05000311/LER-2004-006, Re Reactor Trip Due to a Malfunction of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (21 BF1 9)

Re Reactor Trip Due to a Malfunction of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (21 BF1 9)

ML042660123
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	09/13/2004
From:	Fricker C Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LR-N04-0401 LER 04-006-00
Download: ML042660123 (5)

LER-2004-006, Re Reactor Trip Due to a Malfunction of Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (21 BF1 9)

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
3112004006R00 - NRC Website

text

PSEG Nuclear LLC P.O. Box 236, Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 I

- i o PSEG NuclearLLC SEP 1 3 2004 LR-N04-0401 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 LER 311/04-006-00 SALEM - UNIT 2 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 This Licensee Event Report, 'Salem Unit 2 Reactor Trip Due to a Malfunction of Main a Feedwater Regulating Valve (21 BF1 9)," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).

The attached LER contains no commitments.

Sincerely, Sale Plant Manager Attachment

/EHV C

Distribution LER File 3.7 95-2168 REV. 7/99

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (62OO4f

, the NRC may r fr e not conduct or sponsor, and a person Is not required to respond to, the digits/charactersfor each blck O

C K

- 0

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3. PAGE Salem Generating Station Unit 2 050003 1 OF 4

4. TTLE Salem Unit 2 Reactor Trip Due to a Malfunction of a Main Feedwater Regulating Valve (21 BF1 9)

5. EVENT DATE

6. LER NUMBER

7. REPORT DATE

8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED FACILInTY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUE O

MONTH DAY YEAR FACRLJTY NAME DOCK6ET NUMBER 07 13 2004 2004 - 006 -

00 09 13 2004

9. OPERATiNG MODE

11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply) 0 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xi) 0 50.73(a)(2XiXC) 0 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 1 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3Xii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(aX2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203(aX))

0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(aX2)(vIflXB) 0 20.2203(aX2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1Xi)(XA) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.73(aX2)(ix)(A)

10. POWER LEVEL 0 20.2203(aX2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1Xii)(A)

I 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(aX2)(x) o 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(A) 0 73.71 (aX4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 100 0 20.2203(a)(2Xv) 0 50.73(a)(2XIXA) 0 50.73(aX2)(v)(C) 0 OTHER O 20.2203(a)(2Xvi) 0 50.73(a)(2XiXB) 0 50.73(a)(2XvXD)

Specify In Abstract below nr in NRI. Fnnm WA

12. LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Indude Area Code)

E. H. Villar, Licensing Engineer 856-339-5456CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU-REPORTABLE STM 1 OP FACTURER TO EPIX FACTURER TO EPIX B

JB FCV cBaier Yes

14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED

15. EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION o YES (If yes, complete 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) 0 NO DATE ABSTRACT (Umit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)

On Tuesday July 13, Salem Unit 2 tripped due to a malfunction of the 21 BF1 9 valve, while Maintenance/I&C personnel were in the process of testing the Digital Feedwater System.

Specifically, the Steam Generator Feed Pump differential pressure input to the feedwater system (PT 508) was being tested in accordance with plant procedures. Initially, all the feedwater regulating valves (21-24BF19s) responded as expected. At approximately 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br />, the 21BF19 valve stopped responding. The Licensed Nuclear Control Operator placed the controller for the 21 BF1 9 valve in manual and attempted to open the valve.

The valve did not respond and the reactor automatically tripped on low steam generator level within approximately 45 seconds of the valve going to 31 % open.

The apparent cause of this event was attributed to a failure of the 21 BF1 9 valve positioner due to the failure of the I/P that resulted in a sudden drop from 60% to 30% valve position. Some of the corrective actions taken were: (1)

The 21 BF1 9 positioner was replaced, (2) The digital feed QAM card was replaced, (3) The bezel control for the 21BF19 was removed and the contacts cleaned, and (4) An air operated valve diagnostic test was satisfactorily performed.

This report is being made in accordance with 1 OCFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), 'any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B)."

NRC FORM 366 (6.2004)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

(if more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS

There were no safety consequences associated with this event.

As stated in the description of event, the 21 BF1 9 valve fully closed as a result of the reactor trip and the low reactor coolant average temperature signal (feedwater interlock), demonstrating that the valve was not stuck and therefore capable of performing its design safety function At Salem there are two valves in each main feed line that serve to isolate main feedwater flow following a steamline break; (1) the main feedwater regulator valve (BF1 9), which receives dual, separate train trip signals from the Plant Protection System on any safety injection signal and closes within 10 seconds (including instrument delays), and (2) the feedwater isolation valve (BF13) that also receives dual, separate train trip signals from the reactor protection system following a safety injection signal.

The BF1 3 valves are motor operated and close within 32 seconds (including instrument delays).

Additionally, the main feed water pumps receive dual, separate train trips from the protection system following a steam line break.

A review of this event determined that a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF) as defined in NEI 99-02 did not occur.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1. The 21BF19 positioner was replaced.

2. The digital feed QAM card (auto/manual station interface) was replaced.

3. The bezel control for the 21BF19 was removed and the contacts cleaned.

4. An air operated valve diagnostic test was satisfactorily performed.

5. LER 311/2004-007 issued September 13, 2004, documents additional corrective actions taken relative to this event.

COMMITMENTS

This LER contains no Commitments.