IR 05000313/2025010
| ML25087A047 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/2025 |
| From: | Brian Correll NRC/RGN-IV/DORS |
| To: | Pehrson D Entergy Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2025010 | |
| Download: ML25087A047 (1) | |
Text
March 31, 2025
SUBJECT:
ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - BIENNIAL PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000313/2025010 AND 05000368/2025010
Dear Doug Pehrson:
On March 13, 2025, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a problem identification and resolution inspection at your Arkansas Nuclear One facility and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations problem identification and resolution program to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your program complies with NRC regulations and applicable industry standards such that the Reactor Oversight Process can continue to be implemented.
The team also evaluated the stations effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, and its use of industry and NRC operating experience information. The results of these evaluations are in the enclosure.
Finally, the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews, the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the violations or the significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Arkansas Nuclear One.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely, Brian K. Correll, Acting Team Lead Inspection Program and Assessment Team Division of Operating Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 05000313; 05000368 License Nos. DPR-51; NPF-6
Enclosure:
As stated
Inspection Report
Docket Numbers:
05000313; 05000368
License Numbers:
Report Numbers:
05000313/2025010; 05000368/2025010
Enterprise Identifier:
I-2025-010-0009
Licensee:
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Facility:
Arkansas Nuclear One
Location:
Russellville, AR
Inspection Dates:
February 16, 2025, to March 13, 2025
Inspectors:
N. Brown, Resident Inspector
C. Highley, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Ruffin, Reactor Inspector
E. Tinger, Resident Inspector
Approved By:
Brian K. Correll, Acting Team Lead
Inspection Program and Assessment Team
Division of Operating Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting a biennial problem identification and resolution inspection at Arkansas Nuclear One, in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section: 71152
List of Findings and Violations
Failure to Obtain an Engineering Evaluation for Scaffolding Erected in Close Proximity to Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000313/2025010-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152B The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50,
Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, due to the licensees failure to follow procedures for erecting scaffolding in close proximity to safety-related structures, systems, and components. Specifically, on February 24, 2025, the inspectors identified scaffolding that was within 2 inches of the emergency feedwater safety system without a timely engineering evaluation being performed.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000313/2024-002-00 ANO Unit 1 Inoperable Containment Isolation Boundary 71153 Closed
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71152B - Problem Identification and Resolution Biennial Team Inspection (IP Section 03.04)
- (1) The inspectors performed a biennial assessment of the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program, use of operating experience, self-assessments and audits, and safety-conscious work environment.
- Problem Identification and Resolution Effectiveness: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees Problem Identification and Resolution program in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems. The inspectors sampled approximately 200 condition reports and associated cause evaluations. The inspectors also conducted a 5-year review of the Unit 2 DC distribution system, which included review of failures, maintenance issues, surveillances, corrective and preventive maintenance, reliability, and maintenance rule performance. Additionally, inspectors reviewed findings and violations issued during the biennial assessment period, specifically the non-cited violations (NCVs) 2023001-01, 2023003-02, 2023010-01,
===2023405-01, 2024002-01, 2024003-01, 2024003-02, 2024003-04, 2024004-03, and 2024010-02.
- Operating Experience: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees processes for use of operating experience. The sample included industry operating experience communications like 10 CFR 50 Part 21 notifications and other vendor correspondence, NRC generic communications, publications from industry groups, and site evaluations.
- Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the licensees identification and correction of problems identified through audits and self-assessments.
- Safety-Conscious Work Environment: The inspectors assessed the effectiveness of the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment. The team interviewed 86 individuals, observed interactions between licensee employees and management during routine meetings, interviewed the employee concerns program manager and reviewed employee concerns files.
The following item's corrective actions will need to be reviewed during the next PI&R biennial inspection:
1. Green NOV 05000313, 05000368/2022011-01
2. Root Cause Evaluation (CR-ANO-1-2024-02226) corrective actions that are
still open are:
a.
For the CAPRs:
i.
CA4 for CAPR 1 Revise OP-3305.001, Supplement 1 ii.
CA5 for CAPR 2 Revise OP-1102.001, Section 5.1 b.
For the Contributing Causes:
i.
CA7 for CC-1 monitor operator performance standards for the behaviors they wanted improved (at least 12 weeks)ii.
CA9 for CC-2 monitor operations management's engagement in improving performance standards (at least 12 weeks)71153 - Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Event Report (IP Section 03.02)===
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
- (1) LER 05000313/2024-002-00,"ANO Unit 1 Inoperable Containment Isolation Boundary (ADAMS Accession No. ML25037A301). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are documented in this report under the Inspection Results section, Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation. This LER is Closed.
INSPECTION RESULTS
Assessment 71152B Corrective Action Program Effectiveness Based on the samples reviewed, the inspectors determined that the licensee's corrective action program was adequate and supported nuclear safety.
Problem Identification: The inspectors found that the licensee was identifying and documenting problems at an appropriately low threshold that supported nuclear safety.
During the monitoring period being assessed, the licensee entered approximately 7500 condition reports each year into the corrective action program as conditions adverse to quality. The team determined that conditions that require generation of a condition report have been entered appropriately into the corrective action program, however there was at least one CR not generated as required by procedure concerning maintenance rule evaluations.
Problem Prioritization and Evaluation: The inspectors found, in general, the licensee was adequately prioritizing and evaluating problems.
Corrective Actions: The inspectors concluded that, overall, the station generally developed effective corrective actions and timely implementing of those actions for the problems evaluated in the corrective action program, commensurate with their safety significance.
Assessment 71152B Operating Experience, Self-Assessment, and Audits Operating Experience: The team reviewed a variety of sources of operating experience including Part 21 notifications and other vendor correspondence, NRC generic communications, and publications from various industry. The team determined that, overall, Arkansas Nuclear One is adequately screening and addressing issues identified through operational experience that apply to the station, and this information is being evaluated in a timely manner once it is received.
Self-Assessments and Audits: The inspectors reviewed a sample of Arkansas Nuclear One's self-assessments and audits to assess whether performance trends were regularly identified and effectively addressed. The inspectors also reviewed audit reports to assess the effectiveness of assessments in specific areas. Overall, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had an adequate departmental self-assessment and audit process.
Assessment 71152B Safety-Conscious Work Environment The team conducted safety-conscious work environment interviews with 86 employees from different disciplines that included maintenance, operations, security, engineering, and radiation protection. The purpose of these interviews were:
- (1) to evaluate the willingness of the licensee staff to raise nuclear safety issues, either by initiating a condition report or by another method,
- (2) to evaluate the perceived effectiveness of the corrective action program at resolving identified problems, and
- (3) to evaluate the licensee's safety-conscious work environment (SCWE). The team also observed interactions between employees during routine performance improvement review group meetings. The team interviewed the employee concerns program manager and reviewed a sample of case files that may relate to safety-conscious work environment. The team found that the licensee had a safety-conscious work environment where individuals felt free to raise concerns without fear of retaliation and all individuals indicated that they would not hesitate to raise safety concerns through at least one of the several means available at the station.
Failure to Obtain an Engineering Evaluation for Scaffolding Erected in Close Proximity to Safety-Related Structures, Systems, and Components Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Aspect Report Section Mitigating Systems Green NCV 05000313/2025010-01 Open/Closed
[H.8] -
Procedure Adherence 71152B The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated non-cited violation of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, due to the licensees failure to follow procedures for erecting scaffolding in close proximity to safety-related structures, systems, and components. Specifically, on February 24, 2025, the inspectors identified scaffolding that was within 2 inches of the emergency feedwater safety system without a timely engineering evaluation being performed.
Description:
On February 24, 2025, while performing a walkdown of the Unit 1 emergency feedwater (EFW) room the inspector identified portions of scaffolding that were in close proximity, approximately 1/4, to EFW piping. The inspector questioned the licensee if an engineering evaluation had been performed for the condition.
Licensee quality-related Procedure EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 26, requires, in part, that scaffold components are greater than 2 inches from safety-related equipment unless approved by engineering.
The licensee determined that an engineering evaluation had not been performed for the scaffolding prior to designating the scaffold as safe for use. The licensee promptly repositioned the scaffolding further from the EFW piping. An engineering evaluation was performed for the as found condition. The calculations determined that the piping would not have been negatively affected by the scaffolding location during a design-basis earthquake nor during thermal expansion consistent with system design. Discussions with the scaffold group determined that there was a misunderstanding of the requirements of Procedure EN-MA-133, Attachment 2, and how long after a scaffold was erected an engineering evaluation was required to be performed. The scaffolding group incorrectly believed they had 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after a scaffold was installed to obtain an engineering evaluation. This was based on Procedure EN-MA-133, Attachment 2, Step 5, which requires an engineering evaluation for partially installed scaffolding where work was suspended for >24 hours. This step is not applicable to completed scaffold.
Corrective Actions: The licensee immediately repositioned the scaffolding and performed an engineering evaluation of the as found condition. A standdown with the scaffolding group was held to clarify the timeliness requirements of Procedure EN-MA-133, Attachment 2, Seismic Scaffold Criteria.
Corrective Action References: The licensee entered these issues into the corrective action program with Condition Reports CR-ANO-1-2025-00275 and CR-ANO-1-2025-00359.
Performance Assessment:
Performance Deficiency: The failure to follow the scaffolding Procedure EN-MA-133 to ensure that scaffolding erected less than 2 inches from safety-related equipment has a timely engineering evaluation completed to ensure the safety function of the system is maintained is a performance deficiency.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, not understanding when to obtain an engineering evaluation for completed scaffolds that were less than 2 inches from safety-related equipment could have negatively impacted seismic calculations.
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined the finding impacted mitigating systems and used Exhibit 2 to evaluate the condition. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green)because it was a deficiency affecting design or qualification of a mitigating system but did not represent a loss of operability or probability risk analysis functionality.
Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.8 - Procedure Adherence: Individuals follow processes, procedures, and work instructions. Specifically, scaffolding workers did not follow the procedure to obtain an engineering evaluation when scaffolding was erected less than 2 inches from safety-related structures, systems, and components.
Enforcement:
Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, states in part, that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. The licensee established Procedure EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 26, to meet this requirement.
Contrary to the above, on February 24, 2025, the licensee failed to follow the procedure for erecting scaffolding near safety-related equipment. Specifically, an engineering evaluation was not performed prior to the scaffolding, erected less than 2 inches from safety-related equipment, was declared completed. As a result, the availability and reliability of the Unit 1 EFW system was impacted.
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71152B This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Violation: Unit 1 Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Reactor Building, requires that The reactor building shall be operable while in Modes 1-4 and if it becomes inoperable to restore the reactor building to operable status within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, otherwise to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Unit 1 Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Reactor Building Isolation Valves, requires that Each reactor building isolation valve shall be operable, while in Modes 1-4 and if one or more penetration flow paths with two reactor building isolation valves are inoperable, to isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, otherwise to be placed in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Mode 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to maintain the reactor building as operable while in Modes 1-4 from December 8, 2024, at 5:56 a.m. until December 10, 2024, at 9:50 a.m.,
exceeding their 36-hour timeframe to be in Mode 5, due to reactor building isolation valves being inoperable. Specifically, reactor building penetration flow path 43 contains manual breathing air isolation valves BA-140 and BA-141 and are deemed operable in power operations when locked closed to help ensure the reactor building is isolated. Both valves were open during the aforementioned time period and therefore were inoperable, causing the reactor building to also be inoperable.
Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, of IMC 0609 Appendix A, Section C, the finding
- (1) did represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment (valves, airlocks, etc.), which requires the use of IMC 0609 Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process. This issue was determined to be a Type B finding because it has no direct impact on the likelihood of core damage but has potentially important implications for containment integrity. Utilizing Figure 4.1, LER-based Significance Determination Process, the risk significance was screened to Green because it did not affect CDF, and the affected SSCs are not important to LERF. The SSCs were determined to not be important to LERF based on Table 4.1, Containment-Related SSCs Considered for LERF Implications, because they are containment isolation valves in small lines (< 1-2-inch diameter).
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-ANO-1-2024-02226 Minor Performance Deficiency 71152B Failure to Initiate a Condition Report Minor Performance Deficiency: The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to initiate a condition report in accordance with Procedure EN-DC-205, Maintenance Rule Monitoring, Revision 9, when a system scoped into the maintenance rule per 10 CFR 50.65(b) exceeded a maintenance rule performance criteria. Specifically, a Unit 1 plant trip occurred which was determined to be associated with a P-32D reactor coolant pump relay replacement. System engineers reviewed the cause of the plant trip and determined a plant level monitoring event associated with the 6.9 kV electrical switchgear system had occurred. The maintenance rule performance criteria for plant level events associated with the switchgear system is less than or equal to zero plant level events. Since the 6.9 kV electrical switchgear system exceeded the plant level event performance criteria, the licensee evaluated the system for maintenance rule (a)(1) status but did not initiate a condition report documenting the plant level event.
Procedure EN-DC-205, Section 7.6, requires that a condition report be initiated if a system engineer determines that a plant level event has occurred. The licensee documented the minor performance deficiency in the corrective action program as CR-ANO-C-2025-00466.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. The performance deficiency reflected an administrative issue that did not adversely affect a cornerstone objective, would not lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected, and could not reasonably be viewed as a precursor to a significant event.
Minor Violation 71152B Failure to Establish Measures to Control the Storage of Quality-Related Material Minor Violation: Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, requires, in part, that Measures shall be established to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning and preservation of material and equipment in accordance with work and inspection instructions to prevent damage or deterioration. () Contrary to this requirement, the licensee failed to establish measures to control the handling, storage, shipping, cleaning, and preservation of material and equipment to prevent damage or deterioration. Specifically, the licensee-identified water intrusion into the main warehouse which stores quality-related plant material and equipment which was documented in several condition reports between 2017 to 2025. The licensee determined that the warehouse roof needed to be completely replaced to prevent the leaks, but the replacement has not been completed causing warehouse staff to protect material with plastic sheeting and use of catch containers to collect water. The licensees failure to take appropriate measures to control the storage and preservation of quality-related material has led to damage and deterioration of material and potential damage and deterioration of equipment stored in the main warehouse.
The licensee documented the minor violation in the corrective action program as CR-ANO-C-2025-00467.
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor. Specifically, due to the fact that no damaged material or potential damaged equipment was issued for use in the plant, this performance deficiency did not adversely affect a cornerstone objective, would not lead to a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected, and could not reasonably by viewed as a precursor to a significant event.
Enforcement:
This failure to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIII, Handling, Storage, and Shipping, constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
- On March 13, 2025, the inspectors presented the biennial problem identification and resolution inspection results to Doug Pehrson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
CR-ANO-
1-2025-00275, 2-2024-01915, C-2025-00359, C-2023-
03387, C-2025-00465
Corrective Action
Documents
CR-ANO-
1-2021-02168, 1-2023-00290, 1-2023-01181, 1-2023-01266,
1-2023-01371, 1-2023-01472, 1-2023-01609, 1-2023-01698,
1-2024-00084, 1-2024-00226, 1-2024-00422, 1-2024-00438,
1-2024-00479, 1-2024-00569, 1-2024-00966, 1-2024-01020,
1-2024-01046, 1-2024-01290, 1-2024-01319, 1-2024-01328,
1-2024-01501, 1-2024-01738, 1-2024-01875, 1-2024-01900,
1-2024-01908, 1-2025-00155, 1-2025-00187, 1-2025-00258,
1-2025-00275, 2-2020-03967, 2-2021-02646, 2-2021-02726,
2-2021-02751, 2-2021-03505, 2-2022-00591, 2-2022-02070,
2-2022-02254, 2-2023-00097, 2-2023-00521, 2-2023-00750,
2-2023-01929, 2-2023-02433, 2-2023-02434, 2-2023-02460,
2-2023-02607, 2-2023-02716, 2-2023-02721, 2-2024-00021,
2-2024-00069, 2-2024-00130, 2-2024-00181, 2-2024-00226,
2-2024-00337, 2-2024-00356, 2-2024-00422, 2-2024-00433,
2-2024-00455, 2-2024-00692, 2-2024-00729, 2-2024-00732,
2-2024-00734, 2-2024-00883, 2-2024-00937, 2-2024-00963,
2-2024-00994, 2-2024-01016, 2-2024-01075, 2-2024-01179,
2-2024-01372, 2-2024-01603, 2-2024-01658, 2-2024-01868,
2-2024-01946, 2-2024-01953, 2-2024-02296, 2-2024-02397,
2-2025-00036, 2-2025-00070, 2-2025-00081, 2-2025-00206,
2-2025-00299, C-2017-02870, C-2019-00478, C-2021-
2976, C-2022-00538, C-2022-01352, C-2022-01563, C-
22-02951, C-2022-03060, C-2022-03109, C-2022-03405,
C-2023-00036, C-2023-00159, C-2023-03156, C-2023-
03157, C-2023-03158, C-2023-03199, C-2023-03220, C-
23-03387, C-2023-03422, C-2023-03468, C-2023-03536,
C-2023-03548, C-2023-03550, C-2023-03612, C-2023-
03638, C-2023-03916, C-2023-03995, C-2023-03998, C-
23-04132, C-2024-00287, C-2024-00311, C-2024-00682,
C-2024-00914, C-2024-00981, C-2024-01024, C-2024-
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
01143, C-2024-01146, C-2024-01169, C-2024-01184, C-
24-01381, C-2024-01478, C-2024-01624, C-2024-01657,
C-2024-01670, C-2024-01834, C-2024-01868, C-2024-
01869, C-2024-01873, C-2024-01877, C-2024-01878, C-
24-01890, C-2024-02095, C-2025-00121, C-2025-00158,
C-2025-00231, C-2025-00323, C-2025-00340, C-2025-
00359, C-2025-00465, CR-HQN-2023-00325
CR-ANO-
1-2022-00562, 1-2023-00612, 1-2023-01264, 1-2023-01347,
1-2024-00056, 1-2024-00596, 1-2024-00712, 1-2024-00715,
1-2024-00824, 1-2024-01063, 1-2024-01080, 1-2024-02213,
1-2024-02226, 1-2024-02233, 1-2025-00166, 1-2025-00167,
2-2023-01679, 2-2023-02352, 2-2024-00140, 2-2024-00233,
2-2024-00909, 2-2024-01319, 2-2024-01357, 2-2024-01362,
2-2024-01981, C-2024-00024, C-2024-00025, C-2024-
00053, C-2024-00128, C-2024-00286, C-2024-00800, C-
24-00951, C-2024-01894, C-2024-01951, C-2024-01960,
C-2025-00192, C-2025-00193, C-2024-00194, C-2024-
00481, C-2024-00564, C-2024-02127, C-2025-00082, C-
25-00051
Corrective Action
Documents
Resulting from
Inspection
CR-ANO-
1-2025-00268, 1-2025-00269, 1-2025-00270, 1-2025-00271,
1-2025-00272, 1-2025-00273, 1-2025-00274, 1-2025-00275,
1-2025-00276, 1-2025-00277, 1-2025-00278, 1-2025-00279,
1-2025-00291, 1-2025-00292, 1-2025-00293, 1-2025-00364,
1-2025-00365, 1-2025-00369, 1-2025-00374, 1-2025-00378,
1-2025-00453, 2-2025-00310, 2-2025-00311, 2-2025-00312,
2-2025-00313, 2-2025-00314, 2-2025-00315, 2-2025-00316,
2-2025-00317, 2-2025-00318, 2-2025-00319, 2-2025-00320,
2-2025-00321, 2-2025-00322, 2-2025-00323, 2-2025-00325,
2-2025-00326, 2-2025-00407, 2-2025-00408, C-2025-00359,
C-2025-00374, C-2025-00447, C-2025-00454, C-2025-
00459, C-2025-00460, C-2025-00463, C-2025-00465, C-
25-00466, C-2025-00467
E-2017, Sheet 1B
Red Train Vital AC and 125vDC Single Line and Distribution
Drawings
E-2017-8,
Full Line - Control Centers 2D01 and 2D02
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
Sheet 1
Miscellaneous
OWA-CRD Burden List
3305.001
OPS System Alignment Tests
EN-CS-S-021-A
Guidelines for Restraint of Seismic Scaffolding at ANO
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
Corrective Action Program
Self-Assessments and Benchmark Process
Causal Analysis Process
Planning
Control of Scaffolding
Conduct of Operations
EN-OP-115-01
Control Room and Field Operator Rounds
004
Radiological Work Permits
Radiological Survey Guidelines
Conduct of Radiation Protection
JA-PI-01
Analysis Manual
OP-1000.006
Procedure Control
OP-1102.001
Plant Preheatup and Precritical Checklist
OP-1104.033
OP-1402.038
Unit 1 Equipment Hatch Opening, Closing, and Maintenance
21, 22
OP-2102.001
Plant Pre-Heatup and Pre-Critical Checklist
100
OP-2102.002
Plant Heatup
OP-2402.026
Unit 2 Equipment Hatch Opening, Closing, and Maintenance
Procedures
OP-3305.001
OPS System Alignment Tests
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs)
251004
Unit-1 Maintenance Activities
LO-ANO-2024-
00013
24 Reactivity Management Snapshot Assessment
2/15/2024
LO-ANO-2024-
00018
Risk Maps Self-Assessment
2/13/2024
Self-Assessments
LO-ANO-2024-
00019
Operations and Operations Training Twelve Point Self-
Assessment
2/16/2024
Inspection
Procedure
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date
NQ-2023-016
Chemistry Effluents and Environmental Programs at ANO
09/25/2023
NQ-2024-013
QA Audit of Maintenance at Arkansas Nuclear One
07/23/2024
QA Audit Report
QA-14-15-2023-
ANO-1
23 QA Audit of Radiation Protection and Radwaste at
10/26/2023
QA Audit Report
QA-19-2024-
ANO-1
24 QA Audit of Training Programs at Arkansas Nuclear
One (ANO)
03/14/2024
QA Audit Report
QA-4-2023-HQN-
1-2024
QA Audit of Engineering Design Control Programs for the
Entergy Fleet
05/06/2024
Work Orders
WO 00581054-01, 54145633-08, 54151393