05000482/LER-2006-004, Regarding Failure to Maintain Closure of Containment Penetrations During Fuel Movement
| ML063620094 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Wolf Creek  |
| Issue date: | 12/21/2006 |
| From: | Matthew Sunseri Wolf Creek |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WM 06-0052 LER 06-004-00 | |
| Download: ML063620094 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function |
| 4822006004R00 - NRC Website | |
text
WOLF CREEK NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Matthew W. Sunseri Vice President Oversight December 21, 2006 WM 06-0052 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
Docket No. 50-482: Licensee Event Report 2006-004-00, Failure to Maintain Closure of Containment Penetrations During Fuel Movement Gentlemen:
On October 24, 2006, with the plant in Mode 6, Refueling, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) personnel discovered a condition where containment closure, per Technical Specification 3.9.4 was not met. The enclosed Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-004-00 is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), to document this condition as any operation or condition which was prohibited by Technical Specifications.
The attachment to this letter identifies the commitments made in this LER.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4008, or Mr.
Kevin Moles at (620) 364-4126.
Sincerely, Matthew W. Sunseri MWS/rlt Attachment Enclosure cc:
J. N. Donohew (NRC), w/a, w/e B. S. Mallett (NRC), w/a, w/e G. B. Miller (NRC), w/a, w/e Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/a, w/e PO. Box 411 / Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET
Attachment to WM 06-0052 Page 1 of 1 Summary of Regulatory Commitments The following table identifies those actions committed to by WCNOC in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Kevin Moles at (620) 364-4126.
COMMITMENT
Due Date/Event Revise STS GP-006, 'CTMT Closure Verification', to provide instruction April 13, 2007 to the Containment Penetration Trackers that tracking of work associated with Containment Penetration Isolations (even if the position of the component is not expected to change) is a requirement during a Refueling Outage. This will ensure all Containment Penetration work will be administratively tracked.
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004)
, the NRC may (See reverse for required number of not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the digits/characters for each block) information collection.
- 3. PAGE WOLF CREEK GENERATING STATION 05000 482 1 OF 4
- 4. TITLE Failure to Maintain Closure of Containment Penetrations During Fuel Movement
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED MONTH DAY YEAR EAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKETONUMBER YA YERNUMBER NO.
05000 10 24 2006 2006 004 -
00 12 21 2006 050I0 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check a/ that apply) 6
[ 20.2201(b)
LI 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
[
50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
LI 20.2201(d)
[]
20.2203(a)(3)(ii) j]
50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
[]
20.2203(a)(1) j]
20.2203(a)(4)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
E] 20.2203(a)(2)(i) f] 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
[
50.73(a)(2)(iii)
Ej 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
- 10. POWER LEVEL LI 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
LI 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
[]
50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(x)
Ij 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
Li 50.36(c)(2)
Ej 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
LI 73.71(a)(4) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
[
50.46(a)(3)(ii)
[
50.73(a)(2)(v)(B)
,I 73.71(a)(5)
LI 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
LI 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
[
50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
LI OTHER LI 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) rn 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
[] 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within Containment, the most severe radiological consequences result from a fuel handling accident. The fuel handling accident is a postulated event that involves damage to irradiated fuel. Fuel handling accidents include dropping a single irradiated fuel assembly and handling tool or a heavy object onto other irradiated fuel assemblies. In Mode 6, the potential for Containment pressurization as a result of a fuel handling accident is minimal.
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that there will be any significant release of radioactive material through the leakage path as described above. If a release were to take place through this path, the quantity of radioactive materials released to the outside environment would be insignificant. Even though the rate of leakage can not be determined, based on engineering judgment, the consequences of this release will be bounded by the fuel handling accident analysis performed for Amendment 95 to the Wolf Creek Generating Station T/S. The analysis assumes that the gaseous effluents escaping from the damaged fuel rods are released directly to the environment within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> through the open personnel airlock doors. The effluents do not mix with the surrounding air of the adjacent Auxiliary Building, and no credit is taken for any iodine removal by the atmosphere filtration system filters. The analysis results demonstrate that the potential dose consequences from a fuel handling accident with the personnel airlock doors remaining open will be well within the 10 CFR 100 limits.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE/PREVIOUS EVENTS:
LER 2005-003-00 reported two instances where containment closure was not met. In the first instance, an air-to-air pathway existed through the exterior equalizing valve of the auxiliary access hatch. In the second instance, the 'B' Steam Generator had an air-to-air pathway through containment to the auxiliary building. Both instances were caused by personnel errors.
LER 1999-004-00 reported a failure to maintain closure of containment penetrations during fuel movement. A direct flow path had been created between the Containment Building atmosphere and the Auxiliary Building during fuel movement. This event was caused by a series of personnel errors in the implementation of the work control process.