05000454/LER-2006-001, Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time Exceeded for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due to Untimely Operability Determination
| ML060890300 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Byron  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/2006 |
| From: | Hoots D Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| byron 2006-0037 LER 06-001-00 | |
| Download: ML060890300 (4) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4542006001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Exe~n March 24, 2006 LTR:
BYRON 2006-0037 File:
2.01.0700 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Licensee Event Report (LEA) 454-2006-001-00, Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time Exceeded for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due to Untimely Operability Determination Byron Station, Unit 1 Facility Operating License No. NPF-37 NRC Docket No. STN 50-454 Enclosed is an LER for the January 24, 2006 event of exceeding the Technical Specification required action completion time for Unit 1 inoperable containment isolation valves due to an untimely operability determination. This condition is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B).
Should you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact Mr. William Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager, at (815) 234-5441, extension 2800.
Respectfully, David M. Hoots Site Vice President Byron Nuclear Generating Station Attachment LEA 454-2006-001 -00 cc:
Regional Administrator, Region Ill, NRC NRC Senior Resident lnspector~Byron Station
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY 0MB: NO 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6 2004)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the nfnrmuti~n,nflw~tlnn
- 1. FACILITY NAME Byron Station
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER PAGE 0500454 1 of 3
- 4. TITLE Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time Exceeded for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due to Untimely Operability Determination
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR E
NTIAL YEAR NUMBER RE NO MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 24 2006 2006 001 00 03 24 2006 FACiLITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER
- 9. OPERATING MODE 1
- 11. TI-laS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR~:(Check all that apply) o 20.2201(b) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
~J50.73(a)(2)(vii) 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) o 20.22D3(a)(1) 0 20.22D3(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 5D.36(c)(1)O)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iU) 0 50.73(a)(2)Øx)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 0 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A) 0 5D.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(x) o 20.22D3(a)(2)(iii) 0 50.36(c)(2) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A) 0 73.71 (a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 0 50.46(a)(3)Oi) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 0 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(c) 0 OTHER o 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
~
50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below i.. MOr C.-..-.-.. )C~A
- 10. POWER LEVEL
.4,-~
IOU
- 12. LICENSEE CONTACT FORTHIS LER FACILITY NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Ares Code)
Byron Station, William Grundmann, Regulatory Assurance Manager (815) 406-2800CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT FACTURER REPORTABLE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
- 14. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED fl YES (If yes. comolete 15 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)
NO
- 15. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE MONTH DAY YEAR ABSTRACT (Limitto 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines)
On January 23, 2006, a Chemistry technician recognized an abnormal condition while attempting to obtain a Pressurizer liquid sample.
He noted that he was able to obtain sample flow at the sample panel with both containment isolation valves and the sample panel isolation valve closed.
The technician and his supervisor didnt have sufficient knowledge to recognize the potential impact on containment integrity with this condition and did not promptly notify Shift Operations.
The supervisor did document the condition in a Corrective Actions Program Issue Report (IA) the next day on January 24, 2006 but failed to notify Shift Operations of the IA, which would have generated a prompt operability determination. On January 25, 2006 during subsequent IR screening activities, Shift Operations became aware of the condition and initiated a prompt operability evaluation.
The containment isolation valves were declared inoperable at 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br /> on January 25, 2006 and appropriate Technical Specifications entered and followed. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B), as an event or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Even though all Technical Specification actions were accomplished within the completion times there was firm evidence to indicate the inoperable condition existed on the day before.
The operability evaluation and subsequent inoperability declaration should have occurred on January 24, 2006. The cause of this event was inadequate understanding within the Chemistry department concerning the threshold of when to report equipment issues to Shift Operations.
Corrective actions include reinforcing the correct expectation to Chemistry personnel.
During this delay in declaring the containment isolation valves inoperable the penetration flow path was always isolated.
Page 2 of 3NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXTCONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
Byron Station DOCKET NUMBER (2)
I LER NUMBER (6)
I PAGE (3)
I YEAR J
SEQUENTIAL I
REVISION I
I NUMBER f
NUMBER Page 2 of 3 0500454 2006 001 00 (If more space is required, useadditional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)
A. Plant Condition Prior to Event:
Event Date/Time: January 24, 2006 / 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br /> CST Unit 1
- - Mode 1 Power Operations, Reactor Power 100%
Reactor Coolant System [AB}: Normal operating temperature and pressure.
B. Description of Event
On January 23, 2006, at approximately 0900 hours0.0104 days <br />0.25 hours <br />0.00149 weeks <br />3.4245e-4 months <br />, a Chemistry Technician (CT) (non-licensed) was performing daily reactor coolant [AB} sampling activities.
During this sampling activity he noted an abnormal condition with the pressurizer liquid space sample line in that he was able to obtain sample flow at the panel with the Pressurizer Liquid Sample Isolation Valve (1 PS9350B) closed, the Pressurizer Liquid Inboard Containment Isolation Valve (1PS9355A) closed and the Pressurizer Liquid Outboard Containment Isolation Valve (1 PS9355B) closed.
The CT did not notify Shift operations and did not notify his Chemistry Supervisor (CS) (non-licensed) of this abnormal condition until approximately 1230 hours0.0142 days <br />0.342 hours <br />0.00203 weeks <br />4.68015e-4 months <br />. A Corrective Action Program (CAP) Issue Report (IR) was not generated to document the abnormal condition.
Not realizing the potential significance of the abnormal condition from a containment integrity perspective, the CS decided to perform a preliminary investigation/troubleshooting effort to gain more information before documenting the issue in an IA. After this preliminary effort, the CS wrote the IR the next morning on January 24, 2006, at 0930 hours0.0108 days <br />0.258 hours <br />0.00154 weeks <br />3.53865e-4 months <br />. The CS did not promptly notify Shift Operations to screen the IA for operability.
Consequently, the IA was not identified as needing an operability determination until subsequent lR screening activities on the morning of January 25, 2006. The Shift Manager then engaged the appropriate plant staff to assess the abnormal condition and provide additional information to make an operability determination of the containment isolation valves involved.
The additional information provided to the Shift Manager could not support a reasonable expectation that the 1P59355A and 1 PS9355B Containment isolation valves could perform their design function. Consequently, the valves were declared inoperable at 1250 hours0.0145 days <br />0.347 hours <br />0.00207 weeks <br />4.75625e-4 months <br /> on January 25, 2006 and Technical Specification 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves, Required Actions A and B were entered.
These actions require that the containment penetration be isolated within one hour by a closed and deactivated automatic or remote manual valve, closed manual valve, or blind flange. This was accomplished by 1350 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.13675e-4 months <br />.
This event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) (B), as an event or condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
Even though all Technical Specification actions were accomplished within the required completion times there was firm evidence to indicate the inoperable condition existed on the day before when the IA was generated.
The operability evaluation and subsequent inoperability declaration should have occurred on January 24, 2006.(7 20 11
Page 3 of 3NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7-2001)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1)
DOCKET NUMBER (2)
LER NUMBER (6)
PAGE (3)
YEAR I
SEQUENTIAL I
REVIS ON NUMBER NUMBER Byron Station 0500454 2006 001 Page 3 of 3 (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)(17)
C. Cause of the Event
The cause of this event was inadequate understanding within the Chemistry department concerning the threshold of when to report equipment issues to Shift Operations.
Not recognizing the containment integrity aspects of this abnormal condition, the CT and CS involved did not believe the condition was significant enough to warrant prompt Shift Operations notification. In addition, the CS and CT involved failed to document the abnormal condition in the CAP in a timely manner.
D. Safety Analysis
This event had minimal safety consequences. The penetration flow path was always isolated during this delay period consistent with the Technical Specification required action except for one of the valves utilized to isolate the flow path was an automatic valve, which was closed but not deactivated. This valve was not intentionally nor inadvertently opened.
E. Corrective Actions
Expectations for prompt supervisor notification and IA initiation concerning equipment issues have been reinforced with Chemistry Department personnel.
Expectations for the prompt notification of Shift operations concerning equipment issues have been reinforced with Chemistry Department personnel.
Appropriate management actions have been performed with the CT and CS involved for their failure to follow CAP requirements.
The causes of the containment isolation valves failure are unknown and will be further investigated and repaired in the fall 2006 refuel outage.
F, Previous Occurrences There have been no previous LEA occurrences of this nature at Byron in the previous 2 years.(7 2001)