phase II submittals from all licensees. Weinterpret Phase II of NUREG-0612 as an enhancement to Phase I. Thus, priorto undertaking a review of the utilities' Phase II response for all of theoperating reactors, and as a test of the adequacy of the Phase I program,we decided to undertake a pilot program with a limited number of plants.The findings from the pilot program would then provide a basis for adecision on whether to proceed with the review of the Phase II submittalsfor all operating reactors, to reduce the scope of the review, or tototally eliminate the review.The pilot program involved the review of operating reactors at 12 sites, atotal of 20 reactors (eight BWRs and 12 PWRs). Of the 20 reactors, 5 BWRs(Browns Ferry 1, 2 and 3 and Peach Bottom 2 and 3) have single-failure-proofcranes for all heavy load lifts. mSingle-failurt-proofP is used to mean acrane which meets the guidelines of NUREG-0554, aSingle-Failure-Proof Cranesfor Nuclear Power Plants.' Three BWR units (Dresden 2 and 3 and Big RockPoint) have taken credit for a combination of single-failure-proof cranes insome plant areas and load drop analyses in others. Five PWR reactors(Millstone 2, Prairie Island 1 and 2, and Surry 1 and 2) have utilized the loaddrop analysis approach. One plant (Kewaunee) has taken credit for acombination of electrical interlocks in some plant areas and load drop analysesin others. The remaining six reactors (Davis Besse, Indian Point 2, Arkansas 1and 2 and Calvert Cliffs I and 2) chose to take credit for a combination ofadministrative controls, procedures and Technical Specification restrictions inconjunction with some type of load, drop analysis. This approach does not meetthe criteria of Sections 5.1.2 to 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612. Rather, it is anamplification of the quidelines of the Phase I effort, reflecting Section 5.1.1of NUREG-0612.
4It should also be noted that we have completed our review of Phase II for fiveoperating license applicants. Of these, two (WNP-2 and Fermi-2) havesingle-failure-proof cranes. The remaining three (Callaway, Wolf Creek andCatawba.1 and 2) employ a combination of electrical interlocks, i .hanicalstops, limit switches and load drop analyses.In addition to the detailed reviews of the Phase II reports in the pilotprogram and in connection with the five operating license applications,we have performed a sufficient review of all other Phase II reports toflag any outstanding plant-spedific concerns reported.From our pilot program and OL Phase II reviews, together with the above-mentioned reviews of the other Phase II reports we have concluded thatthe risks associated with damage to safe shutdown systems are relativelysmall because:1. nearly all load paths avoid this equipment2. most equipment it protected by an intervening floor3. of the general independence between crane failure probability andsafety-related systems which has been observed4. redundancy of componentsWe did not identify any outstanding plant specific safety concern associatedwith heavy loads handling.Therefore, most of the risk appears to be associated with carrying heavy loadsover or in a location where spent fuel could be damaged. The single mostimportant example of this concerns loads handled over the open reactor vesselduring refueling (such as the reactor vessel head). Howevef, as previouslymentioned, this is limited to the extent practical and where necessary, isperformed with a specifically implemented program in conformance with the PhaseI guidelines.From the pilot program and OL reviews, we noted that nine of the twentyreactors, all PsRS, do not have single-failure-proof cranes. To date, we havenot identified any PWRs with single-failure-proof cranes. Further, sinceelectrical interlocks and mechanical stops are not possible for PWR polar
- 50* *cranes, these reactors would be required to perform costly detailed loaddrop analyses. If satisfactory results could not be demonstrated fromthese analyses, NUREG-0612. would call for installation of a single-failure-proof crane.Based on the above, since a single failure proof crane becomes-theonly solution for satisfying the NUREG-0612 criteria, the cost/benefitshould be examined. Because we are dealing primarily with PWRs, thecost for modification of a polar crane to meet single failure criteria(NUREG-0554) guidelines) is approximately $30 million. This includes,as the dominant cost element, the cost of the extended shutdown which isrequired in order to gain access to containment. On the benefit side,given the improvements obtained from the Phase I implementation and theinformation obtained in the course of the pilot program and OL Phase IIreviews, we cannot perceive a significant enough benefit in conversionto single-failure-proof polar cranes to warrant the high costs. (SeeAttachment I for a cost-benefit analysis.) We believe that the cost/benefit analysis in NUREG-0612 is no longer valid because of thebenefits realized by Phase I implementation.We believe the above assessment is further borne out by the industryexperience with handling of heavy loads over the years. Precautionshave been and are being taken such that no heavy load drop accidentsaffecting any features of the defense-in-depth against severe core-damage accidents have occurred. This determination is also supportedby the recommendation of our contractor for the pilot program reviews(Franklin Research Center) and our benefit-cost analysis suggestingthat we accept other, less strigent but less costly means for Phase IIcompliance as an alternative to the criteria of NUREG-0612 with respectto conversion to single-failure-proof cranes.Conclusion and RecommendationBased on the above, we believe the Phase I implementation has providedsufficient protection such that the risk associated with potential heavy load*There have, however, been recent occurrences of lesser severity. (See forexample, IE informatfon Notice No. 85-12: Recent.Fuel Handling Events LER84-015, Fort Calhoun 1, Load Over the RCS; and LER 84- San nofre , PolarCrane Malfunction). Accordinqly nothing in this determ 7ion should beregarded as a basis for any Be-emphasis of continued attention to thesafe handling of heavy loads.
6drops is acceptably small. We further conclude that the objective identifiedin Section 5.1 of HUREG-0612 for providing gmaximum practical defense in depthuis satisfied by the Phase I compliance, and that the Phase II analyses did notindicate the need to require further generic action at this time.lyThis conclusion has been confirmed by the results obtained-from"Die Phase IIpilotprogram and additional Phase II reviews, which identified no residualheavy loads handling concerns of sufficient significance to demand furthergeneric action. All plants have examined their load handling practices againstthe recommendations of Phase II and submitted the Phase II report. In thisway, the utilities were required to identify any unexpected problems to thestaff.
ATTACHMENT ISUMMARY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF--PWR POLAR CRANE CONVERSION TO SINGLE-FAILURE-PROOF FEATURES'SCOPEThe safety benefit of converting the polar crane in the containment of anoperating or completed or nearly completed PWR to single-failure-prooffeatures and the cost of the conversion were estimated and compared.The safety benefit was estimated in terms of the resulting reduction in therisk of a severe accident, involving major radioactive material release,during the remaining plant life. The risk was expressed as the product ofthe accident probability and the population radiation dose from the release,should the accident occur.The cost estimate included the cost of shutdown (or extension of anon-operating period) needed to accomplish the conversion.ACCIDENT FREQUENCY ESTIMATESCrane Failure FrequencyThere were 32 crane LER events in the approximately 400 reactor-years ofU.S. power-reactor operation in the 10-year period July 1969 to July 1979(NUREG-0612, p. 4-6). None resulted in radioactive release. Of the 32events, 17 (i.e., just over half) were apparently due to hardware design orfabrication causes, the other 15 to human factors. (Navy crane statistics,cited in NUREG-0612, for 40 load-drop or potential load-drop events in1974-77 show 80% of the events to be due to human factors.)
-2 -It may be assumed, as a rough approximation, that Phase I of NRC'sheavy-loads generic program is addressed to all the human factors causes andone-half of the hardware causes and succeeds in reducing the affected partof the failure frequency to a quite small fraction of the frequencyoriginally present. Since human factors and hardware each contribute aboutone-half of the failures, approximately 3/4 of the total crane failures canbe expected to be eliminated by the Phase I program. Single-failure-proof(SFP) cranes should substantially reduce the remaining 1/4 of the failurefrequency, though those failures would not be eliminated altogether, sincethe SFP feature (as. defined in NUREG-0554) does not protect against all typesof possible failure (e.g., the bridge is not SFP and the SFP feature itselfis subject to defeat by some types of human error). On the other hand, theSFP feature would make the cranes more "forgiving" of imperfections in thePhase I implementation. Accordingly, one may reasonably assume that the SFPfeature would have a net effect of eliminating 1/4 of the pre-Phase Ifailure frequency.Frequency of Accidents Involving Radioactive ReleaseNot all LER events involve radioactive release. In over 600 reactor-yearsof U.S. power-reactor operation to date [1982) there have, to our knowledge,been no radioactive releases due to load drops. The 10-year period coveredby the survey in NUREG-0612, which included 32 crane LER events, all withoutrelease, represents about 60% of all U.S. power-reactor operating time todate. An assumption of a pre-fix frequency of some radioactive release oncein 1,000 reactor-years appears consistent with the LER-reflected failureexperience, taken together with the absence of releases to date. With 1/4of these releases averted by an SFP crane feature,,-the pertinent releasefrequency reduction would be 1 in 4,000 RY. For the most part, these can beassumed to be minor releases due to limited fuel damage in the spent-fuelstorage pool or in the reactor.
-3 -Frequency of Accidents Involving Major ReleasesFor a load-drop event to cause a major accident, with major radioactiverelease, special circumstances need to be present -- circumstances thatPhase I is intended to make much less likely to occur. A highly damagingheavy load drop, such as one that could destroy a core cooling featurethrough violation of -- or imperfections in -- Phase I provisions combinedwith other failures, should be unlikely, and very unlikely to lead to majorrelease, because of back-up safety provisions (e.g., independent additionalcore cooling provisions).,Review of typical load paths and associated crane-operation frequenciessuggests that of all load drops in a typical PWR plant that could haveradiological consequences, some 1/4 could involve equipment with a role insafe reactor shutdown, including primary-system piping. If one assumes thatthere is typically a 1% probability that back-up revisions would also fail,then the pertinent major-release frequency is 1 in 1,600,000 reactor-years.Frequency ReductionSingle-failure-proof cranes may reasonably be expected to eliminate most,perhaps 90%, of the residual load-drop probability after the Phase Iimprovements. Thus, the frequency reduction for major release isapproximately 1 in 1,800,000 RY (90% of 1/1,600,000).It should be noted that these estimates are sensitive to plant layout.Plant-specific evaluations could, depending on case specifics, point to amuch higher or lower major-release frequency estimate for a specific case.For example, should layout of a specific plant be such that a particularlyunfortunate load drop could destroy all means of core cooling orincapacitate the control room (possibilities suggested by the situations atMontecello and Arkansas Nuclear 1, respectively, before remedial actions weretaken at those plants), the above generic analysis could be wide of the mark
-4 -for such a plant. The major-release accident frequency could well be anorder of magnitude higher for such a plant (i.e., of the order of 1 in100,000 reactor-years) -- or even higher, depending on plant and cranefeatures, load paths, and operating practices.CONSEQUENCES ESTIMATEPotential radiological consequences of load-drop accidents encompass a wide.range of possibilities, depending on specific features of plant design,operating practices, and the nature and location of the specific load-dropevent. We assume that some -- though very rough -- indication of theseverity of the load-drop accident-risks may be gained by using in thesesimplified calculations certain selected release categories described inWASH-1400, Appendix VI, pp. 2-1 to 2-4. Category PWR 4 was selected for themajor-release estimates for pressurized water reactors.In PWR 4 core cooling and containment both fail. Core melt occurs. -Thisrelease category is used to explore consequences of a load drop thatincapacitates core cooling (during or promptly after reactor operation),with containment open.The release estimates, stated as resulting public dose, based onrepresentative generic estimates, for a hypothetical site with a projectedYear 2000 mean U.S. power-reactor-site population density, developed byBattelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories (NUREG/CR-2800) is 2,700,000person-rem.COST ESTIMATECosts of change-over to single-failure-proof cranes are subject to wideplant-specific variation, depending on the number of features of thespecific cranes involved and other aspects of plant design and status.
-5 -Based on advice from the Auxiliary Systems Branch, DSI, and limited vendorand utility contacts.,'we take thelfollowing estimates as representative(as of 1982, when the estimates were made).For future plants, the cost differential for original inclusion of SFPfeatures is estimated at about $250,000 for PWRs (based on information fromEderer Crane Co.).At the pre-operating-license stage, with no startup delay, the costs --including planning, engineering, hardware, installation, and testing -- areestimated at $2 million per plant. This is based on the Monticelloexperience (1.M in 1976, adjusted for inflation). (The Monticelloinformation was obtained from the licensee through the NRC residentinspector.)For operating PWRs the estimated costs are dominated by plant shutdownduring modifications of the polar crane located inside the containmentbuilding. (The shutdown may be an extension of a shutdown for refueling oi4tother purposes.) The cost effect of a startup delay for a completed or nearlycompleted plant would be similar. With a 3-month shutdown and with shutdown..costs taken as determined by the cost of replacement power at $300,000 perday,.representative total change-over costs for operating PWRs are estimatedat about $30 million.RISK REDUCTIONBased on the foregoing frequency and consequences estimates, the "expectedvalue" of the risk subject to being affected by the possible Phase II SFPfeature, i.e., the magnitude of release times the frequency of its II-6-occurrence, integrated for the remaining plant life taken as 20years,'is asfollows:Major release risk 20 x 2,700,000 = 30 person-rem/reactor2,800,000COST-BENEFIT RATIOThe cost-benefit ratio indicated by the foregoing estimates is approximately$1,000,000/person-rem. This. estimate is subject to wide plant-to-plantvariation as well as large uncertainties in the underlying estimates ofaccident frequency and consequences. Nevertheless, it is possible toconclude with reasonable confidence that the benefit-cost ratio for thecrane conversion would fail to meet a $1,000/person-rem worthwhilenesscriterion by a large margin.,..I , .
TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEARPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER 85- )On December 22, 1980, NRC issued a generic letter (unnumbered) which wassupplemented February 3, 1981 (Generic Letter.81-07) regarding NUREG-0612,"Control of Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This letter requestedthat you implement certain interim actions and provide the NRC informationrelated to heavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals were requestedin two parts; a six month response (Phase I) and a nine month response(Phase II).All licensees have completed the requirement to perform a review and submita Phase I and a Phase II report. We believe that further action is notrequired based on the improvements in heavy loads handling obtained fromimplementation of NUREG-0612 (Phase I). Therefore, a detailed Phase IIreview of heavy loads is not necessary and Phase II is considered completed.However, while not a requirement, we encourage the implementation of anyactions identified in Phase II regarding the handling of heavy loads.For each plant which has a license condition requiring commitmentsacceptable to the NRC regarding Phase II, an application for licenseamendment may be submitted to the NRC to delete the license condition citingthis letter as the basis, If you have any questions, contact your ProjectManager or Don Neighbors (301) 492-4837.Sincerely,Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorDivision of Licensing*See previous white for concurrencesORB#1:DL* ORB#1:DL* BC-ORB#1:DL* D/DSI* AD:OR:DL* D:DLCParrish JDNeighbors;ps SVarga Bernero GLainas HThompson3/7 /85 5/6/85 3/11/85 3/13/85 3/19 /85 5/ /85AD/L* OELD*TNovak3/21/85 4/22/85 TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER 85- )On December 22, 1980, we issued a generic letter which was sup enentedFebruary 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regarding NUREG-0612 'Control ofHeavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This letter request that youImplement certain interim actions and provide the NRC inf ation related toheavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals were t ave been in twoparts; six month response (Phase I) and nine month re onse (Phase II).We have almost completed Phase I of our review and ost licensees havereceived a plant specific letter closing Phase I.As for Phase II, we believe that further NRC ac on is not necessary. Asindicated in the enclosure, we conclude this othe basis of theimprovements in heavy loads handling obtained from implementation ofNUREG-0612 (Phase I), the results of the Pha e II pilot program performedby our contractor, Franklin Research Center which identified nofurther heavy loads handling concerns, ad tional evaluations of Phase IIsubmittals by the staff and cost benefitWe, therefore, consider this portion ( ase II) of our review of heavyloads complete. However, while not a equirement, we encourage theimplementation of any actions identi ed in Phase II regarding the handlingof heavy loads.For each plant which has a licens condition, an application for licenseamendment should be submitted to he NRC to delete the license conditionusing this letter as-the basis. If you have any questions, contact yourProject Manager or Don Neighbor (301) 492-4837.Sincerely,Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorEnclosure: Division of LicensingAs stated*See previous white or concurrencesORB#1:DL* ORB BC-ORB#1:DL* D/DSI* AD:OR:DL* D:DLCParrish JDNe ors;ps SVarga Bernero GLainas HThompson3/7 /85 3/11/85 3/13/85 3/19 /85 4/ /85AD/L* OELD%TNovak3/21/85 4/ /85 TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT NUCLEARPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER 85- )On December 22, 1980, we issued a generic letter which was supplementedFebruary 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regarding NUREG-0612, "Control ofHeavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This letter requested that youimplement certain interim actions and provide the NRC information related toheavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals were to have been in twoparts; six month response (Phase I) and nine month response (Phase II).We have almost completed Phase I of our review and most licensees havereceived a plant specific letter closing Phase I.As for Phase II, we believe that further NRC action is not necessary. Asindicated in the enclosure, we conclude this on the basis of theimprovements in heavy loads handling obtained from implementation ofNUREG-0612 (Phase I), the results of the Phase II pilot program performedby our contractor, Franklin Research Institute which identified nofurther heavy loads handling concerns, additional evaluations of Phase IIsubmittals by the staff and cost benefit.We, therefore, consider this portion (Phase II) of our review of heavyloads complete.For each plant which has a license condition, an application for licenseamendment should be submitted to the NRC to delete the license conditionusing this letter as the basis. If you have any questions, contact yourProject Manager or Don Neighbors (301) 492-4837.Sincerely,Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorDivision of Licensing*See previous white for concurrences AORB#1:DL* ORB#1:DL BC-ORB#1:DL* D/DSI* AD:OR:DL*13DLCParrish J jbg' bors;ps SVarga Bernero GLainas HThompson3/7 /85 4/4185 3/11/85 3/13/85 3/19 /85 4/ /85AD/L* OELDTNovak3/21/85 4/ /85\ Ao,41 f9 TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOADS AT N LEARPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER 85- )On December 22, 1980, we issued a generic letter which was s plementedFebruary 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regarding NUREG-06 , "Control ofHeavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This letter reque ed that youimplement certain interim actions and provide the NRC i ormation related toheavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals were o have been in twoparts; six month response (Phase I) and nine month r ponse (Phase II).We have almost completed Phase I of our review an most licensees havereceived a plant specific letter closing PhaseAs for Phase II, we believe that further NRC ction is not necessary. Asindicated in the enclosure, we conclude this on the basis of theimprovements in heavy loads handling obtai d from implementation ofNUREG-0612 (Phase I), the results of the P ase II pilot program performedby our contractor, Franklin Research Ins tute which identified nofurther heavy loads handling concerns, ditional evaluations of Phase IIsubmittals by the staff and cost benef .We, therefore, consider this portio (Phase II) of our review of heavyloads complete.For those plants which have lice e conditions, this letter resolves therequirements of those condition as far as meeting the generic concerns ofNUREG-0612. If you have any estions, contact your Project Manager orDon Neighbors on 301-492-4837.Sincerely,Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorDivision of Licensing*See previous Ite for concurrencesORB#1:DL* / 1-5DL BC-ORB#1:DL* D/DSI* AD:OR:DL* D:DLCParrish / ighbors;ps SVarga Bernero GLainas HThompson3/7 /85,/- : tV85 3/11/85 3/13/85 3/197/85 3/ /85-I
TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY XADS AT NUCLEARPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER -)On December 22, 1980, we issued a generic letter ich was supplementedFebruary 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regardin NUREG-0612, "Control ofHeavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This let r requested that youImplement certain interim actions and provide e NRC information related toheavy loads at your facilities. Your submitt s were to have been in twoparts; six month response (Phase I) and nin month response (Phase II).We have almost completed Phase I of our r lew and most licensees havereceived a plant specific letter closing hase I.As for Phase II, we believe that furth NRC action is not necessary. Asindicated in the enclosure, we conclu e this on the basis of theimprovements in heavy loads handlin obtained from implementation ofNUREG-0612 (Phase I), the results the Phase II pilot program performedby our contractor, Franklin Researh Institute which identified nofurther heavy loads handling con rns, additional evaluations of Phase IIsubmittals by the staff and cos benefit.We, therefore, consider this rtion (Phase II) of our review of heavyloads complete.For those plants which hav license conditions, this letter resolves therequirements of those con tions as far as meeting the generic concerns ofNUREG-0612.Sincerely,Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorDivision of Licensing
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- J. D. NeighborX24837ORB#l:DL* *See previous white for concurrenceCParrish> .3/7/857 OR 1 )8 fiB#1:DL A d AH A X :DL D:DLJDt Ihbors; SY a D4Arnero GL s HThompson3 J 8 31/5/85 3 /85 3/ /85 TO ALL LICENSEES FOR OPERATING REACTORSGentlemen:SUBJECT: COMPLETION OF PHASE II OF "CONTROL OF HEAVY LOAD AT NUCLEARPOWER PLANTS" NUREG-0612. (GENERIC LETTER 85-On December 22, 1980, we issued a generic letter which As supplementedFebruary 3, 1981 (Generic Letter 81-07) regarding NUR -0612, "Control ofHeavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants". This letter r uested that youimplement certain interim actions and provide the C information related toheavy loads at your facilities. Your submittals re to have been in twoparts; six month response (Phase I) and nine mon response (Phase II).We have almost completed Phase I of our revie and most licensees havereceived a letter closing Phase I. Only a f plants remain to be reviewed.As for Phase II, we believe that further C action is not necessary. Asindicated in the enclosure, we conclude is on the basis of theimprovements in heavy loads handling ob ained from implementation ofNUREG-0612 (Phase I), the results of e Phase II pilot program performedby our contractor, Franklin Research nstitute which identified nofurther heavy loads handling concer additional evaluations of Phase IIsubmittals by the staff and cost b nefit.We, therefore, consider this po ion (Phase II) of our review of heavyloads complete. TlHowever, this ction is not intended to preclude licenseesfrom making improvements in t Ir load handling systems which they feel arenecessary for safe load hand ing.)For those plants which hay license conditions, this letter resolves therequirements of those co itions as far as meeting the generic concerns ofNUREG-0612.Sincerely,Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., DirectorDivision of Licensing
CONTACT
- J. D. NeighborX24837ORB#1:DL ORB BC-ORB#1:DL D/DSI AD:OR:DL D:DLCParrish ' JDN hbors;ps SVarga Bernero GLainas HThompson3/4 /85 M 3 3/ /85 3/ /85 3/ /85 3/ /85
.IDISTRIBUTIONCentral FileCParrishJDNeighborsSVargaGLainasBerneroHThompsonORB#1:RdgMemo FileTNovak